Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

Short answer is: legally, yes.

And if you did, without a couple of years of preparation and huge investments of various kinds, it would probably looks something like this

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Short answer is: legally, yes

Long answer: political suicide

 

[dapaterson]

I mean, The Army would introduce lengthy unneeded and counterproductive additional training requirements, not adequately resource them, lose the paperwork, and have everyone do a BFT twice a week for four months because HOW DARE YOU QUESTION ME.

 

[FJAG]

Long answer: political suicide

I honestly don't think so but then I have no more idea what the great unwashed Canadian public expects anymore. Long story short, mobilizing a reservist who has already volunteered to be in the military is not the equivalent of a conscription crisis.

I'm of the view that the country (and not that granola eating sub set of it) expects that reserve service means that people may be required to go rather than volunteer a second time.

In any event a proper education program can fix that.

I mean, The Army would introduce lengthy unneeded and counterproductive additional training requirements, not adequately resource them, lose the paperwork, and have everyone do a BFT twice a week for four months because HOW DARE YOU QUESTION ME.

That I'm afraid might be true. A proper system is not complex. It could be based primarily on training the hell out of students during the summers when they are young, fit and tremendously interested in getting summer employment. After that you lay off them except for well organized and conducted refresher training. (Oh yeah. And fire all the Class A LCols and CWOs)

 

[Halifax Tar]

I mean, The Army would introduce lengthy unneeded and counterproductive additional training requirements, not adequately resource them, lose the paperwork, and have everyone do a BFT twice a week for four months because HOW DARE YOU QUESTION ME.

Tell me you were an augmentee for an Afghanistan deployment without telling me you were an augmentee for an Afghanistan deployment.

 

[dapaterson]

Hey, the Vancouver Olympics went off without an incident requiring CAF intervention solely because of the number of BFTs the Army ran the Res F augmentees through.

 

[quadrapiper]

I honestly don't think so but then I have no more idea what the great unwashed Canadian public expects anymore. Long story short, mobilizing a reservist who has already volunteered to be in the military is not the equivalent of a conscription crisis.

I'm of the view that the country (and not that granola eating sub set of it) expects that reserve service means that people may be required to go rather than volunteer a second time.

In any event a proper education program can fix that.



That I'm afraid might be true. A proper system is not complex. It could be based primarily on training the hell out of students during the summers when they are young, fit and tremendously interested in getting summer employment. After that you lay off them except for well organized and conducted refresher training. (Oh yeah. And fire all the Class A LCols and CWOs)

The Class As, or the lifer Class Bs-who-should-be-Cs/Regulars?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Hey, the Vancouver Olympics went off without an incident requiring CAF intervention solely because of the number of BFTs the Army ran the Res F augmentees through.

I thought it was because they made all the Reservists suffer under the leadership of the Strathconas, thus convincing them that the Reg F was a bad career choice

 

[RangerRay]

I thought it was because they made all the Reservists suffer under the leadership of the Strathconas, thus convincing them that the Reg F was a bad career choice

 

[Fabius]

And there are lessons learned from the UK roaming about, e.g.,


But the most significant mobilisation of Reserve Forces (volunteer and regular reserves) since the1950s occurred with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – Operation TELIC.

We called out over 8000 reservists of which about 5200 were mobilised. Reservists continued to be involved after the main combat was over, right until the end of the campaign, providing key enablers to support deployment; backfilling of posts in the UK; individual augmentees to bring units up to war-fighting establishments; manning Reserve sub-units including niche capabilities such as CBRN; and providing specialist services like linguists, media operations and medics (760 were medical staff, including 93 doctors).

Lessons learned from this, the first really compulsory mobilisation since the Suez operation in the 1950s, included:

• The importance of notice. The nature of the invasion decision meant this was difficult and reservists and employers got very little formal notice.
• Fitness. A considerable number were medically unfit and not properly trained – this also applied to Regulars !
• It was difficult to mobilise people effectively, particularly individuals. Support; administration, kit and equipment issue, and basic refresher training, all caused problems. This led to the rapid development of a mobilisation centre, with dedicated staff.
• Many people were not used in their proper role, and felt that administration in theatre of reservists – for example pay - was poor.

