Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[daftandbarmy]

I worry about investing in such a heavy vehicle for infantry deployment.  My worry is that the vehicle will become central in the thinking, and the infantry will become no more than a screen for the bus, and not an arm of attack.  Combined arms wins battles, yes, but by focusing on the infantry carrier, it is easy to quickly find the infantry tactics being based on the vehicle, and not on the men.

Mechanized infantry are a great tool, but the mechanized part is their to support the infantry.  Too expensive a tail soon wags the dog.  It is hard to justify exercises and training for mechanized forces that do not employ the expensive and highly visible equipment.  This limits the ability to train your infantry, and its leaders, to explore the uses of the dismounts as a weapon, and not as attachments to the heavily armoured behemoth that began as a bulletproof taxi.

Likewise, if the vehicle becomes the accepted heavy weapons for the infantry section, what happens when terrain or mines forces the infantry to fight without the vehicles.  If we become too reliant on vehicle systems, our infantry is forced to fight at a disadvantage when employed alone. 

Lastly, this is Canada.  I would rather see us have a larger number of general purpose hulls and the doctrine to employ them in a variety of roles, than a small number of absolutely fabulous hulls that exist in such low numbers as to limit the size of the forces equipped and trained with them, making them just expensive hanger-queens, and undeployable.

I'm probably talking out my a$$, but when I see a heavy tank as an APC, I have my doubts that the owners will still think like infantry, and not turn into closet blackhat treadheads.

It's all been done before - by us. As all you history geeks well know, Canada was the first country to deploy APCs made from turretless tanks. The Kangaroo was first deployed by the Canadian Army in Normandy. Why shouldn't it work now?:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kangaroo_(armoured_personnel_carrier)

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

The Kangaroo and the Priest were all modifications of tanks that were built by the Canadian army in wartime mode.  We had tanks rolling off the production line, and divisions of troops in the field.  At the time, we had a wartime economy, and were lavishing our monies on getting all the tools for a job that the whole world knew needed to be done, but which no one was sure could be done.

Now we have a military that struggles to get the tools to do a job that a large portion of the public refuses to admit needs to be done and which our politicians mostly lie about what is actually being done.  Thus stated do you see an unweaponed tank being used by the Canadian Forces as an APC to safely deploy Canadian troops to the point of attack?  Or do you see an unweaponed tank being used to "keep the troops safe" and buttoned up, thus totally useless as infantry.

Already at any casualties the public cries that our military equipment must be the problem, that tanks are useless because Canadians are still dying, that LAVs and Nylas are death traps, and we should bring the boys home because the Afghans could stop the Soviet armour.  Infantry finds and fixes the enemy, so that the heavier weapons of the troops and that can be called and directed by the troops can destroy them.  If we tie our troops to an elephant, they will find and fix only what an elephant can catch.  If we tie our troops to wolves, they can find and fix whatever can be caught, and can whistle up their elephants when the armoured punch is needed.

Infantry is the tool for going anywhere, the tool for presence wherever the enemy could be.  Heavy armour is awesome and unmatchable at the direct assault, but that is the smallest part of the infantry role, and tying us to a heavy assault IFV is pissing away the mobility that is the infantry assest. 

When we were looking at the channel forts the Kangaroo was a godsend.  Were we looking at storming St Petersburg today, then the heavy tank hull might be a good idea.  For our procurement levels and deployment needs I just don't see it. 

 

[vonGarvin]

It is a trade off.  You just described a tank. 

A Mech Inf Sections greatest strength is not the "A+" factor - it it the section that dismounts...so lets focus on the whole, not just the parts.

Exactly my point.  In an ideal world with unlimited funds and unlimited logistics, having all three would be, well, super.  We live in a non-Euclidean plane, and for a mech infantry vehicle, Mobility and Protection are what's needed (so that it can keep up with the tanks and be able to take a hit to protect the infantry in the back).

 

[a_majoor]

The real downside of these machines is both the cost (especially the turret and associated FCS) and the logistical bill for any sort of HAPC/HIFV, not to mention tactical limitations due to size and weight. HAPC/HIFV's are most useful for complex terrain and assaults, but smaller "general purpose" machines are still needed for other roles.

