Ottawa seeking ‘impartial’ board members to review military colleges

[FJAG]

I see the personnel requirements of the CAF to be broken into four basic streams: the doers, the technicians, the leaders and the managers.

Doers are the foundation. They form our basic workforce and from them you select and train the primary level of leadership, the NCM core. (Just to develop the structure a bit better, I'm going to get rid of the term warrant officer here and replace the upper level NCM leadership with ranks like "Staff Sergeant", "Sergeant Major" and "Command Sergeant Major" (yes, I know its very American but more flexible than "Regimental Sergeant Major").

Technicians are the high-level, specific subject matter specialists. You select them from the public, or from amongst the doers. They are not required to provide leadership, just technical expertise, albeit that they can rise to form a leadership element within their own fields. This is where I would group the warrant officers. The concept provides an ability to attract qualified people off the street and provide them with a better starting pay than the doers.

Leaders come from several places. They develop within the doer field through promotion in the NCM ranks. Secondly you develop them through commissioned officer training. You can select them from both high school graduates and university graduates as civilian enrollees. You can also CFR them from the doer and technician groups if they show aptitude for higher leadership roles. The key is that they must demonstrate leadership traits and be trained specifically as leaders within their fields. They do not have to be broadly "educated".

Mangers are those needed to provide the overall management of the military system. They can be recruited from the street (as civilians) or from the doers, technicians, and leaders if they show an aptitude for management. Once identified they are further trained AND "educated" to be able to properly perform high level management functions.

I find it both a waste of resources and a person's life to spend 4 years of their most formative years being "educated" in things that more often than not have no benefit for their future careers or for the military's needs. Yes, some will need to be "educated" eventually--especially technicians and managers--but that can wait for when they are ready for it and should be in fields that benefit the military. Whether its in political science, or business management, strategic force structure and employment, or information technology, etc doesn't matter so long as its relevant to their role in the military and the military's needs at the time.

Just a thought.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The same skills that make for a good senior officer are the same ones that make for a good senior manager. We can train army into them as they go.

Looking forward to seeing how they fare during the foundational blocks of training.

Also wondering what would be the effect of having senior officers who never really have any experience as company officers.

I suppose it doesn't take four years of a program that develops analytical skills to have good analytical skills, but a core competency for officers is estimates/appreciations (analytical skills).

 

[dapaterson]

Conceptually, in the late 1969s the model was: a small degreed officer corps intended to be the long serving population who would fill the small wedge of senior and general/flag officer positions, and a larger pool of short service officers who would not be required to have degrees, whose service would be for nine years, then released with a chunk of money (and return of pension contributions, as vesting was ten years then).

That model unfortunately morphed into everyone getting the nine year buyout, including those with 4-5 years of paid education, and the institution was then hit by the double whammy of structural reductions while introducing the degreed officer requirement.

There was, ironically, significant resistance to some degreed officer corps recommendations by RMC. The concept of three entry cohorts annually, of coordination of education and training institution calendars to produce an occupationally qualified officer passing through the arch ... All strongly and successfully resisted by RMC.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Looking forward to seeing how they fare during the foundational blocks of training.

How does it work out for chaplains, MOs, Dent Os, and Legal Os? Does the CAF somehow find a way to turn those professionals into military professionals? Me thinks we do.

Now do Log Os, PAOs, Comms Os, etc...

Also wondering what would be the effect of having senior officers who never really have any experience as company officers.

A different perspective? Like I said above, we have proven we don't have the market cornered on ethical behaviour or professional development. Echo chambers are just as bad in uniform as they are in civilian land.

 

[FJAG]

Conceptually, in the late 1969s the model was: a small degreed officer corps intended to be the long serving population who would fill the small wedge of senior and general/flag officer positions, and a larger pool of short service officers who would not be required to have degrees, whose service would be for nine years, then released with a chunk of money (and return of pension contributions, as vesting was ten years then).

That model unfortunately morphed into everyone getting the nine year buyout, including those with 4-5 years of paid education, and the institution was then hit by the double whammy of structural reductions while introducing the degreed officer requirement.