The UK Experiemce:- Reserves as a part of the whole Force

The UK Experiemce:- Reserves as a part of the whole Force DRA - Defence Reserves Association

dra.org.au

Despite the NDA several General Officers, who are currently serving, have indicated to myself when I brought this up portion of the NDA, that they do not believe it’s feasible to use it. My understanding of their view is that it would only happen if it was WW3 and even then be likely to result in a conscription crisis.
It’s a view I can’t understand but again it seems to be a view that exists with at least some of the CA senior leadership.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Despite the NDA several General Officers, who are currently serving, have indicated to myself when I brought this up portion of the NDA, that they do not believe it’s feasible to use it. My understanding of their view is that it would only happen if it was WW3 and even then be likely to result in a conscription crisis.
It’s a view I can’t understand but again it seems to be a view that exists with at least some of the CA senior leadership.

I think part of the reason is for the past 55 years, there has been a prevailing belief the P Res is a part time gig that only becomes full time if the member chooses.

I remember a lot of very confused and upset folks from 32 Sig Regt who signed up for FTSE showing up in Wainwright for Bold Eagle who thought they were just going to hang out in the QM for 3 months and make bank.

Imagine instead that these members got a nice CFTPO stating "so...hope you like dill and mashed potatoes for the next 6 months..." would see a massive amount of releases and even more abysmal recruitment.

I reckon that's why the CCA doesn't want to pursue that CoA.

Me on the otherhand....

 

[FJAG]

The Class As, or the lifer Class Bs-who-should-be-Cs/Regulars?

I'm of the view that the majority of CA units should be hybrid led by a RegF CO - therefore no Class A COs (or RSMs) except those who have had the equivalent training and experience of a RegF LCol and willing to serve full-time during his tenure.

As for Class B's, the only ones I see are the ones "temporarily" filling RegF vacant positions.

Despite the NDA several General Officers, who are currently serving, have indicated to myself when I brought this up portion of the NDA, that they do not believe it’s feasible to use it.

I'm reaching back to pre-2009 but many that I spoke to when I lectured on ResF terms of service did not even appreciate that the NDA provided that broad power. Once aware of it many defaulted to the "the government would never authorize it" excuse.

My understanding of their view is that it would only happen if it was WW3 and even then be likely to result in a conscription crisis.
It’s a view I can’t understand but again it seems to be a view that exists with at least some of the CA senior leadership.

I don't disagree that the perception exists. It's a self-induced illusion that has become a reality of sorts.

Personally, I also tend to agree that while we are in a peacetime mode we should not use the provision but rely on volunteers to fill the positions.

Where I go in a different direction is that Canada can save large sums of full-time personnel costs if it created a proper structure for a mobilizable ResF so that we do not have to keep large numbers of full-timers in peacetime. When I'm at my most neurotic and cynical I sometimes think that the ResF is kept in its infant state by the CA's leadership exactly so that the government doesn't cut the size of the RegF.

What's needed is a culture change to aligning the entire force and government to understand the legislation as it stands and the theory behind it. It was basically the culture from 1867 to the 1950s and then started to steamroll from a symbiotic relationship to one that's almost disjointed parasitic.

 

[Kirkhill]

About the MGS the thing being it didn't work.
I think its been removed and they are replacing with a "not tank" tank.

View attachment 77737
The GD Griffin. Mobil Protected Firepower MPR, its not a tank.

The Stryker Mobile Gun System can fire 18 rounds of 105-mm main gun ammunition; 400 rounds of . 50 caliber ammunition; and 3,400 rounds of 7.62 ...

M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun System

www.globalsecurity.org

From what I understand the Leo 1 carries 55 to 60 rounds of 105mm and 4400 rounds of 7.62 for the coax and a further couple of thousand for the anti-air MG.

