Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).

 

[FJAG]

Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).

IMHO, anyone who still thinks that tanks and artillery are obsolete should join Hillier in retirement.

 

[KevinB]

Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).

Let's be honest you don't have that much armor anyway

IMHO, anyone who still thinks that tanks and artillery are obsolete should join Hillier in retirement.

The CA is generally its own biggest enemy.

 

[GR66]

If we're realistically looking at moderate, incremental change for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) then maybe at least we can take a couple of steps in the right direction to move us toward where we eventually want to be.

1) Consolidate our Heavy/Medium/Light forces.
2) "Right-Size" our Reserve units and group them together under a Reg Force umbrella.
3) Reduce the HQ Overhead.

Maybe something like this:


A first step only. Lot's of loose ends/adjustments still required like changes to how the Reserves work (legistlation/TOS/training structure, etc.), consolidation/redistribution/elimination of units, unit manning levels, tons of equipment issues, etc. But it's like eating an elephant as they say...just take one bite at a time.

 

[FJAG]

Maybe something like this:

I'll look at this in more detail later but the points that pop out to me are:

• I'm a great fan of reducing and streamlining administrative headquarters but operational ones not so much. We tend to use brigade headquarters and their staff on deployments as national command elements even if the deployed force is primarily a battle group. Therefore I see nothing wrong with having a few more brigade headquarters in the mix so long as they are primarily staffed with RegF and are designated to take their place in rotations.
• I'm also a fan of an operational CSS capability. I see the need for a primarily ResF CSS brigade.

 

[GR66]

I'll look at this in more detail later but the points that pop out to me are:

• I'm a great fan of reducing and streamlining administrative headquarters but operational ones not so much. We tend to use brigade headquarters and their staff on deployments as national command elements even if the deployed force is primarily a battle group. Therefore I see nothing wrong with having a few more brigade headquarters in the mix so long as they are primarily staffed with RegF and are designated to take their place in rotations.
• I'm also a fan of an operational CSS capability. I see the need for a primarily ResF CSS brigade.

Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's? Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process. My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.

Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.

Same argument for Reserve CSS units. My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment. Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.

As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization. Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc. The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.

 

[markppcli]

Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's? Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process. My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.

I assume you mean CBGs here. Yes for the regular force ones, no for the reserve brigades.

Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.

Why would a deployable reserve Bn, in the current CF operational model be a desirable thing ? We’ve already deployed Reserve sub units on operations in the current model so it’s hardly an aspirational goal. Your asking a LOT of a brigade HQ to both be an operational HQ and to manage all the reserve units across its area and responsibly integrate their training.

Same argument for Reserve CSS units. My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment. Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.

As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization. Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc. The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.

Define CSS in this context please

 

[FJAG]

Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's?

Good God, no! But there is no reason why 2 to 4 of them couldn't be especially if one were to create blended units and formations.

Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process. My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.

I absolutely agree that ResF subunits should fall under Ref units and brigades. I don't think that one brigade could manage 11 battalions especially if some are RegF and some are ResF. A span of control comes in around 5, give or take. Based on the total number of folks in the Army's field force I think somewhere in the nature of 5 to 6 manoeuvre brigade headquarters and 4 support brigades is achievable and desirable.

Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.

I can't see ResF battalions deploying without serious RegF leadership these days. I'm pretty settled on 30/70 - 70/30 units and brigades.

Same argument for Reserve CSS units. My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment. Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.

ResF integration will not bolster day-to-day RegF manning shortfalls. ResF augmentation should only be of those RegF unit positions that are not needed day-to-day but only in the event of mobilization.

As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization. Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc. The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.

We agree on the objective but not so much on the methodology.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's? Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process. My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.

Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.

Same argument for Reserve CSS units. My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment. Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.

As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization. Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc. The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.

AFAIK, right now the CAF is investing something like $20 million per year in a Reserve CBG: HQ and units. In BC at any rate. That's about 2000 all ranks I think. No idea how many are 'effecives' but I'd guess at less than 50%.

Are the CAF getting the return on investment that they're expecting?

If yes, then leave the CBGs alone. If not, then it's time for a change.

 

[FJAG]

AFAIK, right now the CAF is investing something like $20 million per year in a Reserve CBG: HQ and units. In BC at any rate. That's about 2000 all ranks I think. No idea how many are 'effecives' but I'd guess at less than 50%.

Are the CAF getting the return on investment that they're expecting?

That opens up a can of worms. One not only needs to define what a return on investment actually is in this particular scenario but also determine if this is the maximum return on investment available.

No insurance policy provides a return on investment unless and until it is actually triggered. Then and only then will you be able to determine if the investment in it was worth it.

However, my gut tells me that the Army is far short of maximizing its return on investment.

If yes, then leave the CBGs alone. If not, then it's time for a change.

Again, just by simply glancing across the border I can tell that a change is long past due.

 

[FJAG]

I may be behind other folks on this but I just noticed the Canadian Army Journal Vol 19.3 is out.

It has a number of pertinent articles including two on cavalry.

https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/army-armee/migration/assets/army_internet/docs/en/canadian-army-journal/caj-19-3-en.pdf

This paragraph from the first article scares me:

The cavalry concept, however, is an acknowledgement of the size of our Corps and the requirement to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces—which inherently means accepting some risks in order to remain relevant and sustainable.

It's wording like that that bladed the artillery 17 years ago.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I may be behind other folks on this but I just noticed the Canadian Army Journal Vol 19.3 is out.

It has a number of pertinent articles including two on cavalry.



This paragraph from the first article scares me:



It's wording like that that bladed the artillery 17 years ago.