There was, ironically, significant resistance to some degreed officer corps recommendations by RMC. The concept of three entry cohorts annually, of coordination of education and training institution calendars to produce an occupationally qualified officer passing through the arch ... All strongly and successfully resisted by RMC.

I was one of those in 1969 who came in under the OCTP.

Went through two major force reduction waves but was nonetheless converted from a 9-year to an Indefinite engagement.

I ended up with 44 years Reg and ResF combined but see nothing wrong with short service officers or ORs. You need a turn over to keep the blood fresh and to have a broader talent base to select leadership and management from. All too often when the pool stagnates you start promoting people who have simply hung around long enough and you wouldn't have selected for higher responsibility originally. What's important is that your training system is set up to mange that turnover smoothly and have people properly trained and experienced when they are needed.

In my perfect world there would be three officer entry programs. 1) OCTP (including Direct Entry) - enrolled off the street and sent for training; 2) a form of RESO which would be for personnel attending civilian universities/community colleges during the academic year and take military training during the summers (I'd make this for both ResF and RegF but would change it to provide tuition and costs for the academic year (but no pay) in exchange for a term of obligatory service after graduation); and 3) CFR.

 

[Ostrozac]

The argument for a degreed officer corps is a a separate issue from the value-for-money of ROTP. 80% of British Officer Cadets report to Sandhurst having already completed a Bachelor’s degree — if we wanted to, couldn‘t Canada similarly delete/downsize ROTP and increase DEO? Would this require greater incentives for DEO in the form of signing bonuses? And would those incentives be cheaper than ROTP?

I hope that the newly forming military college review board looks at junior officer education and production holistically - it would be a missed opportunity if they only look at making small incremental changes at the existing colleges in Kingston and St Jean.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Not when it's being discussed at the upper echelons because of the lack of yield in the investment

Which is, at least in 2023, less and less about education raising people up the rungs, but reinforcing the social class system. The majority of people with Bachelor's degrees in Canadian society are living and working poor. There are a select minority that are legacies who are moving up because of Mom and Dad's connections.




Yes and no.

Where does a junior officer sit in the pecking order of Canadian society? Pretty goddamn low I would say. Those who hold the rungs of power politically and militarily in this country are there due to the social network I mentioned above, not the school or degree they hold.

What we are seeing now is a look into how much are we willing to pay for a mediocre product? The education industry itself is under the microscope within larger Canadian society, not just the CAF.

RMC/ROTP is a massive cost to taxpayers and, rightly so, if that investment is bringing more bad press than results... I'd look into pulling my chips out.

For my own kids, I am actively encouraging moving away from University and towards applied college programs or apprenticeships. The Boomer idea of getting a 4 year degree, becoming management at a company, and living comfortably in suburbia is becoming extinct with every raise of interest , tax increase, and tuition hike.

How long before the concept of ROTP is no longer a draw, as credential saturation floods the job market?

I think we actually agree. I was not meant to be understood to be in support of the current standard.

I would shutter RMC, sell it all off and give officer production back there respective services.

It's only moot if it's never questioned or challenged. If we stayed with the status quo all the time we'd be wearing powdered wigs and leather stocks.

Every once in a while a sacred cow needs to be slaughtered.

You're absolutely correct. I think we lack the institutional fortitude to be willing actually make/want to make these kinds of changes.

There are empires and belief systems at stake old boy.

 

[FJAG]

I would shutter RMC, sell it all off

Never sell land. They're not making it anymore.

Honestly. It's a great piece of property located half way between our greatest population centres. If we can't repurpose it for something valuable we're just not trying hard enough. I'm a rabid opponent of divestiture - whether of land or still serviceable equipment.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Never sell land. They're not making it anymore.

Honestly. It's a great piece of property located half way between our greatest population centres. If we can't repurpose it for something valuable we're just not trying hard enough. I'm a rabid opponent of divestiture - whether of land or still serviceable equipment.

Turn it into a campground ?

 

[Brad Sallows]

How does it work out for chaplains, MOs, Dent Os, and Legal Os? Does the CAF somehow find a way to turn those professionals into military professionals? Me thinks we do.

Now do Log Os, PAOs, Comms Os, etc...

