Rick's Napkin Forces Challenge

[Kirkhill]

The temptation to offload responsibilities onto civilian agencies is highly tempting in this scenario. Some of those make sense, such as search and rescue and patrolling going to the coast guard.

Even use of force legal scenarios are not problematic in that the appropriate legislation can always be made to cater to that. More problematic is that the use of military force isn't a simple matter of allocating the responsibility to another agency. It takes equipment, a doctrine and constant training. The idea of having a basically civilian organization which on a day to day basis does non-lethal work suddenly, in an emergency, switch over to conduct lethal operations - regardless whether against manned or unmanned system - is asking quite a lot. Let me put it this way, the Reg F does not trust reservists who already get military training on both courses and on an ongoing basis to deploy for combat using relatively minor weapons without significant predeployment training. What is the likelihood of a government having the confidence to release lethal force authority for major weapon systems to people who are in all respects civilians and who have limited training and a part time command and control structure?

Do not underestimate the complexity of these weapon systems and the rigid command and control structure that needs to be in place and rigorously tested and practiced on a regular basis.

Just a point on Op Palaci. I did two tours as the Oi/c of AvConDet and understand the system quite well. In short, there is never a transfer of control to the military. Parks Canada employs several civilian experts in what is now called the Avalanche Control Section who are on duty in round the clock shifts and who are responsible for researching weather and snow conditions throughout Rogers Pass and who determine when a shoot is required to release dangerous slides. While the Army mans the guns, its the ACS supervisor who accompanies each shoot who determines what target is to be fired and when. There isn't a single round that leaves a gun unless expressly ordered by the civilian ACS supervisor.

I look forward to your next few posts.

The Civil-Military interface alluded to by both you and Lenaitch is indeed a significant problem. And Op Palaci may not be the appropriate example but it is one of the few examples I can think of where "The Ordnance" has been, and is currently, used domestically.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities. Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action. Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.

One model I can think of, particularly appropriate, is the role of 22 Wing, and particularly 21 Squadron, at North Bay. It is responsible for the Canadian Air Defence Sector, I believe, and works in a civilian controlled NAVCAN environment. NORAD and NAVCAN seem to have come to an amicable understanding. I see no reason, even under the new government, to disrupt that arrangement.

Given that, and given that North Bay monitors the North Warning Systems 47 (IIRC) radars remotely while launching fighters from Cold Lake and Bagotville, and Leitrim monitors Masset and Gander remotely, it would seem not impossible that 22 Wing continue as the military's National Airspace Coordination Centre. It would then continue working in conjunction with NAVCAN and its Air Traffic Controllers. The Airspace would still be owned by the civilian controller. They would have the military advice and assistance of the RCA GBAD det on site operating in conjunction with 22 Wing in North Bay.

Perhaps something along those lines?


As to the question of manpower and shifting responsiblities - absolutely I would anticipate that in downsizing the CAF from 68,000 to 15,000 that the remaining 53,000 PYs would be transferred along with the responsibilities, thickening up the civil agencies. And off course the personnel budget would go with them.

 

[FJAG]

The Civil-Military interface alluded to by both you and Lenaitch is indeed a significant problem. And Op Palaci may not be the appropriate example but it is one of the few examples I can think of where "The Ordnance" has been, and is currently, used domestically.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities. Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action. Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.

I don't want to sound pedantic - like I've said, one can always change the law - but Aid of the Civil Power is a very specific constitutional provision contained within the NDA whereby the federal military power is deployed in support of and at the request of a provincial authority in the event of riots and disturbances of the peace which are beyond the ability of the province to control. The concept that you are building goes far beyond AoCP and is principally integrating provincial powers and personnel (for example under s 92 "Administration of Justice") with the federal authorities' s 91 powers and personnel (such as "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence" and "Sea Coasts and Fisheries")

One model I can think of, particularly appropriate, is the role of 22 Wing, and particularly 21 Squadron, at North Bay. It is responsible for the Canadian Air Defence Sector, I believe, and works in a civilian controlled NAVCAN environment. NORAD and NAVCAN seem to have come to an amicable understanding. I see no reason, even under the new government, to disrupt that arrangement.

