Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[TangoTwoBravo]

How much artillery cover could we offer our Combat Team? I assume a 155mm battery/regiment as required?

It would depend. The company group would be part of a Battle Group (BG) that would in turn be part of a Brigade. The BG would certainly be Canadian. The Bde might not be.

We should have some form of Battalion/Battle Group level fire support - most armies use mortars. The Bde would have a Regiment/Battalion of artillery - lets say SP 155mm. Maybe they all fire in support of our company group. Maybe they have another more pressing target?

One thing I neglected to mention in my little wargame was engineer support. However it happens, the company/combat team would have counter-mobility support (as part of a higher plan) and survivability support.

If we were employing an Optimized Battle Group as part of a multi-national Bde or Div then I would imagine that Canada would include an Engineer Sqn. Or not! Perhaps Canadian Sappers would in turn be part of a multi-national Engineer construct. The Staff College assumption is an integral Canadian Engineer Squadron.

 

[blacktriangle]

A robust BG, though, could indeed work in a Multinational Div (a Div Cav mission set)

T2B, could you elaborate on how you might see this playing out? If I'm reading into it correctly, it strikes me as a way for a BG in Europe to make a useful contribution to a larger NATO force.

Also, I'd be curious to hear if anyone has opinions on the use of Light Cav like the UK has fielded on Jackal/Coyote? Is there a place for something like this in the CA?

 

[Kirkhill]

Just to recap and round out - By sacrificing rifles (40 to 28) and LAVs (4 to 3) in the Platoons,

The Swedes end up with a Combined Arms Battalion of

2x Half-Squadrons of 11x Leo2 each
2x LAV* Coys of 12x LAVs and 3 dismount groups of 19 rifles well equipped for ground combat (AT and APers)
1x Recce Pl of 4 LAVs with 4 Inf Sections and an HQ
2x Mortar Pl of 4 LAVs with 120mm mors
1x VSHORAD AAA Pl of 4 LAVs with Radar guided 40mm
1x Pnr Pl with 3x LAV-E and 1x AVLB

Command and Control is organized around the BHQ (Pl), a Comms Pl, the Spt Coy HQ and the Log Coy HQ.

The Log Coy comprises

1x Tn Pl
1x Fuel and Ammo Pl
1x Repair Pl
1x Med Pl

The Spt Coy supplies its own Tn fleet.

The Log Coy supplies each of the four Manoeuvre Coy Qs with

2x Armd Log vehs
1x Armd Amb
1x Armd MRT
1x ARV

In addition each company receives, or has embedded, its own FOO/FAC team in its own LAV.


And, by way of Background

Objectives for Swedish total defence 2021–2025 - Government bill ‘Totalförsvaret 2021–2025’

The Government bill contains proposals on an overall objective for total defence, new objectives for military and civil defence, the direction of t...

www.government.se

Swedish Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Old Sweat]

TangoTwoBravo has raised an interesting point about fire support. I know I am light years out of date, but to my old gunner mind, the most important asset his FOO brings with him, besides his training and experience, is his radio. For a quick attack, the FOO using the DS battery and the battalion mortars could organize a fairly hefty and flexible fire plan. For anything more, we are talking battle group, so the BC would ask for the use of the artillery regiment with an allotment of ammunition for the task.

If the operation needs to be upgraded, we are talking the divsional artillery with a whole bunch of bullets, and maybe, to steal a phrase from my fighter pilots cronies back then, aluminum overcast. Certainly fixed and rotary winged and unmanned to boot. It is hard to get this across in our tiny army and air force, but learning and understanding the process has to be part of officer development.

Sir Brian Horrocks, who commanded 30 (BR) Corps in NWE, wrote in his memoirs, and I am paraphrasing, how his Corps artillery commander have every gun within range perched on the end of his radio antenna. All Sir Brian had to do was ask, and it happened. Unlikely these days, maybe, but nature hates a vacuum.

 

[Infanteer]

Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore. FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.

 

[Ostrozac]

Pretty expensive fly swatter for a horde of pests.

