I'll believe it when I see it.
Agreed, but said company doesn’t have to ask others whether they’re allowed to pay people more, or do anything else with the income they get.
What is not talked about in the above is the number of applicants to the CAF vs the number that was actually inducted - from what someone else has stated previously, that ratio is like 6-7 to 1 or even much higher. Sitting from the sidelines, at a high level, it doesn't seem to necessarily be an issue of getting people interested in applying to the CAF as a possible career - it seems to be an issue of those in the recruiting department to actually be able to offer a position to those applying. I'm fully aware that there can be, (are), other factors in play here - like maybe the funding is only in place to accept 2,800/yr people a year, or the resources from a training/housing/equipping perspective is only able to handle 2,800 people a year. But clearly, the ability to induct people at a ratio of much closer to 1 applying and 1 be inducted must occur. The current disconnect of 6-7 applying to only 1 being inducted must cease.
The Canadian Armed Forces Recruitment Crisis: Structural Challenges and Political Solutions - 5 Dec 24
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are in the midst of a recruitment and retention crisis, one that threatens not just Canada’s security but also its standing with allies like the United States and NATO. With approximately 12,000 unfilled positions—16% of its target strength of 71,500 regular members—the military is struggling to maintain basic operational capacity. This shortfall, compounded by outdated equipment, rising attrition, and a lack of political urgency, reveals deep structural flaws. The stakes are high, and the question is not just what should be done, but whether Canada’s political leaders are willing and able to do it.
Structural Challenges in Recruitment and Retention
The CAF’s recruitment and retention issues are a systemic problem, not a passing phase. Recruitment processes are outdated and cumbersome, with timelines that stretch over six to nine months—an eternity for applicants in today’s competitive job market. These inefficiencies discourage potential recruits, many of whom turn to private-sector opportunities that offer quicker hiring processes, better pay, and clearer career paths. In 2023, the CAF recruited only 2,800 new members, far short of its annual target of 5,900. The recruitment crisis is compounded by a lack of outreach to underrepresented groups. Women, Indigenous communities, and ethnic minorities remain underrepresented in the military, despite Canada’s diverse population. Efforts to improve diversity have been sporadic and insufficiently integrated into broader recruitment strategies.
Retention poses an equally significant challenge. The CAF’s attrition rate climbed to nearly 8% in 2022, with over 5,000 personnel voluntarily leaving the military. Job dissatisfaction is a major factor, driven by limited career progression, long deployments, and challenges balancing service with family life. Many service members cite frustration with outdated equipment and inadequate infrastructure as contributing to their decision to leave. For instance, the CAF’s barracks and training facilities are widely seen as substandard, and the delays in procuring modern equipment—such as fighter jets and naval vessels—have eroded confidence in the military’s ability to meet operational demands.
Morale is further undermined by a perception that the federal government does not prioritize defense. Successive governments have treated the military as an afterthought, allocating resources only when forced by external pressures or crises. This lack of consistent political support has left service members feeling undervalued, exacerbating retention problems and creating a cycle of dissatisfaction that the CAF has struggled to break.
The Broader Implications for Canadian Security
The recruitment and retention crisis is not just an internal issue for the CAF; it has profound implications for Canada’s ability to respond to domestic and international security challenges. Domestically, the shortfall in personnel undermines the CAF’s capacity to respond to emergencies, such as natural disasters or threats to Arctic sovereignty. The Arctic, in particular, is an area of growing concern. With climate change opening new shipping routes and increasing competition for resources, Canada’s ability to assert its sovereignty in the region is critical. Yet, the CAF’s limited resources and personnel mean that it cannot adequately patrol or defend its Arctic territory, leaving a gap that adversaries like Russia and China could exploit.
Internationally, the crisis weakens Canada’s contributions to NATO and its defense partnership with the United States. Canada has consistently failed to meet NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, a shortfall that has not gone unnoticed by its allies. At present, Canada spends only 1.37% of GDP on defense, placing it near the bottom of NATO member states. This chronic underfunding has strained Canada’s relationships within the alliance, with allies openly questioning its commitment to shared security objectives. U.S. Senator Jim Risch recently characterized Canada’s defense spending as “a joke,” a sentiment that reflects growing frustration among NATO members. Such criticism diminishes Canada’s influence in the alliance and risks sidelining it in critical discussions about NATO’s strategic direction.
The U.S.-Canada defense relationship, exemplified by joint operations in the Arctic and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), is also at risk. With Russia increasing its Arctic presence and China seeking greater influence in the region, the United States needs a strong partner to help secure North American interests. Canada’s inability to maintain a fully operational military not only jeopardizes its own security but also places additional strain on U.S. resources and planning. If Canada cannot fulfill its responsibilities, the United States may be forced to fill the gap, further eroding Canada’s credibility as a reliable ally.