Given that, and given that North Bay monitors the North Warning Systems 47 (IIRC) radars remotely while launching fighters from Cold Lake and Bagotville, and Leitrim monitors Masset and Gander remotely, it would seem not impossible that 22 Wing continue as the military's National Airspace Coordination Centre. It would then continue working in conjunction with NAVCAN and its Air Traffic Controllers. The Airspace would still be owned by the civilian controller. They would have the military advice and assistance of the RCA GBAD det on site operating in conjunction with 22 Wing in North Bay.

Perhaps something along those lines?

As to the question of manpower and shifting responsiblities - absolutely I would anticipate that in downsizing the CAF from 68,000 to 15,000 that the remaining 53,000 PYs would be transferred along with the responsibilities, thickening up the civil agencies. And off course the personnel budget would go with them.

I think this is where the whole construct starts to fall apart. In the Coast Guard and search and rescue example, one can see the utility in transferring the DND resources (including budget) to the Coast Guard. The function can be done by a civilian agency already related with the task and there is little need in maintaining a military establishment for that role (some utility maybe but no need). I see a similar utility in centralizing all intelligence functions into a single agency even if there is no reduction in overall personnel or budgets. There are several other tasks that might benefit by such transfers as well. The 22 Wing/NAVCAN system, on the other hand, is one of interagency cooperation and not one of a transfer of PYs and responsibility or cost reductions.

The only reason a government would consider downsizing the military as drastically as suggested in Rick's scenario is to a) reduce costs (fiscal) and/or b) demilitarize the country (political/ideological). If there is no financial benefit to be gained (such as reducing the PY payroll (and let's not forget there's another 24,000+ civilian hangers-on in DND) then one needs to look solely at the political/ideological ones.

I'm not woke so I don't understand all of the Woke Party's motivations but I would think its the military hardware and actions that tints their rosy glasses and not simply the uniform and military hierarchy. I think Rick's scenario deals with a demilitarization of the country for both fiscal and ideological reasons rather than one of the civilianization of the military. Effectively you are suggesting reducing the military to 15,000 trigger pullers but maintaining a 77,000 PY decentralized civilianized bureaucracy some of which may or may not have some trigger pulling powers. This does not improve effectiveness and really doesn't meet any financial or ideological goals.

I take the principal objective in Rick's challenge is to significantly reduce the recurring billions in PYs funded annually in favour of providing a smaller and more effectively equipped defence force which concentrates on defending the homeland rather than expeditionary operations. Transferring all those PYs is a zero sum game.

 

[Haggis]

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that "The Ordnance" (continuing from the Canadian Armed Forces) will be operating solely on home-turf and thus always subject to Canadian civil authorities. Effectively every action will be an Aid to the Civil Power action. Rules of Engagement will have to be sorted out on a government-wide basis.

Domestic ROE have always been based on the Criminal Code. During the G8/20 in 2010 the Op CADENCE soldiers were required to learn and understand the Incident Management/Intervention Model and how it drove the application of force in that context. Would the Woke Party's approach be to appoint members of "The Ordnance" as constables when employed in AoCP/ALEA duties within Canada?

As to the question of manpower and shifting responsibilities - absolutely I would anticipate that in downsizing the CAF from 68,000 to 15,000 that the remaining 53,000 PYs would be transferred along with the responsibilities, thickening up the civil agencies. And off course the personnel budget would go with them.

This would be a classic "rob Peter to pay Paul" scenario. A more likely outcome would be the creation of Special Operating Agencies (SOA) to support the log/admin side of "The Ordnance" and staff those SOAs by transferring the PYs and funding across from the CAF. There would be a ton of second and third order activities needed to support this such as changes to various pension laws and polices, unionization, benefits transfers etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

To be honest, the way I am working through this is primarily on the basis of reviewing the jobs that need doing first and then trying to figure out how to get them done within the context of Rick's 15,000.

My sense is that I can move the Intelligence and Surveillance functions into the civilian domain. I can move the Rangers into the civilian domain and also the Militia. In large part that is because intelligence and surveillance already have a heavy civilian component. The Rangers and the Militia hardly qualify as a major funding drag on the military nor does the military expend a great deal of effort on them. Transferring them out and forming a Homeguard would not, in my opinion, be a major concern.

