Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Even though I've always been a 'light/airborne' Infantry type guy I'm sad to see too much time being wasted on this light stuff, in any western military.

The real decision maker has always been the 'heavy metal' crew.

But it's expensive and complicated so my guess is that the 'good idea merchants', who want a great performance review followed by a swift promotion, tend to focus on the light stuff because it's easier to get some kind of result within a fairly short timeframe - like their 2 year posting cycle.

True enough.

I think the start of this on the light side is based on two things: First the light side desperately needed fixing and secondly the work done there probably has more relevance to the ABCT as base information. It's a bit iterative because if one had started with the ABCT then not very much of what was learned there would apply to the IBCTs.

My biggest question is still as to whether or not the third brigade in each armored division will become an SBCT as originally forecast? It doesn't matter here because 1st Cavalry Division is earmarked to become an Armor Division (Reinforced) which will require some augmentation (such as an engineer brigade and a protection brigade).

I like the idea of giving an armored division a brigade with a higher infantry ratio for "follow-up" work on bypassed localities or for a temporary defensive foundation, but . . .

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The problem is that your site is static. Once identified via satellite or whatever it can be destroyed. It would need to be mobile which means it would likely have to be under armour to protect it on the move.

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So is much of the Ukrainian frontline. The biggest issues with the older forts is the minimal protected firing positions. The role of engineering equipment and lightweight prefab bunker components and trench cover cannot be overstated.

In Kursk, much of the fighting was mobile defense, but eventually the Russians were able to fix and destroy light forces. The Light forces are a screen while you furiously dig in and prepare for the counter offensives with regular troops, then pull you light forces back to recoup and prepare for the next assault.

Or the light forces all just get slaughtered because they’ve been sacrificed in contact with a fully tooled up armoured division.

Mountainous terrain? Littoral operations? Behind enemy lines stuff? Sure… that can work with the right support.

 

[GK .Dundas]

The manuals have it wrong , light infantry in contact with heavy formations don't melt away ( fall back ) they just burn .

 

[Kirkhill]

Just doing some reading and came across two new terms (well at least new to me) in use in the US Army.

There has been a study ongoing on how to reorganize, equip and trial the IBCT within the new division constructs (Transforming-in-contact 1.0) . Three IBCTs have been involved in this, one each from the 101 Airborne, 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry (Hawaii).

The term MBCT (Mobile Brigade Combat Team) has been coined for the 2/101st going back to last August. It denotes an IBCT which has been equipped and is being trialled with the M1301 Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV). The 2/25th and 3/10th, OTOH are being designated and equipped and trialed as LBCTs (Light Brigade Combat Teams).



A similar experiment is starting up with the 2nd ABCT of the 1st Cavalry Divison to see how to restructure an armored brigade combat team.



The next phase (Transforming-in-contact 2.0) will look at the divisional structures.

I'm generally ambivalent, but never virulently opposed, to adopting American terminology. With respect to BCT, both our closest allies (yeah. I know) use the term which distinguishes the organizational structure from the simpler "brigade" to the more descriptive "mechanized brigade group" (which reflects back on a more tracked CFE model which no longer exists). Maybe its time to keep watch on what shakes out of these trials - I'm never opposed to letting someone else do the heavy lifting and copying them when the time comes.

Even though I've always been a 'light/airborne' Infantry type guy I'm sad to see too much time being wasted on this light stuff, in any western military.

The real decision maker has always been the 'heavy metal' crew.

But it's expensive and complicated so my guess is that the 'good idea merchants', who want a great performance review followed by a swift promotion, tend to focus on the light stuff because it's easier to get some kind of result within a fairly short timeframe - like their 2 year posting cycle.

Further to this discussion. On another thread I made an obscure pictorial reference to the 18th struggle between Gage's Light Americans and Dundas's Heavy Prussians. The debate is not new, nor is the struggle for funding and influence.

My sense is that Britain performed well over the last couple of hundred years because of the debate and not in spite of it. I am pretty sure I would get majority support for saying that there is need for both types of forces to manage the full spectrum of threats that may arise.

Which brings me to this article

Reconnaissance in the Light Brigade Combat Team

The Army’s Transformation in Contact (TiC) initiative leverages emerging technology and future-forward force design to transition existing brigade comba...

www.army.mil

In 2024, the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team transitioned from an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) to a light brigade combat team (LBCT-prototype).

The LBCT is designed to be a lethal and adaptable formation that can fight in heavily restricted terrain. Traditional enabling assets like the brigade engineer battalion (BEB), cavalry squadron, and brigade sustainment battalion (BSB) have been restructured or eliminated entirely to lighten the formation and unburden the brigade staff.

Building a more robust enabling capability at the division level facilitates the Army’s desire to return to it as a unit of action while allowing the brigade to focus on training and employing its rifle companies.

The rifle battalion has also not been immune to change. Battalion scouts and mortars were combined with the remnants of the cavalry troop to form battalion-level cross-domain effects companies (CDEs). ... CDEs combine robotics and autonomous systems with traditional reconnaissance platoons to form lethal and highly enabled teams.

The LBCT rifle company has more assets than ever to sense, see, and strike the enemy.

This statement was stryking.

Equipped with Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISVs), the LBCT’s infantry formations can rapidly move combat power around the battlefield while providing more off-road capability than legacy vehicles.

....

But

The transition from a brigade cavalry squadron to three battalion CDEs leaves the brigade commander short of intelligence capability.

This gap in manned reconnaissance also exists at the division level and has compounding effects in the LBCT construct.

To address this gap, both LBCT prototypes have stood up provisional reconnaissance companies to answer brigade PIRs directly. The 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has successfully tested a multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC), while 2/25 deployed its reconnaissance and strike company (RSC) at the most recent JPMRC iteration.3 These concepts mirror previous experimentation conducted by 2/25 during fiscal years 2022 and 2023 at Twentynine Palms, CA, and Japan. Combining electronic warfare (EW), UAS, and traditional human reconnaissance techniques can have a tremendous effect in the brigade fight. The Army should consider standardizing this structure across its TiC formations to speed the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the acquisition of equipment for reconnaissance companies.

Which leads to the author's thesis

In this article, I will articulate a structure for a multidomain reconnaissance company (MRC) that can answer PIRs in the brigade deep area while enabling rifle battalions to succeed in the close fight.

....

Are troops safer with the heightened awareness that comes from operating with no armour, as with the ISV, or does "light armour" (inadequate armour) give them a false sense of security that encourages rash decisions?

...

And in terms of fire support, it has always been a given that a gun will deliver the support, that a gun needs to be heavy, a heavy gun demands a vehicle and that any gun, and its crew, will be a target. That targeting has resulted in the impulse to protect the crew with armour.

The Author of the article joins with a lot of others in promoting the combination of ground launched LAMs and UAVs to take some of the strain off the guns.

I note that the current pause affects all the armoured weapons systems as well as the robotic vehicles.

Does the pause suggest that a longer look is being taken at the entire issue of fire support and what can be delivered with uncrewed aerial vehicles as well as uncrewed ground vehicles? Accepting that lack of crews may mean less resilience BUT not having to worry about crews may mean cheaper systems and ultimately more systems.