Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Why not a 60/40 Bn? 2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.

With HQ and Admin Coy - I think you get 70/30

 

[KevinB]

Australian small boat with US comms package in testing for Marine Corps urgent need

The Whiskey Project is pitching its multimission reconnaissance craft as a way to meet the Marines’ needs to “sense first, see first and strike first” with a low-signature boat and a situational awareness package that's already proved itself in Afghanistan.

www.defensenews.com

That is a very well thought out craft - scaleable armor packages - and various deck mounting options -- plus its wired for network 'stuff'
After seeing a lot of guys doing that who've been damaged badly in RHIB's and the like - the engineering work they put in the design makes it very user friendly even in unpleasant water conditions at speed.

The defence of Canada is custom made for Dispersed Operations with its emphasis on expeditionary advanced base operations.

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-signature, operationally relevant, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain

www.marines.mil

Although the US is applying the concept in a maritime environment I believe it is equally applicable in the Canadian context. The common denominator is "space". Too much space to hold by conventional means resulting in the classic dilemma of trying to defend everything while holding nothing. The difference between the USN/USMC operating environment and the CAF operating environment is that tropical waters are replaced with rocks and ice, palms replaced with pines.


Here's a question. Has Canada ever really had an Arctic Capable Brigade?

No - other than CAR jumps into the Arctic for "Lightning Strike" which occasionally got boosted with other Abn assets - there was never a real attempt.
and it wasn't a fully Bde - more of a BN+ with enablers.

When Canada was offered the opportunity to relocate from Germany to Norway, because of assumed Arctic expertise, was Canada actually capable of deploying, sustaining and operating a brigade in the Arctic? Is it now?

I susceptibility it could - but it would empty the cupboard bare for anything else - there would need to be constant C17 and C130 sorties for supplies. As well I don't think the CF has BV206's anymore - so everything would be the few snowmobiles and bangyboard ski's...
So pretty much no real mobility.

I believe that at least one USMC type "littoral" regiment, similarly armed but geared towards operating in the bogs, pines, rocks and ice of Canada's Arctic should be in our tool box.

I would argue that would be the role for the Light Bde's - but I wouldn't shoehorn them just into that.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why not a 60/40 Bn? 2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.

My limited time with in contact with the 10/90 experience, personalities excluded, leads me to believe that this is a model that should be adopted wholesale across the CAF, and is one that somewhat mirrors the approach with the TA in the UK (which I have also seen in action, and it works well).

We don't need to have everyone wearing the same cap badge, we just need consistent support at the reserve unit level that can train and FG troops for various exercises and operations, and provide ongoing, relevant and thoughtfully prepared and delivered Pro D for all rank levels, up to and including LCol etc.

I don't know if 10/90 is the right proportion, of course, but the principle seems sound.

 

[FJAG]

Why not a 60/40 Bn? 2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.

To an extent the % figure is arbitrary. My key point is that you do not distribute the Reg F element across the entire bn but keep one subunit (or two in the 70/30 version) intact so that it can train and deploy as a full subunit.

As to cbt support companies, I think they are typically not needed for day-to-day usage and I wouldn't waste valuable full-time resources on them. I would keep just enough to be able to support the one full time Reg F company if it should need to deploy rapidly and to provide the SMEs needed to provide leadership and training to the Res F members. That's the same reasoning why I make all armoured and arty units 30/70 - the lower probability that they need to deploy.

As for a four rifle company construct, in such a case I would prefer a 50/50 split in the cbt sp coy for the same reason. But having said that, I'm not sure why one would add another rifle company. The only advantage I see is the ability to have more Res F volunteers within the battalion to draw on. My way of dealing with 30/70 and 70/30 bns is to create a force that has an overall appx ratio of 50/50 but is broken into higher and lower readiness units. In any case where a 70/30 bn needs to quickly deploy with three rifle companies I would prefer they are augmented by a Reg F coy from another bn. I don't see two Res F companies able to generate a full company's worth of volunteers in any event. One company would either need to be placed on active service or a wider volunteer pool would need to be looked to.

