Replacing the Subs

[Rainbow1910]

They were explicit that there will be no changes to the subs and we will learn to use whatever weapons the platform comes with. He also said they will adopt the procedures used to operate and maintain the host navy subs. I suspect if we go KSS-III, we won't buy the missiles at first, but eventually buy a few and "certify the VLS cells". At which point the usage and development of doctrine would be more common. I would also see SK start to test more weapon systems for the VLS.

For reasons I've said below, I would very much bet that the RCN would accept the KSS-III with empty VLS compared to operating Hyunmoo 4-4 missiles even in small numbers.

I would suspect SK would set up a missile facility in canada for the hyunmoo 4-4, or the next Gen Chonryong SLCM. Building them here makes sense for us and for them to have a safe country building them. They are also developing an insert for the VLS to take anti aircraft missiles. Its an insert to the cell, and 1 cell can hold several AAM, which would give huge versatility and self defense against sub hunters.

Hyunmoo 4-4 does not seem like a very good fit for any possible Canadian uses, given that these weapons are designed to act as a deep penetrating weapon to destroy underground North Korean bunker systems. These are specialist, expensive, very sensitive and key systems to the South Korean defence strategy, I have my doubts they will export them and am very skeptical that Canada wants/needs them. Noah has stated that the Koreans are not interested in setting up Hyunmoo production in Canada, so that seems unlikely as well. It seems likely that the South Korean's can/will develop us a sort of insert for the large K-VLS aboard KSS-III if we produce it, allowing them to fit a sizable number of their own domestic cruise missiles aboard. Current cruise missile types are only integrated into the submarines torpedo tubes as far as I am aware in order to keep the VLS open for the Hyunmoo 4-4.

As with the Germans, I seriously question the utility of anti-aircraft missiles aboard a submarine outside of a last ditch "mutual kill" system. The worst possible thing for a submarine to do is reveal its position, and firing a missile at patrolling ASW aircraft is a very good way to tell everybody where you are at the end of the day.

No one is really making swim out SLCM’s anymore. It is a VLS world.

The Koreans are still actively producing and using swim out SLCM's on the KSS-III, and would likely be offering them to Canada until they can adequately modify their submarine VLS to launch these systems with some sort of adapter.

 

[Underway]

Let's get a few things straight:

First, Intent on not moving the boats between coasts and the reality of what could happen in the next 30 years are two different things. You can't plan your acquisition of assets on your current intent without considering potential future events. Therefore, I don't think it adds any plausibility to a mixed fleet option.

Second, based on the interview given by RAdm Robinson above we have to consider the fact that numbers of boats of each type and per coast would have to play differently in such a scenario. When I was in, we needed three boats to keep one in operation at all time. I recall only a small window where that was not the case while the O-boats underwent the SOUP refits. Robinson, however, mentions the need for a ratio of four boats to keep one operational. I don't know if this is based on actual lack of capability to do more (and go to a 3 to 1 ratio) for technical reasons as the boats are now more complex and sophisticated, or if it is simply because, under the current availability of trained personnel and the fleet of four boats the RCN has gotten comfortable with that ratio. In any events: Robinson indicates the RCN requirement as being a minimum of 8 boats, so one per coast is available, and preferred 12 boats so three are available, including one deployed to the Arctic. In this last case (12 boats) with three boats deployable, including one to the Arctic, each group of four would have to be colocated, so one coast (likely the East coast, which has better and more direct access to the Arctic) would have to have 8 boats, to the other coast's four.

In a split fleet, would the RCN want to wait as long as it would take to get 8 boats from TKMS, on one hand, or to have a secondary fleet of four boats of a different model.

P.S., I don't think that even a split of 6/6 boats between Hanwa and TKMS gets us to 12 boats delivered to us as fast as a single order for 12 with Hanwa alone.

I think we're playing with words a bit on the operational ratios. You need 4 boats to have one constantly at sea doing mission work. You need 3 boats to have one available (but not necessarily at sea, perhaps alongside as ready duty).

