• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Let me guess - no one kept any portion of Chilliwack's range facilities for 39 Bde.

I've been wracking my brains since I went through CFOCS Venture in Esquimalt for my BOTC - I'm sure we qualified on a range somewhere - William's Head, or Albert Head, or Royal Roads maybe?

I know when I was with 3 RCHA I went out to Yakima as a safety officer for 5 Fd Bty (as it then was and should be again) and 15 Fd Regt.

Sigh.

🍻
If BC Ferries wasn't involved, probably Heals up in Saanich, though RRMC had some small range facilities. (maybe pistol only?)

Not sure if Albert Head ever had a rifle range; there's currently a grenade range (on what is admittedly a somewhat rifle range-shaped bit of cleared land, though I can't imagine anyone being happy with its orientation if that was what it was used for in the dawn of time). Williams Head is home to a jail. Off Rocky Point, just to complete the tour of ranges, is Bentinck Island with a demolition range. Mary Hill, behind William Head, IIRC has (had?) a healthy supply of UXO, so someone was chucking something around there at some point.
 
Not saying it has to be a PRes run thing...although the 40th ID of the California National Guard is taking the lead in creating the first Urban Warfare Planners course in the US.

We may have a long way to go to get there, but it shows what is possible.

And while it's still very important to learn and train for this:
View attachment 74747

I think there's a very great likelihood that we're going to be more likely to have to be prepared for this in the future:
View attachment 74748
Irrelevant, doesn’t validate combat team commanders
 
If BC Ferries wasn't involved, probably Heals up in Saanich, though RRMC had some small range facilities. (maybe pistol only?)

Not sure if Albert Head ever had a rifle range; there's currently a grenade range (on what is admittedly a somewhat rifle range-shaped bit of cleared land, though I can't imagine anyone being happy with its orientation if that was what it was used for in the dawn of time). Williams Head is home to a jail. Off Rocky Point, just to complete the tour of ranges, is Bentinck Island with a demolition range. Mary Hill, behind William Head, IIRC has (had?) a healthy supply of UXO, so someone was chucking something around there at some point.

RRU is now a civilian university and the ranges are out of use and over grown.

There are also very few pieces of CAF owned terrain to shake out a dismounted unit, larger than a couple of sections or so, anywhere close to Vancouver/Lower Mainland, or on Vancouver Island, where most of the troops are. Rocky Point is very limited, for example, as are the various Chilliwack dry training areas.

It's a real PITA when you're trying to develop skills above section level in anything other than patrolling.
 
RRU is now a civilian university and the ranges are out of use and over grown.

There are also very few pieces of CAF owned terrain to shake out a dismounted unit, larger than a couple of sections or so, anywhere close to Vancouver/Lower Mainland, or on Vancouver Island, where most of the troops are. Rocky Point is very limited, for example, as are the various Chilliwack dry training areas.

It's a real PITA when you're trying to develop skills above section level in anything other than patrolling.
Absolutely: was just trying to guess at where FJAG might have qual'd some indeterminate number of years ago. Quite like how the CAF has divested to various degrees all sorts of useful space in the Esquimalt area: Fort Rodd and Hatley Park (RRMC, now RRU). Probably not big enough to be any more useful than Rocky for army training, but might come in handy for other purposes.

I'm enjoying the notion of sending units up to Chilcotin: enjoy the ad hoc winter survival ex on the side of the road.
 
Irrelevant, doesn’t validate combat team commanders
Not sure what point you're making.

My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives. As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.

My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in. Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?
 
Not sure what point you're making.

My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives. As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.

My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in. Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?
I think there was some humor in his sarcastic point.

1) Urban Ops a messy - and very few Commanders want to get validated in one, as it would probably be a disaster - and a career impediment.
2) The CA is not a very agile or forward thinking entity - they will be training for Cbt Team + Validation when other Armies a using teleportation, and death rays.
 
Absolutely: was just trying to guess at where FJAG might have qual'd some indeterminate number of years ago.

200.gif
 
More then likely Heals range was used in Victoria.

As for a dry fire training Area. The Forestry Companies around Nanaimo were very lenient to us dry training on their land. They allowed Smoke, T flashes , Arty sims and blanks to be used. Along with providing some very detailed maps of their land. I think we used their land twice during my time. Doing Cresting drills alongside a mountain was interesting. They also were at the time willing to let us do live fire rifle and MG if we gave them the notice so they could ensure the area was safe (we never did pursue this) They stated the military used to have Artillery/ Mortar range in the area.
 
More then likely Heals range was used in Victoria.

As for a dry fire training Area. The Forestry Companies around Nanaimo were very lenient to us dry training on their land. They allowed Smoke, T flashes , Arty sims and blanks to be used. Along with providing some very detailed maps of their land. I think we used their land twice during my time. Doing Cresting drills alongside a mountain was interesting. They also were at the time willing to let us do live fire rifle and MG if we gave them the notice so they could ensure the area was safe (we never did pursue this) They stated the military used to have Artillery/ Mortar range in the area.

No longer. Mosaic (the current forest company that owns most of the private land on VI) is very risk averse, as they should be.

The need for a reasonable, reliably available, well equipped field training facility (live firing and dry firing) in BC close to the major population centres is starkly evident, and long ignored, unfortuantely.

Relying on random and happy accidents, like the occasional forest company letting us use their land, is no way to run a railroad... or to train soldiers for battle.
 