 

[KevinB]

My limited time with in contact with the 10/90 experience, personalities excluded, leads me to believe that this is a model that should be adopted wholesale across the CAF, and is one that somewhat mirrors the approach with the TA in the UK (which I have also seen in action, and it works well).

We don't need to have everyone wearing the same cap badge, we just need consistent support at the reserve unit level that can train and FG troops for various exercises and operations, and provide ongoing, relevant and thoughtfully prepared and delivered Pro D for all rank levels, up to and including LCol etc.

I don't know if 10/90 is the right proportion, of course, but the principle seems sound.

10/90 was too small IMHO - as the 10% did 90% of the work
Most of the 10% in my experience got caught up in the administration - and as a result very few of the 10% went into the field force.
Those who did got the shaft - as the reg force 4 year to Cpl clashed with the 2year to Cpl in the Militia - and often there was a sever disparity in experience at the lowest ranks.
Which meant that again those positions either ended up doing more work than their fair share - or got put into more senior jobs.
Then at the SNCO level - the "day staff" ended up either with nearly nothing to do - or doing tasks that should have been done by all.
The officers nearly all ended up sucked into HQ functions - as having been part of Res in the Before - During - After Phases of 10/90, it seemed that the HQ drain spiked during the 10/90 phase - which seems bizarre - given it shouldn't - but I suspect the higher level HQ's had adopted a Reg Force like aspect - and where expecting 5 days of work - in what used to be done either 1 weeknight a week and some RSS and Class B staff.

____________________________________________________

I think that in order for a XX/YY system to work - the time in grade requirements for the Reserves and the Regular Army needs to be equalled (IIRC the Navy Reserve does 4 years to LS - but I may be wrong). And for dispersed units - some Reg personnel WSE Promoted (I'm a fan of WSE as I only made it to M/Cpl twice and both WSE by the RCR while teaching at their BSL)

I also believe that Res Units need a real unit base - so using Edmonton as example - all the Edmonton area Res would be based out of CFB Edmonton (yes that can suck for travel times)

Most Reserve Armories (admittedly I am years out of date and only really familiar then with ones in Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton) aren't ideal for Military Training - in order to create a true Integrated Force - there would be significant infastructure work needed - so troops could actually do some training - even if its just simulation based.

 

[GR66]

If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?

 

[KevinB]

If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?

Quite often the personnel the Res have to offer, are not the ones the Regs need.
Additionally there needs to be an operational ability to use the Res, otherwise they are just more empty #'s.

I don't see any solution to the CA's woes at this point, that can be done easily.

Every solution to making at real attempt at a credible Force 2025 is either ensnared by Cap Badge politics (Reg AND Res), or Political spinelessness, and budget issues.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?

This might work where the units are co-located, like Edmonton. Otherwise it's a non-starter IMHO.

 

[FJAG]

Let me start of by saying how much I'm enjoying this thread as well as some similar ones. When I look back over the last two years I find that my approach to the overarching issue about how to fix the Army to maximize its capabilities through better utilizing of the Res F have changed quite a bit by virtue of some of the discussions here as well as through my stepped up research into army transformation brought on by the book Old Sweat and I are working on. There may be a few areas where I'm still digging in my heels but overall there are quite a few ideas here that have changed my mind or reinforced certain thoughts.

10/90 was too small IMHO - as the 10% did 90% of the work
Most of the 10% in my experience got caught up in the administration - and as a result very few of the 10% went into the field force.
Those who did got the shaft - as the reg force 4 year to Cpl clashed with the 2year to Cpl in the Militia - and often there was a sever disparity in experience at the lowest ranks.
Which meant that again those positions either ended up doing more work than their fair share - or got put into more senior jobs.
Then at the SNCO level - the "day staff" ended up either with nearly nothing to do - or doing tasks that should have been done by all.
The officers nearly all ended up sucked into HQ functions - as having been part of Res in the Before - During - After Phases of 10/90, it seemed that the HQ drain spiked during the 10/90 phase - which seems bizarre - given it shouldn't - but I suspect the higher level HQ's had adopted a Reg Force like aspect - and where expecting 5 days of work - in what used to be done either 1 weeknight a week and some RSS and Class B staff.

