markppcli
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If we need a DMR, just buy or re purpose the C20s. Done.
Informing the Army’s Future Structure
- Thread starter dimsum
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Thanks FJAG. From my quick read at the paper, the Stinger remains the man-portable option, with Avengers (basically a Humvee with a bunch of Stingers) being replaced by M-SHORAD, a Stryker mounted system. Then a bunch of laser weapons that will probably never come to fruition.Not
Not just weak but nonexistent. Air defence in the US Army is a divisional and higher resource. Around the same time that the Army started splitting into BCTs, the divisions (which still exist) were divested of air defence capabilities although a significantly reduced capability stayed within bot Active Army and National Guard AD battalions and brigades.
At it's lowest level is the shoulder fired Stinger which, while it still is available in large numbers are not in general distribution within BCTs. They are available for specific roles and some appear as self defence weapons on Navy ships.
The next level of air defence that would be available at the BCT level is the Avenger which is a vehicle mounted battery of Stingers and a .50 machine gun. These mostly exist in Natl Guard battalions but because of the recent revival of AD a few additional Active Army battalions have been reformed as a temporary measure while the new Stryker mounted SHORAD systems are coming on line.
There are additional layers of higher and further striking systems in the inventory and if your interested in the overall state, there's a fairly recent Congressional briefing paper on the subject here.
In short, BCT's do not currently have organic AD systems but do operate under an AD umbrella when there is an air threat.
My question is this:
The US is no longer guaranteed to have air superiority in a peer conflict, therefore their maneuver units are required to have their own air defense. Today, the only air defense that is available is a few battalions of Humvee mounted Stingers, in a 58 BCT strong army. Why is air defense so low on the priority list for modernization? How does the Patriot function in an air defense system?
If the US, who itself cannot even protect their own units, cannot protect their allies, should it not be the CAF's priority to fill this gap since nobody else can provide it in times of war?
How does the 6.8/NGSW factor into this equation? Would it be worth it to follow the US if they do change caliber? How does increasing the standard caliber affect the DMR role?
markppcli
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In the next five years? It doesn't.
GR66
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I guess this really is the $64,000 question. Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?
Can we realistically (even with some HQ consolidation and other "tweaks") deploy a full CMBG plus the CCSB in support to a conflict zone, keep it supplied and reinforced with both troops and replacement equipment/ammo/fuel/supplies to cover losses without totally breaking the Army?
If it's not currently realistic then in terms of Force 2025/Force 2030 timeframes should we instead focus on being able to deploy a Battle Group instead? If that's the case, then does using out current "Affiliated" Battle Group approach still make sense, or would creating "Optimal" Battle Groups better prepare us for a fight (17 pages of discussion here - enjoy!: The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group). Or possibly an asymmetric mix of the two. Two or three "optimal" Battle Groups configured for (and training together for) a peer fight and a separate "traditional" CMBG with the Medium/Light forces to fulfill the ongoing typical/non-peer fight deployments.
I personally believe that we should aspire to being able to deploy and sustain full CMBG to a conflict but maybe we should accept that all the changes that are required to achieve that (force structure, major equipment, Reserve legislation, etc.) are beyond what can be realistically achieved in the 10-year timeframe. If that's the case should we in the meantime structure ourselves in a way that we can maximize what we can currently contribute while we work toward the eventual goal?
daftandbarmy
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No idea if this has been done before, or makes sense, but would it be easier/ more efficient to have a reasonable number of 'high readiness coys/sqns/btys' in each Division?
Kind of like an IRU, but more of them and fully tooled up for WW3....
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Given anything approaching 6 months of conventional conflict, there will be no enemy airforce left in a conflict with the US. No one comes even close to them. The US Navy has the second-largest airforce in the world with over 3700 aircraft. NATO doctrine assumes strategic control of the air because frankly that's the most likely scenario by a long shot.
That being said with UAV's the NATO may not have local superiority. Or there may be a need to shoot down incoming ordinance which is where GBAD comes into play.
Small UAS that can't be tracked or engaged by traditional air defense is the gap that needs to be plugged. A MALE or HALE UAS can be engaged by traditional fighter aircraft and will likely be wiped out pretty quickly. In particular triangulation of their ground stations will also be a priority.
But the small platoon and company level stuff of Scan Eagle size or smaller is a problem as they can sneak in under the fighter cover.
This is the type of GBAD that the Canadian army should be focusing on (IMHO), Stinger missiles, directed energy (microwave,laser), AA guns, and their own suicide UAVs to engage and limit exposure to such things. It's a good thing small UAS were not mature enough during Afghanistan or there would have been plenty of issues with them in the FOB's dropping mortar bombs on us or flying into airspace to collide with aircraft.
