Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

Luckily it's finally happened from what I've been reading

Really? Where did you see any information about the consolidation of militia units?

I've only ever seen plans for expansion, usually wholly unsupported by organizational realities of course

 

[MilEME09]

Really? Where did you see any information about the consolidation of militia units?

I've only ever seen plans for expansion, usually wholly unsupported by organizational realities of course

F2025 is looking at different options but the end result is different flavourful of the same thing but units will keep their identity. Funny enough it's something suggested on here long ago

 

[FJAG]

It's in SSE, under the clause "meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

Thanks. I've always taken that as referring to our general obligations under the NATO agreement.

Is there a specific agreement or tasking or MOU or something that spells out the specific obligation for a division?

 

[KevinB]

Thanks. I've always taken that as referring to our general obligations under the NATO agreement.

Is there a specific agreement or tasking or MOU or something that spells out the specific obligation for a division?

Part of the issue is the CA seems to think they have a Heavy Force in some areas already.

• The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.

 

[Good2Golf]

A few MBTs…a Heavy Force.

You know, like how the RCAF is a global strategic heavy lift airforce…C-17s and all…

 

[FJAG]

Part of the issue is the CA seems to think they have a Heavy Force in some areas already.

• The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.

Don't confuse "seem to think" with "putting a spin on things".

If you carefully parse the language at the end, "heavy capabilities" only means "we have some tanks" not "we have a heavy force". Similarly do not confuse "sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise" with "we have close combat capabilities". What it means is that we can practice for close combat with what we have; something in the nature of how armies prior to WW2 were practicing close armoured combat with plywood tanks mounted on cars. It does not say we can actually do close combat in a high intensity conflict.

I guess the real question is are they fooling themselves or just trying to fool others? The phrase "versatility across the spectrum of missions" goes a bit far IMHO.

And just let me say as an aside, I do think that LAV 6.0s with Leopards and even the limited artillery and other CS enablers that we have do have some utility (like a BTR equipped Motor Rifle Battalion has - less the artillery) but just not at the high end.

 

[KevinB]

Don't confuse "seem to think" with "putting a spin on things".

Spun out of control ?

If you carefully parse the language at the end, "heavy capabilities" only means "we have some tanks" not "we have a heavy force". Similarly do not confuse "sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise" with "we have close combat capabilities". What it means is that we can practice for close combat with what we have; something in the nature of how armies prior to WW2 were practicing close armoured combat with plywood tanks mounted on cars. It does not say we can actually do close combat in a high intensity conflict.

I guess the real question is are they fooling themselves or just trying to fool others? The phrase "versatility across the spectrum of missions" goes a bit far IMHO.

And just let me say as an aside, I do think that LAV 6.0s with Leopards and even the limited artillery and other CS enablers that we have do have some utility (like a BTR equipped Motor Rifle Battalion has - less the artillery) but just not at the high end.

I agree with you, my main issue is when NATO asked for a Heavy Bde, the CAF, if being honest would have said, sorry we don't have that.
We can offer X, Y, Z, but as we don't have a Heavy Bde - we can't give you blood from a stone.

It is a Medium Bde (Minus some Key Enablers) with Tanks -- Heavium Brigade maybe?

Back when 4 CMBG was in Germany and the AMF(L) was a thing, the CA had a dual role, for a Heavy Bde and a Light Bde-, something went sideways in the last 30 years.

 

[Kirkhill]

Spun out of control ?

I agree with you, my main issue is when NATO asked for a Heavy Bde, the CAF, if being honest would have said, sorry we don't have that.
We can offer X, Y, Z, but as we don't have a Heavy Bde - we can't give you blood from a stone.

It is a Medium Bde (Minus some Key Enablers) with Tanks -- Heavium Brigade maybe?

Back when 4 CMBG was in Germany and the AMF(L) was a thing, the CA had a dual role, for a Heavy Bde and a Light Bde-, something went sideways in the last 30 years.

Kevin, can you point me in the direction of this agreement? What exactly have we signed up for?

 

[KevinB]

Kevin, can you point me in the direction of this agreement? What exactly have we signed up for?

See PM

 

[FJAG]

While this article might fit better into the Brit Military thread, it raises many questions about the Future Soldier structure (and where the Brit Army has been) which are very relevant to the Canadian Army today and the F2025 construct. The dichotomy between a "useful" army and a "ready" army and whether one can be both at the same time is perhaps the biggest question ours needs to come to grips with.

More range or more Rangers – the fight for the future of the British Army.

The British Army is at a cross roads. The army can't do everything, the question is: What does it want to do next?

wavellroom.com

 

[daftandbarmy]

While this article might fit better into the Brit Military thread, it raises many questions about the Future Soldier structure (and where the Brit Army has been) which are very relevant to the Canadian Army today and the F2025 construct. The dichotomy between a "useful" army and a "ready" army and whether one can be both at the same time is perhaps the biggest question ours needs to come to grips with.

A useful Army is a ready Army, IMHO. These are not mutually exclusive.

Despite the challenges in the CAF, I wouldn't point to the UK as a great example of how to organize an Army.

Things like multiple rounds of regimental amalgamations, successfully avoided here, and cranking up 'special' brigades for tasks that seem to barely exist - to apparently mollify vicarious political whims and address questionable financial managment practises - are not great ways to 'run a railroad' as it were.

