New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Underway]

And Jollyjacktar, here is a little secret: every single war in the history of the planet has been "come as you are". When war breaks out , you have what you have - on both sides, but then you can start to build up/mass produce war materiel. If you were a bit prescient (and in most cases, wars don't just breakout, there is a period of tension where both sides see what might happen and start preparations), you can implement urgent production programs before it actually breaks out - like the corvettes of WWII which were implemented before the war began as an emergency program.

The "Come as you are war" concept of the 60's and 70's what premised on something different: that the next war with the Soviets would not give us time after the beginning of the war to build up resources because it would escalate into a nuclear conflict as soon as things start to go bad for one side, and that nuclear conflict would resolve the matter once and for all. I personally don't believe that the next war will necessarily "go nuclear" right away, so things are not totally going to be crystallized with what you have at the beginning.

I completely agree.  The quote from Gwen Dyer that was referred to had an extra addition to it which is often lost when quoting him.  What he was specifically referring too was that with the very high technology of the current (read 1985 tech) military could not be produced fast enough to keep pace with losses in the event of Warsaw Pact vs NATO.  That meant that you would have to "come as you are" and then build faster, cheaper, easier low tech solutions if the war dragged on.  The new versions of the cheap and nasties.  You saw this with the end of WW2, as Shermans and T-35's could be produced much faster despite the fact they were not the "best" tank vs the Germans versions, they were good enough and the quantity over quality argument was very important.  Even the Germans tried to improve the cheap with the Panzerjager's etc... 

 

[MarkOttawa]

Having hard at Irving--via twitter:
https://twitter.com/mspilkaokeefe/status/678301867672252416

@mspilkaokeefe
New MPs & Gov't take note: Frontline's opening editorial has an ELI5 primer on the challenges facing NSPS structure.
http://defence.frontline.online/interactive/15def6-3d/html5/index.html?page=1

FrontLine Defence:
http://defence.frontline.online/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[jollyjacktar]

My youngest son works at Irving.  He finally got his eyes opened with what was done with VDQ.  He is disgusted and tells me that even the old hands said it was the worst refit they'd ever seen come out of the yard.  If they're bitching, it must be true.

 

[NavyShooter]

I heard that the VDQ was a mess coming out....hard to think it was worse than MON.  I was duty tech the first night we got MON out of their hands (grasp?  claws?)

-No heat
-No running water
-emergency lighting rigged
-no functional washrooms

It was....interesting....

 

[Pat in Halifax]

And yet the institution preaches accountability-I guess only those in uniform are held accountable. I also guess it really is true: All people are created equal, some more equal than others.
This is not new either and has been happening since the HALIFAX class first started doing DWPs in Halifax-They ALWAYS came out in worse shape than when they went in. You wouldn't keep taking your car to a garage for service if that was the case would you? Maybe some of those with their f***ing blinders on would I guess. Unfortunately those are the same ones glossing things over and praising this marriage of government and industry. One reason I really had to take the uniform off-These things were driving me nuts...and who will pay?...the crew will be worked to the bone to reactivate and meet a near impossible time line. What happened to "Lessons Learned"; more like "Lessons Missed".
Can't tell this is pissing me off can you?!

 

[Stoker]

I think a lot of yards are guilty at less than stellar refits. I remember a few years ago Athabaskan's state wasn't very good when they got her back to Halifax finally. From first hand experience MCDV refits at certain smaller yards have also been less than good.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I heard that the VDQ was a mess coming out....hard to think it was worse than MON.  I was duty tech the first night we got MON out of their hands (grasp?  claws?)

-No heat
-No running water
-emergency lighting rigged
-no functional washrooms

It was....interesting....

My son works at ISI.  He told me about VDQ, he was digstusted with the state of her.  Said she needed at least two months work before she should have been turned over to the navy.  But, they wanted to meet the deadline and to be able to trumpet they turned her over in time.  As far as I'm concerned, heads should roll for this.  Of course, it won't and FMF will be forced to repair her.