The big problems come with the jobs required of the RCN and the RCAF. We can require a lot from the Coast Guard but even with that I consider the RCN's Patrols and the RCAF's ability to respond to emergencies to be critical tasks that can't be downsized. In fact, I consider both forces pretty well stretched as it is. I have difficulty figuring out how to cut the forces and maintain their kit, let alone manage Command and Control.

The other big concern I have is the GBAD construct necessary to protect the cities, their people and their infrastructure without breaking the bank.

I am looking to history for answers because I consider the national wars and their levee-en-masse to be aberrations. Historically logistic support for both the Army and the Navy was a civilian field. Crimea prompted the rise of the military logistic support system because inter-agency co-operation failed. In WWI and WWII new technologies were being introduced to the public and training was a key element in raising those armies. Historically there was less of a gap between the domestic skills possessed by the soldiery and the skills they needed for fighting. Establishing discipline was a greater problem.

I don't know the command and control structure that guides NORAD-NAVCAN co-operation, any more than I know the command and control structure of the artillery at Dover Castle or even Fort Henry in Kingston. I just know that military aircraft are launched when required and neither civvy, nor foreign military, aircraft have been shot down. Equally, I know that vessels sailed in and out of Kingston harbour and travelled the Thousand Islands without being sunk by the artillery. Whatever was, and is happening, somebody is doing something right.

I do think that duplicating technology and personnel simply because we can't figure out when to hand over control from one agency to another is silly. Some where between having gunners shooting down pigeons and quad copters and airport managers shooting down Hyper Velocity Missiles there has to be an acceptable answer and frankly, I believe without knowing, that the answer exists at the interface between NAVCAN and NORAD.

All of which leads me towards a growing sense that the RCN and RCAF numbers as they currently stand are not indefensible. I think that was part of my gut reaction to try and protect them from this exercise by removing them to the Coast Guard in their entirety.

The major problem I have is what to do with the army in a domestic role in a largely peaceful society that doesn't face imminent threat of an invasion. There is a system in place to manage the brushfires within the population. That is largely as civil control responsibility and it is expected that the agents of the civil authority will manage it. By assigning the Militia to the civil side of things then the RCMP are provided with their own B Specials.

The only problem with that is that nobody likes the B Specials and soldiers don't like being used against neighbours they drink with.

And that not only goes for the Militia but the Regular Force as well.

So what is left for the army to do?

Stay tuned?

Special Constabulary - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Ulster Special Constabulary - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[FJAG]

Okay. Everyone whose COA included setting up a mountain warfare unit in Merritt BC needs to reconsider.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/merritt-wastewater-system-failure-dont-flush-1.6249377

 

[daftandbarmy]

Okay. Everyone whose COA included setting up a mountain warfare unit in Merritt BC needs to reconsider.

OTOH, Commando Forces would be welcome in Abbotsford:

Google Maps

Find local businesses, view maps and get driving directions in Google Maps.

www.google.com

 

[KevinB]

Domestic ROE have always been based on the Criminal Code.

Pedantic point: Not actually true.
At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)
I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.

During the G8/20 in 2010 the Op CADENCE soldiers were required to learn and understand the Incident Management/Intervention Model and how it drove the application of force in that context. Would the Woke Party's approach be to appoint members of "The Ordnance" as constables when employed in AoCP/ALEA duties within Canada?

I am aware (and I am sure several other members are as well) of other DomOps where the IMIM wasn't applicable.
If you remember the little issues in Quebec with the natives - and the potential to use Leo's andM109's to "soften" defensive positions - that's not exactly CCC sort of stuff.

This would be a classic "rob Peter to pay Paul" scenario. A more likely outcome would be the creation of Special Operating Agencies (SOA) to support the log/admin side of "The Ordnance" and staff those SOAs by transferring the PYs and funding across from the CAF. There would be a ton of second and third order activities needed to support this such as changes to various pension laws and polices, unionization, benefits transfers etc.

Agreed in this respect, all I see in Kirkhill's model is cheating the system and following the letter not the intent (as creative as it was) .

 

[KevinB]

Honestly I see some fantastic ideas on a lot of these responses - so much so I am almost wanting to play with some hybrid combinations.
A lot of things I hadn't focused on (and I cheated the system with contractors admittedly) that could be reworked - and several different paths forward could be used from various participants.

 

[Kirkhill]

Pedantic point: Not actually true.
At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)
I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.

