Replacing the Subs

[YZT580]

You're making a lot of assumptions that don't reflect how the RCN actually introduces a new class of submarine.

The biggest flaw is the belief that getting the first boat a year earlier somehow solves the manpower problem. It doesn't. It simply moves the problem forward by a year unless the training, maintenance, infrastructure, spares, simulators, documentation, and certification systems are already being built in parallel. And that is exactly the point people keep missing.

Once the submarine is selected, especially if the Korean design is chosen, you are going to see a steady stream of Canadian submariners, engineers, technicians, maintainers, instructors, and project staff going to Korea long before the first Canadian boat ever shows up in Halifax or Esquimalt. That is where the real transition starts. Not on delivery day. Not when the first submarine sails into Canada. It starts years earlier with Canadians embedded in training, construction, trials, documentation, maintenance planning, and acceptance work.

There is also a rumour floating around that Korea may even lend Canada a boat to accelerate crew training. If that turns out to be true, it would only reinforce the point. The manpower solution is not simply “deliver Boat 1 sooner.” The solution is getting Canadian crews onto the selected class as early as possible, building the training cadre, and growing the support system before Canada receives its own fleet.

Your suggestion of “robbing Peter to pay Paul” is exactly what the RCN has been trying to avoid for decades. Strip experienced sailors out of the Victoria class and you've just degraded the very fleet responsible for keeping the submarine service alive. You haven't created people. You've simply redistributed a shortage.

And while everyone loves to talk as if recruitment and retention are in freefall, the reality is more nuanced. Recruiting and retention are actually improving with the new benefits, pay changes, and quality of life measures recently introduced. Is the problem solved? Of course not. There is still a mountain of work to do. But pretending nothing is changing ignores the fact that the CAF is finally starting to put resources in place to keep people and attract new ones.

The manpower challenge isn't caused by delivery schedules. It is caused by trying to grow from four submarines to twelve while sustaining the boats we already have. Delivering Boat 1 in 2031 instead of 2032 doesn't magically produce hundreds of submariners, engineers, technicians, and maintainers.

Question: We currently have 4 subs. If I have followed things correctly all are tied up at the moment although one could sail if needed. Are they all crewed or are there maybe 2 crews total for 4 boats? That first crew, if it actually exists, could be on an A330 for Korea by Monday and starting their training. (exaggeration I know)

 

[Czech_pivo]

Question: We currently have 4 subs. If I have followed things correctly all are tied up at the moment although one could sail if needed. Are they all crewed or are there maybe 2 crews total for 4 boats? That first crew, if it actually exists, could be on an A330 for Korea by Monday and starting their training. (exaggeration I know)

One is in Hawaii right now.

 

[Underway]

Question: We currently have 4 subs. If I have followed things correctly all are tied up at the moment although one could sail if needed. Are they all crewed or are there maybe 2 crews total for 4 boats? That first crew, if it actually exists, could be on an A330 for Korea by Monday and starting their training. (exaggeration I know)

No one here should be telling you the numbers. But any ships/boats in refit don't have full crews. They never do. Adding 12 subs is a massive lift.

The RCN is undergoing an insane period of transition.

All new trades.
Increase in numbers to be trained across the fleet.
Completely new ways of doing things because of AEGIS being introducted.
Adding 12 submarines and getting those up an running.
Introduction of at current count, three new ship/boat classes (RCD, PRO, CPSP) while trying to keep HFX's running. There may be two more classes coming (Orca Replacement and CDC).
Change in how we do air operations (perhaps a Cyclone replacement, certainly introduction of Class 1 and 2 UAV's)

 

[Stoker]

Question: We currently have 4 subs. If I have followed things correctly all are tied up at the moment although one could sail if needed. Are they all crewed or are there maybe 2 crews total for 4 boats? That first crew, if it actually exists, could be on an A330 for Korea by Monday and starting their training. (exaggeration I know)

You’re not wrong to separate “four submarines” from “four deployable crews.” Those are not the same thing. Canada owns four Victoria class boats, but at any given time some are in maintenance, some are in trials or force generation, and some are simply not at a readiness state where you point them at the ocean and go. The limiting factor is not just hulls, it is qualified submariners, maintainers, instructors, shore support, and the whole training pipeline behind them. It will be the same construct when we get our future twelve boats.


