Mortars: 51 mm, 60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mm & more

[MedCorps]

1) I was at a day of meetings where the "Army of Tomorrow" was being discussed as a planning concept. It was pretty interesting stuff and I was pleased and surprised to see that the Army is taking this topic quite seriously, placing real resources behind working on it.  While I was there I was given a copy of a publication called "Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow".  It was written last year by DLCD in Kingston.  A good read if you can find a copy. Might be on the DWAN somewhere.

Here is an Internet source if anyone cares: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/DLCD-DCSFT/specialPubs-eng.asp

MC

 

[McG]

The officers who do these sort of war-gaming for the future were suitably impressed.

I assume this was a simulation ex?  Similar experimentation/war-gaming impressed many force developers with the idea that we did not need another mortar.  Beware accepting the apparent lessons of a simulation without understanding the model upon which it is based.

There are no PYs to reintegrate - when the gunners and sappers were told to take on those roles, there were no PYs attached.

I have no doubt that infantry are capable.  Any soldier is, with the proper training.  The 120mm MOR Bn mentioned above were fulltime mortarman, and mortars were their core competency, essentially a different branch eventhough they were classified as infantry. 

And there is the critical fact.  Had PYs moved to Arty & Engr along with the responsibilities of mortar & pioneer, then this discussion would not be happening today.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Uh....guys...........are these humpable?



I remeber fondly humping tube, or baseplate, or ammo for the sixty......that was enough.....

Stop your teasing.... they took our 60s away and gave us something we couldn't carry, or do the same job as a 60. Now that's progress I tell you.  :

 

[GnyHwy]

Had PYs moved to Arty & Engr along with the responsibilities of mortar & pioneer, then this discussion would not be happening today.

I cannot speak on the engineers, but the Arty has been supplying mortar troops, and is currently training mortar troops for that exact responsibility.  The use of the 81s in Afghan is a bad example as they were used for Arty local defence, and only on a couple rare occasions actually performed that task.  Another task could have been in close FOB fire, which again was very seldom. 

If a need was identified, and the numbers demanded of the Arty Regt had been bigger, a mortar platoon dedicated to the forward Cbt Tms could have been deployed as well.

 

[Petard]

This subject has come up a number of times on the boards here, and the conclusion always seems to be: it ain't happenin' no matter how good the idea, which, IMHO, is too bad

Shortly after I arrived in DLR, I was tagged to look after the file for the potential to introduce 120 mortar capability. For awhile it had some support from DLCD, and even looked promising, when the concept to re-role some returning TLAV's by mounting a 120 system on them gained some traction. The concept included the ability to use it dismounted, if need be. To overcome the enormous new ammo qualification costs, the requirement would be for a weapon mount that could take the in service 81 barrel for training purposes (read, we would primairily use the 81 in an SP mount until we could gradually spread the 120 ammo cost over a few years).

But it was never high in the priority list, and as Afghanistan drew down, it seemed to be nothing more than another "kick the can game"
So when I left last year, I added my file on the 120 to the many others (some which go back to the late 70's), probably not to see daylight 'til the next poor SOB gets his turn at "the can".

Not to rain too hard on the parade though, I do believe it can be done, but this thing will never go anywhere until a high enough sponsor puts his/her support behind it, and gets a real hard push from the field force that there is a capability deficiency

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

The unfortunate reality is the CF is not large enough nor has the resources to do everything.  Capabilities have to be prioritized.  In order to bring in a new capability something has to be divested.  The .50 cal is in the process of being divested and the 60 mm mortar was divested, both capabilities in exchange for the AGLS. 

 

[Infanteer]

The unfortunate reality is the CF is not large enough nor has the resources to do everything. 

But we are large enough to support a ASIC for each brigade (and a LFIC for the Army), three fleets of armoured vehicles for the Infantry, and a 4th Artillery Regiment dedicated to something that the other three Regiments could do?

 

[GnyHwy]

Capabilities have to be prioritized.

My sentiments exactly.

But we are large enough to support a ASIC for each brigade (and a LFIC for the Army), three fleets of armoured vehicles for the Infantry, and a 4th Artillery Regiment dedicated to something that the other three Regiments could do?

The ASIC is a choice made much higher than us; I agree.  Three fleets of armoured Inf for 3 Bdes doesn'nt seem too much. escpecially since most want heavy armour.  Lastly. the 4th Regt is a Div asset and does not possess guns; only enablers such as radars and  UAVs.

 

[Infanteer]

Lastly. the 4th Regt is a Div asset and does not possess guns; only enablers such as radars and  UAVs.

4 GSAR has 3 Btys each affiliated with a Brigade containing a troop of UAVs, radars and ASCC.  The 3 Field Regts have ASCC capability built in to them - just give the radar and UAV to the STA batteries and you can fold up that fourth unit.