The Abrams seems to carry

Main armament	M1: 105 mm L/52 M68A1rifled gun (55 rounds) M1A1: 120 mm L/44 M256smoothbore gun (40 rounds) M1A2: 120 mm L/44 M256 smoothbore gun (42 rounds)
Secondary armament	1 × 0.50 caliber (12.7 mm) M2HBheavy machine gun with 900 rounds 2 × 7.62 mm (.308 in)M240machine guns with 10,400 rounds (1 pintle-mounted, 1 coaxial)

Stryker ISC carries 2000 rds of 12.7mm OR 480 rounds of 40mm HV grenades.

AND the LAV 6.0

Main armament	1 x M242 Bushmaster (210rnds) or 1 x RWS C6 GPMG (2,200rnds)[1][3]
Secondary armament	C6 GPMG[1][3]

With all of that said: What mission was the MGS supposed to perform?



Each Stryker Company was an Infantry Company, mounted on wheels with its own dedicated, permanently attached, penny packets of support.

The three rifle platoons, full strength, standard platoons, had a permanently attached Armoured Transport Section with four Infantry Section Carriers - not Armoured Fighting Vehicles or even Infantry Fighting Vehicles but Section Carriers. And each vehicle came with its own Driver and Commander, one of which commanded the Transport Section.

Each Company had its own dedicated team of Medics in their own Infantry Section Carrier equipped with what tools they could carry to save lives in the field. The team could also leave their Carrier and accompany the Infantry Platoons when they were operating on foot.

And then the Company had permanently attached Fire Support.

The Fire Support came in three forms.

The Sniper Team, which could work with the full strength, standard platoons when they were operating where their Transport Sections couldn't take them.

Indirect Fire Support, in the form of a Fire Support Team and a pair of Mortar Teams, each in its own Carrier. Like the Medics, they could leave their Carriers if the Rifles were operating on foot. Or perhaps the Rifles were better served if the FST stayed mounted in the rear and the Mortars came forwards. The Mortar Teams had access to 120s, 81s and 60s. The 120s and the 81s could be fired from inside the Carriers. Or dismounted and humped like the 60.

And finally, the issue at hand.

Direct Fire Support

When the full strength, bog standard, rifle platoons were operating on foot, where their Carriers couldn't go, then their permanent Fire Support included their Sniper Team, their FST and their Mortar Teams and their integral, man portable, direct fire support systems: their 7.62 machine guns and their Javelins, augmented by AT4s, soon joined by the CG84s. Javelins were a bit too expensive, even for the Americans, to deploy against grape huts and city doors. The 84mm was adequate for a lot of jobs. Just like the 66mm M72 was adequate for a lot of jobs.

But

Sometimes you needed a bigger gun.
Sometimes you needed a protected gun.
Sometimes you needed a protected machine gun team with lots of ammunition

And if you were operating where the Carriers could carry the Rifles then it was possible to put a bigger gun on a Carrier and have it available to expand the capabilities of the Rifle Company and to increase its ability to respond to threats.

The Mobile Gun System was a larger calibre Carl Gustaf to be used by the Company Commander to support his Rifles when he thought they would be useful.

They were his own personal weapons systems that he could use at his discretion. He didn't have to go to Brigade to beg for the release of a Platoon of Leos or Abrams from the Tank unit. Now he will have to go to Division to get a Tank/Non-Tank/Light Tank. The odds of him getting a Bigger Gun when he thinks it would be useful just got a whole lot longer.

I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that his Divisional Commander is going to think that his appreciation of how his Tank unit would be useful is going to be a bit different to that of his 27 Rifle Company Commanders. Each of whom used to have 3 Bigger Guns available to him.
How many mobile 105mm guns will the new Divisions have? 81? or 42?

The MGS was not an Armoured Fighting Vehicle. It was a Mobile Gun System. Used in an Infantry Formation to support the Infantry.

The Armoured Corps should have supported the MGS concept and fought to retain the Tanks as well, along with appropriate Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

A LAV based Infantry with an Armoured Fist mounted in Leo 1s and CV90s would have been a much better allocation of funds.

