Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[TangoTwoBravo]

Given that operating environment is the Army appropriately organized to meet its day-to-day needs? We have been working with the CMBG construct for 60 years or so. The Army has been "managing" to meet the government's requirements, varied and variable, with that construct. The construct has been retained over concern that it may be needed, or at least be useful, in a high intensity conflict. But in 60 years the optimum construct sat in garrison for 25 years (in fairness, like the rest of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces contributing to the maintenance of international stability). For the last 35 years the construct has not been employed as designed. Even when opportunities arose, the Gulf Wars, the government of the day declined to employ the tools that the Army offered. Instead they went different directions. They employed the Air Force when they wanted to make a short, sharp statement publicly. They routinely employ the silent service on long term alliance building operations like Op Carib and STANAVFORLANT and RIMPAC type exercises. They also routinely employ Special Forces on operations that are becoming less and less special.

Meanwhile the entire structure of the Army continues its focus on a construct that hasn't been employed in any manner in 35 years and, operationally, since the Korean War.

I understand the frustration of those who feel we could be doing more with the money and people the government allocates to the Army and its Reserves. And I share that frustration.

I also understand the importance of being ready for worst case scenarios. I plan that way myself.

But sometimes we might have to shift our focus.

Personally I understand how we got to a LAV based, medium weight, infantry-centric force. And I can appreciate its value in situations like Eritrea, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and ePF. And potentially elsewhere.

And I accept that the Army we have may be called to do things other than that for which it prepares and may turn up a variety of UORs.

My concern is that the Army, by focusing on the very Canadian Middle of the Road Medium Weight LAV force is neither adequately preparing for the operations for which the CMBG was designed, nor is it taking advantage of the opportunities available to it to refocus efforts to deal with emerging threats and non-traditional operations.

I appreciate that the Army is very busy. But is it usefully busy? Or is a lot of that busyness the result of having to meet the government's needs by managing a force construct that is not optimal for those needs?

The Army "manages". But should it have to spend as much effort as it does just managing?

FJAG is concerned about his 22 billion dollars. I suggest that he is probably getting value for about 50 to 70% of that money given the ongoing operations of the CSE, the RCN, the RCAF and CANSOFCOM, as well as the Army. My personal belief is that any business that operates at 70% efficiency, especially in a highly changeable environment, is probably doing about as well as can be expected. I also believe that a 70% organization can also be profitable and effective.

In Army terms that translates into 10 units under command - 2 groups of 3 committed forwards dealing with the actual situation, 1 group of three ready to adapt to the situation as it evolves and the 10th group in the commander's back pocket ready to react act short notice to manage his unknown unknowns.

I believe, with the LAV force we have 60% of the force committed. It seems to me we are debating the nature of the 10% strategic reserve and also, more importantly how to manage that final 30%. Do we need it or should it be committed to support the LAV Force? Should it be committed to the Strategic Reserve? Does it need to be used to build Reserve capacity through training and leadership? Or, should it be retained in a more amorphous adaptable element.

Do we make matters more difficult for ourselves with nomenclature and not fully giving credit to the value of the administrative brigade and assuming that brigades only have value when they are operational and fully supported?

What was it that Brad Sallows said? "How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?" That doesn't just apply to AT platoons in battalions. It is equally worth considering at the Army level.

Infanteer favours, based on his experience, spatial concentration in peacetime and operational dispersal.

There is another alternative and that is to disperse units in peacetime but add to their training regime local brigading of those dispersed assets.

The Ops Order format, under Situation is explicit in noting that the fighting force will be different than it was in garrison, or even the approach march. Every Situation includes Atts and Dets. I hope that current army training regularly reflects that lack of certainty.

And, personally, I would be more than happy to have a readily adaptable, trained but undefined element in the construct. An Odd Job Brigade - dispersed or concentrated.

Does the Army train for Max-Flex?

I think we have to train for uncertainty in how/where/against who we are going to be employed, and indeed flexibility is very important. We talk about "a war vs the war." During Afghanistan I think it was entirely appropriate to train for "the war" since we knew where we were going and who we would be fighting. I suppose now we have to train for "a war" or "many wars." Some might not even look like war at first glance.

I do not see a need to abandon the CMBG construct, nor training the CMBG HQs for operations. We've generated enough HQs above BG for operations in the last two decades to show that there is absolutely value in continuing to do so. You are correct, though, that they also have a very important purpose which is administering and training battalions/regiments.