That said, this is exactly why an early training pipeline with Korea would matter if Canada selects the KSS III. You would not wait until the first Canadian boat is sitting alongside in Halifax or Esquimalt before sending people. The moment the decision is made, you start flowing Canadian submariners, engineers, maintainers, combat systems people, logisticians, and future instructors through Korean schools, simulators, shipyards, and potentially even cross pol opportunities. That is how you build the cadre that later trains the rest of the force.


And yes, the “A330 to Korea by Monday” line is an exaggeration, but the point behind it is solid. The people do not have to be sitting around waiting for the submarine to be delivered. If Korea is selected, you will almost certainly see Canadians going to Korea early and often. There are already reports that South Korea is pushing hard on speed, industrial partnership, and practical training advantages, and the KSS III has already crossed the Pacific to Esquimalt as part of the sales effort and we have Canadian submariners on Korean boats as we speak.


The rumour that Korea could lend access to a boat or accelerate Canadian crew training would make sense in that context, though I would still label it as rumour until confirmed. Hopefully that it turns out to be true. That is exactly the sort of thing Korea can offer that matters: not just “we can build you submarines,” but “we can start turning your people into operators of this class before your first Canadian hull arrives.”


So no, we probably do not have four complete submarine crews sitting idle. But we likely do have the nucleus of a transition cadre. That first group would not be the entire future submarine fleet. They would training cadre. Send them early, train them hard, qualify them on the new class, bring them home, and use them to build the next waves. That's how you build your submarine force.

 

[Halifax Tar]

One is in Hawaii right now.

It drives me nuts how loosey goosey we are with ships movements now. There was a time, in a much younger HTs days, when talking about that publicly was a big no no.

 

[Czech_pivo]

It drives me nuts how loosey goosey we are with ships movements now. There was a time, in a much younger HTs days, when talking about that publicly was a big no no.

I agree with you - publishing that info after its occurred - maybe a 5-10 day lag should be the order of the day.

 

[Stoker]

I agree with you - publishing that info after its occurred - maybe a 5-10 day lag should be the order of the day.

Unless you want to stop social media or news, not possible. The best you'll get when the sub leaves, hits a port or comes home. If we were at war, a news blackout would occur but you'll still reports of subs leaving or hitting ports unless we choke the internet.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I agree with you - publishing that info after its occurred - maybe a 5-10 day lag should be the order of the day.

Not your fault my man. We (The institution) post this shit on social media now... Its bonkers...

 

[NavyShooter]

I realize that your list is probably made in order of those of us who guessed, but I've re-ordered it here based on date, ok? My OCD was twitching....

@Retired AF Guy 26 June 15:00 SK 10 B2 option 2 B3
@JMCanada 29 June 5+2 SK & 5+2 Ger
@Nvlgzr 30 June 13:00EST SK & GER 8 + 6
@MilEME09 30 June 14:00 EST SK 12
@HavokFour 1 July SK 12
@OldSolduer 1 July - 3pm EST SK ?
@NavyShooter 2 July SK 12
@GR66 2 July Australia(!) 6 Collins Class
@Genetk44 3 July SK 12
@Oldgateboatdriver 3 July SK 12
@deepblue202 5 July SK 12
@Czech_pivo 7 July Ger 12
@Colin Parkinson 8 July SK 9
@foresterab 9 July SK 12
@calculus 10 July SK & GER 8 - 4
@vonGarvin 10 July 10:39 ADST SK 9
@oldcpu 13 July SK 12
@MacNav63 13 July SK 12
@KevinB 15 July Split - SK & GER 7 + 7


@JMCanada - You're in the batter's box......
@MilEME09 & @Nvlgzr - You're both in the warm-up circle.....