Addressing the recruitment and retention crisis requires comprehensive reforms that tackle the root causes of the problem. The recruitment process must be modernized to make it faster and more transparent. Applicants should not have to wait months for a response, especially when other employers can offer positions within weeks. Leveraging technology, such as digital application tracking systems, could streamline the process and make it more user-friendly. Targeted recruitment campaigns are also essential to attract underrepresented groups. Women currently make up only about 15% of the CAF, a figure that has barely budged in recent years. Indigenous communities and ethnic minorities are similarly underrepresented, despite being key demographics that could help the CAF meet its personnel targets.
Retention requires a different set of solutions, focused on improving the experience of service members. Modernizing infrastructure and upgrading equipment are critical first steps. No one wants to work in substandard conditions, and service members should not have to. Offering more flexibility in deployment options and expanding family support programs—such as childcare and relocation assistance—would help address work-life balance issues, a major driver of attrition. Competitive salaries and benefits are equally important, particularly in specialized roles where the CAF struggles to compete with the private sector. Signing bonuses, student loan repayment programs, and other incentives could make military service more attractive to young Canadians.
Canada’s defense spending must also increase to support these reforms. Meeting NATO’s 2% GDP target is not just a symbolic gesture; it is a practical necessity to ensure that the CAF has the resources it needs. The Trudeau government’s pledge to meet this target by 2032 is too little, too late. Accelerating this timeline would signal to Canada’s allies that it takes its defense obligations seriously while providing the funding necessary to address its personnel challenges.
The question of who can fix the CAF’s recruitment and retention crisis is as important as the solutions themselves. Canada’s three major political parties—the Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democratic Party (NDP)—offer differing visions for defense policy, but none has a flawless track record.
The Liberal Party, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has been criticized for its lack of urgency on defense. While the government introduced a defense policy update in 2023 that included $15 billion in new spending commitments, much of this funding remains unallocated or delayed. The Liberals have also struggled with procurement delays, such as the years-long saga of replacing Canada’s aging CF-18 fighter jets. Their efforts to promote diversity within the military are commendable but have been undermined by a lack of systemic follow-through. Incremental progress is better than none, but the Liberals’ approach has been too slow to address the scale of the crisis.
The Conservatives position themselves as the party of defense, emphasizing the importance of meeting NATO commitments and strengthening Canada’s military capabilities. Their "Canada First Defence Strategy" includes promises to increase defense spending and streamline procurement, aligning with the urgency of the CAF’s challenges. However, past Conservative governments have also struggled with procurement delays and personnel shortages, raising questions about whether they can deliver on their promises. Despite these challenges, the Conservatives’ willingness to prioritize defense as a core issue makes them better positioned than the Liberals to address the crisis.
The NDP, by contrast, has traditionally focused on social justice and economic equality, often relegating defense to the sidelines of its platform. While the party supports peacekeeping and emphasizes diversity, its approach to defense policy lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the structural challenges plaguing the CAF. Moreover, the NDP’s heavy emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, while well-intentioned, could inadvertently exacerbate the recruitment and retention crisis. By framing military service predominantly through the lens of social equity, the NDP risks alienating a broad segment of potential recruits who view the armed forces as a place for merit, camaraderie, and shared purpose, rather than as a vehicle for social engineering. These recruits, many of whom come from rural or conservative backgrounds, may find such an approach off-putting and out of step with their own values. Similarly, within the ranks of the CAF, an overemphasis on DEI without addressing core issues like pay, career progression, and modern equipment could deepen dissatisfaction, leading to further attrition. Ultimately, the NDP’s reluctance to prioritize defense spending, combined with its narrow focus on DEI, risks making the recruitment and retention problem worse rather than better.
The CAF’s recruitment and retention crisis is a test of Canada’s political will and its ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment. The solutions are clear, but implementing them requires sustained effort, adequate funding, and a commitment to making defense a national priority. Among the major parties, the Conservatives appear best positioned to take on this challenge, given their emphasis on defense spending and reform. However, their past performance raises questions about execution. The Liberals, despite some progress, have failed to act with the urgency the crisis demands. The NDP, while offering valuable perspectives on inclusion, is unlikely to make defense a priority.
The stakes could not be higher. Canada’s security and its reputation as a reliable ally depend on decisive action. This is not just about filling vacancies; it is about reaffirming Canada’s role as a credible partner in NATO and a trusted ally of the United States. Anything less risks not only national vulnerability but also the erosion of Canada’s standing on the world stage. The time for half-measures is over. Canada must act decisively to fix its military, or risk becoming a nation that cannot defend itself or its allies.
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with DefensePriorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.
The current disconnect of 6-7 applying to only 1 being inducted must cease.
Could be, could be.Or maybe the applicants are just not employable in the CAF.
What is not talked about in the above is the number of applicants to the CAF vs the number that was actually inducted - from what someone else has stated previously, that ratio is like 6-7 to 1 or even much higher. Sitting from the sidelines, at a high level, it doesn't seem to necessarily be an issue of getting people interested in applying to the CAF as a possible career - it seems to be an issue of those in the recruiting department to actually be able to offer a position to those applying. I'm fully aware that there can be, (are), other factors in play here - like maybe the funding is only in place to accept 2,800/yr people a year, or the resources from a training/housing/equipping perspective is only able to handle 2,800 people a year. But clearly, the ability to induct people at a ratio of much closer to 1 applying and 1 be inducted must occur. The current disconnect of 6-7 applying to only 1 being inducted must cease.