A key aspect of the LAV infantry battalions is their flexibility. Could they leave their LAVs in Canada and deploy in TAPVs or even lighter vehicles to a peacekeeping/stability operation in a jungle/urban area of operations? I think so. Could they leave their LAVs in Canada and deploy in support of a Head of Mission for an assisted departure or NEO? I think so. Could their LAVs allow them to patrol an area of separation in Africa? Yes. Could they participate in combat operations in an operation such as Gulf War 1 or OIF? Yes - they need a tank squadron with them and some anti-tank missiles, but they can do that type of operation.

Regarding skill sets, some do indeed benefit from being housed together and then attached out as needed.

 

[Kirkhill]

So a quick follow up to FJAG's questions.

Are you happy with your Army?

Are you happy commiting your soldiers to your Army?

For me those questions are far more important than what we outsiders think of your Army.

But.

The comms gap, as in all projects, occurs between what you expect to supply and what your client expects to buy.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

So a quick follow up to FJAG's questions.

Are you happy with your Army?

Are you happy commiting your soldiers to your Army?

For me those questions are far more important than what we outsiders think of your Army.

But.

The comms gap, as in all projects, occurs between what you expect to supply and what your client expects to buy.

Is this a Senate hearing?

There are things I would look at changing and of course there are problems, but I am happy with the Army. Some of the organizational changes I would make would likely cause other problems. It is fun to reorganize the Army on a napkin at the mess when you are not accountable for the implementation and outcome. I think that one thing we tend to neglect in our musing is support (both combat service support and institutional support). I would privilege some capabilities over others, based on my own biases from experience, inclination and my own read of events which may well be wrong.

I am between postings right now, but when I was in command I was not a feudal baron deciding to commit "my" soldiers. Those soldiers were entrusted to me by the Army. I will respond to a reframed question: I did not and do not feel moral injury commanding soldiers in this army.

 

[Kirkhill]

Heard you clear.

Just an interested citizen trying to stay informed.

 

[FJAG]

Do you not think that the Army has been busy on operations since 4 CMBG was shut down and we left Germany? Have we been sitting around? Is there a task from the Government where we have failed to provide? What else would you have liked the Army to have done in Afghanistan? Do you understand what was involved in sustaining those rotations? The Army has three combat brigades, and the people in those brigades were fully committed to rotational operations from the 90s onwards. Do you feel that we did not provide value for your money?

The missions today are different, ...

FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe. It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.

Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.

I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.

Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.

My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.

Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.

While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.

It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.

In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.

In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.

By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.

The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.

Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.

By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.

So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.

Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."

As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.

There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.

Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).

However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.

So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.

That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.

 

[Underway]

GBAD is indeed one of the top priorities (it might actually be the top) for capability development right now. I don't have a timeline, but just being a priority is a huge step from before. There is a tank life extension project.

This is good to hear. As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.

Opinion:
Regarding GBAD this makes sense. UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity. A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats. Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.

What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG. It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce. And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US. But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
/Opinion

Regarding the Leo life extension, is this an upgrade type thing (aka LAV III to LAV 6) or just a fix everything old to make it better. I would be nice to see something like the Challenger 3 upgrade, with significant mods to the tank to bring it electronically and safetywise into the 2020s (storing ammo without blowout panels, active protection, third gen thermals, 50 cal RWS and so on), or even making all the tanks a single mod (like upgrading all the Leo 2A4 to the 2A6 CAN standard).

 

[Kirkhill]

FJAG

You know I accept much of your argument but there is one area where I think we need to clarify things.

When you talk of a four division, fourteen brigade establishment I think we need to separate clearly the operational from the administrative. I accept that even when considering just the administrative functions it strains my credulity to accept the need for the numbers of HQs given the numbers of bodies, both reserve and reg, in question.

But don't have to be clear that the Administrative requirement for HQs is independent of the Operational needs?

By the way it is five divisions if we include the Joint First Division.

I can see the value of retaining 3x CMBGs in their current format. It does give an operational focus should the need arise while creating a pool of assets from which can be drawn appropriate adhoc assemblages to suit the mission. Given the necessary time. And that is my biggest concern: the size and speed of any reaction force. I would like to have an additional option in the back pocket than just the Medium Weight option. That is why I am fond of maintaining a pool of well trained light troops suitably equipped with the most firepower they can carry with them on the planes we have.