Agree absolutely for every reason that you state.

I'm also not a fan of the 90/10 concept which looks at individual reservists to fill holes in Reg F units. It doesn't incentivize the system to ever move beyond individual training because there simply is no reason to ever require collective training beyond that platoon/troop level which helps the soldier to see where he fits in as an individual. The system must be organized so that individual COs are responsible for the training and development of both the Reg F and Res F soldiers assigned to his unit.

I think that in order for a XX/YY system to work - the time in grade requirements for the Reserves and the Regular Army needs to be equalled (IIRC the Navy Reserve does 4 years to LS - but I may be wrong). And for dispersed units - some Reg personnel WSE Promoted (I'm a fan of WSE as I only made it to M/Cpl twice and both WSE by the RCR while teaching at their BSL)

Yes but not only that, the DP1 and DP2 training should be identical which is relatively easy to achieve by maximizing the summer training time available for young high school and university students. BUT, having said that, the Army needs to very closely scrutinize their existing course structures from BMQ on up. Many courses have become bloated, and by working simply five-day weeks are entirely too long and unachievable for Res F soldiers. We need to concentrate courses more. In addition we need a better manage the recruiting/training system.

I also believe that Res Units need a real unit base - so using Edmonton as example - all the Edmonton area Res would be based out of CFB Edmonton (yes that can suck for travel times)

Most Reserve Armories (admittedly I am years out of date and only really familiar then with ones in Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton) aren't ideal for Military Training - in order to create a true Integrated Force - there would be significant infastructure work needed - so troops could actually do some training - even if its just simulation based.

I'm somewhat with you but not all the way.

Let me start by saying that I'm not a fan of the Tuesday night, Thursday night, two weekends a month system. When I was an RSSO the unit did it that way. Tuesday nights were admin, Thurs night training one weekend were BMQ course and the other some form of gunnery. IMHO the only use for the weekday evening activities were to get people to the mess because admin and trg was crappy at best. I'm a fan of one weekend per month and two to three weeks in the summer and all obligatory and rigorously scheduled and planned trg.

In my perfect world there would be five or six depot battalions spread across the country each located at one of the primary divisional training centres. Each depot battalion would have one depot company at each of its major urban centres. Their responsibility would be Army wide recruiting and NCM DP 1 and DP 2 training for the whole Army, Reg F and Res F. Recruits would go onto a BTL managed by the depot bn and stay there until DP1 qualified at which point they would be "posted" to their Reg or Res F unit. Summers would be used for large scale training but some training would also be available over the winter months for both Reg F personnel and those Res F personnel available to take the training. All officer training and NCM DP3 and above training is conducted at centralized schools. Officer DP1 for the most part should align with MilCol summer training cycles and be identical for both.

If you reduce the focus of unit training to refresher training and annual collective training, then the local armouries become more of a gathering place and lecture hall. I wouldn't close any of them for starters but would certainly do a study to determine how best to consolidate facilities as one starts to consolidates and restructures units. Quite frankly though, a city like Montreal can generate around a 1,000 reservists (and should be able to generate more). Considering that these are split along about a dozen company sized battalions/regiments at this time you'll still need several armouries to accommodate them especially if each of a 30/70 bde HQ, inf bn HQ, engr regt HQ, Fd Amb HQ, Svc bn HQ and a dozen or more full company-sized subunits work out of there.

I see these armories as the place where the full-time administrative/training staffs work out of and as the gathering place for the Class As. Some training would be classroom oriented and take place there but for the most part its where the busses pick them up on a Friday night to go to the ranges for their one weekend per month; the place where their weapons are stored and where their QM/CQMS operates out of, and, to an extent where some of their vehicles and heavier gear might be stored.

As a final thought, there aren't many Edmontons around - maybe Toronto's Dennison - but most urban centres have no large bases or, like in Halifax, Victoria and Winnipeg, belong to the Navy or Air Force and aren't "fitted for" soldiers. Changing to "super centres" with adjacent training areas is impractical. Most of the ARNG and USAR armouries are even smaller company sized facilities in small urban centres with the advantage of decent sized parking lots for all their issued vehicles. They too have to travel to central range facilities and seem to have few command and control problems with these distributed subunits. Personally, if money was available for infrastructure changes, I'd like to see the Army buy up surplus shopping malls in the suburbs (especially if they have an old Canadian Tire service centre attached), fence in the parking lot and turn them into battalion/company bases.

