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Major-General Lewis MacKenzie CM, MSC, OOnt, CD

Would Maj Gen MacKenzie have made a good CDS.


  • Total voters
    57
Gee whiz - it almost sounds like some snot-nosed Liberal party whankers might have been paying attention ...

http://www.canada.com/components/printstory/printstory4.aspx?id=afc0dd62-f0f3-4a9e-b0d1-61a927a3b4d7

Our Forces need more muscle
Graham: 5,000 new troops to bolster ability to fight overseas
 
Mike Blanchfield, The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, December 22, 2004


Canadians should prepare for a meaner, tougher version of the peacekeeper because almost all of the promised 5,000 new personnel for the Armed Forces will go to the army as Canada moves to double its foreign fighting force, Defence Minister Bill Graham says.

"The nature of peacekeeping itself has changed," he said yesterday in a year-end interview.

"You have to fight your way in. You're going to have to go into a situation where you're going to have to fight to establish stability first and then you're going to have to bring democracy, and institution building and humanitarian aid."

That characterization is squarely at odds with the kinder, gentler peacekeeper image that Prime Minister Paul Martin put forth last year when he promised the additional troops during the federal election campaign.

"What we've got to do is give (the Armed Forces) more muscle," Mr. Graham said. "The vast majority (of new recruits) would go towards the army, but not 100 per cent." The navy and air force would see limited personnel increases, he added.

Canada will return to Kandahar next year and will likely work with the French on a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan's volatile south. Mr. Graham announced he would travel to Kabul next month to consult with Canadian soldiers stationed there as part of the NATO protection force for Afghanistan.

As the Canadian Forces nears completion of its defence review, Mr. Graham said the new realities of fighting terrorism and other unconventional threats has rendered obsolete the familiar perception of Canadian peacekeepers "patrolling a line" in less-threatening locales such as Cypress or the Suez.

Mr. Graham said he believes Canadians realize the world has changed and will accept more of their soldiers, in greater numbers, operating in harsher conditions on foreign soil.

He said he'd be ready to present his defence review to Parliament before the House of Commons reconvenes in early February.

The defence review is part of Mr. Martin's broader foreign policy review, which included his campaign promise of 5,000 additional full-time personnel for the Forces. At the time, Mr. Martin predicted the new troops could be dedicated to a new peacekeeping brigade.

But Mr. Graham made clear the additional troops -- which he conceded would take years to recruit and train -- would bolster existing units, such as the JTF-2 elite special forces commandos.

Mr. Graham said the army currently has the capacity to sustain two groups of 1,200 troops abroad at any given time, in addition to another 800 to 1,000 support troops.

"If we add the 5,000 we should be able to ... almost double that," he said. "So we could keep a substantial large number of troops abroad for a sustained period of time."

Canada has scaled back its record number of 4,000-plus foreign troops, including the 2,000 soldiers it had in Afghanistan until the end of last summer. Canada now has 700 soldiers in Kabul as part of the NATO-led force. Mr. Graham would not say whether all the additional troops would end up in Afghanistan.

But the landlocked Central Asian country -- whose former Taliban rulers hosted al-Qaeda terrorists while they plotted the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks -- is now the focus of Canada's foreign military efforts for the foreseeable future.

Canada ended its 13-year commitment to the Balkans this year and maintains about 80 officers with the new European Union force there.

Mr. Graham met last week with Gen. Henri Bentegeat, the chief of the French defence staff, and the two agreed that it would make sense for Canada to team up with French forces in southern Afghanistan next year.

Kandahar was the birthplace of the Taliban, and remains a hotbed of resistance to the international efforts to bring stability to the country.

Canadian troops spent six months in Kandahar in 2002 working with American commandos. They took part in search and destroy missions that targeted al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants and their snipers excelled at killing enemy combatants.

Gen. Bentegeat told Mr. Graham that Canada's expertise in the French language and the long historical military links between the two countries would make a Kandahar mission a natural fit.