My problems start with the 4th regular brigade and continue through the utilization of the reserves. We agree that the reserves are under-equipped and under-employed. I think we could make better use of the four tiers of availability baked into the reserve system - Short time Cs, Part time Bs, Occasional As and if absolutely necessary Supp List.

It would be nicer if we could reclaim the Regiment from its political dungeon to its original administrative meaning. A body of troops trained in a common regime to a common standard.

I also not that many armies still retain the Repple Coy or Bn in their organization. A depth pool of reservists, those off strength undergoing training, the sick and the LOB.

Those troops are not tactically organised. They are retained on strength but at long lead times. My sense is the longer the lead time the less need their is for detailed organisation and task assignment. And, indeed it may be counter productive if it causes current resources to be used in supplying outmoded capabilities.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is good to hear. As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.

Opinion:
Regarding GBAD this makes sense. UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity. A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats. Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.

What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG. It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce. And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US. But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
/Opinion

Regarding the Leo life extension, is this an upgrade type thing (aka LAV III to LAV 6) or just a fix everything old to make it better. I would be nice to see something like the Challenger 3 upgrade, with significant mods to the tank to bring it electronically and safetywise into the 2020s (storing ammo without blowout panels, active protection, third gen thermals, 50 cal RWS and so on), or even making all the tanks a single mod (like upgrading all the Leo 2A4 to the 2A6 CAN standard).

Underway - I would still like to be able to deconstruct the 3 stripers command, with all its offensive and defensive capabilities, and be able to relocate those same capabilities to the land war. Option one would be to put everything on trailers and drag it into position. Option two, and I say this knowing the sailors are going to say "The Ship!!!", but option two is to take a ship and tie it up at the dock in a foreign port. The ship then assumes the same risks as the inhabitants of the dock, the host country and any Canadian Army types that would be doing the same job instead. Actually I would be looking for something other than a frigate - perhaps something more like a warehouse/transit point/hotel/hospital/maintenance facility/comms/command facility with both strong local Air Defence and lots of Reach. - Kind of like and AOR with some of its TEU space tasked to GBAD and LRPRs modules in the ready to fire mode.

Putting it another way I guess, I am looking for a floating Brigade Maintenance Area that can ship from Halifax and dock in Riga and tie up there for the duration. The navy's job is just to get her into harbour and escort her back to Halifax after the festivities are over and the Brigade, or Battlegroup, is recalled.

 

[FJAG]

This is good to hear. As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.

Opinion:
Regarding GBAD this makes sense. UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity. A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats. Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.

I would go a step further than "extremely useful" to "critical". We were very lucky in Afghanistan that the technology was not as mature then as it was not long after. Our only AD capability at the time (yes we still had one for much of that time) was targeted at the conventional air threat and would in all likelihood been of little use for aircraft as small as that.

What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG. It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce. And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US. But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
/Opinion

AD organizations vary. In the US low level AD was principally organized in battalions for the command and control element that is offered by such units and for the larger area that they cover. They were originally designed for divisions. It will be interesting to see how the new IM-SHORAD systems will be used but I note that so far they have deployed a full battalion, the 5th of the 4th AAR. The plan is to have 144 IM-SHORAD systems fielded in four battalions this year which means 36 systems per battalion or 12 per battery which is similar to the Avenger organization. Each battery ordinarily also has target acquisition radars over and above those on the individual system. I have no idea what the deployment allocation would be seeing as there is one rotational Stryker brigade in Poland along with V Corps (forward) and various support installations and an artillery brigade in Grafenwohr and an Airborne brigade in Italy.

On the other hand, when we had Blowpipe it was organic to the brigade's artillery regiment. ADATs was concentrated in 4 AD regiment and allocated out to brigades and in Germany was employed in separate otganizations one of which supported the airfield and another 4 CMBG.

The establishments of a typical Russian Motor Rifle brigade comes with two AD battalions (as well as two SP arty battalions, an ATk battalion and an MLRS battalion)

I would expect when GBAD comes back to Canada it will be centrally held in 4 GS Regt but allocated out to deployed BGs or CMBGs as required.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG

You know I accept much of your argument but there is one area where I think we need to clarify things.