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On the aspirational or delusional front - do we know how our enemies are going to fight? Will they fight like 1980s communists, 1990s Iraqis, Partisans or 2020 Turks? Or better yet - will they fight like Americans. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
One cheap weapon that we are apparently not training with, supplying, or respecting as much as we should perhaps is smoke.
MarkPPCLI noted that very few people seem to be exploiting their grenade dischargers on their vehicles.
One of the primary capabilities of mortars is the ability to project smoke densely and fast and at a distance. Our 1980s vintage 60mm mortars were primarily Smoke Projectors (WP if I remember). I recall reading about the Radfan campaign in Oman in the 1970s where FOBs with a 25pdr and an 81mm would have the 81 with a mixed load of 5-10 rounds prepped for Immediate Action. The Mix was predominantly Smoke with a couple of HE mixed in.
So, in terms of tools that can be bought cheaply
- a lethal, modern armoured defense system based on the Carl Gustaf for the Short Range work (500 to 1000 (2000 Extreme)), a Medium Range direct fire system for the 2000 to 5000 m band and, if the budget stretches that far, an NLOS system for the Arty.
- good DMR, indeed, widely distributed
- refresh the 60 and 81 mm mortars
- upgrade the CG84 to the lighter, shorter, M4 version with improved sights.
- upgrade the ammunition inventory for the Mortars and CG84 (essentially a direct fire mortar) and buy lots of smoke and use it freely in training.
Everything from vehicle MBGDs, to 40s, 60s, 81s and CG84s. Not to forget hand grenades
Smoke, or Obscurants, allows Light Infantry with ATGMs to break contact cleanly after getting off two rapid Fire and Forget shots. Just like a tank or a LAV with their MBGDs.
Daniel Morgan and the Battle of Cowpens
www.robert-morgan.com
One cheap weapon that we are apparently not training with, supplying, or respecting as much as we should perhaps is smoke.
MarkPPCLI noted that very few people seem to be exploiting their grenade dischargers on their vehicles.
One of the primary capabilities of mortars is the ability to project smoke densely and fast and at a distance. Our 1980s vintage 60mm mortars were primarily Smoke Projectors (WP if I remember). I recall reading about the Radfan campaign in Oman in the 1970s where FOBs with a 25pdr and an 81mm would have the 81 with a mixed load of 5-10 rounds prepped for Immediate Action. The Mix was predominantly Smoke with a couple of HE mixed in.
So, in terms of tools that can be bought cheaply
- a lethal, modern armoured defense system based on the Carl Gustaf for the Short Range work (500 to 1000 (2000 Extreme)), a Medium Range direct fire system for the 2000 to 5000 m band and, if the budget stretches that far, an NLOS system for the Arty.
- good DMR, indeed, widely distributed
- refresh the 60 and 81 mm mortars
- upgrade the CG84 to the lighter, shorter, M4 version with improved sights.
- upgrade the ammunition inventory for the Mortars and CG84 (essentially a direct fire mortar) and buy lots of smoke and use it freely in training.
Everything from vehicle MBGDs, to 40s, 60s, 81s and CG84s. Not to forget hand grenades
Smoke, or Obscurants, allows Light Infantry with ATGMs to break contact cleanly after getting off two rapid Fire and Forget shots. Just like a tank or a LAV with their MBGDs.
Two Shots and You're Free
Daniel Morgan and the Battle of Cowpens
Two Shots and You're Free | Robert Morgan
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Should it?
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Thinking about smoke I remember being thoroughly impressed with demonstration staged on one exercise where the Calg Highr ex staff surrounded our position with trip flares and smoke grenades then proceeded to trigger the lot at night. The effect was to comprehensively blind those in the smoke and light and at the same time set them up against a lighted backdrop for us in the defense. It was like shooting at people backlit by a movie screen. People that couldn't see us shooting at them.
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I think we are confronted with Admiral Jellicoe's dilemma - 'the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon' - and dam near did at Jutland. We need to have an army can survive the opening moves of any war in which it is engaged. And it needs to be able to engage in any war and counter any tactics. And it needs to be cheap, quick and good.
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For a bit of seasoning
sof.news
Fighting the Fight We Are In | SOF News
Dr. Ajit Maan argues that the U.S. needs an offensive narrative strategy that shapes perceptions that inoculates populations to insurgent narratives.
sof.news
FJAG
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Canada has been wrestling with this question from when we first committed a force to NATO some 70 years ago. Then as now the issue was to deter aggression with the aim of avoiding what at that time was a likely thermonuclear war. Deterrence, now as then, has to show convince the opponent that any attack is likely to end in failure which, in short means the deterring force has to be a credible one.