 

[oldcpu]

You're making a lot of assumptions that don't reflect how the RCN actually introduces a new class of submarine.

The biggest flaw is the belief that getting the first boat a year earlier somehow solves the manpower problem. It doesn't. It simply moves the problem forward by a year unless the training, maintenance, infrastructure, spares, simulators, documentation, and certification systems are already being built in parallel. And that is exactly the point people keep missing.

I disagree with your characterization of my post.

Solves the manpower problem? Solves the man power problem?? Who stated that?

First - lets not exaggerate nor make up words on what I posted. Shall we be clear on that?

I never stated it "SOLVED" the manpower problem. Go back and read my post.

I think you will find my words were "would actually help address the manpower challenge rather than make it worse.".

Somehow in your lexicon, the words "help address" equals solved. We speak different languages.

An early boat does thou contribute to solving the issue - mainly in training and ultimately maintenance (via training) needed for the boats.

Once the submarine is selected, especially if the Korean design is chosen, you are going to see a steady stream of Canadian submariners, engineers, technicians, maintainers, instructors, and project staff going to Korea long before the first Canadian boat ever shows up in Halifax or Esquimalt. That is where the real transition starts.

I did not want to go into too much detail in my already long post that evoked your reply, but obviously one does not 'wait' until the 1st boat is delivered before training starts.

And yes, likely about a year, after contract award, ideally the 1st training should start. Perhaps here we have agreement.

Hanwha Ocean will have a big urgent task of translation of already existing South Korean training material into English language, from plannings such from the moment of Contract award to the first manuals being made available. They will have to go through their own cadre of instructors and select those whose English language skills are up to the task of teaching in English language.

Sadly, I suspect one will not see many South Koreans able to teach in the French language. English IS taught in South Korean schools at a moderately young age - French language is not taught so much. Creating French language material training material will be an RCN problem ... Again, I did not want to delve into such detail in my previous post.

So if a late 2026 contract award, then possibly in early 2028 first training starts.

Not on delivery day.

I never stated training starts on "delivery day". Again, go back again and read my post. Do I need to repeat what I posted?

Not when the first submarine sails into Canada. It starts years earlier with Canadians embedded in training, construction, trials, documentation, maintenance planning, and acceptance work.

Again, I never stated when 1st submarine sails into Canada. Again, go back and read my post.

I don't know who you are replying to at times? This is getting tiresome when you infer statements or assessments I did not make.

There is also a rumour floating around that Korea may even lend Canada a boat to accelerate crew training. If that turns out to be true, it would only reinforce the point. The manpower solution is not simply “deliver Boat 1 sooner.” The solution is getting Canadian crews onto the selected class as early as possible, building the training cadre, and growing the support system before Canada receives its own fleet.

There is NO one solution to the recruitment and retention. There is not.

An early boat would help thou.

So what is your view, a later boat delivery is better? Frankly, IMHO, an early delivery helps with the very aspects you stated in that last quote.

We very very clearly massively disagree if you think an early boat delivery does not help.

My view: an early 2028 training start and a 2031 early boat delivery helps a lot. It does not 'solve'. It helps. Which is my point. It definitely would help more than a later delivery.

I ask you again, is your view a boat delivery in 2032 superior to one in 2031? Is your answer yes? Then let me ask this, is a delivery in 2033 better than one in 2031? Is your answer again yes? Then if you think the later delivery is better, then again, yes, again, we do disagree.

I would say we disagree massively if that is your view.

Your suggestion of “robbing Peter to pay Paul” is exactly what the RCN has been trying to avoid for decades. Strip experienced sailors out of the Victoria class and you've just degraded the very fleet responsible for keeping the submarine service alive. You haven't created people. You've simply redistributed a shortage.

I think you 100% fail to understand the very personnel shortage the RCN has. You don't understand the seriousness. ... and I dare say, I do not believe you are alone. Many do not understand it.

Robbing "Peter to pay Paul" is the ONLY way they will have the people to send in 2028, 2029 in order to get the first batch of training started.