When you talk of a four division, fourteen brigade establishment I think we need to separate clearly the operational from the administrative. I accept that even when considering just the administrative functions it strains my credulity to accept the need for the numbers of HQs given the numbers of bodies, both reserve and reg, in question.

But don't have to be clear that the Administrative requirement for HQs is independent of the Operational needs?

By the way it is five divisions if we include the Joint First Division.

Sure. There are three operational brigades: 1, 2 and 5. The CCSB is primarily administrative and to the best of my knowledge does not have a deployment capability. The four army divisions and the ten reserve brigades are all administrative although they do have operational roles vis-a-vis domestic operations. They do not have a deployable international operations role. In effect they are force generators.

I don't include 1 Div which is an operational hq with a deployment capability but does not belong to the Army per se - it belongs to CJOC and, as you say, is a joint hq.

In my mind 1 Div as the sole operational Div HQ is adequate as are two non deployable force generating Div HQs.

I think three Reg F deployable brigade headquarters are sufficient and that the CCSB should remain a non deployable HQ as long as we do not foresee ever deploying a division. On the other hand it should be capable of deploying a command and control element if there is ever a need to deploy several CS elements that cannot be adequately controlled by a brigade headquarters. I do not see that as an issue with the current level of deployments.

Based on numbers and geography I see a need for only five reserve brigades which for so long as we have no capability to deploy reserve units should be non-deployable force generators. That would give every reserve brigade between three to five thousand personnel. (and as an aside, yes I think reserve units need to be amalgamated into roughly forty bn sized units)

I think the Army should aspire to developing the reserves into a force that can deploy units and even formations. If we ever get close to that then I think that reserve brigade headquarters (which in my mind should have a high Reg F component to them) should also become deployable. In my mind the optimum should be a deployable reserve brigade and just below that the capability that a reserve brigade should be able to generate a battle group for a rotation such as with the eFP.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.

I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.

Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.

My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.

Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.

While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.

It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.

In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.

In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.

By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.

The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.

Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.

By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.

So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.

Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."

As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.

There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.

Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).

However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.

So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.

That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.

Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.

I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.

Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.

My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.

Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.

While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.

It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.

In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.

In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.

By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.

The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.

Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.

By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.

So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.

Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."

As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.

There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.

Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).

However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.

So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.

That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.

You keep talking about four Divisions. Yes, we have four organizations that are called Divisions and they have Brigades, but in reality we have three CMBGs, a CCSB and a collection of Reserve units. Those Divisions are very busy commanding and administering those reserve units in their geographical areas and three are double-hatted as Joint Task Force headquarters for domestic operations (an important task that is always being used). When we cut 4 CMBG in the early 90s as part of the reduction of the CAF those units became, for the most part, 10/90 units. Many then came back into being units circa 96/97, but with only a modest increase in personnel for the Army. We stripped out the schools in the mid-90s as part of this, leading to the migration of leadership to fill CFTPO. We have some hollow structures.

Fighting a conventional war in Europe at Brigade level is, perhaps, the ne plus ultra task, but it is not the task that justifies the current structure and size of the army. With Leopard 2A6M in a BG we are arguably in a better place than we would have been in 1989 as a CMBG if the balloon went up. As an armour officer I certainly think of the conventional fight, but something like a Kandahar redux is a more likely fight. While not everybody deployed over the conflict, we needed the size of the Regular Force that we have to sustain that fight and we would need it for the next one.

Moving forward as a army, I believe we need to prepare for everything from peacekeeping to stability/COIN to conventional war. The first does not have to be UN and the last does not have to be in Europe. We need some capabilities for the conventional fight, but we cannot neglect those needed for the more likely stability operation. I love a good combat team attack against an isolated Soviet platoon ("March on the Guidon!"), but there might be some others tasks out there. It turns out that COIN and stability operations aren't easy. We need to keep training our CMBG HQs. I think that some units could be re-rolled into capacity- building, and our tanks should be consolidated (in Gagetown).

 

[Kirkhill]

The struggle is real

AN AMERICAN FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY​

An American Force Structure for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks

The United States is unprepared for its current strategic challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, no nation could seriously threaten the territorial or

warontherocks.com

While the United States maintains global security responsibilities, much of its combat power — along with its sustainment base — is located in the homeland and would require transportation into theater in the event of war. The requirement to deploy globally in a crisis or conflict is not new. But the challenges in executing such movement rapidly enough to be relevant are novel ones. Influenced by the successes of Desert Storm, the U.S. national security leadership fashioned the nation’s military for short wars that would quickly deny U.S. adversaries their objectives. America’s military leadership also has had the luxury of being able to plan for a protracted logistics build-up. In the future, the country’s most powerful potential adversaries start with significant advantages that render a strategy focused on rapid denial of their objectives risky.