If you don't mean to include the cbt and cbt sp branches, then sure. Especially the ones who will mostly be found in or behind the Comm Z.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

If you don't mean to include the cbt and cbt sp branches, then sure. Especially the ones who will mostly be found in or behind the Comm Z.

That would be a Phase 2 approach, honestly.

Commanding a Coy, exercising the power from the Sovereign to commit legislated murder; requires a certain Je ne sais quoi not found on civi street

 

[Kat Stevens]

Is it a new thing though? I remember folks saying the same thing pre-2008, and even pre-9/11. Much of the ROTP crowd (I wasn't one) left after their obligatory service.


Arguably, globally, we should be playing cricket instead of baseball

While I broadly agree with what you're saying, the "plug and play" Exec to military leadership may also have some pretty big downsides. I can't remember which paper I was reading but it basically said that the US military, a while back, had issues because many of their leaders had MBAs and were making the military too "corporate" and bringing ideas/processes over that don't work in a military context.

We can definitely teach folks how to OPP and all that, but if their experience has been "just in time" everything and having little, if any, stockpiles, they aren't going to want to keep stocks (that aren't making money, in their mind) in warehouses. But, as we all know, militaries do need stockpiles because just-in-time doesn't really work when a shooting war just shows up.


I suppose my real question in this case is whether we are trying to create an [insert trade] officer, or and officer in an [insert trade]?

What you're suggesting is the first case, where in most MOSIDs, the CAF is doing the second case. I suggest that the higher officers go (and it's not really even that high - most start doing less or none of their formal training past Captain), creating an officer that happens to be an [insert trade] is more beneficial as a whole.

Even less reason for an engineering degree if you're going to be promoted out of any sort of engineering roll. It doesn't take a degree to order the red shirts down to the planet on the away team, or makes sure beans, bullets and beer get to where they're supposed to be. There is very little "ENGINEERING' in the military engineer world.

 

[KevinB]

Even less reason for an engineering degree if you're going to be promoted out of any sort of engineering roll. It doesn't take a degree to order the red shirts down to the planet on the away team, or makes sure beans, bullets and beer get to where they're supposed to be. There is very little "ENGINEERING' in the military engineer world.

I’m of the opinion that Military Colleges (if they are going to be a 4 year Bachelors offering entity) that they should offer specific Military oriented education.
Thus for the Bachelor’s side - I would favor a mixed education of STEM and Social Sciences. Award a BSc in Military Science.
The goal of a Military College should be to produce a well rounded junior officer- not set them up for a job post Military.

 

[Kilted]

[QUOTE/]

For my own kids, I am actively encouraging moving away from University and towards applied college programs or apprenticeships. The Boomer idea of getting a 4 year degree, becoming management at a company, and living comfortably in suburbia is becoming extinct with every raise of interest , tax increase, and tuition hike.

How long before the concept of ROTP is no longer a draw, as credential saturation floods the job market?
[/QUOTE]


Realistically, to be competitive, they should do both.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Some interesting lessons learned from the Border War, published by the SADF and starting at p.29:


The Need for Officers’ Intellectual Education


This brings us to the question of an intellectual education for officers. Many

of the mistakes made in war, writes the naval historian Philip Crowl, “have

been, at root, failures of the imagination, failures of the intellect. The

strategic problem is essentially an intellectual problem.”85 The way the

SADF generals directed Operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer testifies to

exactly this – a failure of the intellect.

A typical example of this mind-set came from the late Brigadier

General J.N.R. (“Junior”) Botha, who was, as a colonel, SSO Operations in

Army HQ during these operations. Shortly before his death, he attacked me

harshly for daring to distil theoretical military principles from the writings

of amongst other Clausewitz and Liddell Hart for a critique of the SADF

command’s handling of the war in Angola in 1987–1988. He wrote: “The

theories of these writers, and many others, are precisely that: theories. They

have never been tested in a real war. They are distanced so far from reality

that they are simply of academic importance!”

One can only describe this – very un-academically – as utter claptrap, as anyone who knows anything

at an intellectual level about warfare will testify.