I'm not going to get into the argument about whether a trip-wire rifle company as part of an international contingent makes a credible deterrent - there are numerous opinions on that already.
What I will say is that for most armies the division used to be the smallest unit of action. That has changed as armies devolved the concept of a self-contained fighting force to the brigade group. Yes, you can push the concept down even further if you wish to a squadron/company combat team. The problem, however, isn't its mix of all arms and support elements, it is the impact that the size of the unit will bring both on the field as well as in the diplomatic circles amongst your allies and opponents.
The smaller that you are the less anyone will care about the fact that you are there. The reason 27 Infantry Brigade was shipped to Europe was to make such an impact. It did. Even when we determined that we'd never be able to send the other 2/3rds of 1 Cdn Div in time to make a difference. But 27 Bde (later 4 CMBG) wasn't all that we sent. We also sent 1 Air Div which had 12 fighter squadrons. Now that was an impact statement and made Canada's commitment at the time a noticeable one.
Things have changed. We're now fending off insidious attacks well below the threshold of tanks crossing the border but nonetheless indicative of opponents who will exploit weakness and who do need to be kept in check whether it be on the border or in cyberspace.
What bothers me is that at this critical time we are making statements like "realistically all we can field is a battlegroup". That has two problems for me. First it shows an inability to properly visualize the potential that four full-time brigades and ten reserve brigades (albeit at half-strength) could bring to the table. Second, if true - and I'm very much afraid that it might be considering our performance to generate forces for Afghanistan - then it shows that the Army has indeed been a very poor steward of the resources given to it by the people of Canada. While its facile to blame the politicians for their lack of committing sufficient funds to the Forces, one has to reasonably ask as to where the fault lies when twenty two billion dollars a year buys you defence outputs of three fighter squadrons, a dozen ships and one battlegroup. Canada employs over 100,000 people in defence but that's our output at the sharp end?
To get back to your question GR66 "Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?". The answer bloody well better be "aspirational" and be supported by a robust plan to do that and even better. If its "delusional" then the criticism of our leadership should go far beyond their inability to get sexual assault issues under control and turn instead to the inability to mange our defence capability outputs.
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I think from what I've read in this thread it's delusional to suggest that Canada could field a brigade group and sustain it over time including sustaining personnel and equipment losses. In this thread we are still hashing out the structure of the organiztion of the Army's Brigades and how they are outfitted. I don't know how to judge that though? How many of our NATO allies could sustain a CMBG overseas? I'm assumming the US/UK/France/Germany(?). Could Poland or Italy or Spain?
TangoTwoBravo
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Is this about prestige and impact for you? You are tracking that Canada is the lead nation for one of the EFP BattleGroups? That is not a minor effort or minor achievement. I am not sure what your comments on Afghanistan force generation are about?Canada has been wrestling with this question from when we first committed a force to NATO some 70 years ago. Then as now the issue was to deter aggression with the aim of avoiding what at that time was a likely thermonuclear war. Deterrence, now as then, has to show convince the opponent that any attack is likely to end in failure which, in short means the deterring force has to be a credible one.
I'm not going to get into the argument about whether a trip-wire rifle company as part of an international contingent makes a credible deterrent - there are numerous opinions on that already.
What I will say is that for most armies the division used to be the smallest unit of action. That has changed as armies devolved the concept of a self-contained fighting force to the brigade group. Yes, you can push the concept down even further if you wish to a squadron/company combat team. The problem, however, isn't its mix of all arms and support elements, it is the impact that the size of the unit will bring both on the field as well as in the diplomatic circles amongst your allies and opponents.
The smaller that you are the less anyone will care about the fact that you are there. The reason 27 Infantry Brigade was shipped to Europe was to make such an impact. It did. Even when we determined that we'd never be able to send the other 2/3rds of 1 Cdn Div in time to make a difference. But 27 Bde (later 4 CMBG) wasn't all that we sent. We also sent 1 Air Div which had 12 fighter squadrons. Now that was an impact statement and made Canada's commitment at the time a noticeable one.
Things have changed. We're now fending off insidious attacks well below the threshold of tanks crossing the border but nonetheless indicative of opponents who will exploit weakness and who do need to be kept in check whether it be on the border or in cyberspace.
