Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

Your organization has created a span of control fiasco in both ways. Why would you want a HQ to command a single brigade? What would it do, aside from be a mailbox. Conversely, your brigades have too much, and would be neutered by the span of control they are responsible for.

Those are really big Bde's = even more me, the Mini-Div Brigade guy.

This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.

When your Army isn't much more than 3 real Brigades- what is Army HQ doing that is occupying them so much?
It definitely isn't planning for the future - because if it is, well I can find a lot more PY to axe from HQ's

 

[FJAG]

Then really we should just call reserve brigade's administrative groups (since battle group implies they deploy into combat), reduce all units to company's in actuality since they are in paper any way. Only 1 LCol per admin group, every other unit is commanded by a captain or major.

You all know my preference: restructure them as real deployable entities. DO NOT MAKE ANY MORE ADMIN HQs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It changes the perception of what the "something" should be. We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time. A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something? But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade". Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.

On Guard/ Oh God 90.... I was there. What a mess. That, and the 'Waincon' I attended in '91, convinced me to never go back.

I was told that the exercise in '89 was pretty good though, so experiences may vary....

 

[FJAG]

On Guard/ Oh God 90.... I was there. What a mess. That, and the 'Waincon' I attended in '91, convinced me to never go back.

I was told that the exercise in '89 was pretty good though, so experiences may vary....

Can't speak for the infantry and recce, but when you have a couple of full Militia batteries firing as a regiment, that feels pretty good.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Can't speak for the infantry and recce, but when you have a couple of full Militia batteries firing as a regiment, that feels pretty good.

As I recall we were just - as independent companies - bounced from 'stand to stand' with no Battle Prep, advanced warning, or rehearsals in a way that I felt humiliated most people and resulted in very little learning or improvement opportunities.

Where there was a BGp/Bde context, higher HQ was pretty much completely absent, or useless.

If I was to follow the example of my higher level commanders I would have, for example, left my troops in the field to go for a shower (while they wallowed in mud) whenever I felt like it, which I did not do of course.

But yeah, train to excite. Or Incite

 

[markppcli]

Amen. Sudden budget cut from on high or necessitated by one unit wildly overspending leads to a couple of months of cancelled training. People go on a roto, come home, apply for CT or to work with a federal agency. Wildly variable leadership. People posted in who don't play well with others. People finish undergrad degrees and move to different cities to continue education or start work. Get stiffed one year on recruiting or entry-level courses. Etc.

Units aren't large enough to easily tolerate disruptions or provide a feed of consistently competent and ethical leaders all the way to the top of the over-promotion chain.

This is why we need to stop obsessing about one town, on armpit, one Regiment with regional recruiting boundaries and have soldiers report to training centres for their reserve training. If Toronto can support 2 Bns, fantastic they have two Bns training out of their depots. If the whole of the interior of BC needs to mass for a weekend a month instead of every Thursday to hit a reasonable critical mass, that’s what we should do. But all of these requires a look at the reserves mission, and a strong re-examine of if their structure fits that mission. I can’t imagine the answer is yes.

 

[Brad Sallows]

As I recall we were just - as independent companies - bounced from 'stand to stand' with no Battle Prep, advanced warning, or rehearsals in a way that I felt humiliated most people and resulted in very little learning or improvement opportunities.

That too. A couple of seasoned people not inclined to play along with silly schemes summed it up as, "We were set up to fail".

 

[Mortar guy]

Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?

 

[Good2Golf]

Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?

MG, it’s a baseline so that Army leadership can put an “improve things with a robust development plan” spin on FORCE 2030…

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is why we need to stop obsessing about one town, on armpit, one Regiment with regional recruiting boundaries and have soldiers report to training centres for their reserve training. If Toronto can support 2 Bns, fantastic they have two Bns training out of their depots. If the whole of the interior of BC needs to mass for a weekend a month instead of every Thursday to hit a reasonable critical mass, that’s what we should do. But all of these requires a look at the reserves mission, and a strong re-examine of if their structure fits that mission. I can’t imagine the answer is yes.

This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.

 

[MilEME09]

This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.

Pretty similar in calgary, though I believe here it is asked that every unit provide atleast one instructor to the battle school. Sometimes that doesn't happen though due to other conflicts, like when you are asked to run a Driver Wheeled, MSVS course, and a CRTT course but somehow find a spare MCpl or Sgt to help a BMQ without affecting unit training.....