And that’s one reason why Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV like the Turkish TB2 are turning out to be such a great weapon. They are only a few million dollars each, without crew on board, so if you lose one it isn‘t the end of the day. And nobody is really out there actively hunting them, as they are generally considered not really valuable enough to task large missiles and fighter aircraft.

So you can stand off above the range of ground fire and MANPADs and happily spend all day calling in artillery or firing missiles. At least that was Azerbaijan’s recent experience using them.

 

[Kirkhill]

And that’s one reason why Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV like the Turkish TB2 are turning out to be such a great weapon. They are only a few million dollars each, without crew on board, so if you lose one it isn‘t the end of the day. And nobody is really out there actively hunting them, as they are generally considered not really valuable enough to task large missiles and fighter aircraft.

So you can stand off above the range of ground fire and MANPADs and happily spend all day calling in artillery or firing missiles. At least that was Azerbaijan’s recent experience using them.

So what is the advantage of a VSHORAD system? Or should the money go into C-RAM?

 

[FJAG]

Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore. FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.

That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.

On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.

Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area.

Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.

 

[Ostrozac]

So what is the advantage of a VSHORAD system?

The really low level stuff is still out there — attack helicopters and the like. Plus there’s now the smaller UAVs, not everything is a Predator-equivalent. If you’re fighting a near-peer foe with decent airpower, you’ll want a layered air defence system. Instead, most western armies (including Canada) went with a hand wave and “the Air Force will win us air superiority on the first day”.

 

[blacktriangle]

Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore. FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.

Reminds me of the reports years back of GRU implanting malware into the apps that Ukrainian artillery were using in order to target them. To be fair, I also read that much of this was overblown. But then again, they're the same actors that pulled off the SolarWinds campaign...

 

[MilEME09]

You mean the app the GRU actually developed that the Ukrainians were using? The one we told them about because we sending their location while feeding them the wrong adjustments. Let's just say some never listen

 

[Kirkhill]

That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.

On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.

Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area.

Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.

And why I like the idea of the RCA being able to replicate the area of influence of an CSC flotilla on land. Not because we need the 1700 km umbrella that Tomahawks supply but because it is something (I believe) we can do within our PY budget, it would supply a focus for our deployments and would really show up on the maps. The Brigade Gp then becomes a Strategic Reserve just as 4 CMBG and the Honest Johns were.

 

[daftandbarmy]

That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.

On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.

Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area.

Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.

'As long as the Infantry, Armour and Engineers can be covered by their own Artillery' might be a good working principle

 

[CBH99]

Reminds me of the reports years back of GRU implanting malware into the apps that Ukrainian artillery were using in order to target them. To be fair, I also read that much of this was overblown. But then again, they're the same actors that pulled off the SolarWinds campaign...

Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions? Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.

First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.

 

[blacktriangle]

Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions? Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.

First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.

IIRC, it was a (supposedly) legitimate app that was compromised. Geolocational data from implanted devices was then supposedly used to cue ISR assets to get the fidelity needed to facilitate strikes. I remember the whole thing was debated quite a bit. I'll see if I can send you a link or something as to not throw this discussion off too much.

 

[McG]

The Ukrainian Artillery app is discussed here:

Fancy Bear - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[markppcli]

Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions? Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.

First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.

Essentially Ukrainians began using an Android App for imputing targetting data on D30 Howitzers. Russians hack the App, and are able to see where large concentrations of users are located, then use this Data to target Ukrainian artillery positions.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

T2B, could you elaborate on how you might see this playing out? If I'm reading into it correctly, it strikes me as a way for a BG in Europe to make a useful contribution to a larger NATO force.

Also, I'd be curious to hear if anyone has opinions on the use of Light Cav like the UK has fielded on Jackal/Coyote? Is there a place for something like this in the CA?

If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.

So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.

Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.

A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.

So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.

Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.

A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.

But it accomplishes the mission of giving the illusion of progress at little cost

 

[markppcli]

If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.

So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.

Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.

A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.

When you see SP Artillery does is need to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?

I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.