In a much-quoted passage Professor Annette Seegers writes:

From the time of Union, debates about the Department of Defence held that

military experience counted more than intellectual or staff ability. Staff

courses and later joint staff courses at the Defence College favoured those with

operational experience, the line officers. The SADF wanted innovative

soldiers. The abstractions of staff officers would spoil them. Even for its elite,

the SADF thought theory best ignored.

She cites the example of Brigadier Willem van der Waals, “one of the

SADF’s chief authorities on COIN. Yet he never reached the pinnacle of

the SADF’s hierarchy. The SADF simply did not believe in rewarding

thinkers.”

As far as is known, Van der Waals is the only officer being awarded a Ph.D. on a

military-related subject while still serving in the SADF. He also came first on the

SA Army’s prestigious command and staff course. But a senior officer who prefers

remaining anonymous, told me that Van der Waals’ promotion to Major General was blocked twice while Jannie

Geldenhuys was CSADF because Van der Waals was deemed too

outspoken. After Geldenhuys’ retirement, Van der Waals was indeed

offered promotion, but opted instead for early retirement and a second

career.


Another officer who, in spite of his lack of an academic education,

had made a thorough intellectual study of warfare, was Roland de Vries. At

the end of his book, based on his own experience in the Army, he wrote

what may be seen as an attack on the rigid mind-set promoted in the

military. He referred to a “dogmatic and subjective approach in training.


Leaders under training are forced to think like their predecessors and tutors.

… Because of this approach we curtail creative thinking.” Students

thinking out of the box are slapped down as “not according to doctrine”, to

the detriment of flexibility and initiative. He then quotes Liddell Hart:

“Mobility of thought implies originality in conception and surprise in

execution.”

Does this not support a conclusion that the SADF’s failure at the very

end of the Cuito Cuanavale campaign was due to the lack of proper

understanding of warfare at general level?

Already in 1980, military writer Helmoed-Römer Heitman said in a

thoughtful article that many officers in the SADF “rarely bother to do more

than glance at the professional journals … One could be forgiven for

receiving the impression that our army is illiterate.”

He continued:

This is an extremely serious problem: a profession that neither reads nor writes

cannot but stagnate and an army suffering from mental stagnation is well on the

way to losing its next war. The whole value of individual professional military

writing lies, after all, therein that it allows and encourages the formulation,

exchange, development and dissemination of new ideas and concepts. This

stimulation and furtherance of military intellectual activity is essential to the

continued effectiveness of an army. It can only be achieved through the open

forum of professional military journals and, not least, their letter pages. It

cannot be achieved by means of mechanical official writing, the letters,

memos, reports, handbooks and manuals that abound in every army.

The Lessons of the Border War | Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies

scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

 

[Navy_Pete]

Even less reason for an engineering degree if you're going to be promoted out of any sort of engineering roll. It doesn't take a degree to order the red shirts down to the planet on the away team, or makes sure beans, bullets and beer get to where they're supposed to be. There is very little "ENGINEERING' in the military engineer world.

Depends on the job, but some do actually need a lot of engineering, especially when you are trying to keep old equipment going and there is no one to actually support it. Have busted out my textbooks more than once, and I'm using my PGT masters daily.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Some interesting lessons learned from the Border War, published by the SADF and starting at p.29:


The Need for Officers’ Intellectual Education


This brings us to the question of an intellectual education for officers. Many

of the mistakes made in war, writes the naval historian Philip Crowl, “have

been, at root, failures of the imagination, failures of the intellect. The

strategic problem is essentially an intellectual problem.”85 The way the

SADF generals directed Operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer testifies to

exactly this – a failure of the intellect.

A typical example of this mind-set came from the late Brigadier

General J.N.R. (“Junior”) Botha, who was, as a colonel, SSO Operations in

Army HQ during these operations. Shortly before his death, he attacked me

harshly for daring to distil theoretical military principles from the writings

of amongst other Clausewitz and Liddell Hart for a critique of the SADF

command’s handling of the war in Angola in 1987–1988. He wrote: “The

theories of these writers, and many others, are precisely that: theories. They

have never been tested in a real war. They are distanced so far from reality

that they are simply of academic importance!”