 

[tabernac]

I think a lot of yards are guilty at less than stellar refits. I remember a few years ago Athabaskan's state wasn't very good when they got her back to Halifax finally.

I spoke with the HTs that were involved with ATH's Port Weller refit. There were plenty of other issues, but they had high praise for the PW metal workers. I'm told they did miracle work, certainly when you compare that specific area to the (less than stellar) rest of the refit.

/tangent

edit for clarity

 

[STONEY]

It would seem to me that if you are getting ships back from shipyards  in such poor condition that is the fault
of the Navy not the shipyards. I spent several years on the Navy trials team and we tested every ship that
came out of refit at 5 different shipyards over that time and would refuse to accept anything that did not meet specs .  This included inspecting all compartments for cleanness and all equipment for proper operation. We required the yard to rectify or we did not accept. Either the Navys standards have dropped a lot or it was not in the contract. I guess the days of new car smells in refitted ships are gone. It could be that someone is trying to save money by leaving out as much as possible out of the contract hence you get what you pay for.

Cheers

 

[jollyjacktar]

I honestly don't know of any sailor, including myself, who likes what comes out of ISI.  We'd refuse to accept it if we could but those decisions come from beyond our control or level.  To be fair, and I really hate to be fair, some of the problems come from arisings and they're not always going to fit into the budget or time scale to correct.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Likely no one had the stones to refuse the transfer from the yard, as it would go political in a hurry these days.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I know the one's who would have loved to had no choice but say, yes.  Those decisions always are made at much higher pay grades and probably are always political in nature.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I spoke with the HTs that were involved with ATH's Port Weller refit. There were plenty of other issues, but they had high praise for the PW metal workers. I'm told they did miracle work, certainly when you compare that specific area to the (less than stellar) rest of the refit.

/tangent

edit for clarity

I know the shipyards out west were making all the complex piping (up to 8' across) to feed water from the Penstocks to the turbines for the small Hydro projects. They were the only people that had the skillsets to do them.

 

[Rifleman62]

From the UK, dated info.

http://www.consultancy.uk/news/3115/canada-blows-its-combatant-ship-budget-out-of-water

Canada blows its combatant ship budget out of water

31 December 2015 Consultancy.uk

The price of war is set to cost the Canadian tax payer dearly as the cost of building 15 surface combatant ships for the navy balloons more than $16 billion to reach $30 billion. The increase was found following an audit by independent professional services firm AT Kearney. One suggested way forward is to reduce the number of ordered ships.

Canada, following continued geopolitical uncertainty and its proximity to the sometimes disputed artic region, has sought to upgrade its navy. 15 newly designed combat ships were ordered in the late 2000s, for the price of $14 billion as part of a wider budget for the navy of $26.2 billion. Yet the federal government recently announced that even that budget has been blown out of the water.

To develop a clearer picture of the total cost of the programme, A.T. Kearney was called in to audit the programme and develop a projection of total costs. The consulting firm was hired to provide a qualitative analysis that examines “the relationship between the project requirements and feasibility, and affordability to provide a solution that allows [the Navy] to fully realise its mission.” The analysis shows that the cost was put at $30 billion for the combat ships, thus $16 billion above budget and pushing the total navy budget to $42 billion.

The problem for the Canadian government is a result of a mismatch between expectations, cost and requirements. There were already initial concerns about the $14 billion agreement when it was agreed to. “We had concerns all along,” says Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, Commander Royal Canadian Navy, in an exclusive interview with the CBC. “It is obvious that the concerns were less acute in 2008 and 2009, when the foreclosure process [cost] down was still fresh and the ink was drying. But as we went forward, you know, we had real concerns.”

Concerns about the costs blowout associated with the construction programme were further raised in 2013, when the Auditor General of Canada Michael Ferguson warned that there were considerable unknowns involved in the project, including labour and equipment, inflation and other project uncertainties, placing critical questions about the originally decided budget cap of $14 billion.