 

[dapaterson]

4 GSAR has 3 Btys each affiliated with a Brigade containing a troop of UAVs, radars and ASCC.  The 3 Field Regts have ASCC capability built in to them - just give the radar and UAV to the STA batteries and you can fold up that fourth unit.

Or, alternatively, build six robust Reg F infantry Bns and you can fold up those other three... if we're looking for ways to trim HQs.  Heck, that would even permit a pioneer platoon and a mortar platoon in each of the six remaining Bns.

There is some (minor) justification in building hollow Reg F structure for round-out on deployment, by force-generation from the Reserves.  Having four arty regiments provides some flex like that.

 

[Infanteer]

Or, alternatively, build six robust Reg F infantry Bns and you can fold up those other three... if we're looking for ways to trim HQs.  Heck, that would even permit a pioneer platoon and a mortar platoon in each of the six remaining Bns.

There is some (minor) justification in building hollow Reg F structure for round-out on deployment, by force-generation from the Reserves.  Having four arty regiments provides some flex like that.

There is some merit in that proposal, but infantry battalions 7-9 are just as functional as 1-6.  4 GSAR isn't a fourth artillery regiment like 1, 2 and 5 RCHA.  Rather, it manages three Btys that are designed to be given to Brigades to bring certain capabilities.  Just give them to the brigades by putting them in the horse regiments.

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

In order to bring in a new capability such as the 120 mm, you would have to identify the capability gap that needs to be filled and why it can't be filled by something else we currently use.

 

[MedCorps]

Not sure if I missed something, but is it not the intention to have the 4th Regt man the Long Range Precision Rocket System (LRPRS aka MRLS) when we get it?

There was a Letter of Intent (in early 2009) that went out indicating we wanted 17 launchers and I seem to recall this capability being part of the Future Land Combat Systems project.

Have not heard much about it since the Letter of Intent. 

MC

 

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Not sure if I missed something, but is it not the intention to have the 4th Regt man the Long Range Precision Rocket System (LRPRS aka MRLS) when we get it?

There was a Letter of Intent (in early 2009) that went out indicating we wanted 17 launchers and I seem to recall this capability being part of the Future Land Combat Systems project.

Have not heard much about it since the Letter of Intent. 

MC

That was the intent some time ago, which would have made 4 AD Regt 4 General Support Regiment, with UAV, CB Radar, and LRPRS.  Last update was that the rockets were dead in the water.  As of this time, Scan Eagle is on a lease to 2015, but the US just ended its association with it, so one can only assume that it's a lame duck UAV.  The radars are supposed to be chosen this year, with them being primarily employed in an AIR detection range, as the SOR only requires a 12km CB capability. 

Infanteer- The case of 4 AD is a strange one.  It provides the Div level STA and CC elements, with 3 batteries of UAV, radar, and ASCC as mentioned (why we need a Tp of ASCC to do what a BK and his staff used to do is beyond me, but that's another story).  The STA battery in the RCHA is designed to support Bde ops, so not focussed on the deep fight.  That said, the 3 battery concepts is smoke and mirrors, as instead of having a Radar battery and UAV battery like planned that could force generate elements to support the Div, they will now have 2 real batteries, and 1 "lame, weak, and lazy" battery to dump the hurt and problem children types.

I agree that we COULD roll up 4 AD into the RCHAs if they want to have an element within them that works at a higher level, and we could support training for that.  However, once we have an air defence shooter again, the plan would fall apart, and we would just recreate 4 AD again (though hopefully not in Gagetown)

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Where instead of Gagetown?  Perhaps Chatham? 

 

[Kirkhill]

I cannot speak on the engineers, but the Arty has been supplying mortar troops, and is currently training mortar troops for that exact responsibility.  The use of the 81s in Afghan is a bad example as they were used for Arty local defence, and only on a couple rare occasions actually performed that task.  Another task could have been in close FOB fire, which again was very seldom. 

If a need was identified, and the numbers demanded of the Arty Regt had been bigger, a mortar platoon dedicated to the forward Cbt Tms could have been deployed as well.

Hey Clint,

It sounds as if:

A) you didn't need the mortars
B) that you probably could have found space somewhere in the back of each gun-det's 10 tonner for the C16
C) that your sense of when the 81s were "required" in support of coal face operations and the sense of a LAV Platoon Leader might be at variance.

But that business of prioritizing (item C) is why the Bns have always had their own integral fire support.

And the professionals can correct me but I have never heard of a Bde Commander detaching Bn mors and grouping them as a Bde level asset.  I suppose it could be ordered to shoot across Bn boundaries in extremis but that isn't the same as moving the baseplates outside of the Bn Boundaries and thus out of the Bn CO's area of control.


