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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

The Armoured Corps should have supported the MGS concept and fought to retain the Tanks as well, along with appropriate Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

A LAV based Infantry with an Armoured Fist mounted in Leo 1s and CV90s would have been a much better allocation of funds.

The LAV based Infantry, armed with the MGS, and the TOW Under Armour turrets and RF TOWs, and the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle supplying integral direct fire support to fight the mobile defensive battle, and conduct recce, would have left the Armoured Corps free to concentrate on fighting the offensive battle, as a mobile strike force, to be kept as a concentrated force. To be used judiciously. With its own, integral Rifles.
Does anyone see us dropping the LAV 6? Moving away from GDLS as our primary armoured vehicle supplier? Budget means we'll hang on to the LAVs and politics means we'll stick with GDLS.

The only hope I see of Canada moving to a tracked IFV for our mechanized forces is if the GDLS Griffin III wins the OMFV contract in the US. Then we could potentially have those built in London as a replacement for the LAVs (but not until the LAVs have reached the end of their operational life).

Until then I think we need to face reality and assume that we're stuck with the LAV 6 as our primary mechanized platform for the foreseeable future. If we are then we should at least make the we can of it. There are several capability gaps that we have that can be filled by LAV variants. SHORAD, ATGM, mortar, DFS (Centauro II 120mm turret w/40 onboard rounds?), there's even a couple of 155mm SP versions on 8x8 chassis that have been prototyped by IVECO and KMW.

That being said, I personally think that for any new platforms (tanks, MRAD and artillery for example) we should just buy what the US is using for the sake of commonality and interoperability. But for new capabilities tied directly to our LAV infantry (SHORAD, SP Mortars, ATGM vehicles, DFS vehicles, etc.) we should develop LAV-based versions. Wherever possible though we should again try for as much commonality with the US as possible where we can (for example the same RWS as the IM-SHORAD and IM-SHORAD-DE for air defence and maybe the MGS turret on a LAV for DFS?)
Wistful whatif...
Cap badges were thrown aside, rice bowls tipped over, visions implemented

  • 3PPCLI and 3R22e disbanded
  • 2CMBG de-mechanized, re-roled as 2CIBG
  • CCV survives, option exercised
  • 10 additional A6M's purchased
  • LAV UP includes key missing variants.
  • ATGM project happens in reasonable timeframe in conjunction with LAV UP
  • Ceasar/Archers purchased
LdSH and 12RBC expanded and organized as combined arms Armoured Regiments, 1x 18 CV90 Recce/Cav Sqn, 2x 14 tank Leo Sqn's, 1x 14 CV90 Inf Coy, Mjolnir Mortar Platoon
1&2 PPCLI plus 1&2 R22e organized and equipped with proper layered anti-armor weapons from section to Bn, have Bn AT and Mortar platoons

1 and 5 CMBG each with two fully equipped (wheeled) mech Bn's, one tracked armoured CAB. Full Bde set of spares pre-positioned in Europe
 
Wistful whatif...
Cap badges were thrown aside, rice bowls tipped over, visions implemented

  • 3PPCLI and 3R22e disbanded
  • 2CMBG de-mechanized, re-roled as 2CIBG
  • CCV survives, option exercised
  • 10 additional A6M's purchased
  • LAV UP includes key missing variants.
  • ATGM project happens in reasonable timeframe in conjunction with LAV UP
  • Ceasar/Archers purchased
LdSH and 12RBC expanded and organized as combined arms Armoured Regiments, 1x 18 CV90 Recce/Cav Sqn, 2x 14 tank Leo Sqn's, 1x 14 CV90 Inf Coy, Mjolnir Mortar Platoon
1&2 PPCLI plus 1&2 R22e organized and equipped with proper layered anti-armor weapons from section to Bn, have Bn AT and Mortar platoons

1 and 5 CMBG each with two fully equipped (wheeled) mech Bn's, one tracked armoured CAB. Full Bde set of spares pre-positioned in Europe

I would start by looking at what sort of formations Canada wants/needs the Army to have.

Right now there in the Reg Force are 9 Infantry Bn's, 3 Armor Reg't, 3 Artillery Reg't, 3 Combat Engineer Reg't.

Assuming one wants a Heavy Armor Bde for Europe:
I would suggest that entity should be pre-deployed - or at least 40% deployed (1/3rd of units, and all major equipment pre-positioned - and spares, warstock etc)
Furthermore accepting Regimental Mafia's being what they are.
Each 1st Bn from the Infantry Reg'ts becomes a Heavy Mech Inf unit.
Each 2nd Bn from the Infantry Reg'ts becomes a Medium LAV unit.
Each 3rd Bn from the Infantry Reg'ts becomes a Light/Para BN.