I am aware (and I am sure several other members are as well) of other DomOps where the IMIM wasn't applicable.
If you remember the little issues in Quebec with the natives - and the potential to use Leo's andM109's to "soften" defensive positions - that's not exactly CCC sort of stuff.

Agreed in this respect, all I see in Kirkhill's model is cheating the system and following the letter not the intent (as creative as it was) .

I prefer to think of it as working the rule book.

 

[lenaitch]

Thanks for the appreciation.

Also thank you for the heads up on the legal ramifications. I understand the financial end of things. TANSTAAFL. However I sense that Canadians generally are happier funding constables and stretcher bearers than soldiers so the new Government of the Day may be on to something.

Having said that can you enlighten me on the use of force rules as they apply to SWAT/ERT operations?

And I get your point about the use of lethal force by harbourmaster or airport manager. I was more thinking along the lines of knocking down uninhabited foreign objects than knocking down people. Or launching observation drones more than loitering munitions. My sense there was that it would be better for the air traffic controller to launch a drone into his airspace than have a third party complicate his picture.

Maybe the transition to lethal force should be made explicit by transferring control temporarily to the artillery det. Somewhat after the practice of Op Palaci avalanche control.

A lot has been said in the interim so I'll just respond to your highlighted question. The use of force rules that apply to police tactical teams, however they are variously called, is no different than the individual patrol officer. Notwithstanding their specialized training and equipment, any individual team member who uses lethal or even non-lethal force, is answerable to their employer, whatever civilian oversight complaint/investigative agency is in place, and the court, for the action they took. There is no scenario where, for example, a member could shoot the next person who came out a door based simply on the grounds that a team leader or incident commander directed him to.

 

[KevinB]

A lot has been said in the interim so I'll just respond to your highlighted question. The use of force rules that apply to police tactical teams, however they are variously called, is no different than the individual patrol officer. Notwithstanding their specialized training and equipment, any individual team member who uses lethal or even non-lethal force, is answerable to their employer, whatever civilian oversight complaint/investigative agency is in place, and the court, for the action they took. There is no scenario where, for example, a member could shoot the next person who came out a door based simply on the grounds that a team leader or incident commander directed him to.

LE Snipers...
I say that as someone who spent 4+ years on a Federal LE Task Force on both Entry Team and a Sniper.

 

[lenaitch]

LE Snipers...
I say that as someone who spent 4+ years on a Federal LE Task Force on both Entry Team and a Sniper.

In the Canadian context?

I'm not saying that the necessary grounds can't be established during a briefing or through information received via comms as the situation unfolds. The oversight bodies and courts will ultimately decide, and that's where the member's fate lies.

 

[KevinB]

In the Canadian context?

I'm not saying that the necessary grounds can't be established during a briefing or through information received via comms as the situation unfolds. The oversight bodies and courts will ultimately decide, and that's where the member's fate lies.

I taught on a Canadian LE class several years ago - the premise is the same on a breach - or command generated shooting.
There has been a bunch of case law on both sides of the border on LE Sniper/Sharpshooter/CounterSniper/whatevernamehere issues with the whole green light issue being dragged through the courts, as people have tried to frame those shootings as Premeditated Murder.

Now if things go sideways - the shooter had better be able to articulate why they did what they did, the totality of the circumstances - not just X saying so.
Generally the Sniper/Observe Team is mostly there to provide intel and eyes on - as well as cover for perimeter/entry pers - but when part of a HR mission - all LE I know will take orders from the Incident or Team Commander, and in certain cases those will be initiated by sniper action.

At that point in the time, I'd like to point out the Incident Commander etc has made the decision that lethal force is needed to preserve other lives - and the shooter is just executing policy as it where.

Rare - yes, but not unheard of, I've been at a few.

 

[Czech_pivo]

As anyone thought about keeping the SOF but as for the regular army units, why can’t we contract this out to a brigade Gurkha’s and use the extra troops for a kick ass RCN and RCAF.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As anyone thought about keeping the SOF but as for the regular army units, why can’t we contract this out to a brigade Gurkha’s and use the extra troops for a kick ass RCN and RCAF.

Dude... I love the Gurkhas too, but they do have some limitations.

 

[Haggis]

Pedantic point: Not actually true.

Pedantic or not, any use of force by government agents within Canada must be justified.