"While it's a complicated and tough area, it's one where you're in good company and guys you can work with well," Mr. Graham explained.

"There are other areas of Afghanistan where maybe the threat isn't as big but you'd be exposed and alone. When you're analysing the threat, it seems you have to look at more than, is it a tricky place? You've got to look at who you are going to be there with."

During his trip to Kabul next month, Mr. Graham said he wants to hear "what's going on in Kabul and how can we translate that success in Kandahar."

Canadian soldiers have already proven they can earn the trust of people in Afghanistan, but the public better not forget they're capable of using force when necessary, he said.

"I think where they're good is they're willing to walk down the street, they've got a machine-gun, and they don't open up every time a cat walks in front of them," Mr. Graham said. "They actually work with the local population to create a situation of stability."

- - -

On the web for seven-day subscribers: 'A complex array of defence and security challenges.' Read Bill Graham's first speech after being named defence minister.

www.ottawacitizen.com
 
We live in hope, bossi.

Merry Christmas
 
In September, after the government dismissed Ismail Khan, the powerful governor of the western province of Herat, a move supported by the United Nations, a mob looted and burned 15 offices of United Nations and other agencies in the city of Herat. After the presidential elections Oct. 9, which were sponsored by the United Nations, three foreign election workers were kidnapped and held for three weeks by a Taliban splinter group.

This is so typical of what happens when the media decides to create a reality as opposed to reporting it. These two incidents were completely and utterly unrelated. The first one involving Ishmail Khan was a "gesture" by a recently deposed local leader against an easy target: the local UN compound. "IK" wanted to express his displeasure at losing his job but was not about to take on the strong US/ANA forces that had been moved into the city. The riot was believed to be orchestrated and was of fairly short duration, and was not likely an expression of true popular feeling but rather the action of a "crowd-for-hire". As a rule the aid agencies function very well in the Herat area, and it is considered to be one of the most secure regions of the country.

The second incident, the kidnapping, in Kabul, on the far side of the country, was not against an NGO or an aid agency: it was against three foreign employees of the Joint Election Management Board (JEMB) which is an agency of the Afgh govt. The suggestion that it was the Taliban is regarded with some skepticism: it was more likely just local criminal types: at one point the name of the Kabul City Police Chief was even rumoured.

But this summer the city often had electricity only eight hours a day. It continues to suffer from a lack of hospital beds, sewage facilities, clean water and housing.

Yes, but does anybody bother checking to see what it was getting before that, or what the actual problems are? Does this article report that there is in fact widespread home electricity use, using car batteries? (Just look at Kabul by night...) Of course Kabul has deficiencies: show me one city in this part of hte world that doesn't? In fact, as far as hospitals and beds go, Kabul is relatively well equipped: what it lacks is doctors, nurses and technical staff. What this article does not report (of course...) is that the overall standard of living, by Afghan terms, has improved greatly over the last year, as a direct result of the military efforts of the US, the ANA and ISAF.

Particularly in Kabul, many feared that the hostages would suffer the same gruesome fate as those executed by extremists in Iraq. This, in turn, might have prompted more aid agencies to leave Afghanistan just when the recovery is beginning to make headway.

Read this statement closely. It actually says very little. "Many" (who...?) "feared" that the hostages would suffer. Of course they feared that. But, guess what: they were released unharmed. "Might have prompted"--well, did it or didn't it? Guess what: it is really just speculation dressed up as fact so it doesn't matter.

While the military may obtain good public relations by building bridges or schools, such initiatives double as intelligence-gathering operations.

I assume that this is directed at the US. Too bad the authors didn't bother to do any research to find out what the US policy in Afgh is on US military actually doing these projects as opposed to assisting and facilitating the Afgh Govt, GOs or even NGOs to do them. This statement ignores the whole way the US PRT system works. And, as for "intelligence-gathering"......I'm sorry--I must have missed something. What exactly is wrong with gathering intelligence? Exactly how does any military force expect to function without doing that? (Asinine and outdated UN "peacekeeping" restrictions aside, please...) How do you provide for your own force protection, or contribute to the security of the GOs/NGOs without an effective intelligence system that includes a very strong HUMINT function?