Europe becomes a 4 year posting akin to 4 CMBG type - and every 2 years one of the 1st Bn's rotates through, (accepting that one of the units will have a short 2 year posting to start).
The Armor is more awkward, but I would suggest that the same sort of rotation could be done except 2 deployed Armor Reg'ts - with the home Reg't being mostly LAV-CAV, and having some training tanks for the spin up year for deployment.
That gives 1 CABG, 2 Armor, 2 Heavy Inf plus the other arms.

Engineers, Arty, etc could rotate personnel not necessarily units - so 1 RCHA, 1 CER, 1 SVC etc would be permanently part of 1 CABG, and rotate troops on a 4 year posting cycle.

This also allows for Reserve Augmentation for 1 CABG, with a know deployment rotation.

2 CAN PARA Bde has the third BN's, 2 RCHA, 2 CER, 2 SVC etc -


3 CMBG is a LAV based entity.

The three CBG's also have PRes Subformations tied to their Regular Force "Counterparts" with the goal of the Brigades being able to grow into true Divisions in times of mobilization.
 
Wistful whatif...
Cap badges were thrown aside, rice bowls tipped over, visions implemented

  • 3PPCLI and 3R22e disbanded
  • 2CMBG de-mechanized, re-roled as 2CIBG
  • CCV survives, option exercised
  • 10 additional A6M's purchased
  • LAV UP includes key missing variants.
  • ATGM project happens in reasonable timeframe in conjunction with LAV UP
  • Ceasar/Archers purchased
LdSH and 12RBC expanded and organized as combined arms Armoured Regiments, 1x 18 CV90 Recce/Cav Sqn, 2x 14 tank Leo Sqn's, 1x 14 CV90 Inf Coy, Mjolnir Mortar Platoon
1&2 PPCLI plus 1&2 R22e organized and equipped with proper layered anti-armor weapons from section to Bn, have Bn AT and Mortar platoons

1 and 5 CMBG each with two fully equipped (wheeled) mech Bn's, one tracked armoured CAB. Full Bde set of spares pre-positioned in Europe
That's definitely wistful and it all hangs on the CCV.

You need to remember though that the CCV project was not initiated to form a heavy organization. It was designed to compensate for the armour weaknesses (especially the thin flat hull) of the LAV3 to IEDs/mines in Afghanistan. Remember that the CCV did not have to be tracked. 3 of the 4 contenders were wheeled. We would not have gotten rid of the LAV3 fleet and the preferred plan in the Army was to distribute the CCV amongst the 3 brigades essentially so that the symmetric managed readiness process would continue as it was.

When LAV UP/ LAV 6.0 came out it made the CCV redundant, at least from the point of view of those who were steering the Army at that time.

In the same vein, there was no need for ATGMs or replacements for the M777 because the ATGMs were unnecessary and the M777s perfectly acceptable for Afghanistan. The same for tanks. One Leo 2A6M squadron and one of Leo2A4Ms squadron was satisfactory for the contemplated operational roles. The rest were training aids.

There was, at the time no forward vision, beyond the course that Advancing with Purpose at set out before and which continued on - well to today.

The Canadian Army of today is a product of its turn of the century reforms which focused on failed state intervention together with our allies. There was no Ukraine then; just a failed Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and the like. We were looking at things at the micro level like improving our JTAC capabilities and artillery to allow for precision strikes in an environment heavily populated by infrastructure and civilians that we did not wish to harm. The Army created then was suitable for that. Do I consider that short sighted? Yes. But it was understandable and a way of maximizing available resources in a sustainable way.

What's missing right now, at least to those of us on the outside looking in, is a new overarching vision for what we want in the way of an Army of Tomorrow and a change agenda to get us there. I'm waiting with bated breath for a new defence statement.

🍻
 
What's missing right now, at least to those of us on the outside looking in, is a new overarching vision for what we want in the way of an Army of Tomorrow and a change agenda to get us there. I'm waiting with bated breath for a new defence statement.

🍻

Well, the CDS articulated his vision. Translation: From soup to nuts ;)


Chief of the Defence Staff Outlines Major Areas of Focus for the CAF​


Reconstitution, Culture, Operations and Modernization are the four areas of focus for the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) moving forward in 2023 and beyond.

In a new message released by Gen. Wayne Eyre on Feb. 8, the CDS outlined his major areas of focus for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which is now facing an ever-changing and dangerous world stage.

 
Grizzly: 10.7t
LAV 2.0: USMC LAV-25 @14.4t, Bison 13t and Coyote 14.4t

LAV III: CAF 16.95t and the original US Army Stryker 18.16t (I am curious why the Stryker weight is higher as they where build on the same chassis and the CAF turret is over 1.4t)

LAV 6.0: 20.436t and 28.6t (with add on armor)
Last time I visited them, GDLS colloquially referred USMC LAV-25 as LAV 1 while Bison & Coyote were "LAV II" and Stryker was LAV 3.5. Canada's Engr & FOO variants of LAV III were also "3.5" which indicated a more substantial drive train that Canada's LAV III ISC. That improved powertrain probably contributed some to the weight difference.
 