Every solution to making at real attempt at a credible Force 2025 is either ensnared by Cap Badge politics (Reg AND Res), or Political spinelessness, and budget issues.

I don't see budget as a problem. Making a greater use of the reserves should be, at worst cost neutral, and, at best, could result in annual manpower cost savings. Initially these changes could also be made equipment neutral and again, a proper reorganization could rationalize equipment and result in maintenance cost savings.

We do have capability deficiencies which need to be addressed and which will cost $$$ but those are organizationally neutral. They are what they are.

Leaving aside the Chretien administration and the Trudeau administration who are not so much spineless but are folks who never truly understood the purpose of a military and both considered there is no need for it The Martin and, for the most part, the Harper administrations had spines but were let down by a military leadership whose visions were for the most part obsessed by the wrong imperatives. Their visions were limited to an extent in trying to define themselves as "not Cold War but OOTW". Yugoslavia for the most part was a success albeit it required the division of a nation into its ethnic parts. It gave our leadership the feeling that this was the way to go. They tried the same thing in Afghanistan but instead of dividing a fractious country into its constituent parts tried to make a whole western nation out of it. With perfect 20/20 hindsight one can say that was clearly doomed to fail big time. We spent a lot of treasure on that and learned a lot of false lessons. Throughout, the CAF leadership has progressed onward aimlessly spending billions to replace aging but useable equipment rather than buying critical equipment it abandoned as unnecessary during our infatuation with OOTW and in inflating its headquarters to the point where its a monstrous drain on the budget and a real stumbling block to progress.

As for cap badge politics. We'll that's just plain stupid. 15-18,000 reservists in 130 plus battalion sized units with all the trappings of regimental command and no plan for wartime expansion. That's just plain stupid. Three Reg F brigade groups based on three different infantry regiments who all need to have an identical piece of the pie. That's just plain stupid. Honestly, besides suspending GOFOs for their mishandling of sexual misconduct matters we should really be investigating them for negligent performance of duty. After 20 years of transformation they have built a military that is incapable of going to war if required.

Rant off. Leaving site to do other things.

 

[KevinB]

The system must be organized so that individual COs are responsible for the training and development of both the Reg F and Res F soldiers assigned to his unit.

Agreed - I also think for real growth in the Reserves - there needs to be a path forward beyond the Platoon as it where.

Yes but not only that, the DP1 and DP2 training should be identical which is relatively easy to achieve by maximizing the summer training time available for young high school and university students. BUT, having said that, the Army needs to very closely scrutinize their existing course structures from BMQ on up. Many courses have become bloated, and by working simply five-day weeks are entirely too long and unachievable for Res F soldiers. We need to concentrate courses more. In addition we need a better manage the recruiting/training system.

I think a ton of streamlining needs to be done -- but I also think that one can run longer courses outside of those times - as some reservists will have availability.

Let me start by saying that I'm not a fan of the Tuesday night, Thursday night, two weekends a month system. When I was an RSSO the unit did it that way. Tuesday nights were admin, Thurs night training one weekend were BMQ course and the other some form of gunnery. IMHO the only use for the weekday evening activities were to get people to the mess because admin and trg was crappy at best. I'm a fan of one weekend per month and two to three weeks in the summer and all obligatory and rigorously scheduled and planned trg.

I've seen good and bad weeknight training at several reserve units.
I think forcing real training plans - and having the ability to have simulators/trainers available is key to making use of that.

In my perfect world there would be five or six depot battalions spread across the country each located at one of the primary divisional training centres. Each depot battalion would have one depot company at each of its major urban centres. Their responsibility would be Army wide recruiting and NCM DP 1 and DP 2 training for the whole Army, Reg F and Res F. Recruits would go onto a BTL managed by the depot bn and stay there until DP1 qualified at which point they would be "posted" to their Reg or Res F unit. Summers would be used for large scale training but some training would also be available over the winter months for both Reg F personnel and those Res F personnel available to take the training. All officer training and NCM DP3 and above training is conducted at centralized schools. Officer DP1 for the most part should align with MilCol summer training cycles and be identical for both.