IMHO PYs are a red herring.  The infantry has never, to my knowledge, been "fully" manned - opinion developed since 1980 as a trainee DEO with the Calg Highrs and held through the my four years with them and the Johns and as an observer since.

But, until this latest kefuffle, when somebody declared that we/you have 10 seats in a LAV and all seats will be filled I have never ever heard of anybody suggesting that the mortars, the pioneers, the AT gunners should be stood down. 

IMHO, again, it might have made sense to declare that, as an initial bet, that the AT gunners were going to be deployed as a 10th rifle platoon (to allow block leave for example?), and possibly even the mortars, until it was discovered that those people were better employed either firing mortars or (perhaps?) supplying MFC teams to patrolling platoons rather than tying up Arty assets needed to co-ordinate fires at company, battalion and BG levels.  If I'm not mistook weren't Infantry MFCs given the necessary training, and on occasion, the authorization, to direct higher level shoots?

However, to set aside those skills was and is an absurdity.

The number of PYs available just changes the amount of work that can be done.  The capabilities held by the Bn CO determine the type and quality of work that can be done.

As has been discussed at length, and heatedly, elsewhere, there is ample evidence from other armies that there is nothing magical about the 10 man section - depending on a bunch of stuff the smallest foot-borne element has ranged from at least 2 to 13 with the high end usually found in the lighter organizations. 

The Danes have currently re-sized their Rifle Sections across their entire organization to reflect both sustainment difficulties (long term operations and maintaining leave etc) AND to reflect the number of seats for arrses in the backs of modern PCs.  By the time various add-ons get included (Meds, Interpretors, Sniper Dets?, AT Dets?, MFC Dets?, 60mm Dets? Pnr?, embedded reporters) it seems to this outsider that the  backs of those vehicles will fill up pretty quickly.  Not to mention body armour, water, rats and ammo.

I have difficulty understanding why manning is presenting so many problems to an organization whose entire structure used to be based on a very simple premise.  Once the force was engaged the most common order heard was "Close up those files". 

 

[Petard]

Hey Clint,

It sounds as if:

A) you didn't need the mortars
B) that you probably could have found space somewhere in the back of each gun-det's 10 tonner for the C16
C) that your sense of when the 81s were "required" in support of coal face operations and the sense of a LAV Platoon Leader might be at variance.

But that business of prioritizing (item C) is why the Bns have always had their own integral fire support.

And the professionals can correct me but I have never heard of a Bde Commander detaching Bn mors and grouping them as a Bde level asset.  I suppose it could be ordered to shoot across Bn boundaries in extremis but that isn't the same as moving the baseplates outside of the Bn Boundaries and thus out of the Bn CO's area of control.

....

IMHO PYs are a red herring. 

GnyHwy can hopefully jump in here to help clear it up too, but I think he was speaking mostly from his own experience.
My  :2c:

A) The artillery did use the mortars far more often then what Gny's post might lead you to believe, especially in the early stages of the campaigns. So much so, that in the fall of 06, the gun Bty was given 120mm mortars by the Americans to augment their firepower, on top of the M777 and 81's they were manning. Sometimes the Gun Tp was firing mortars and guns simultaneously on different targets.
Even in the case of using them for local defence, the 81's were critical for turning back direct attacks on the gun position in a few instances. Yes there were only a few instances of that kind of defence of the gun postion, but if they had not had those mortars, the outcome might well of been different. Unlike the view some have of the guns being relatively well off in a FOB, there were times when they were very isolated, and entirely responsible for their own protection. This is likely to continue.

B) The HLVW's, and later AHSVS's, were loaded to the gunwales, largely because the Gun Bty then, and now, does not really have an Ech anymore. There wouldn't be room really for a C16, if they were issued. As mentioned above, they need to retain the 81s not just for local defence, and given the premium of space, its not likely they can carry much more on their limited lift capability

C) GnyHwy is very experienced, I think you're misunderstanding his pt, and in any case I'm sure he can certainly respond to that one on his own

The Artillery did, and does, need the use of the 81's, but what is not getting emphasized enough is the capability deficiency that exists at both the Coy and Bn level since the 81's and 60's were taken away from them. I think most would agree that the C16 (and new Carl G ammo) did not replace some of the capability the 60 provided, and it can expected that gun Bty's will be tasked away from the Cdn BG they deployed with, thereby leaving the Cdn Infantry Bn without that capability either.
The problem is not going to be solved by taking the 81's away from the guns to give back to the infantry, I would argue there is need for that type of capability at both those levels of fire support. 

I wouldn't call the PY issue a red herring; though not the only reason, it was certainly part of why that 120 project I was working on foundered.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll withdraw the snark, Petard.  Apologies GnyHwy.