Last time I visited them, GDLS colloquially referred USMC LAV-25 as LAV 1 while Bison & Coyote were "LAV II"
The weird aspect of that is the LAV-25 has no distinguishing features from the Coyote - other than the surveillance etc stuff the CAF put in the Coyote. DDGM was originally calling them LAV 2 platforms (LAV-25, Bison, Coyote), and the original LAV 1.0 to describe the AVGP Series
Hull wise, the LAV -25 and Coyote are identical.
and Stryker was LAV 3.5. Canada's Engr & FOO variants of LAV III were also "3.5" which indicated a more substantial drive train that Canada's LAV III ISC. That improved powertrain probably contributed some to the weight difference.
That makes sense, and the current Stryker is now a 6+, as it got the V Hull and now just recently a major power train and engine upgrade past the 6.0 to be able to work with the networked systems, and power for the DE C-UAS systems being trialled.

I'm honestly curious why the 6.0 became the name for the 4th Gen LAV, and not 4.0, would have made it a little more logical.
 
That's definitely wistful and it all hangs on the CCV.

You need to remember though that the CCV project was not initiated to form a heavy organization. It was designed to compensate for the armour weaknesses (especially the thin flat hull) of the LAV3 to IEDs/mines in Afghanistan. Remember that the CCV did not have to be tracked. 3 of the 4 contenders were wheeled. We would not have gotten rid of the LAV3 fleet and the preferred plan in the Army was to distribute the CCV amongst the 3 brigades essentially so that the symmetric managed readiness process would continue as it was.

When LAV UP/ LAV 6.0 came out it made the CCV redundant, at least from the point of view of those who were steering the Army at that time.

In the same vein, there was no need for ATGMs or replacements for the M777 because the ATGMs were unnecessary and the M777s perfectly acceptable for Afghanistan. The same for tanks. One Leo 2A6M squadron and one of Leo2A4Ms squadron was satisfactory for the contemplated operational roles. The rest were training aids.

There was, at the time no forward vision, beyond the course that Advancing with Purpose at set out before and which continued on - well to today.

The Canadian Army of today is a product of its turn of the century reforms which focused on failed state intervention together with our allies. There was no Ukraine then; just a failed Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and the like. We were looking at things at the micro level like improving our JTAC capabilities and artillery to allow for precision strikes in an environment heavily populated by infrastructure and civilians that we did not wish to harm. The Army created then was suitable for that. Do I consider that short sighted? Yes. But it was understandable and a way of maximizing available resources in a sustainable way.

What's missing right now, at least to those of us on the outside looking in, is a new overarching vision for what we want in the way of an Army of Tomorrow and a change agenda to get us there. I'm waiting with bated breath for a new defence statement.

🍻
Having wheeled entries into the CCV competition was utter stupidity. You can't compete with tracks if your goal is armour protection, the gods of ground pressure are not kind to wheeled vehicles in that regard. Having two different 8x8 would have been asine.
 
The weird aspect of that is the LAV-25 has no distinguishing features from the Coyote - other than the surveillance etc stuff the CAF put in the Coyote. DDGM was originally calling them LAV 2 platforms (LAV-25, Bison, Coyote), and the original LAV 1.0 to describe the AVGP Series
Hull wise, the LAV -25 and Coyote are identical.
The distinction seemed to be primary hydraulic vs electric turret drives. The hull shape is also distinctly different between Bison and USMC LAV-C2.

That makes sense, and the current Stryker is now a 6+, as it got the V Hull and now just recently a major power train and engine upgrade past the 6.0 to be able to work with the networked systems, and power for the DE C-UAS systems being trialled.

I'm honestly curious why the 6.0 became the name for the 4th Gen LAV, and not 4.0, would have made it a little more logical.
The current nomenclature is power train & suspension focused. The LAV III could accept a GVWR of a bit over 30,000 lbs. The "3.5" was able to take something just over 35,000 lbs. I don't know if there was ever a LAV 4, but there was a LAV 5 (I think only prototyped in about 2007/8) and it could go up to a max GVWR of a little over 50,000 lbs. Guess what the LAV 6 GVWR sits slightly above.
 
That's definitely wistful and it all hangs on the CCV.

You need to remember though that the CCV project was not initiated to form a heavy organization. It was designed to compensate for the armour weaknesses (especially the thin flat hull) of the LAV3 to IEDs/mines in Afghanistan. Remember that the CCV did not have to be tracked. 3 of the 4 contenders were wheeled. We would not have gotten rid of the LAV3 fleet and the preferred plan in the Army was to distribute the CCV amongst the 3 brigades essentially so that the symmetric managed readiness process would continue as it was.
Was not initiated to, but had it happened the vehicles would be available to do so today. But yes, it's a presumption on my part that logic would have won out and CV90 would have been selected.