The rest of the article is, IMHO, littered with such rubbish. I think the real problem is that many of these GOs and NGOs are populated by people of a rather lefty persuasion who see a devil behind every Western soldier no matter what. They neither like nor understand the military and it shows. My experience over the last few years suggests to me that "aid" is a business and that a number of  these people figure that we might cramp their style.

Cheers.
 
pbi said:
My experience over the last few years suggests to me that "aid" is a business and that a number of these people figure that we might cramp their style.

Cheers.

BINGO!!! Someone's got what we've been saying all along. ;D
 
And, in the context of "what does the CIMIC Assessment provide?"
Here's an example (in the context of Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies/MAHE, since it's too late for Civil Emergency Planning/CEP):

"The message to Canadian policymakers is that you have to do an assessment of the capacity of the Sri Lankan government, which can't do it all," said Alphonsus. "You have to assess on the ground who can deliver it."

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/Co...&c=Article&cid=1104621011891&call_pageid=null
 
With talks of relationships between CIMIC, reg forces, IOs, and INGOs, and roles and responsibilities for each, i'd like to throw in an additional thread to this discussion on CIMIC.   i understand that the Canadian Government has adopted an integrated "3D approach" (defense, diplomacy, development) to providing assistance in conflict or post-conflict environments.  

Does anyone know who spearheaded this initiative (pmo, DND, dfait or cida)? When?  
How is it being received, at different ranks, by members of the forces?  
Without getting too candid, is any of the three partners playing or taking more of a lead role?  
Any feedback on how tactically the partnerships are being implemented in the field?
Will this approach pass the test of time, or is it considered by insiders as an experiment in foreign policy?

.
 
I voted no:

(1) Didn't know the system.  Despite his "Man from outside" schtick, Gen Hillier knows well how the system works, and how to work it (and work around it).  MGen Lew would have been bitten and stung repeatedly by things he never saw coming becasue of his lack of NDHQ savvy.

(2) Different times.  His style (carefully cultivated with speechwriters and the ghostwriter who helped him write his memoirs) would not have worked well with the political leadership of the time when he was serving.

(3) Didn't display sufficient leadership when it was called for.

MGen (ret) MacKenzie testified before us in an honest and straightforward manner. He alone seemed to understand the necessity to acknowledge error and account for personal shortcomings. We did not always accept everything that he said, but we accept that what he offered us was the truth as he saw it. Unlike some senior officers who appeared before us, he was never less than courteous and respectful in the way that he gave evidence or responded to our questions.

Also, MGen (ret) MacKenzie fully accepted the need for a public accounting of what went on in Somalia. He invariably supported our effort to probe the incidents and events in the wider public interest. We regard his comportment and demeanour throughout his testimony before us as consistent with the highest standards of military duty and responsibility.

...

MGen MacKenzie was well aware that the Canadian Airbome Regiment (CAR) was facing serious leadership problems in the pre-deployment phase. He was informed by BGen Beno almost immediately upon assuming command at LFCA, and several times thereafter, of concerns raised about LCol Morneault's leadership, and that it might be necessary to replace LCol Morneault. In these communications, MGen MacKenzie was a passive recipient of information: he took no steps to personally investigate the problems he was told about; he did not advise BGen Beno of his opinion concerning what LCol Morneault may have been doing wrong and what his shortcomings may have been; and he took no steps to assert his leadership role as a means of solving the crisis. Rather, he limited his response to expressing over the telephone his confidence in BGen Beno's ability to properly assess and solve the problem, and left the situation to develop on its own.