... The U.S. military does not have enough logistics capability to rapidly deploy for and sustain a fight against a peer-level adversary. But the magnitude of the imbalance, and the fact that the U.S. defense budget is very unlikely to grow enough to address the imbalance while continuing to fund current combat capabilities, requires recognizing a very difficult truth. To enable the United States to prevail in a fight against a peer-level adversary oceans away — and in a potentially protracted contest — requires shifting a large portion of the defense budget from combat capabilities to deployability and sustainment assets. Only by having the supporting and sustainment capabilities to succeed in such a conflict can the United States maximize its ability to deter any such conflict in the first place.

If the US is short of assets to move its own forces, with whom are we going to hitch a ride?

 

[CBH99]

The struggle is real

An American Force Structure for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks

The United States is unprepared for its current strategic challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, no nation could seriously threaten the territorial or

warontherocks.com

If the US is short of assets to move its own forces, with whom are we going to hitch a ride?

One thing the US does repeatedly - which genuinely surprises me - is eliminate their ability to generate critical capabilities due to short term thinking.

In some areas, the US is swift and effective at planning for and equipping for future conflicts.

But eliminating the C-17 production line, the F-22 production line, etc - because “we don’t have any orders so it doesn’t make sense to keep that building equipped to produce those planes.” Planes need replacing, regardless of whether they crashed, aged out, damaged, etc.

Every year, the US Congress buys the US military hardware they don’t ask for.

The US Army had to officially request no more M1’s due to they don’t have anywhere to store them anymore. (Have thousands fresh off the production line, parked, and stored.)

The US Navy requests 14 E/F Super Hornets, Congress buys them 18 ‘just because we like you.’ If they are able to keep those lines running despite no orders, couldn’t they keep a very baseline capability to produce C-17’s and cheap transport ships?


<Bewildered rant done>

 

[Kirkhill]

Ford keeps production lines open, with no orders, because people keep replacing worn out trucks.

 

[PuckChaser]

One thing the US does repeatedly - which genuinely surprises me - is eliminate their ability to generate critical capabilities due to short term thinking.

But eliminating the C-17 production line, the F-22 production line, etc - because “we don’t have any orders so it doesn’t make sense to keep that building equipped to produce those planes.” Planes need replacing, regardless of whether they crashed, aged out, damaged, etc.

Every year, the US Congress buys the US military hardware they don’t ask for.

You answered your own question. The US system has more money to throw at the problem, but is exponentially more politically tainted. Those production line openings and closings are all negotiated between political parties based on who's up for re-election, so military hardware is held hostage if you want to stick it to the other guy because they didn't vote for your bill.

I fully agree with you though, the C-17 line being shut down was incredibly short-sighted as there's no real replacement for that aircraft and it's a workhorse for many militarys. If someone waved a magic wand and dropped 2 more CC-177s into our laps, the RCAF would welcome them with open arms as we're running our A/C into the ground very quickly.

 

[CBH99]

You answered your own question. The US system has more money to throw at the problem, but is exponentially more politically tainted. Those production line openings and closings are all negotiated between political parties based on who's up for re-election, so military hardware is held hostage if you want to stick it to the other guy because they didn't vote for your bill.

I fully agree with you though, the C-17 line being shut down was incredibly short-sighted as there's no real replacement for that aircraft and it's a workhorse for many militarys. If someone waved a magic wand and dropped 2 more CC-177s into our laps, the RCAF would welcome them with open arms as we're running our A/C into the ground very quickly.

I'm guessing it's based on what state, or area of state, the factory is in? Aka who's district it is in? (For example, they are happy to buy E/F Hornets from Boeing, but not C-17's because that facility isn't where it should be?)