At least 1 open source one I can point to is the 2002 G-8 in K country, Red Zone penetrations had unlimited lethal response - as did Air Penetration of the Blue zone (and there where some itchy ADATS crews eyeballing a Dash-8 at around 2min before the zones went live)

Nothing in the Criminal Code or IMIM precludes the justified use of lethal force as a first measure response.

I suspect that the Blue Zone for 2010 was based on your example below - but the Red Zone was not.

In 2010, the frequently changing ROE became a running joke in my TF HQ (I was RSM of the IRU). In one version (an obvious cut & paste error), which we had to hastily recall, the ROE allowed soldiers in any zone to go from "physical presence" to "lethal force" with no intervening steps, regardless of the actions of a threat actor - or Huntsville hiker.

"Ma'am, please stay back from the fence."

"Huh??"

BANG!

I am aware (and I am sure several other members are as well) of other DomOps where the IMIM wasn't applicable.
If you remember the little issues in Quebec with the natives - and the potential to use Leo's andM109's to "soften" defensive positions - that's not exactly CCC sort of stuff.

I spent seven long months between that location and the one straddling the Canada/US border a few dozen km west. We are damned lucky things didn't spiral way out of control there.

 

[Kirkhill]

Fraught. I think that seems to be the one word answer to the use of lethal force by the Government of Canada within its realm. Proceed at your own risk.

So how did NORAD handle ROE on 9/11 and the days immediately following?

NORAD Statement on 9-11 Commission Report Release

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. - North American Aerospace Defense Command officials expressed their gratitude for the effort of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States,

www.norad.mil

 

[Kirkhill]

Wiki notes seem to suggest that Air Sovereignty is an assistance to law enforcement task and that it is a sustained tasking. It requires documented definitions of roles and procedures and compatible communications - apparently relatively cheap at 75 MUSD for the first fix.

Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) preparedness[edit]​

Background[edit]​

In January 1982, the FAA unveiled the National Airspace System (NAS) Plan.

The plan called for more advanced systems for Air Traffic Control, and improvements in ground-to-air surveillance and communication with new Doppler Radars and better transponders. Better computers and software were developed, air route traffic control centers were consolidated, and the number of flight service stations reduced. There is no overlap of responsibility between DoD and FAA within the NAS: this is why within FAA-controlled airspace the FAA is in charge of controlling and vectoring hijack intercept aircraft.[1]

The radar systems at NEADS had been scheduled to be upgraded in a contract awarded in 1997, but the project cost had been revised upwards by 700% causing the Air Force to cancel the contract and begin plans to re-open the bidding process.[47]

Planning for terrorist use of hijacked airplanes as missiles had been considered for some military exercises prior to 9/11, though all but one of those exercises considered only aircraft originating from other countries.[48]

The US and Canadian militaries, particularly NORAD and the US Air National Guard, have been tasked with interception duties concerning hijacked aircraft. Their primary duty was assistance to law enforcement. Quoting Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold: "We always viewed an attack from within our borders as a law enforcement issue, ...".[49] Military aircraft were to be used to assure positive flight following, report unusual observances, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.[1] Jamie Gorelick of the 9-11 Commission had taken part in those security measures as Deputy Attorney General, and described the measures in Commission hearings. In April 2001, NORAD considered an exercise in which an aircraft of foreign origin was hijacked by terrorists and flown into the Pentagon, like a missile, but rejected the scenario as implausible.[48] Five months later, a similar scenario occurred.[50] However, in January 2002 Maj.Gen. Larry Arnold, stated "... we did not honestly think about hijacked airliners being used in suicide attacks."[49]

Efforts post-9/11[edit]​

In April 2003, a contract was awarded to upgrade the Battle Control Systems by summer 2006.[51]

Later systems, such as the Joint-Based Expeditionary Connectivity Center (JBECC), merge civil and military radar data. Once deployed, the JBECC can fuse and correlate target data covering about 400 miles (640 km) of coastline from disparate airborne, land- and sea-based sensors creating fire-control-quality tracks that can guide interceptors to engagement.