We find MGen MacKenzie's actions inadequate under the circumstances. By his own admission, the senior command faced a unique situation with the CAR in the fall of 1992. The Commanding Officer (CO) was replaced in mid-stream -- a virtually unprecedented move in peacetime -- yet MGen MacKenzie remained passive. MGen MacKenzie failed to properly address the breakdown in the chain of command between the Brigade Commander and the CO of the CAR. Though he knew of a mounting crisis that could possibly have compromised the participation of the CAR in the Somalia mission, MGen MacKenzie failed to take adequate corrective measures to initially prevent the crisis and, subsequently, measures to resolve it satisfactorily.

http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol4/v4c31e.htm
 
I only voted no because I don't think he'd be keen on being a "political" soldier, in spite of him trying to be a politician proper in a previous election.
 
Ex-Dragoon said:
Just for a little bit of fun.
Are you proposing him to replace Gen Hillier?  He would not be the first General brought out of retirement to be CDS (though maybe the first who was not already CDS prior to first retirement).
 
No I am just trying to guage the membership view on whether or not he would have made a decent CDS based on their experiences and knowledge of him.
 
Are you proposing him to replace Gen Hillier?  He would not be the first General brought out of retirement to be CDS (though maybe the first who was not already CDS prior to first retirement).

Not really. John de Chastelain was brought back in 1994.

In 1989, he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1993, he transferred to the Reserves and was appointed Canada's Ambassador to the United States. In 1994, he was recalled to Regular Force duty and re-appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, from which post he retired in December 1995.

 
A man of the times..... BEEP!"  Time's up!

Next!
 
Lewis MacKenzie would have made an OK CDS if we had stayed in the Peacekeeping realm, I don't think he would have had a smeck on how to lead a war-time national force.  He has been pretty controversial writer and columnist since his retirement in 1993.  He reached MGen after 35 years of service and did not compete with his peers at the time.

He had his day at the airport in the Sarajevo sun.  It was so glamorous at the time but IMHO it pales in comparison to what Battle Group Commanders and TF Commanders are doing today in a combat setting.

All those voting yes have chosen not to comment, interesting indeed! ???
 
I think he would make a good CDS but I do agree he's been out of the game too long.  It might take him a little while to get back in the groove. 

On a related note, I've heard a few members in the RCMP suggest Gen. Hillier for our next Commissioner of the RCMP.  I totally agree.  I think he would be great for us.  Not that Commissioner Elliot isn't doing a great job, by if Hillier could do for the RCMP what he did for the CF, bring him on.
 
I somehow think Gen Hillier will spend the first year or so of "retirement" burning off accumulated leave and writing his memoirs, with his feet up by the fire.

Then, once the Maple Leafs fall (as they do every spring) he'll be back out and about - though I can't yet imagine what he'll be up to.
 
Have one more chapter to go, but I really enjoyed this book. It's not a very long read at 280 pages. The initial 2 chapters about his youth are little boring but it helps shape and explain his personality later in life.



I definitely recommend for anyone interested.
 
There is an excerpt from the book on the Publishers web site. It deals with his comments about Carol Off.

http://www.dmpibooks.com/book/9781553653509/excerpt
 
I know Lew fairly well, having first met him on the Combat Team Commanders' Course in 1972 and having crossed paths many times over the years. We most recently renewed our relationship at a social function near Ottawa this June. (We were always on a first name basis despite our difference in rank.) I cannot comment on Ms Off's work, but I would like to go on record as supporting the general's comment about soldiers making one look good. Like him, throughout my career I was fortunate enough to find soldiers tolerant enough of my foibles to carry out my orders in a way that reflected well on me.

As luck would have it, a close friend of mine from high school joined the Queen's Own Rifles as a rifleman and served in the same battalion as Lew in Canada and Germany. At a recent QOR reunion in Calgary he called the general 'Sir' and was politely, told "It's Lew." That explains at least in part why he can claim that the soldiers made him look good.
 
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