Part 2 of 2
Although not exact fits, the well documented histories of 11th century England and 11th century Normandy tend to mirror the histories of Britain and Scandinavia, on the one hand, and
Romano-Europe (France, the Rhineland, Spain and Italy) on the other. The two societal groups had very different social orders.
The Anglo-Saxon (and related) people were, in the main, of four classes: slaves, cottagers,
villeins (vile or
ordinary people) and
thegns (thanes – but NOT the way Shakespeare used that word in Macbeth). Of these the thanes were fewest, next were slaves while the overwhelming majority were cottagers and villeins. The ratios were something like 1:2:5:20+ (thanes:slaves:cottagers:villeins). It
appears that, in Anglo-Saxon England,
villeins were freemen; cottagers, on the other hand, were tied to the
thane by stronger feudal duties. Most of the obligatory military service in 11th century England was undertaken by the few thousand
thegns who were (partially) trained and equipped fighting men and made up the
fyrd. It was rare (very rare?) for
villains to be called up –armed, as they would be, with a few axes and rakes. (It might have happened at Stamford Bridge when Harold (Godwinson) (England) defeated Harald (Hardrada) (Norway) who, like William of Normandy also made a claim to Harold’s throne.)
In Normandy and France things were different. Slaves, cottagers and
villains existed but, while slaves were slaves – a pretty low condition anywhere – cottagers and
villains were, quite clearly, serfs –
some might have been called ‘free’ but their feudal ties were so strong as to make that terms senseless. The French and Normans also had chivalry (
chevalier – knight or mounted warrior) which added another layer to the nobility. There was still a local ‘lord’ of the manor (
manoir) (a proto
seigneur), very much like the English
thegn but above him was the mounted (expensive) knight – who had to be maintained by the serfs.
Normandy was ‘better’ organized (for war) and
managed than England – because William was, essentially, an absolute monarch, unconstrained by anything like a Constitution. He was very good at what he did: decisive, visionary, disciplined, ruthless, etc. Harold Godwinson, on the other hand, had to answer to the
witan a proto-council, for sure, maybe even a proto-parliament (one already existed in Iceland – the
Althingi (established in 930 – it is inconceivable that England did not know of their Icelandic cousins political system.) The
witan elected Harold king – as was its
right and
duty to do. English kings did not, unlike their Romano-European counterparts (including the French and Normans) inherit a
divine right to rule – each king was elected by the
witan, as they had been since the 7th century.
The point of this long history, overfilled with
Englisc words, is to point out that England was a becoming an inherently
liberal society as Normandy, like most of Romano-Europe, was becoming more and more
illiberal. It is interesting to note that this
liberalism existed prior to the 7th century, in e.g. the Celtic Church, and it survived the Norman conquest. Henry II (100 years after William the Conqueror), whose English
kingdom was far less rich and ‘important’ than his various French duchies (Anjou, Aquitaine, Gascony, Nantes and Normandy), was able to introduces his system of standardized ‘courts’ in England – as he had to in order to pacify his English barons who wanted a
return to trial by jury, but it came much slower and harder in his French (Angevin) ‘emprire.’ It was not the ‘jury’ which was novel – the French had that, it was the composition of the jury and the application of the King’s law in a standardized manner which mattered. The French jury consisted of 12
knights – men who owed loyalty to the king. The English
assizes had a jury of 24 free men – a huge difference.
Thus, 1,000 years before Max Weber, and, in Iceland, before the arrival of Christianity, English, Icelandic and other North European peoples were developing the
liberal base onto which the Calvinists and Presbyterians would graft their doctrine of productivity. The result would be an increasing (still present, I think) gulf between Northern European liberal
rationalism and Romano-European dysfunctional, illiberal
statism.
What about China?
China’s political and social histories are at least as long and complex (arguably longer and more complex) than Europe’s.
The society is socially and politically
conservative.
(Conservatism is at the opposite end of a political spectrum from
liberalism. Illiberal cultures do
not appear in that spectrum. Illiberal systems are just as foreign to conservative systems as they are to liberals ones. We use
illiberal because, thankfully, American political scientists Fareed Zakaria decided not to try to invent a word to describe authoritarian systems which poorly mirrored some of the aspects of conservative democracies.)
The society is also economically
liberal.
The recent rise of the
Red Dynasty has not interfered with innate
conservatism in China. In fact communism (like socialism) is a highly conservative political philosophy – placing, as it does, the w3elfare of the collective over the rights of the individual. The problem, for the Chinese Communist Party, is that while the Chinese don’t mind a highly conservative, far less than democratic central government, they object – sometimes quite strenuously - to any government, central or local, which intrudes too much into the
family’s affairs.