I don't like that any better than you, but it would help massively in getting the ball rolling to solve the initial training problem - one that is clearly very real in terms of the RCN shortage of manpower today.

The RCN can't man the boats they have today, how can they send people to be trained, if they don't "rob Peter to pay Paul" ?

And while everyone loves to talk as if recruitment and retention are in freefall, the reality is more nuanced. Recruiting and retention are actually improving with the new benefits, pay changes, and quality of life measures recently introduced. Is the problem solved? Of course not.

There is no proof of a continuation month after month of such recruitment improvement.

The Canadian Armed Forces experienced one month of improvement.

That is a far cry from the year after year of consistent recruitment and retention improvement they absolutely need. A very far cry.

There is no nuance about this. There is a MASSIVE issue here with an incredibly serious personnel shortage.

There is still a mountain of work to do. But pretending nothing is changing ignores the fact that the CAF is finally starting to put resources in place to keep people and attract new ones.

On this, we agree - in part only.

I would say your selection of the word 'still' is an understatement. Again, one month of improvement does not show the necessary year after year of recruitment and retention improvement needed.

The manpower challenge isn't caused by delivery schedules. It is caused by trying to grow from four submarines to twelve while sustaining the boats we already have. Delivering Boat 1 in 2031 instead of 2032 doesn't magically produce hundreds of submariners, engineers, technicians, and maintainers.

Yes - a boat in 2031 does not magically solve the hundreds of submariner numbers. Nor does a boat delivery in 2032 solve the problem, nor in 2033, nor in 2034, nor in 2035.

NONE of that will solve the numbers problem. You totally miss the point.

A boat delivery in 2031 helps massively to improve the training, and experience needed, sooner, rather than later boat delivery. The early trainees will have to come from existing trained submariners (if the navy can retain current personnel). Only the later trainees can be those new to the navy, if, and ONLY if, the navy can recruit them.

That recruitment and retention is another issue - one which I wrote a paper about.

 

[Kirkhill]

Re the issue of making NATO happy by buying the German subs

I think the bigger issue is the matter of securing the North Atlantic and the Baltic and fitting in with the JEF - Atlantic Bastion ConOps.

The Brits, Norwegians, Danes and Dutch seem to be integrating their efforts around the GIUK Gap.

The Swedes, Finns, Poles, Balts and Germans have a different set of problems in their salt water lake.

The North Atlantic fleet seems to lean heavily on the Type 26 and Type 31. Perhaps if Canada weighted its Atlantic effort on the Rivers and its Pacific efforts on the Subs that might suffice.

 

[DBNSG]

Re the issue of making NATO happy by buying the German subs

I think the bigger issue is the matter of securing the North Atlantic and the Baltic and fitting in with the JEF - Atlantic Bastion ConOps.

The Brits, Norwegians, Danes and Dutch seem to be integrating their efforts around the GIUK Gap.

The Swedes, Finns, Poles, Balts and Germans have a different set of problems in their salt water lake.

The North Atlantic fleet seems to lean heavily on the Type 26 and Type 31. Perhaps if Canada weighted its Atlantic effort on the Rivers and its Pacific efforts on the Subs that might suffice.

Canada will also probably be the Senior P-8 user in the North Atlantic. 14 confirmed with two options and most will fly out of Greenwood. Lets confirm 24 while Santa Carney is around.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If we get the KSS, I suspect a lot of the senior submariners will stick around to be part of that. For recruitment, this year we doubled the number of recruits, hopefully there will be a gradual increase in successful recruits flowing in and getting DP1 training in a timely manner. We get 70,000 applicants, so we need to continue to work on getting them in, trained, housed and able to focus on their taskings.

 

[OldSolduer]

If we get the KSS, I suspect a lot of the senior submariners will stick around to be part of that. For recruitment, this year we doubled the number of recruits, hopefully there will be a gradual increase in successful recruits flowing in and getting DP1 training in a timely manner. We get 70,000 applicants, so we need to continue to work on getting them in, trained, housed and able to focus on their taskings.