Too bad he quotes Trevor Cadieu... probably a career limiting move in today's Woke-Land

 

[FJAG]

I highly recommend the article by Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future at pg 8. It is thought provoking and seems to fly in the face of where the RCAC may be heading based on reading the tea leaves coming from Colonel Dove's editorial at p. 6 (which is the one that scared me).

Simpson gets things back to first principles and one can leave lots of room as to how one equips and mans the various elements (dismounts, anti-armour, indirect fire) that support the basic recce and security elements of the cavalry squadron/regiment but the fact that these elements are all essential appears glaringly obvious. New technologies can easily find their way into all the key elements.

Too bad he quotes Trevor Cadieu... probably a career limiting move in today's Woke-Land

I expect this was written in the production mill well before the allegations surfaced. That said, one should not disregard valid ideas just because there is a veil of allegations (and as yet unproved) out there.

 

[WestIsle]

I think its extremely telling that the infantry battalions prioritize having sniper and recce platoons over mortar. Ironic to have recce platoons as we are creating brigades that are built to produce battlegroups each of which are to have a recce squadron.

 

[CBH99]

I highly recommend the article by Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future at pg 8. It is thought provoking and seems to fly in the face of where the RCAC may be heading based on reading the tea leaves coming from Colonel Dove's editorial at p. 6 (which is the one that scared me).

Simpson gets things back to first principles and one can leave lots of room as to how one equips and mans the various elements (dismounts, anti-armour, indirect fire) that support the basic recce and security elements of the cavalry squadron/regiment but the fact that these elements are all essential appears glaringly obvious. New technologies can easily find their way into all the key elements.


I expect this was written in the production mill well before the allegations surfaced. That said, one should not disregard valid ideas just because there is a veil of allegations (and as yet unproved) out there.

I am extremely familiar with Trevor, as we worked together every day & lived together overseas for 7 months.

Those allegations came directly (well rather indirectly) from the PM's office because of Trevor's differing stance on woke culture BS. We have proof of this, which is why the media hasn't focused on it at all since it was first reported, and the PMO went silent on the matter also.

Solid guy, great boss, and able to get things done.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think its extremely telling that the infantry battalions prioritize having sniper and recce platoons over mortar. Ironic to have recce platoons as we are creating brigades that are built to produce battlegroups each of which are to have a recce squadron.

Did you notice that you didn't even mention Anti-Tanks?

Not a criticism, just an apt reflection of our current (navel gazing) approach

 

[IRepoCans]

Did you notice that you didn't even mention Anti-Tanks?

Not a criticism, just an apt reflection of our current (navel gazing) approach

Best thing about it is this: the best ISTAR asset the light battalions have right now is the DFS platoon (which have been inviting over a lot of Aussie and British DFS instructors to observe the courseware and doctrine in Gagetown).

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that all of the following should be read together:

Colonel Dove's editorial
Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future
Colonel Christopher W. Hunt: Defining Cavalry within the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Jean-François Gravel and Lieutenant-Colonel François Laroche: Maximizing Survivability of Canadian Army combat platforms
Major John Keess, CD, Ph.D. (ABD), RMC, plsc: Freed by Limits: The strategic realities of the Canadian Army, Close Engagement,
and the potential for a new way of thinking about Canadian land power

As a companion piece I like tihis (recommended by a friend)

The video describes, among many other useful things, the composition of the Ukrainian Forces in Kherson and Kharkiv.

The Kherson Force is backed by US HIMARS and Polish Krabs (UK AS90 turrets with L52 cannons on Polish hulls)
The Armoured element comprised westernised T72s and BMPs
Special emphasis was made of the use of Technicals (Pickup trucks with weapons in the rear) as a Light Cavalry force

The Kherkiv Force is backed by UK/Nor/German MLRS and German PzH2000s (also with L52 cannons)
The Armoured element comprised more westernized T72s but these were paired with US M113s
Again special emphasis was given to the use of a wheeled Light Cavalry force but this time typified by the Australian Bushmaster - a lightly armoured 4x4 section carrier.

Interesting that the Ukrainians are making their 3 man T72s work for them, despite the inherent Jack in the Box design. I have also seen reference to Ukrainians expressing concern about the wasteful 4 man crew of NATO tanks. (Leopards, Challengers and Abrams). The Poles, also familiar with the 3 man system have selected the 3 man Korean K2 as their future battle tank despite having access to Leopards, Abrams and Challengers

Edited to the Maximizing Survivability reference.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is from Maximizing Survivability.

The one thing that I notice is that the survival gear competes with space (and likely dollars) for ATGMs and Air Defence Missiles.




If the future standard of the RCAC is the 4 car troop then perhaps we need to stop drawing individual vehicles but instead drawing 4 vehicles in a group and considering the suite of kit available to the Troop Leader. More like a single ship with four compartments rather than 4 individuals.

Perhaps then we look at 3 Sabre vehicles with the TL forward and a Support Vehicle in the hands of the Troop 2iC.

 

[KevinB]

This is from Maximizing Survivability.

The one thing that I notice is that the survival gear competes with space (and likely dollars) for ATGMs and Air Defence Missiles.

In my opinion a small exceptional equipped Army is better than a larger ill equipped one - at least as far as an Expeditionary Force goes. That at least forms a backbone of capabilities than can be expanded on

If the future standard of the RCAC is the 4 car troop then perhaps we need to stop drawing individual vehicles but instead drawing 4 vehicles in a group and considering the suite of kit available to the Troop Leader. More like a single ship with four compartments rather than 4 individuals.

Perhaps then we look at 3 Sabre vehicles with the TL forward and a Support Vehicle in the hands of the Troop 2iC.

Or look at what other countries add to capabilities to their Recce/Cav elements.