What bothers me is that at this critical time we are making statements like "realistically all we can field is a battlegroup". That has two problems for me. First it shows an inability to properly visualize the potential that four full-time brigades and ten reserve brigades (albeit at half-strength) could bring to the table. Second, if true - and I'm very much afraid that it might be considering our performance to generate forces for Afghanistan - then it shows that the Army has indeed been a very poor steward of the resources given to it by the people of Canada. While its facile to blame the politicians for their lack of committing sufficient funds to the Forces, one has to reasonably ask as to where the fault lies when twenty two billion dollars a year buys you defence outputs of three fighter squadrons, a dozen ships and one battlegroup. Canada employs over 100,000 people in defence but that's our output at the sharp end?
To get back to your question GR66 "Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?". The answer bloody well better be "aspirational" and be supported by a robust plan to do that and even better. If its "delusional" then the criticism of our leadership should go far beyond their inability to get sexual assault issues under control and turn instead to the inability to mange our defence capability outputs.
I've been part of contemporary exercises where 1st Canadian Division is deployed for a general war in Europe (Computer Assisted Exercise of course) - when you actually count up the resource requirements its staggering. I've been involved in the briefings of the bill should we try to do it for real - some stony faces around the table from those being briefed. Even a full CMBG requires equipment and capabilities not really being looked at. A CMBG for Europe is aspirational - a BG, a real fighting BG, is absolutely possible. If you stretch the timeframe out from warning to delivery to something like a year then things become more realistic for formation-sized employment in a hot war.
Force 2025 does not count on additional resources. It is not a pipedream or armchair fantasy session.
The good news, though, for an aspirational CMBG in a European hot-war is that we have the structure, doctrine and indeed much of the training regime already in place. It is one of our "happy places" as an institution - the CMBG Jungian mask is quite familiar.
A CMBG HQ and a Canadian BG is also something that could be realistic for many missions, be they a modern peacekeeping mission such as an Eretria Redux or a counter-insurgency mission. There might be some capabilities from our Kandahar days that have been allowed to whither or simply become dormant that might prove useful in such an operation.
FJAG
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I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.
Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:
There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.
The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.
My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.
I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.
The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.
We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science.
Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"
The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.
There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.
If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.
I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.
So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?
I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)
TangoTwoBravo
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Do you not think that the Army has been busy on operations since 4 CMBG was shut down and we left Germany? Have we been sitting around? Is there a task from the Government where we have failed to provide? What else would you have liked the Army to have done in Afghanistan? Do you understand what was involved in sustaining those rotations? The Army has three combat brigades, and the people in those brigades were fully committed to rotational operations from the 90s onwards. Do you feel that we did not provide value for your money?I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.
Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:
There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.
The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.
My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.
I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.
The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.
We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science.
Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"
The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.
There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.
If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.
I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.
So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?
I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)
The missions today are different, but we still have significant Army contributions to three international missions (every third year a CMBG is heavily committed to those missions), and I will say again that we are the lead nation for one of the EFP Battle Groups. We've exercised moving a Bde HQ and a Battalion to Norway and conducted several warfighting CAXs with NATO in a European context. Were the Canadian Army called upon to deploy a Bde HQ and a BG to a UN or NATO mission we could certainly do so. The shortfall I see is a CMBG against a peer in Eastern Europe. How would pick the crews that get the well-protected tanks from the crews that don't? Do you wish to send towed artillery into that fight?
I will say it again that the calculus could change for something like OIF. I will also note that when the possibility of deploying a CMBG to Gulf War 1 presented itself it did not happen. Canada could deploy a very capable BG to something like OIF (just need some infantry AT). I really like the CMBG - its where things come together. We also need a lot things to be able to put one up against a peer foe. A Battlegroup with a squadron of Leopard 2A6Ms, though, is something very capable that could do something important now. I am sure that the US would appreciate having such a BG as part of a multinational force for some unforeseen kinetic operation. Similarly, leveraging our experience of the past decades we could absolutely provide a Bde HQ and a BG and all the things on the very important edges (capacity building etc) to a UN or NATO stability operation. We are in better shape than we were in 2005 heading into the South.
GBAD is indeed one of the top priorities (it might actually be the top) for capability development right now. I don't have a timeline, but just being a priority is a huge step from before. There is a tank life extension project. The managed readiness plan has been adjusted to have a CMBG actually in high readiness for a year before it gets sent on those missions I mentioned earlier. This means that the Army is much better positioned to generate forces for unforeseen missions while still honouring the existing ones. These are positive developments.
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FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe. It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.
Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:
There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.
The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.
My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.
I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.
The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.
We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science.
Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"
The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.
There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.
If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.
I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.
So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?
I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)
Take the year 2010 for instance:
Canada had a SOTF, Infantry Battlegroup, PRT, Aviation Task Force and TF HQ deployed to Afghanistan.