Chinese economic liberalism does not focus on the individual – it is tied to the family. Individuals are expected to sacrifice for the sake of the family. Sometimes even second cousins can make a powerful claim on family support. This is in sharp contrast to our, European, view of
liberalism.
So we have this potent mix: socio-political conservatism and economic liberalism, of a sort. The outcome, for the Chinese, for 2,500 years, has been a relatively stable system in which a central government
acquires a mandate – which is,
de facto,
not objected to by the people. When, eventually, the government’s mandate is withdrawn there may be a brief interregnum but, as often as not a new mandate is acquired by a new dynasty – sometimes the new dynasty doesn’t last very long but it is replaced by a long-lived, stable dynasty. China’s long history has made the people comfortable with this system – just as North Europeans were accustomed to liberalism before the Protestant Reformation and the rise of modern capitalism and just as Roman-Europeans were accustomed to
illiberal governments long before e.g. the rise of the modern papacy.
It is economics more than socio-political issues which threaten the Chinese current
Red Dynasty. The people will accept strong, remote central governments so long as more local governments have more local, direct, popular (democratic) input and, more important, so long as all governments leave most people ‘free’ to pursue economic
rationalism. Socialism is not ‘natural’ for the Chinese – not above the family level, anyway.
Culture Matters!
I see the cultural ‘universe’ as being something akin to a rugby ball. At the two ends we have to ‘ superior’ systems: English liberalism and Chinese Confucianism. Moving towards the middle – but staying on the centre line – we find a range of progressively less liberal and less conservative systems. When we get off the centre line, near the middle and out towards the ‘skin’ of the ball we find the vast array of illiberal socio-political and economic systems: the preferred systems of about 175+ of the UN’s 200± members.
Amongst the most illiberal regimes are those in which very conservative Islam religious values, equally conservative Arab/Persian social and linguistic values and valueless oligarchy based economic practices (governments practicing this are often referred to as
kleptocracies). Most North African, Middle Eastern and West and Central Asian governments fall into this category. We cannot expect to impose anything like democracy, in any form, on them or even ‘lead’ them to experiment with democracy unless and until they
all undergo a huge (probably long and bloody) religious
reformation followed by a social-economic
enlightenment. Only then – maybe in 2050 – will some people in some of those countries begin to talk about democracy. Right now they cannot because their culture does not permit it.
Africa is worse off.
Latin America is, relatively, well off. It is more illiberal than Romano-Europe – maybe they are
culturally close to the
level of the Balkans and Russia, which is to say not quite hopeless.
Asia, broadly, is
enlightened – and has been for 1,000 years. Asia is also
irreligious. It is not that they lack religious values – far from it. Being irreligious means that they are not slaves to imposed values – they are, essentially religious and economic liberals even as they are, otherwise, socially conservative. I think this applies to India as well as to China. Malaysia and Indonesia, being Muslim and The Philippines, being Christian, are less irreligious and, therefore, will have a harder time in adapting to 21st century globalization.
The biggest and most immediate cultural problem for us, the American led, democratic West, is unreformed Islam – which sees itself as both/simultaneously a religion and a system of government. There are other problems on the horizon. Africa cannot be sustained in it current social, cultural, political or economic forms. I have no idea how to solve Africa’s many, HUGE problems but some smart people need to bring some ideas forward or unreformed Islam will take over, magnifying our existing problem.
Latin America and Asia can, in the case of Asia, must be left to their own devices without too much danger to us.
The bottom line.
Culture matters. Military solutions to cultural problems are possible – but only if we understand that
culture drives people’s social, political and economic values. If we ignore cultural we will fail. If we misunderstand culture we will fail. If we try to impose our cultural values on another we will fail.
To win we must understand other cultures. That does
not mean we need to support or even condone some cultural values. We should not tolerate slavery or female genital mutilation or women being treated as property. But we must understand why it happens and we must understand that only ‘they’ – the people who hold such values – can change those values.
Most Western politicians and the leaders of most NGOs are on a course headed towards failure in Africa and Asia. Soldiers will end up paying the price.
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* And see the book of the same name (New York, 2000) edited by
Lawrence E Harrison and
Samuel P Huntington. It ought to be required reading at our Staff College and for all senior officials in DFAIT.
† Comprising 65+ years, a goodly proportion spent living and working in a large handful of countries on several continents and archipelagos – working with people from different races
and cultures.
‡ Maybe, it’s not one of the languages I can speak much beyond ordering beer, one would use the formal
‘u’ rather than the less formal but far more common
’ji’to address a superior in the army.