 

[FJAG]

A useful Army is a ready Army, IMHO. These are not mutually exclusive.

Despite the challenges in the CAF, I wouldn't point to the UK as a great example of how to organize an Army.

Things like multiple rounds of regimental amalgamations, successfully avoided here, and cranking up 'special' brigades for tasks that seem to barely exist - to apparently mollify vicarious political whims and address questionable financial managment practises - are not great ways to 'run a railroad' as it were.

Being a great believer in confirmation bias I took "ready" army and "useful" army to meet my definition of "army in reserve" and "day-to-day army" simply because that is the way that Army 2020 Refine was structured. Those I do believe to be mutually exclusive.

On the one hand you have a core of forces that are equipped for and train for high intensity warfare that you hope will never come and at the other end you have the light and medium rapid reaction forces that are deployed on the myriad of COIN or foreign assistance or UN peacekeeping missions that governments are so fond of rushing off to.

For me that forms the dividing line between where our ResF should be concentrated and where the RegF should be focused on (with an appropriate ratio of each with the other as required to make them effective)

I tend to agree with the other points you make. Size alone makes it difficult for us to use the Brits as a model. On the other hand size also makes it impossible to stay as a multipurpose force while specialization has a negative impact on career development, a factor that really impacts the RegF negatively.

As to amalgamation: the ResF needs it while the RegF would be well served by taking apart the three infantry regiments. I have a great deal of time for the American regimental system with its tiny unit badges which makes it very easy and accepted to have people posted wherever they are needed rather than kept inside regimental silos.

 

[KevinB]

Being a great believer in confirmation bias I took "ready" army and "useful" army to meet my definition of "army in reserve" and "day-to-day army" simply because that is the way that Army 2020 Refine was structured. Those I do believe to be mutually exclusive.

On the one hand you have a core of forces that are equipped for and train for high intensity warfare that you hope will never come and at the other end you have the light and medium rapid reaction forces that are deployed on the myriad of COIN or foreign assistance or UN peacekeeping missions that governments are so fond of rushing off to.

110%

For me that forms the dividing line between where our ResF should be concentrated and where the RegF should be focused on (with an appropriate ratio of each with the other as required to make them effective)

This where the amalgamation aspect works - because you need some ready and some in reserve on both ends.

I tend to agree with the other points you make. Size alone makes it difficult for us to use the Brits as a model. On the other hand size also makes it impossible to stay as a multipurpose force while specialization has a negative impact on career development, a factor that really impacts the RegF negatively.

Multipurpose often means good at nothing...
Or extremely expensive. In the 80's and early 90's I think the CA had a very solid MultiPurpose Force - that could do Light, or Mech very well.
Certain Specialization comes with the understanding that one will likely have slower career growth - but generally those going into those trades understand and accept that as part of the price.

As to amalgamation: the ResF needs it while the RegF would be well served by taking apart the three infantry regiments. I have a great deal of time for the American regimental system with its tiny unit badges which makes it very easy and accepted to have people posted wherever they are needed rather than kept inside regimental silos.

I would not stop at just the Infantry - the Armoured in Canada can be almost as bad, and honestly the Reg Force Regimental Mafia issues are not nearly as bad as the Reserves.


However when you end up with a Mech (Heavy or Medium) entity - and a Light entity, there is going to be some clique built on that. Or simply making all Infantry Light - and a Cavalry trade for those who crew the bus, but I don't think that works well. The Artillery and Engineers seem to do okay when changing from Light Reg't to Mech though - so perhaps all that really needs to be done is #rd Inf Bn's and #'rd Armoured Regiments.

 

[FJAG]

so perhaps all that really needs to be done is #rd Inf Bn's and #'rd Armoured Regiments.

You know, I kind of like to stay with the old names of regiments that saw combat for this country. I always thought amalgamating the Reg F into three was a bit of a travesty in loosing the RegF QOR and Black Watch and even the 8CH and FGH - The Cdn Gds not so much because they were a recent, post war invention anyway.

The engineers and guns have differently numbered regiments and its easy to transfer between them because there isn't much accoutrement and badging stuff to change around. (The odd RCA to RCHA shoulder flash and blazer button)

If we had a standard uniform with removal cap badges and shoulder flashes on slip-ons with common career managers and a single point of promotion that would be good.

My guess is that we could eliminate much of the heartburn in amalgamating the ResF and injecting RegF command is if a given aggregated ResF battalion had companies from four different ResF regiments and each was allowed to retain some old regimental affiliation and maybe their old armoury and an honourary lieutenant colonel. I know, I know. It's silly but baby steps, baby steps. Negotiating change is making allies and knowing which battles are worth fighting and where you can make concessions without compromising the objective.

 

[MilEME09]

Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.

 

[FJAG]

Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.

Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.

Of course, becasue going places where everyone regards Canadian troops as God-like saviours is a bad thing when you've donned the hair shirt

 

[MilEME09]

Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.

That would require many of them to not work from home

 

[MilEME09]

Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.

They would probably stand more up to study the effects of pausing non core tasks

 

[Good2Golf]

They would probably stand more up to study the effects of pausing non core tasks

How many PYs are expended working the Army Ball and staffing the associated honours and awards each year?