 

[FJAG]

You keep talking about four Divisions. Yes, we have four organizations that are called Divisions and they have Brigades, but in reality we have three CMBGs, a CCSB and a collection of Reserve units. Those Divisions are very busy commanding and administering those reserve units in their geographical areas and three are double-hatted as Joint Task Force headquarters for domestic operations (an important task that is always being used). When we cut 4 CMBG in the early 90s as part of the reduction of the CAF those units became, for the most part, 10/90 units. Many then came back into being units circa 96/97, but with only a modest increase in personnel for the Army. We stripped out the schools in the mid-90s as part of this, leading to the migration of leadership to fill CFTPO. We have some hollow structures.

Fighting a conventional war in Europe at Brigade level is, perhaps, the ne plus ultra task, but it is not the task that justifies the current structure and size of the army. With Leopard 2A6M in a BG we are arguably in a better place than we would have been in 1989 as a CMBG if the balloon went up. As an armour officer I certainly think of the conventional fight, but something like a Kandahar redux is a more likely fight. While not everybody deployed over the conflict, we needed the size of the Regular Force that we have to sustain that fight and we would need it for the next one.

Moving forward as a army, I believe we need to prepare for everything from peacekeeping to stability/COIN to conventional war. The first does not have to be UN and the last does not have to be in Europe. We need some capabilities for the conventional fight, but we cannot neglect those needed for the more likely stability operation. I love a good combat team attack against an isolated Soviet platoon ("March on the Guidon!"), but there might be some others tasks out there. It turns out that COIN and stability operations aren't easy. We need to keep training our CMBG HQs. I think that some units could be re-rolled into capacity- building, and our tanks should be consolidated (in Gagetown).

This may surprise you but you and I agree fully on this.

With respect to the four divisional headquarters and the 10 reserve brigade headquarters the only point that I'm making is that if the Army is once again "hollow" then half of these headquarters could be eliminated based on the size of the overall force and the pressing need of people in more vital areas.

I agree with you fully on what we need to prepare for and even on the fact that most of our full-time effort should go to COIN and stability. I've always maintained that if (and its a big if) we reorganized to two divisional headquarters then the western division (basically Ontario and west) with one Reg F heavy brigade, two Res F brigades and a Res F CSS/CS brigade should concentrate on European high intensity issues. In other words the less likely but more extreme scenarios. Meanwhile the eastern division with one light Reg F brigade, a mechanized Reg F brigade, a Res brigade and a Reg/Res CSS/CS brigade concentrate on all the OOTW matters. As would CANSOFCOM. In other words 3/4 of the full-time strength would concentrate on the day-to-day more likely types of operations we would be participating in while the smaller full-time portion, including a fairly heavy res component would concentrate on the less likely high intensity matters.

My view is that you need some elements (including reservists whether as augmentees or deployable entities) to prepare for, have the capabilities, and be the centre of knowledge of high intensity combat. Its too important to leave as a secondary duty. As it is the Army is trying to be a jack of all trades. I think that both high-intensity and OOTW are very challenging fields that need specialization - well developed doctrine and well developed forces to execute that doctrine. I've disagreed with the "agile, multi-purpose" force concept from day one simply on the basis that you can't do both well and the only way that you can is with lengthy predeployment cycles. If the force was split by function then not only would the skill sets get better but the readiness cycles could be significantly shorter. Similarly equipment holdings and training materiel could be allocated and concentrated to the appropriate division.

By reducing to two divisional headquarters, you have unity of purpose within each division in the management of the force generation of their respective subordinate headquarters and units including rotations and exercises. The same in the lower number of res brigades. Each would have a number of troops closer to a full-sized brigade and would manage their res elements in accordance with the direction of their respective divisional headquarters. Fewer headquarters and a shorter span of control should lead to a more unified and focused output.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This may surprise you but you and I agree fully on this.

With respect to the four divisional headquarters and the 10 reserve brigade headquarters the only point that I'm making is that if the Army is once again "hollow" then half of these headquarters could be eliminated based on the size of the overall force and the pressing need of people in more vital areas.

I'm sorry, I just had a slight 'MI moment' when I read that.

Pass the AED please

 

[dapaterson]

Five Res F Bdes:

BC, AB, SK

MB, ON

ON

QC

NB, NL, NS, PE


Next problem?

 

[FJAG]

Five Res F Bdes:

BC, AB, SK

MB, ON

ON

QC

NB, NL, NS, PE


Next problem?

Actually numbers wise you need to group MB with BC, AB, SK to be able to get up to around 4,500. Otherwise . Ontario could support both a 4,500 brigade and a 3,000 CSS/CS brigade.