One can only describe this – very un-academically – as utter claptrap, as anyone who knows anything

at an intellectual level about warfare will testify.

In a much-quoted passage Professor Annette Seegers writes:

From the time of Union, debates about the Department of Defence held that

military experience counted more than intellectual or staff ability. Staff

courses and later joint staff courses at the Defence College favoured those with

operational experience, the line officers. The SADF wanted innovative

soldiers. The abstractions of staff officers would spoil them. Even for its elite,

the SADF thought theory best ignored.

She cites the example of Brigadier Willem van der Waals, “one of the

SADF’s chief authorities on COIN. Yet he never reached the pinnacle of

the SADF’s hierarchy. The SADF simply did not believe in rewarding

thinkers.”

As far as is known, Van der Waals is the only officer being awarded a Ph.D. on a

military-related subject while still serving in the SADF. He also came first on the

SA Army’s prestigious command and staff course. But a senior officer who prefers

remaining anonymous, told me that Van der Waals’ promotion to Major General was blocked twice while Jannie

Geldenhuys was CSADF because Van der Waals was deemed too

outspoken. After Geldenhuys’ retirement, Van der Waals was indeed

offered promotion, but opted instead for early retirement and a second

career.


Another officer who, in spite of his lack of an academic education,

had made a thorough intellectual study of warfare, was Roland de Vries. At

the end of his book, based on his own experience in the Army, he wrote

what may be seen as an attack on the rigid mind-set promoted in the

military. He referred to a “dogmatic and subjective approach in training.


Leaders under training are forced to think like their predecessors and tutors.

… Because of this approach we curtail creative thinking.” Students

thinking out of the box are slapped down as “not according to doctrine”, to

the detriment of flexibility and initiative. He then quotes Liddell Hart:

“Mobility of thought implies originality in conception and surprise in

execution.”

Does this not support a conclusion that the SADF’s failure at the very

end of the Cuito Cuanavale campaign was due to the lack of proper

understanding of warfare at general level?

Already in 1980, military writer Helmoed-Römer Heitman said in a

thoughtful article that many officers in the SADF “rarely bother to do more

than glance at the professional journals … One could be forgiven for

receiving the impression that our army is illiterate.”

He continued:

This is an extremely serious problem: a profession that neither reads nor writes

cannot but stagnate and an army suffering from mental stagnation is well on the

way to losing its next war. The whole value of individual professional military

writing lies, after all, therein that it allows and encourages the formulation,

exchange, development and dissemination of new ideas and concepts. This

stimulation and furtherance of military intellectual activity is essential to the

continued effectiveness of an army. It can only be achieved through the open

forum of professional military journals and, not least, their letter pages. It

cannot be achieved by means of mechanical official writing, the letters,

memos, reports, handbooks and manuals that abound in every army.

The Lessons of the Border War | Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies

scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

That would be great if most officers actually studied the theories/history of warfare in the university degree that they earn. Most don’t.

 

[Kat Stevens]

Depends on the job, but some do actually need a lot of engineering, especially when you are trying to keep old equipment going and there is no one to actually support it. Have busted out my textbooks more than once, and I'm using my PGT masters daily.

I was specifically addressing the need for a combat engineer officer to be degreed. Trust me, when it comes to keeping old platforms running, they are nowhere to be seen. That's down to guys like me. Even less requirement when promoted up and out.

 

[Remius]

Never sell land. They're not making it anymore.

Honestly. It's a great piece of property located half way between our greatest population centres. If we can't repurpose it for something valuable we're just not trying hard enough. I'm a rabid opponent of divestiture - whether of land or still serviceable equipment.

Agreed. Hand it over to CFB Kingston. Turn it into more work space or maybe even affordable base housing. Worst thing they ever did in Ottawa was hand over land that could have been repurposed or developed.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed. Hand it over to CFB Kingston. Turn it into more work space or maybe even affordable base housing. Worst thing they ever did in Ottawa was hand over land that could have been repurposed or developed.

It could be repurposed as a military prison for all those nasty, politically incorrect, people the military seems to be so adept at producing.

All hail INGSOC!