I appreciate being set straight wrt the employment of the systems.  You certainly describe an interesting operating environment for the gunners.

However I still have difficulty wrt the manning issues.  For example, I know that our 1982 era 4 coy mech battalions employed over 1000 personnel (1032 comes to mind for some reason).  And I know that some of that (60 or so) was due to the need to support all the vehicles.  At the same time the Brit Paras were in the Falklands with approximately half the number of troops in a Battalion but their Battalions were only down by 3 rifle platoons.

The had 9 rifle platoons vs 12 for us, a Mortar, AT and Pnr pl, just like us, a Recce pl AND a Patrols pl, as well as an MG pl and an Motor Transport pl.  Headquarters, medics, MPs, sigs were all represented.

 

[Old Sweat]

At the risk of sidetracking the discussion, Kirkhill, you should not use the 1982 model as an example of anything as it did not progress beyond paper. A fundamental error was made in allowing each of the study teams to come up with what they considered as an optimum decision, and then no one tried to apply any fiscal or personnel discipline to the process. The Corps 86 organization that resulted was nearly metropolitan in population. The gunner regiment, which ended up some 1500 pers strong, was a prime example of this.

In the case of the mortars in Afghanistan, I support Petard's statements 100%. The gun troops used them extensively in support of the infantry, as well as for local defence of austere gun positions. Austere gun position is gunner speak for one stuck out on an open field all by itself with no friendlies around. Especially in the early rotos, some troops spent a considerable amount of time in them. Guns were also given away to other formations, some outside our AOR, on a routine basis to make up for their organizational deficiencies. TF 1-07, for example, was short at least one gun troop for the majority of its tour. All this seems to me to cry loudly for mortars back in the battalions.

 

[Kirkhill]

Fair call on the Corps 86 organization Old Sweat, although I seem to recall earlier Bn organizations that were on similar scale. 

All that said I still have difficulty accepting that manning levels, especially for the infantry, cause as much consternation as they do.  There are many examples of "tiny, perfect" or "small, but perfectly formed" infantry battalions that retain all the capabilities of a "Standard" - read post 1916 - infantry battalion.  Manning levels from 250 (Soviet era) to 1000 (USMC) are all available as starting points. 

I accept that some of that is driven by the manner in which the unit is commanded and supported (the Soviets relied heavily on regimental and divisional support as I recall and did not operate independently).  I also accept that with fewer people you can do less.  Therefore a smaller force, equivalently armed and supported, will hold less ground for less time, or will be limited to assaulting smaller objectives, than a large force.  But those issues can be managed in two ways, either by limiting the objectives or by increasing the number of assigned units. 

In the current era of "Cabinet Wars" and Multi-National operations, two things are paramount for governments of the day, "Show Up" and "Don't Get Anybody Killed". It strikes me that it is more critical that deployed commanders have within their personal control as many capabilities as possible to deal with the broadest range of battlefield conundrums than it is critical that we stress over the size of the area of operations, or the frontage on a linear battlefield, or the number of days of combat that can be sustained*.  We will always have to co-operate with others to secure our flanks.  Should we have to rely on others to supply critical support when it is possible to supply the support ourselves in a cost-effective manner.  *(My apologies for the run-on sentence).

IMH (and inexpert) O, that argues strongly for retaining skill sets like pioneering and mortaring, in battalions even if the battalion is reduced to 250 men and can only man 2 tubes and supply a section of Pioneers.  If the need arises new numbers can always be fed in an trained by the existing personnel.  If skills are set aside then the recovery time is that much greater.

Which brings us back to the point of this loop:
If your gunners are being left to swan around in the blue with no dedicated local protection assets then I can clearly understand how they would come to enjoy the comfort of having mortars available to them.    I believe that that comfort is what most of the infantry types here are arguing for as, I believe, they are no less isolated in their FOBs than your gunners are in their Gun Positions. Although they may be better dug in from what I can see and less peripatetic.

But, I think we're actually arguing the same side here in that we both agree that that nice, compact, easily transportable mortar should be supplied to the infantry.  (By the way, as you are well aware, neither the 4.2 nor any of the 120s are, IMO, either compact or easily transportable and thus should be left either to gunners, or to those other people in Black Hats, who have big vehicles to move them and their ammunition around the field).

I am still a strong believer that if you can't carry it it isn't an infantry weapon.  If the weapon needs a vehicle to move it then it belongs to either the Artillery or the Armoured.  That means, in my view, that 2" to 81mm are infantry weapons. 

Now if the Arty is having to do more "infantry" work to defend their guns on the open battlefield, rather than being held behind a well defined front on a linear battlefield, then it makes sense to me that they would need more "infantry weapons" to do their job effectively (and PYs to man them....) and those weapons would include the 81s.