The LAV based Infantry, armed with the MGS, and the TOW Under Armour turrets and RF TOWs, and the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle supplying integral direct fire support to fight the mobile defensive battle, and conduct recce, would have left the Armoured Corps free to concentrate on fighting the offensive battle, as a mobile strike force, to be kept as a concentrated force. To be used judiciously. With its own, integral Rifles.

And let the Arty do what the longer ranged indirect fire support thing with the mix of guns and missiles they think best while also supplying the Brigade/Division's Air Defence bubble.

The GMG/60mm debate was exactly the same debate. And the professionals lost to the bean counters.

As to the MGS and the TUA and MMEV not working -

The Leopard 1 is now at the A5 version, not including national variants like the C1 and C2, and has spawned a Leopard 2 which, according to Wiki has gone through 17 design changes to reach the current A8 configuration. Not all of those changes were successful or adopted.

In 12 years, from 1936 to 1948

There were 24 marks of Spitfire and many sub-variants.

The fact that the MGS M1/C1 and the MMEV C1, now known as the MSHORAD, had kinks that required design changes to fix should not have been a surprise to anybody but the bean counters and politicians. And they should have been made aware of that requirement from the initiation of the project. THAT was the biggest failure of the Professionals. The failure to explain to amateurs that there are no magic bullets. That every plan goes wrong. That every project needs a very hefty, discretionary, contingency reserve.

As a Project Manager I am committed to the 60/30/10 model. 60% goes to the Known Knowns. 30% goes to the Known Unknowns. And 10% goes to the Unknown Unknowns.

And I will be back to you for more money in the Warranty period, once Commissioning is complete and we have achieved 95% of the original project's goals, because from the Conceptualization to completion of Implementation the Situation has changed and the target has moved. Officially this is known as Continuous Improvement. And the clue is in the title. Continuous. It never ends.

The difference between the Leopards, 1 and 2, and the Spitfires, and the MGS and the MMEV, was there was no commitment to the Commander's Intent. Just like the Littoral Combat Ships and Shinseki's black berets.

 

[Kirkhill]

When I look at the original Stryker Brigade concept and organization, almost 25 years old now, I don't see a problem with either the concept or the intent.

As armoured transport to rapidly relocate foot infantry from location to location in company sized packets with integral support it seems to me as valid a concept today as it was then. And no yuks from the gallery about it not being valid then. Opinion: It was and is valid.

It is due for a refresh though.

The Rifle Platoons - nice mix of rifles, MGs, CGs and Javelins - man-portable, LOS weapons.

The Armoured Transport Section - modernize the Carriers but keep them within the constraints of the 16 tonne C130 envelope. Not the max limit of the 20 tonnes. I am an 80% man. Carrier's weaponry? Focus on Anti-Air Point Defence. The 30mm seems to becoming quite popular and has a very useful effect against ground targets. Switch to a bolt on RWS to free up more space inside the hull for bodies and Monitors.

Medics - Absolutely permanently attached with their own Carrier and their own gear. As much as they can squeeze inside a standard Carrier. And no Red Crosses. Nobody's paying attention to those things except Russian Targeters.

Snipers... let them do their thing. They're cheap.

Fire Support Team - Carry on. New electronics and a UAV or two.

Mortars - Again. Carry on. Keep up to date with the latest projectiles, lethal or not.

The MGS - Time for an MGS MkII

Take the LAV 6 and install the HitFact Turret installed on the Italian and Spanish Centauro.

Hitfact-MKII

electronics.leonardo.com

Maybe we should stick with the 105 and reduce the number of rounds on board and save the mass and volume for ATGMs and additional coax rounds.

If the Carrier is to be used to supply direct fire support when operating attached individually to a Carrier mounted Rifle Platoon. And task the Turret mounted RWS to Anti-Air Defence of the Carrier.

Company HQ - Add UAVs to both Carriers.

At Battalion

The Battalion Mortar Platoon - Swap out the 120s for the Hero-120s and Brimstones. Increase range. Loitering munitions and Precision Strike munitions.

Effectively the NetFires solution - a solution contemporary with the Stryker - also 25 years old. But Carrier mounted.

XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Battalion Recce Platoon - more UAVs.

At Brigade

The Brigade Anti-Tank Company - See the Battalion Mortar Platoon - same kit. More of it.

Brigade Engineer Squadron - new Carriers with point Air Defence. Like the Snipers and Medics, let them carry on.

Brigade Support Battalion - spend what you need to on that one and don't scrimp.



Which brings us to the Cavalry Regiment and the Artillery Regiment......

The only thing I know for sure is that there will be lots of UAVs.....

I suspect the Artillery Regiment could plus up to a proper III Regiment (more than a II and less than an X) because it will need to manage a heavy GBAD load and could benefit from a II GBAD entity separate from the II Fire Support entity. Or entities.

Cavalry? - Primary role? Screening and Observing? Flying Columns? If that then what tools?

Arty? - How far can they stand back from the fight and supply all weather, all terrain, rapid close support to the Brigade AND its Rifle Companies AND it Cavalry Regiment?

 

[Kirkhill]

Armoured Fist Time

I like the Swedish Pansarbataljon. I heart Scandihoovians.

Keep our Leo 2s. Replace the ones we have donated to the Ukrainians with A8s and start upgrading Grandad's Axes to the A8 level as they go in for annual maintenance. Add a few extra when and if needed. For example if the maintenance shop is taking to long to return the vehicles to the field units.

Buy CV90s. And put them all on Black. Along with the Assault Troops in the rear. Arm the CV90s and the Pioneers similarly to the LAV infantry but focus them on the Armoured Fist.

 

[Kirkhill]

And finally Band Vagons and Boats. Militia capabilities to be manned by transport companies that are willing to be called out and deployed anywhere at short notice.

The Transport Sections of the Regs that normally drive LAVs and CV90s should also be current on Bv206s and Boats as a secondary capability.


-

And one other thing....

Helicopters and VSTOL capabilities. A secondary task for the Full Strength, Bog Standard, Rifle Platoons who normally ride in the back of LAVs and CV90s, and occasionally Band Vagons, Boats or even Trucks.

The Militia.

The Militia infantry trains to produce Full Strength, Bog Standard, Rifle Platoons.
Militia Transport trains to drive Trucks, Band Vagons and Boats
Militia Cavalry trains to conduct screening and recce in Trucks with UAVs. And supply bodies to fill in the Armoured Fist and the Direct Fire Support Vehicles of the Infantry.
Militia Arty trains to conduct GBAD for local defence, and for deployment and to supply bodies to fill in the Regular Force Artillery Indirect Fire Support system.

-

OK! I'm done! .

Ready to take my beating now.

Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

No I'm not.

Taking a look at that Stryker Coy again and focusing on the Carriers of the Transport group what I see is

3x Transport Sections of 4x Carriers each with its own dedicated Driver. Each Carrier also has a VC with one of them in charge of the Section

3x Independent Carriers each with its own dedicated Driver, one tasked to carry the Medics and two tasked to carry the Mortar Teams

2x Command Carriers each with its own dedicated Driver and both with a dedicated VC. The VCs are both of E5 rank, the same as the VCs in the Transport Sections.

1x FIST Carrier driven by its own team - why not supply them a Driver at least, like the Medics?

3x MGS Carriers with 3x Drivers, 3x Gunners with the same rank as the VCs in the Transport Sections, 1x Senior VC, 1x Platoon Sergeant and 1x Platoon Officer

Which results in this

1x OiC Transport Platoon mounted in 1x MGS with his own crew
1x Pl Sgt mounted in 1x MGS with his own crew
1x Sr VC mounted in 1x MGS with his own crew

Together they comprise the Transport Platoon's HQ

The Transport Platoon also provides

3 Sections of 4 Carriers each with its own Driver and VC with the Section Leader being one of the VCs
That means a Total of 12 Carriers dedicated to transporting the Rifle Platoons.

It also provides

2 Carriers with Drivers and VCs for the Company HQ to keep up to with the Rifle Platoons
3 Carriers with Drivers only for the Medics and Mortars
1 Carrier only for the FIST Team
2 Cargo Trucks and Trailers only for the CSM and Stores NCO
2 Light Tactical Trucks and Trailers only for Rovers.