I had a great conversation with a future AESOP last night at a car show. This young man was incredibly smart and had a good head on his shoulders.
Of course...he's the son of a PPCLI officer

I hope the subs are crewed with people like him.

 

[Stoker]

If we get the KSS, I suspect a lot of the senior submariners will stick around to be part of that. For recruitment, this year we doubled the number of recruits, hopefully there will be a gradual increase in successful recruits flowing in and getting DP1 training in a timely manner. We get 70,000 applicants, so we need to continue to work on getting them in, trained, housed and able to focus on their taskings.

Where I work is in close proximity to the submariners and had more than a few in my departments on ship over the years. As soon as the trigger is pulled you'll see a very large recruiting program for the boats. I can't speak specifically but there is some out of the box ideas for recruiting for boats being developed with potential international exchanges. Despite the naysayers we are recruiting more in the RCN these days and in a few years it should start to payoff.

 

[Stoker]

One point that has come up here in the KSS III discussion is that training and technical documentation would not start the day the first submarine shows up in Canada.

If Canada selects the South Korean KSS III, the training pipeline would almost certainly begin in Korea well before delivery. That means Canadian submariners, maintainers, instructors, project staff, engineers, logisticians, and technical authorities would start moving through Korean facilities while the first Canadian boats are still being built. That is how you build the initial cadre. You do not wait for the boat to arrive in Halifax or Esquimalt and then suddenly discover you need operators, maintainers, courseware, simulators, spare parts, and technical publications. This is somewhat be the same as what we did for the Upholder/Victoria Class. Going to Korea is a great selling point for sailors to go boats.

The idea that all the South Korean technical material would have to be created from scratch is probably overstated. The ROK Navy’s own books are almost certainly in Korean, because they are written for Korean crews and Korean maintainers which makes sense. But KSS III is now being marketed as an export submarine. That means Hanwha has almost certainly already done at least some of the work required to turn a Korean submarine into an exportable package. There will already be English briefing material, training material, system descriptions, design documentation, OEM manuals, maintenance data, and export support material either complete or in progress. If Canada selects them that would ramp up, if not already in progress. Would every single Korean technical book already exist in perfect Canadian English format on day one? Probably not. But that is not the same thing as starting from zero.

A Canadian contract would require a Canadian technical data package. That would include operating procedures, maintenance manuals, planned maintenance routines, illustrated parts breakdowns, safety documentation, configuration data, training packages, simulator support, and class specific publications. Some of that would come from Hanwha. Some would come from the OEM. Some would be adapted by Canada into RCN formats. Some would be Canadianized as the program matures.

The French language issue is also being overplayed by some. Canada has official language obligations, yes, but that does not mean every valve book, pump manual, wiring diagram, battery procedure, and combat system document has to be translated into French before the first sailor can begin training in Korea. Initial training would almost certainly be in English. The French language requirements would be worked into the long term CAF training and publication system over time, especially where formal courseware, safety critical instructions, and Canadian issued documentation are concerned. I believe all our NATO training is in English as well.

The real point is this:, if Canada selects KSS III, the training system, documentation system, maintenance system, spares system, and instructor cadre would have to be built in parallel with construction. That is exactly where the schedule advantage matters. An early start does not magically solve the submarine crewing issue, but it gives the RCN time to grow the cadre, qualify people, build experience, and stand up the support system before the first boat enters Canadian service. Some personnel will have to come from existing boat crews but as long as its done selectively, shouldn't be an issue in regards to operations or training.

The likely reality is much more practical: English export documentation already partly exists, OEM technical manuals already partly exist, Korean training systems already exist, and Canada would pay for the Canadianized package needed to operate, maintain, train, and sustain the class as part of the overall contract. That is how you introduce a new submarine class. You do not wait for delivery. You build the people, books, simulators, procedures, and support structure while the boat is still being built. There is a lot of thought going into getting the submariners we need, and support of the boats when they come to Canada.