RCN wants (ideally) three boats always at sea. One for each ocean.

 

[FJAG]

I think we're playing with words a bit on the operational ratios. You need 4 boats to have one constantly at sea doing mission work. You need 3 boats to have one available (but not necessarily at sea, perhaps alongside as ready duty).

RCN wants (ideally) three boats always at sea. One for each ocean.

Okay, I'll bite.

Do those ratios depend on crew numbers or actual boat numbers?

In other words do we need a real 3:1 boat ratio because the boats need to spend 2/3rds of their lives in maintenance, refit etc, or does the ratio come from the fact that we can't expect any given crew spend 12 months at sea during peacetime?

The little data that I had on the Halifaxes seems to indicate that each ship is assigned a full crew's PYs but not three shifts of crews. That leaves it up to the various fleets to balance and shuffle the crews for its allocated ships around between deployments, courses, leave, MELs etc etc.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

For reasons I've said below, I would very much bet that the RCN would accept the KSS-III with empty VLS compared to operating Hyunmoo 4-4 missiles even in small numbers.


Hyunmoo 4-4 does not seem like a very good fit for any possible Canadian uses, given that these weapons are designed to act as a deep penetrating weapon to destroy underground North Korean bunker systems. These are specialist, expensive, very sensitive and key systems to the South Korean defence strategy, I have my doubts they will export them and am very skeptical that Canada wants/needs them. Noah has stated that the Koreans are not interested in setting up Hyunmoo production in Canada, so that seems unlikely as well. It seems likely that the South Korean's can/will develop us a sort of insert for the large K-VLS aboard KSS-III if we produce it, allowing them to fit a sizable number of their own domestic cruise missiles aboard. Current cruise missile types are only integrated into the submarines torpedo tubes as far as I am aware in order to keep the VLS open for the Hyunmoo 4-4.

As with the Germans, I seriously question the utility of anti-aircraft missiles aboard a submarine outside of a last ditch "mutual kill" system. The worst possible thing for a submarine to do is reveal its position, and firing a missile at patrolling ASW aircraft is a very good way to tell everybody where you are at the end of the day.


The Koreans are still actively producing and using swim out SLCM's on the KSS-III, and would likely be offering them to Canada until they can adequately modify their submarine VLS to launch these systems with some sort of adapter.

The Koreans want to sell defense products. If Canada goes KSS-III, expect to see more sub sales to other countries, having more than one missile type for the VLS makes sense and I expect a successful Canadian sale is going to spur that development. It would likley not take much to convert it into a general usage land attack missile and the change in warhead and likely the pattern of flight, might even boost the range.

 

[Rainbow1910]

The Koreans want to sell defense products. If Canada goes KSS-III, expect to see more sub sales to other countries, having more than one missile type for the VLS makes sense and I expect a successful Canadian sale is going to spur that development. It would likley not take much to convert it into a general usage land attack missile and the change in warhead and likely the pattern of flight, might even boost the range.

The Koreans want to sell defence products however like many other nations, they are careful not to undermine their own defensive capabilites at home. They have spent a substantial amount of effort, time and money to create a submarine VLS alongside weapon systems to utilize inside it, even before we get into the high capability and hyper specialized nature of systems like the Hyunmoo 4-4. These weapons are a key piece of the South Korean strategy to punch back against the North, being a mobile and survivable strategic strike capability in the event of a large scale conflict. It is very unlikely to be exporting these weapons, let alone allowing a foreign nation to produce them for very obvious national security reasons.

According to Noah, the Hyunmoo 4-4 is a 10m long and 1m~ diameter SLBM with a 1 ton warhead alongside a range between 500km and 800km. This is a very large and expensive system, it makes very little sense to convert it over into a general use land attack missile when a submarine launched cruise missile does this role much better, for cheaper and can be carried in much larger mass.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Koreans want to sell defence products however like many other nations, they are careful not to undermine their own defensive capabilites at home. They have spent a substantial amount of effort, time and money to create a submarine VLS alongside weapon systems to utilize inside it, even before we get into the high capability and hyper specialized nature of systems like the Hyunmoo 4-4. These weapons are a key piece of the South Korean strategy to punch back against the North, being a mobile and survivable strategic strike capability in the event of a large scale conflict. It is very unlikely to be exporting these weapons, let alone allowing a foreign nation to produce them for very obvious national security reasons.