110% there

If you reduce the focus of unit training to refresher training and annual collective training, then the local armouries become more of a gathering place and lecture hall. I wouldn't close any of them for starters but would certainly do a study to determine how best to consolidate facilities as one starts to consolidates and restructures units.

As a final thought, there aren't many Edmontons around - maybe Toronto's Dennison - but most urban centres have no large bases or, like in Halifax, Victoria and Winnipeg, belong to the Navy or Air Force and aren't "fitted for" soldiers. Changing to "super centres" with adjacent training areas is impractical. Most of the ARNG and USAR armouries are even smaller company sized facilities in small urban centres with the advantage of decent sized parking lots for all their issued vehicles. They too have to travel to central range facilities and seem to have few command and control problems with these distributed subunits. Personally, if money was available for infrastructure changes, I'd like to see the Army buy up surplus shopping malls in the suburbs (especially if they have an old Canadian Tire service centre attached), fence in the parking lot and turn them into battalion/company bases.

Interesting -- I wasn't really thinking they needed a large training area - as I believe they would be till to small to be much good.
What I was thinking is they need a Sim Center - with the ability to conduct virtual warfighting - either as a dismount - or vehicle crew - so one can conduct activities without the need for real bullets and range space - that while don't replace actual live training - can be used for instruction and refresher training.

I don't see budget as a problem. Making a greater use of the reserves should be, at worst cost neutral, and, at best, could result in annual manpower cost savings. Initially these changes could also be made equipment neutral and again, a proper reorganization could rationalize equipment and result in maintenance cost savings.

I wasn't thinking of Budget as being a Res issue - I was thinking of Budget as opposed to actually capital equipment shortfalls.

We do have capability deficiencies which need to be addressed and which will cost $$$ but those are organizationally neutral. They are what they are.

I'm not sure many of them are actually Organizationally neutral.
Recreating the Combat Support Combat in Inf Bn's surely isn't a neutral PY aspect.

Leaving aside the Chretien administration and the Trudeau administration who are not so much spineless but are folks who never truly understood the purpose of a military and both considered there is no need for it The Martin and, for the most part, the Harper administrations had spines but were let down by a military leadership whose visions were for the most part obsessed by the wrong imperatives. Their visions were limited to an extent in trying to define themselves as "not Cold War but OOTW". Yugoslavia for the most part was a success albeit it required the division of a nation into its ethnic parts. It gave our leadership the feeling that this was the way to go. They tried the same thing in Afghanistan but instead of dividing a fractious country into its constituent parts tried to make a whole western nation out of it. With perfect 20/20 hindsight one can say that was clearly doomed to fail big time. We spent a lot of treasure on that and learned a lot of false lessons. Throughout, the CAF leadership has progressed onward aimlessly spending billions to replace aging but useable equipment rather than buying critical equipment it abandoned as unnecessary during our infatuation with OOTW and in inflating its headquarters to the point where its a monstrous drain on the budget and a real stumbling block to progress.

Agreed.
I'm constantly confused as to some of the CF's choices to divest items - or what they double down on.

As for cap badge politics. We'll that's just plain stupid. 15-18,000 reservists in 130 plus battalion sized units with all the trappings of regimental command and no plan for wartime expansion. That's just plain stupid. Three Reg F brigade groups based on three different infantry regiments who all need to have an identical piece of the pie. That's just plain stupid. Honestly, besides suspending GOFOs for their mishandling of sexual misconduct matters we should really be investigating them for negligent performance of duty. After 20 years of transformation they have built a military that is incapable of going to war if required.

Rant off. Leaving site to do other things.

Agreed

 

[McG]

I'm not sure why one would add another rifle company.

Not that long ago, four rifle companies was the doctrinal standard. Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a rather small gene pool to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed. For your 50/50 concept, that would mean fewer PRes rifle companies unless each Bn has two PRes rifle companies.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not that long ago, four rifle companies was the doctrinal standard. Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a rather small gene pool to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed.