 

[McG]

Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB

I have not seen anything saying this Bn is being given to CANSOF. Instead of three light battalions done half-assed, the Army is saying it will do one right ... which should mean properly structured resourced CS and CSS to go with it for the first time since the 90's. There is a role for such a unit, we just need a little institutional discipline to not allow individual COs to prance-off after a personal fantasy of pseudo-SOF.

 

[Mortar guy]

I have not seen anything saying this Bn is being given to CANSOF. Instead of three light battalions done half-assed, the Army is saying it will do one right ... which should mean properly structured resourced CS and CSS to go with it for the first time since the 90's. There is a role for such a unit, we just need a little institutional discipline to not allow individual COs to prance-off after a personal fantasy of pseudo-SOF.

OK, so "gets a LIB" is unclear. On the presentations I have seen it shows the one and only LIB as "earmarked for SOF support" - albeit under CCSB. Also, the structure presented is hardly properly structured and resourced - small rifle sections, small weapons platoons in the rifle coys, small mor pls (only 6 tubes), small DFS platoon (3 sects vice doctrinal 6). Don't let anyone blow smoke where they shouldn't - the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.

 

[Infanteer]

I don't see that as an issue. The Army HQ already has many functions including force development; requirement definition and fulfillment; training; infrastructure management; personnel management and several others. I fail to see what added value an administrative intermediate "divisional" headquarters brings to the table beyond creating regional stovepipes. There clearly are "regional" requirements but these could be handled in other ways (such as an adjunct of the four RegF brigades or an added or expanded element of the Army HQ itself.) Army HQ should be able to separate its forward leaning activities from the management of its current ones.

I'll throw the challenge out to those arguing that the Divisions/Areas/Whatever in the CA are superflous. If your brigades are focused on managing the generation of combat power, and the CA is focused on corporate requirements, business planning, and force development, why would you eliminate a layer of HQ that handles the following (paraphrasing from a previous experienced poster):

• Provides proper "span of control" to the CA's numerous Regular and Reserve formations;
• Provides a regional structure for Dom Ops, and speaks with the provinces;
• Manages infrastructure and interfaces with Real Property Management;
• Manages the Reserves and much of its administration.

If you think this is going to be centrally managed from Ottawa, or handled by a CMBG, then I'd counter that your argument fails to consider what each echelon of command does from day-to-day.

 

[Infanteer]

the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.

How many PYs is the infantry losing?

 

[Ostrozac]

A single small light unit, parked off to the side of an otherwise motorized force? That will have no clear doctrine, undefined tactical roles and an unclear impact on career progression? It’s just like when I joined, the circle is complete.

Can we please please call it the Enrobria Regiment?

 

[MilEME09]

- the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.

Funny you day that, in a recent interview with Canadian Defense Review, the commander of the army also described us as a hallow force, ill see if I can post the excerpt from the interview

 

[markppcli]

Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?

What’s being lost here is that we simply do not have the established numbers, even when full, to fill out these units. We rob the Bns to deploy a single company, and used to have to rob every unit in a Bde to deploy a BG. Ending the farce of being able to man these units is, in my mind, a good thing.

Also while I appreciate that we have doctrine, the Inf BN in Operations still talks about four rifle companies and an AT coy, so let’s not pretend it’s this up to date, we’ll thought out plan.

This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.

Right but my point is that this should be the norm of operations. The Rocky Mountain Rangers and BCRs are going to get a lot more value out of 2 full days in a weekend massed then 4 week days of being less than a section. I’d add that this would also allow us to recruit multiple trades across smaller centres.

 

[MilEME09]

Right but my point is that this should be the norm of operations. The Rocky Mountain Rangers and BCRs are going to get a lot more value out of 2 full days in a weekend massed then 4 week days of being less than a section. I’d add that this would also allow us to recruit multiple trades across smaller centres.

Talking to my wife's grandfather who was in during the late 50s, early 60s. It used to be back then 2 x evenings a week, 1 Saturday and one full weekend a month. That is a significant increase over current day, and frankly might be required just to get through all the required training that isn't related to our actual trades and jobs. Unfortunately budget won't allow for any increase in time.

 

[markppcli]

So the reserve pay system of half days and full days means that 1 full weekend (48 hours, let’s be reasonable and say 16 working hours) costs the same as 4 3 hour long half days right ? So we’re actually getting more training time at similar costs, obviously there’s some feeding issues and mileage that come into play but still, it’s much more effective use of time.