After Louis St. Laurent the only prime ministers who seemed to care even a little bit about the military IMHO were Mulroney who had a greater notion of Canada’s place in world affairs and perhaps Harper who was basically forced to respond to the threats posed by terrorism worldwide. Having said that, neither Mulroney nor Harper did nearly enough to stem the undoing decline. Poilievre (assuming he will be our next PM) will do only what Trump requires of him. If O’Toole had stayed on as party leader, I think he would probably have done a lot more based on his patriotism and not necessarily what was politically expedient. But maybe I’m being too kind to him based on what he never was in a position to actually do.That is almost hysterically funny that presupposes that Canadian Prime Ministers actually pay that much attention to the military. It is just another Government department to them and therein lies the problem..It's not but that is the way it is.
The military is about the only governmental body whose members are required to lay down their lives of asked to.take the lives of their fellow human beings.
What Canadian politicians see is a department that whines about the size of budgets has members who very publicly can't keep it in their pants . Can't win you an election but could conceivably loose one for you.
And they tend to dress a little oddly too.
You're not dealing with malice by and large you dealing with a strange combination of ignorance lack of world level experience and irritation.
It could be said Mulrony didn't have time to see out his vision to its completionAfter Louis St. Laurent the only prime ministers who seemed to care even a little bit about the military IMHO were Mulroney who had a greater notion of Canada’s place in world affairs and perhaps Harper who was basically forced to respond to the threats posed by terrorism worldwide. Having said that, neither Mulroney nor Harper did nearly enough to stem the undoing decline. Poilievre (assuming he will be our next PM) will do only what Trump requires of him. If O’Toole had stayed on as party leader, I think he would probably have done a lot more based on his patriotism and not necessarily what was politically expedient. But maybe I’m being too kind to him based on what he never was in a position to actually do.
Possibly…or maybe CFLRS and the environments training orgs are broken, including basic training, and not only are decent candidates giving up along the way to basic qualifications, but also in the way to OFP?Or maybe the applicants are just not employable in the CAF.
I'd suggest that's not an "either, or" situation, and both factors are a problem. Also, how many of the number of people who walk into a recruiting centre walk out when they discover they'll have to move to a place they don't want to live? Without accurate data down to that level of detail, all we are doing is speculating and putting forth our favourite hobby horses. e.g. "The CAF sucks at recruiting" or "Kids today are too soft/lazy to join"...Possibly…or maybe CFLRS and the environments training orgs are broken, including basic training, and not only are decent candidates giving up along the way to basic qualifications, but also in the way to OFP?
How many applicants submit for equivalent civilian jobs vs. how many actually get the job? My understanding is that many large companies are contracting AI sorting/hiring tools to vet resumes because there are too many applications for people to sort through.
I have no doubt! It's a field I find interesting, and may some day explore a bit more as I approach the end of my CAF career.The high quality ones stand out though, and make the decision making pretty easy, believe me
I have no doubt! It's a field I find interesting, and may some day explore a bit more as I approach the end of my CAF career.
Remember, VAC ETB will pay for your follow on education and training.I have no doubt! It's a field I find interesting, and may some day explore a bit more as I approach the end of my CAF career.
Remember, VAC ETB will pay for your follow on education and training.
is there an analysis on the applicants that make it and those that dont and why?Or maybe the applicants are just not employable in the CAF.
is there an analysis on the applicants that make it and those that dont and why?
The second part of your question regarding OFP is a symptom of our lack or Jr leadership. Until recently many schools were under staffed leading to a back log. At one point RCEMES PAT platoon was looking more like a PAT Coy plus. Unfortunately until this entire situation had already gotten out of hand before anyone decided to fix it. We have made steps by making the schools priority during APS but with such a back log it will be years to catch up.Possibly…or maybe CFLRS and the environments training orgs are broken, including basic training, and not only are decent candidates giving up along the way to basic qualifications, but also in the way to OFP?
What is not talked about in the above is the number of applicants to the CAF vs the number that was actually inducted - from what someone else has stated previously, that ratio is like 6-7 to 1 or even much higher. Sitting from the sidelines, at a high level, it doesn't seem to necessarily be an issue of getting people interested in applying to the CAF as a possible career - it seems to be an issue of those in the recruiting department to actually be able to offer a position to those applying. I'm fully aware that there can be, (are), other factors in play here - like maybe the funding is only in place to accept 2,800/yr people a year, or the resources from a training/housing/equipping perspective is only able to handle 2,800 people a year. But clearly, the ability to induct people at a ratio of much closer to 1 applying and 1 be inducted must occur. The current disconnect of 6-7 applying to only 1 being inducted must cease.
The military received more than 70,000 applications last year but accepted fewer than 5,000 new members. A series of new initiatives to speed up recruiting — including a probationary period that would get candidates enrolled while security checks are carried out — have been introduced.
Or maybe the applicants are just not employable in the CAF.