Dude, I'm in the room

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT the discussion of Bases, Trg Support and Armouries

How did this joint effort in Windsor work out?

Major FA Tilston Armoury & Police Training Centre
4007 Sandwich St.
Windsor, ON

General Number
(519) 971-7301

General Fax Number
(519) 971-9689

Our facility is a first of it's kind in Canada in partnership with the federal government's Department of National Defense (DND). This facility which opened in June of 2004, houses the F.A. Tilston Armoury as well as a comprehensive training facility for both the Windsor Police Service and the DND. Other agencies will visit our training facility to provide their members with some of the top-notched training opportunities including a 10 position indoor and 20 position outdoor firing range, rappelling tower, and close quarters firearms training house. This facility also provides housing and an extensive training centre for the Windsor Police Service Dog Unit.

 

[GR66]

As to cbt support companies, I think they are typically not needed for day-to-day usage and I wouldn't waste valuable full-time resources on them. I would keep just enough to be able to support the one full time Reg F company if it should need to deploy rapidly and to provide the SMEs needed to provide leadership and training to the Res F members. That's the same reasoning why I make all armoured and arty units 30/70 - the lower probability that they need to deploy.

IF we were able to make the transition to a mounted CS element within the HQ Company similar to the Swedish Mech Battalion model (and dropping the Platoon Weapons Detachments by shifting the CarlG's and C6's down into the Infantry Sections) the PY cost of maintaining it with Reg Force personnel wouldn't be too high.

1 x 4 vehicle LAV-Recce Platoon
2 x 4 vehicle LAV-120mm Mortar Platoons
1 x 4 vehicle LAV-SHORAD Platoon

Perhaps due to the importance of these support capabilities a Battalion should have two CS Companies...one Reg Force and one Reserves?

 

[FJAG]

I'm not sure many of them are actually Organizationally neutral.
Recreating the Combat Support Combat in Inf Bn's surely isn't a neutral PY aspect.

You're right there. However if we closed down CMTC and gave those PYs back to the infantry...

Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a rather small gene pool to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed. For your 50/50 concept, that would mean fewer PRes rifle companies unless each Bn has two PRes rifle companies

The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.

 

[KevinB]

You're right there. However if we closed down CMTC and gave those PYs back to the infantry...

The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.

But what would happen to all those HQ's????

 

[KevinB]

IF we were able to make the transition to a mounted CS element within the HQ Company similar to the Swedish Mech Battalion model (and dropping the Platoon Weapons Detachments by shifting the CarlG's and C6's down into the Infantry Sections) the PY cost of maintaining it with Reg Force personnel wouldn't be too high.

1 x 4 vehicle LAV-Recce Platoon
2 x 4 vehicle LAV-120mm Mortar Platoons
1 x 4 vehicle LAV-SHORAD Platoon

Perhaps due to the importance of these support capabilities a Battalion should have two CS Companies...one Reg Force and one Reserves?

Armor Defense Platoon?

I don't like the LAV as an Infantry Recce Vehicle
Also your Snipers - are they housed back inside of Recce Platoon - or still a separate "Platoon Minus"

Doctrinally the 120mm Mortar is an Artillery weapon - but given the recent (last 20 years) changes - I am unsure if Doctrine matters anymore as no one else seems to follow it...

 

[McG]

The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.

The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.

 

[FJAG]

But what would happen to all those HQ's????

Do you mean all those HQs above brigade, wing and fleet level that I'd unilaterally cut by 25% across the board?

I don't care.

I don't like the LAV as an Infantry Recce Vehicle

I've always liked something around the size of a VBL. I know we're still a bit IED shy but I grew up around Ferrets and loved the little buggers.

Works well as an ATGM carrier as well.

You could probably equip the whole cbt sp coy with them if you were prepared to use a towed 120 mm mortar.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.

Commissioned Officers bound for Gurkha regiments go straight from Sandhurst to command rifle companies. I don't see any reason why we can't do that too.

Might be an opportunity to economize a bit that way.