According to Noah, the Hyunmoo 4-4 is a 10m long and 1m~ diameter SLBM with a 1 ton warhead alongside a range between 500km and 800km. This is a very large and expensive system, it makes very little sense to convert it over into a general use land attack missile when a submarine launched cruise missile does this role much better, for cheaper and can be carried in much larger mass.

The cruise missile market is undergoing explosive growth just now with multiple new vendors joining the establishment vendors in generating new products.

Those missiles have the entire range of power plants: jets, fans, props, ramjets and rockets. Rocket boosted launches are popular options as are vertical launch options.

I strongly suspect that if the RCN has empty silos it will find people eager to fill them.

Led, no doubt by the makers of Tomahawks, NSM/JSMs and SM6s (if they fit).

 

[KevinB]

Okay, I'll bite.

Do those ratios depend on crew numbers or actual boat numbers?

@Underway and other have done the math earlier this thread on SubSafe and why it is a 4:1 ratio for operational boats.

IIRC it goes something like
1 Sailing
1 Readying
1 Return ‘short DWP’
1 longer DWP/refit.

In other words do we need a real 3:1 boat ratio because the boats need to spend 2/3rds of their lives in maintenance, refit etc, or does the ratio come from the fact that we can't expect any given crew spend 12 months at sea during peacetime?

It’s boats not bodies. From my understanding you may get away with 3.5 crews / 4 boats, but in the ideal world you would have a 1:1.

The little data that I had on the Halifaxes seems to indicate that each ship is assigned a full crew's PYs but not three shifts of crews. That leaves it up to the various fleets to balance and shuffle the crews for its allocated ships around between deployments, courses, leave, MELs etc etc.

I

I’m sure it would be similar with subs / the only difference I know is on the SSBN side down here with 2 crews per operational boat.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Okay, I'll bite.

Do those ratios depend on crew numbers or actual boat numbers?

In other words do we need a real 3:1 boat ratio because the boats need to spend 2/3rds of their lives in maintenance, refit etc, or does the ratio come from the fact that we can't expect any given crew spend 12 months at sea during peacetime?

The little data that I had on the Halifaxes seems to indicate that each ship is assigned a full crew's PYs but not three shifts of crews. That leaves it up to the various fleets to balance and shuffle the crews for its allocated ships around between deployments, courses, leave, MELs etc etc.

Ok. First of all, I get @Underway 's point, and it's a valid nuance.

Second, in Canada we don't do Gold crew/Blue crew rotations of full crew on submarines. In fact, I believe that only the Americans, and then only for their Ballistic Nuclear Submarines, do that.

As for time in maintenance, I would say a submarine spends about one third of its time in what we could term "long refit". Then, during it's remaining two thirds of time, about a quarter of that time, here and there, is spent in maintenance periods and repairs (planned and unplanned). So if you do the calculation, you see that a submarine is available to sail half of its life. In that half life, you have periods where you just came out of refit, and thus have to run through crew changes and through work ups prior to operational deployment, and at the end, time to do the logistic and administrative work relating to going into long refit. Those two take about three months each, and that is how you get into the one in three availability.

But then during that "operational year", you still have to be in harbour at times to cover leave periods and crew rest, resupplying, etc. That's where the fourth boat comes in handy: having two available in operational status means that you can cover all these and maintain one boat away on deployment at all times.

If you watch the interview with RAdm Robinson, you will see that he is quite clear: The boats getting ready to go into long refit and the ones that just came out of it are available to the Navy as needs be. It's just that, to do the work ups or prep work, we prefer that they not be burdened with operations at that point of their cycle unless absolutely necessary. I suspect that in wartime, every four boats grouping would let you keep two at sea pretty well all of the time.