The cost explosion has been attributed to a number of factors: the marine requirements did not exist to meet the construction demand and needed to be developed. It was almost impossible to judge the cost of the technology required for advanced war ships, given the pace of development. Even today, the final costs produced by A. T. Kearney remain projections, as the ships are still only in the design phase.

The programme has been placed under pressure from the Minister of National Defence when Jason Kenney, who in October suggested that, given budget constraints, the number of ships ordered may need to be lowered to 11. “Based on expert advice that we received from the Royal Canadian Navy and after exhaustive analysis the Ministry of Public Works, following the most comprehensive and transparent major process in the history of the Canadian government, we believe that it is possible with a budget of $26 billion to build between 11 and 15 warships surface,” Kenney explains.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Story above:

...15 newly designed combat ships were ordered in the late 2000s...

The CSCs were neither actually designed nor ordered.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Bearpaw]

I think the whole problem resides in the CSC concept itself----it would have been good to have used these ideas in the late 1980's when the Halifax class was being designed. 

IMHO what the RCN needs for surface combatants are

4 DDGH----area air defence destroyers with a significant ASW and ASuW capabilities
                -- these should be somewhat larger than the Type 45 for the RN, have 2 CH-148,.....
                -- the AAD capability should be very heavy in view of potential swarming attacks
                -- these are very expensive ---my guess is $2.5 billion to $3 billion each

8 Frigates----somewhat larger than Halifax class---more heavily armed for AA and ASuW roles
                -- my guess is that these would cost $1.5 - $2.0 billion each

12+ "Corvettes"---about 2500 tons, similar to an enlarged Braunshweig class ship with 1 helicopter for ASW
                ---my guess is that these would cost about $0.5 - $1.0 billion each
                --this is the class of ship that we might be able to sell to other countries as part of a
                    revised NSPS.

Just my 2-cent opinion.

Bearpaw

 

[CBH99]

I understand there is an enormous cost in building the infrastructure necessary, in order to actually build the ships.  But $30B?

That breaks down to $2B for every single ship.  That seems awfully expensive...

Is it possible to build the hulls, and then install the latest & greatest in weaponry, sensors, C&C facilities, etc - after?  Since these vessels will be upgraded in the future, do all of these systems need to be built into the ship?  Or can we get the hulls built in a more speedily & cost effective manner, and then equip them after?

I'm not an expert in this in the slightest.  I've read quite a few suggestions from people who have far more knowledge about this than I do, and some of those suggestions seem quite logical. 

Going with fewer than 15 ships seems to be really digging into our ability to be flexible & responsive when needed. 

 

[CBH99]

Further to what BearPaw posted...

With the introduction of the AOPS to the fleet, will the MCDV fleet still be maintained at current strength?

Because if AOPS can carry out some of the patrol duties currently being fulfilled with the Halifax class, perhaps that is why few numbers of CSC could be suggested?

Again, just thinking out loud here...  :2c:

 

[Stoker]

Further to what BearPaw posted...

With the introduction of the AOPS to the fleet, will the MCDV fleet still be maintained at current strength?

Because if AOPS can carry out some of the patrol duties currently being fulfilled with the Halifax class, perhaps that is why few numbers of CSC could be suggested?

Again, just thinking out loud here...  :2c:

In regards to the MCDV's as AOPS comes online they will be utilized in more MCM and DRDC support role. They still however deployed to the Arctic and Caribbean. I doubt if the MCDV's will be tied up as they are very cheap to operate.

 

[jollyjacktar]

The sums being discussed include the maintenance, crewing, fuel etc for the vessels over their lifespan.  If you were to project the cost of insurance, fuel and maintenance for that new car you just bought, it wouldn't look so attractive either.  It's all how's the data is being presented that makes the eye's bulge.  In the end, at the completion of 30 years it will still be $1B per year that would have  been spent anyways when the fuel, crewing and maintenance was accounted for.  Don't get all caught up in the spin that some would like to mislead the general public on.