More grounded what if- CV90 is awarded the CCV contract. No option, no extra tanks. With CCV in hand the worn out LAV3 fleet is refurbished to a 3.5 standard.

6 bn's of LAV 6.0 for 2 Bn's of CV 90 and 4 of LAV 3.5 - do you take the trade?
 
More grounded what if- CV90 is awarded the CCV contract. No option, no extra tanks. With CCV in hand the worn out LAV3 fleet is refurbished to a 3.5 standard.
There is no LAV III or 3.5. Canada is all LAV 6. You are proposing to replace imaginary vehicles via a cancelled project.
 
Was not initiated to, but had it happened the vehicles would be available to do so today. But yes, it's a presumption on my part that logic would have won out and CV90 would have been selected.

More grounded what if- CV90 is awarded the CCV contract. No option, no extra tanks. With CCV in hand the worn out LAV3 fleet is refurbished to a 3.5 standard.

6 bn's of LAV 6.0 for 2 Bn's of CV 90 and 4 of LAV 3.5 - do you take the trade?
I would take the trade.

Mainly as it would give a true Heavy Bde with a tracked IFV with upgraded cannon and ATGM, plus better off road mobility to work with the Leo 2’s.
1 Tank and 2 Inf ‘CAB’ for 1 CABG
(eventually getting a 3rd CV Bn to rotate to Europe).
Ideally more tanks too

I would place the 3rd BN’s in 2 CAN PARA Bde

The 2nd Bn’s reduced to 30/70 LAV formations for OOTW

1 remaining Bn of LAV broken up into Trg Coy for PRes as LAV’s from GD would be easiest to use for DOMOPS or surge production for mobilization.
 
In January, the 3 R22eR BG, augmented by close to 100 reservists, deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) in Louisiana as part of a US SCBT in a very challenging instrumented force on force exercise with the difficulty setting at "hard mode." Supported by OCTs from CMTC, this validated them to Level 6 (Battle Group).
Intriguing. At what rank levels were the reservists, and how much prep/workup did they participate in prior to the ex?
 
Intriguing. At what rank levels were the reservists, and how much prep/workup did they participate in prior to the ex?
Members of all three messes joined the Bn, with a concentration at the Cpl and MCpl level (but also Lt/Capt and Sgts). They joined the Bn several months prior to the exercise and were incorporated into various sub-units including the combat support platoons.
 
Since this thread is titled “Informing the Future Army’s Structure” I will raise a question about the reserves fleshing out the GRTF in a larger context than simply the last JRTC Roto.

If the CA is serious about the GRTF deployment timeline then we need to be increasing the manning priority for the GRTF forces both on the VCDS and CA sides.

Manning your high readiness units intended to deploy in approximately a weeks time across the globe is not best done by asking for reserve augmentation on receiving an order to deploy.

Although I have not checked and could be wrong I would strongly suspect that 3 R22R had reservists only for JRTC and the build up to. I would be very surprised if they are on Class B/C with the Bn for the 12 months the Bn will be on High Readiness.

If my suspicion is correct and they are not with that Bn anymore, is the Bn actually manned to accomplish its assigned missions as a GRTF?
I would argue that if they needed reserve augmentation to do JRTC then the GRTFs are not manned to accomplish their assigned missions and the CA and CAF need to think through how the HR GRTFs are manned in relation to other CA units and overall CAF priorities.

Options include;
1. 16 month reserve contacts.
2. Increased VCDS and CA manning priority at the expense of other infantry billets specifically.
3. Reduced GRTF ORBAT and expected mission capabilities to match manning levels. Instead of a Bn it would be a Bn(-) etc.
4. Something else.
 
Members of all three messes joined the Bn, with a concentration at the Cpl and MCpl level (but also Lt/Capt and Sgts). They joined the Bn several months prior to the exercise and were incorporated into various sub-units including the combat support platoons.

Which is an excellent example of how things should work.
 
Options include;
1. 16 month reserve contacts.
2. Increased VCDS and CA manning priority at the expense of other infantry billets specifically.
3. Reduced GRTF ORBAT and expected mission capabilities to match manning levels. Instead of a Bn it would be a Bn(-) etc.
4. Something else.
Getting close to point 1, last I looked at the future rotos, entire class B work up period and class C deployment is around 12 months.
 
Thats a long time for Reservists to be away from their civilian careers as well.

Which is probably the whole point of course. Don't want to spoil the Reg F love in ;)


Benedict Cumberbatch No GIF by Showtime
 
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