Canada also deployed an Infantry Battalion to Haiti for Op HESTIA along with Naval and Air Assets.
It did both these missions while also contributing a significant effort to the security effort of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.
This isn't even mentioning all the other enduring Naval and Air contributions to NATO, NORAD, Disaster Response, the MENA theatre, etc.
The CAF managed to run two simultaneous major international operations along with a major domestic operation, at one point having 10k+ personnel engaged in operations concurrently on opposite ends of the World, one of which is a landlocked Country.
It then turned around the next year and made another big contribution in Libya, leading the operation and contributing 10% of the ordnance. I don't know how much more bang for your buck you get than that? I don't know of many other NATO countries outside the big players that could even pull that off.
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Given that operating environment is the Army appropriately organized to meet its day-to-day needs? We have been working with the CMBG construct for 60 years or so. The Army has been "managing" to meet the government's requirements, varied and variable, with that construct. The construct has been retained over concern that it may be needed, or at least be useful, in a high intensity conflict. But in 60 years the optimum construct sat in garrison for 25 years (in fairness, like the rest of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces contributing to the maintenance of international stability). For the last 35 years the construct has not been employed as designed. Even when opportunities arose, the Gulf Wars, the government of the day declined to employ the tools that the Army offered. Instead they went different directions. They employed the Air Force when they wanted to make a short, sharp statement publicly. They routinely employ the silent service on long term alliance building operations like Op Carib and STANAVFORLANT and RIMPAC type exercises. They also routinely employ Special Forces on operations that are becoming less and less special.
Meanwhile the entire structure of the Army continues its focus on a construct that hasn't been employed in any manner in 35 years and, operationally, since the Korean War.
I understand the frustration of those who feel we could be doing more with the money and people the government allocates to the Army and its Reserves. And I share that frustration.
I also understand the importance of being ready for worst case scenarios. I plan that way myself.
But sometimes we might have to shift our focus.
Personally I understand how we got to a LAV based, medium weight, infantry-centric force. And I can appreciate its value in situations like Eritrea, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and ePF. And potentially elsewhere.
And I accept that the Army we have may be called to do things other than that for which it prepares and may turn up a variety of UORs.
My concern is that the Army, by focusing on the very Canadian Middle of the Road Medium Weight LAV force is neither adequately preparing for the operations for which the CMBG was designed, nor is it taking advantage of the opportunities available to it to refocus efforts to deal with emerging threats and non-traditional operations.
I appreciate that the Army is very busy. But is it usefully busy? Or is a lot of that busyness the result of having to meet the government's needs by managing a force construct that is not optimal for those needs?
The Army "manages". But should it have to spend as much effort as it does just managing?
FJAG is concerned about his 22 billion dollars. I suggest that he is probably getting value for about 50 to 70% of that money given the ongoing operations of the CSE, the RCN, the RCAF and CANSOFCOM, as well as the Army. My personal belief is that any business that operates at 70% efficiency, especially in a highly changeable environment, is probably doing about as well as can be expected. I also believe that a 70% organization can also be profitable and effective.
In Army terms that translates into 10 units under command - 2 groups of 3 committed forwards dealing with the actual situation, 1 group of three ready to adapt to the situation as it evolves and the 10th group in the commander's back pocket ready to react act short notice to manage his unknown unknowns.
I believe, with the LAV force we have 60% of the force committed. It seems to me we are debating the nature of the 10% strategic reserve and also, more importantly how to manage that final 30%. Do we need it or should it be committed to support the LAV Force? Should it be committed to the Strategic Reserve? Does it need to be used to build Reserve capacity through training and leadership? Or, should it be retained in a more amorphous adaptable element.
Do we make matters more difficult for ourselves with nomenclature and not fully giving credit to the value of the administrative brigade and assuming that brigades only have value when they are operational and fully supported?
What was it that Brad Sallows said? "How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?" That doesn't just apply to AT platoons in battalions. It is equally worth considering at the Army level.
Infanteer favours, based on his experience, spatial concentration in peacetime and operational dispersal.
There is another alternative and that is to disperse units in peacetime but add to their training regime local brigading of those dispersed assets.
The Ops Order format, under Situation is explicit in noting that the fighting force will be different than it was in garrison, or even the approach march. Every Situation includes Atts and Dets. I hope that current army training regularly reflects that lack of certainty.
And, personally, I would be more than happy to have a readily adaptable, trained but undefined element in the construct. An Odd Job Brigade - dispersed or concentrated.
Does the Army train for Max-Flex?
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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And yet, we still seem to suffer from a self-image issue, as well as being seen as somewhat of an 'Uncle Sam coat tail rider'.