Carriers x21 including the MGS Carriers
Cargo Trucks and Trailers x2
Light Trucks and Trailers x2

Personnel

1x OiC - Lt
1x Pl Warrant
4x Sgt (Sr VC in HQ and 3 Sect Leaders)
11x MCpl (all VC)
20x Cpl/Pte (all Driver/Mechanics)

They need an MRT team to be added.

-

Now I'm done.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Whew

 

[FJAG]

Nice little cri de coeur.

Much of the problem with the Stryker company's MGS were related to technical issues that made the vehicle in the opinion of a 2007 DOT&E assessment to be operationally ineffective. Many of the design shortfalls were related to the size and weight limitations to make the vehicle C130 transportable. The MPF doesn't have to be but two need to be able to fly in one C-17. There were 23 deficiencies listed and by 2011 only 17 of those had been mitigated either in materiel of through TTPs. Two that stood out in my mind was the low amount of on-board ammo and the vulnerability of its gun pod.

The technical issues with the vehicle were behind Caron's decision to recommend to the VCDS the cancellation of the project in early June of 2006. The MMEV and the whole Direct Fire Unit experiment tumbled with it.

When the decision was made in 2010 to change the Stryker line from a flat bottom hull to a V Hull, MGS was not included for upgrades which demonstrated the lack of faith in the vehicle's longevity. There were folks in the brigades that loved the MGS but many despised it and many tactically misused it. It has finally died after a long lingering illness.

I'm not about to denigrate the concept of a direct fire vehicle at the company level simply because the MGS was a deficient vehicle. There may be others that fit the bill but I don't know enough to evaluate them technically. I'll simply stay with the idea that the US Army, after more than two decades of the Stryker BCT concept, do not have any mixed companies anymore. The do have combined arms battalions but their companies are either straight infantry or tank. The new MPF also exists just in pure companies within an MPF battalion at division.

There are a number of reasons not to mix these assets at the company level in peacetime such as maintenance and individual training and career development (which does matter if you wish to develop trained and experienced leaders). Operationally keeping them separated allows for easier and more flexible regrouping to suit the tactical situation and you'll have an organization that can fight them as either an MPF platoon in a combat team or battle group, an MPF company in a battle group or brigade or (although I doubt this) as an MPF battalion if the situation demands it.

 

[KevinB]

The whole issue with Medium weight systems is that they start to get pushed beyond their initially levels of planned employment.

Most of the ideas behind the Stryker started from Somalia.
A rapidly deployable light armor system to protect troops in OOTW.
However the employment of them beyond the original scope resulted in the ‘identification’ of a lack of armor, and a need to up armor them.

You can see the same effect on the LAV development More and more armor was added, and they stopped being Medium APC’s and no longer easily deployed.

I’m not a ‘medium weight’ formation fan, simply as they often end up too light to fight the battle they are being used in, and now too heavy to be employed in the role they where designed for.

@Kirkhill has made a number of posts and tables on the growth of the original MOWAG concept from the 6x6 AVGP to the LAV in its current state.

I’d suggest the original Stryker idea was a valid idea to provide Light Armored Mobility for a mostly Light Force to work within certain situations.
It went off the rails when more was wanted from the platform, and without a proper analysis done of what would be lost when trying to add significantly higher levels of protection.

MGS to be was an answer in search of a problem. The 105mm gun had already been proven to be too much for the chassis, and personally I never saw the point to that setup for the Stryker formation, simply because it wasn’t a tank, and shouldn’t be viewed as an anti-tank system, as well as it wasn’t a viable anti-structure system. If instead it had something like a low velocity demolition gun simply intended for anti-structure usage, it would have made a great deal more sense.

If there was an anti-armor requirement for a Stryker entity, there were ample examples of other systems that would have been a better fit to the LAV chassis. Given the ATGM options available in other platforms.
MGS wasn’t even a Jack of all trades, it was more like a 2 of Clubs.