No longer. Mosaic (the current forest company that owns most of the private land on VI) is very risk averse, as they should be.
We use to deal with TimberWest and Macblo, They were pretty good to deal with. What I liked was nav exercises were in the woods. Dry gun deployments were in not pre approved flattish locations.
The need for a reasonable, reliably available, well equipped field training facility (live firing and dry firing) in BC close to the major population centres is starkly evident, and long ignored, unfortuantely.
We always said Vancouver Island could use a good multi use range. Lots of land that could be utilized as a impact area. But to many protesters.
Relying on random and happy accidents, like the occasional forest company letting us use their land, is no way to run a railroad... or to train soldiers for battle.
Land use with them use to be based on mutual respect. I Know Mosaic limits many users dues to being responsible for the third parties damage to the land and infrastructure as indicated by the Gov of BC. The lands from Comox lake into the mountains use to be freely open to public access. After a few car collisions into the lake, some road damage from idiots. The gov going after the land owner/ leaser they locked the gates. I am not sure now but they had them locked most of the time. Which sucked because getting into some of the small lakes back in there was more difficult.
 
Not sure what point you're making.

My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives. As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.

My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in. Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?
My point, I’ve probably made it a couple times, was to point out that the CAF has no real interest in Pershing urban operations, our training cycles are built to culminate in combat team attack ranges to validate their commanders. There is no requirement for a company commander to take an urban objective with their company, which is absurd but is probably digressing.

BC needs to either have a range / training area with better access inside it, or have a formal agreement to access and use something south of the border.
 
Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing. It is not a "different type" of warfare either.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.
 
Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing. It is not a "different type" of warfare either.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.
Combat footage from Falluja (either 1st or 2nd time driving insurgent forces out en-mass) shows just this. All arms in.

Plenty of infantry going block by block, building by building. Tanks & IFV’s providing a solid punch from the street where called for, helping the infantry in clearing some well fortified positions, while infantry kept the immediately area around the vehicles clear of insurgents.

One hell of a bloody battle, both times.

Without the armour, it would have been a lot worse
 
We use to deal with TimberWest and Macblo, They were pretty good to deal with. What I liked was nav exercises were in the woods. Dry gun deployments were in not pre approved flattish locations.

We always said Vancouver Island could use a good multi use range. Lots of land that could be utilized as a impact area. But to many protesters.

Land use with them use to be based on mutual respect. I Know Mosaic limits many users dues to being responsible for the third parties damage to the land and infrastructure as indicated by the Gov of BC. The lands from Comox lake into the mountains use to be freely open to public access. After a few car collisions into the lake, some road damage from idiots. The gov going after the land owner/ leaser they locked the gates. I am not sure now but they had them locked most of the time. Which sucked because getting into some of the small lakes back in there was more difficult.

Coincidentally, it looks like the local SAR community has out-thought/ manoeuvred the military. If the military was smart enough to begin seeking a similar agreement at all, of course ;)

Mosaic Forest Management opens land to search and rescue training​


Mosaic Forest Management, which manages private timberlands and public forest tenures on Vancouver Island, has signed a deal with seven Island search and rescue groups giving them land access

Mosaic Forest Management, which manages private timberlands and public forest tenures on Vancouver Island, has signed a deal with seven Island search and rescue groups giving them land access for training purposes.

The agreements also offer data-sharing opportunities and support for the groups.

“We’re very proud to support the dedicated volunteers of these search and rescue organizations,” said Domenico Iannidinardo, Mosaic’s chief forester. “They play a critical role in public safety, providing a vital lifeline to those who are lost or injured in the Vancouver Island wilderness.”


 
Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing. It is not a "different type" of warfare either.
Precision Urban Combat is however.
I would argue that most NATO countries populations wouldn't be exceptionally thrilled for a Grozny/Mariupol type event.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.
Again it depends on context of the Operation - and the Enemy forces.
Light Forces can succeed in many ways where heavier combined forces will not (unless you consider destruction of the city to be a valid COA).

If you are only facing fairly lightly armed fighter, you are going to be better off (in the long run) using precision and targeted killings to effect change -- using SOF, with rapid precision strikes from both Low Vis mobility and Rotary Wing, and having a Armored QRF.

If you are facing a determined conventional opponent - then yes I agree that Combined Arms operations are the only way to go - unless you can just isolate the city and starve them out.
 
Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing. It is not a "different type" of warfare either.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.
I don’t disagree with anything you said.

The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.
 
Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing. It is not a "different type" of warfare either.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.

Tanks were conceived of as siege engines and work well in that role.
 
Tanks were conceived of as siege engines and work well in that role.
In the Urban environment Tanks however work poorly alone - they require DISMOUNTED Infantry to provide security and screening - while they provide the Infantry a Rolling Firebase.
At the individual level between tank and infantry it requires a great deal of communication and experience to work decently together (tank not squishing infantry, and infantry not leaving tank alone to it's demise).

A good friend of mine once called the M1 Abrams the most dangerous thing to the American Infantryman - in the terms of battles in Iraq - he was not wrong...
 
I don’t disagree with anything you said.

The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.

FWIW, our soldiers can do that stuff very well in my experience.

Many of our leaders are so risk averse though, they shudder at the thought of anyone leaving the pavement or 'rolling plains'.
 
Other urban combat facilitator
I don’t disagree with anything you said.

The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.

Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.

But

Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain? I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.

For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.
 
Back
Top