Major General Larry Arnold, USAF, ret. stated in May 2001, that JBECC will provide "... more time to scramble fighters and see any target, whether small, large, low or high."[52]

General Arnold also stated "In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we had to hook up to FAA radars throughout the country, install compatible radios for nationwide coverage between our command and control agencies and our airborne assets, and purchase a new command and control computer system to integrate radar and communications. The initial investment was for $75 million, and this number has grown to nearly $200 million."[26]

Organizations outside the FAA (e.g., the airlines, Department of Defense, NASA, and international sites) also have access to the FAA's Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) software and/or data for purposes of flight management and tracking.[53]

2009 Government Accountability Office report on ASA[edit]​

In January 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published "Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace"[54] on the Air Force's Air Sovereignty Alert mission. According to the report:

The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite) mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included integrating ASA operations into the Air Force's planning, programming, and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges the units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the challenges associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions.

The report further stated:

The GAO analysis also showed that none of the Air Force's key homeland defense documents—the Air Force homeland defense policy directive, the Air Force homeland operations doctrine, and the Air Force homeland defense concept of operations—fully defines the roles and responsibilities for, or accurately articulates the complexity of, Air Sovereignty Alert operations.

The report made the following recommendations to improve ASA operations:

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services with units that consistently conduct ASA operations to formally assign ASA duties to these units and then ensure that the readiness of these units is fully assessed, to include personnel, training, equipment, and ability to respond to an alert.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following five actions:
• Establish a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission.• Implement ASA as a steady-state mission according to NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance by• updating and implementing the ASA program action directive;• updating the Air Force homeland defense policy, homeland operations doctrine, and concept of operations to incorporate and define the roles and responsibilities for ASA operations; and• incorporating the ASA mission within the Air Force submissions for the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.• Develop and implement a plan to address any projected capability gaps in ASA units due to the expected end of the useful service lives of their F-15s and F-16s.• Develop and implement a formal method to replace deploying units that still provides unit commanders flexibility to coordinate replacements.

U.S. military response during the September 11 attacks - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

Dude... I love the Gurkhas too, but they do have some limitations.

They have difficulty reaching the top shelf.

 

[ArmyRick]

I don't want to sound pedantic - like I've said, one can always change the law - but Aid of the Civil Power is a very specific constitutional provision contained within the NDA whereby the federal military power is deployed in support of and at the request of a provincial authority in the event of riots and disturbances of the peace which are beyond the ability of the province to control. The concept that you are building goes far beyond AoCP and is principally integrating provincial powers and personnel (for example under s 92 "Administration of Justice") with the federal authorities' s 91 powers and personnel (such as "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence" and "Sea Coasts and Fisheries")


I think this is where the whole construct starts to fall apart. In the Coast Guard and search and rescue example, one can see the utility in transferring the DND resources (including budget) to the Coast Guard. The function can be done by a civilian agency already related with the task and there is little need in maintaining a military establishment for that role (some utility maybe but no need). I see a similar utility in centralizing all intelligence functions into a single agency even if there is no reduction in overall personnel or budgets. There are several other tasks that might benefit by such transfers as well. The 22 Wing/NAVCAN system, on the other hand, is one of interagency cooperation and not one of a transfer of PYs and responsibility or cost reductions.

The only reason a government would consider downsizing the military as drastically as suggested in Rick's scenario is to a) reduce costs (fiscal) and/or b) demilitarize the country (political/ideological). If there is no financial benefit to be gained (such as reducing the PY payroll (and let's not forget there's another 24,000+ civilian hangers-on in DND) then one needs to look solely at the political/ideological ones.

I'm not woke so I don't understand all of the Woke Party's motivations but I would think its the military hardware and actions that tints their rosy glasses and not simply the uniform and military hierarchy. I think Rick's scenario deals with a demilitarization of the country for both fiscal and ideological reasons rather than one of the civilianization of the military. Effectively you are suggesting reducing the military to 15,000 trigger pullers but maintaining a 77,000 PY decentralized civilianized bureaucracy some of which may or may not have some trigger pulling powers. This does not improve effectiveness and really doesn't meet any financial or ideological goals.

I take the principal objective in Rick's challenge is to significantly reduce the recurring billions in PYs funded annually in favour of providing a smaller and more effectively equipped defence force which concentrates on defending the homeland rather than expeditionary operations. Transferring all those PYs is a zero sum game.

Certainly would like to see some of the unnecessary expenses trimmed. I don't think in the next 20-50 years there will be a economic boom.