I was trying to suggest that specialized machines should be considered for the assault role since they are the only practical way to conduct a close assault in complex terrain. If we agree on this, then there are several ways to go about it:

Get a machine like the Puma, TLAV, M-113 for all roles and invest in up armour kits to layer on the vehicles before we get into situations like Ortona or Fallujiah. This might be considered HAPC-

Buy a small number of real HAPC's and parcel them out into the battalions (one company in the Combat Support Company). We can buy ambulance, Engineer section vehicles and so on to get some economy of scale

Buy the same total number of HAPC's and designate a unit to be the assault unit which gets them all.

Each solution has certain advantages and disadvantages (as some have already pointed out). Having only two tools in the toolbox (the LAV III and RG-31) leave several gaps in the ability of the Infantry to close with and destroy the enemy, and the HAPC option covers close terrain.

 

[a_majoor]

An interesting video on another thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/65730.0.html

At about 3:03 you actually see some footage of the Merkava 4 being used as an HIFV (although that is not the primary purpose of the rear compartment and hatch; that is the ammunition stowage area and crew emergency escape).

Just as a note, the Centurio armoured car can also be modified to carry a four man "close support squad" by removing the rear ammunition racks, and a modified Ukrainian version of the T-84 is also able to carry a five man squad alongside the engine compartment. I would doubt the Ukrainian soldiers would be in great fighting shape after a day stuck in the back. In any event, these soldiers might not be considered "Infantry" in the same sense that we think of them, they more resemble the squires of Knights and mounted soldiers of the middle ages, there to protect their mounted counterparts.

Going even farther back, the concept existed in late classical Greece, with a form of light Infantry who were trained to grasp the mane of a horse and run alongside in order to protect the horse and rider from attack. These troops were known as "Hamippos", and I will propose to reintroduce the term to distinguish them from "Panzer Grenadiers" or "Dragoons"

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interesting.

Maybe we need to think less of our APCs/MICVs as armoured mobile homes (complete with hammocks, sleeping bags and Cheez Whiz) and more as true 'assault vehicles' e.g., from the LD to the Objective only.

 

[TCBF]

... and a modified Ukrainian version of the T-84 is also able to carry a five man squad alongside the engine compartment. I would doubt the Ukrainian soldiers would be in great fighting shape after a day stuck in the back. ...

- They, like us in the old days, would be drunk.

"Dragoons"

- The term "Dragoons" used as mounted Infantry only lasted maybe a hundred years as a British tradition.  Thereafter it was applied to some (usually heavy) cavalry regiments (unless as "Light Dragoons").  It retains it's mounted infantry flavour possibly only in the US Army.

 

[a_majoor]

- The term "Dragoons" used as mounted Infantry only lasted maybe a hundred years as a British tradition.  Thereafter it was applied to some (usually heavy) cavalry regiments (unless as "Light Dragoons").  It retains it's mounted infantry flavour possibly only in the US Army.

The only other English language term which is suitable might be "Mounted Rifles", but the historical context is soldiers combining a high degree of mobility (comparable to Cavalry) with the fighting power of dismounted Infantry. A LAV III + Coyote force could fill this role.

"Dragoons" or "Panzergrenadiers" would indicate Infantry soldiers who are trained and equipped to fight both mounted and in conjunction with their vehicles, perhaps to the point of considering the vehicle to be a support weapon. The LAV III would be about the minimum IFV, heavier vehicles such as the Warrior, Bradley or PUMA would be more appropriate here.

"Hamippos" would be close protection troops for AFV's, so these vehicles can operate in complex terrain and provide direct and indirect fire support to the assaulting troops without being disturbed. These troops would be attached to (or part of) Armoured regiments operating suitable AFV's (like the Merkava or Centurio armoured car)

For a small army like ours, this degree of specialization would be very difficult to support. General purpose "Mech Infantry" have proven they are quite capable of fulfilling these roles in the past, so the real argument here is how do we want to conduct the assault in complex terrain?

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

If we wanted to keep the armoured vehicles to have support for the dismounted troops, then couldn't we have maybe smaller vehicles? Or if that isn't feasible, there could be a resurgence of aircav, where we would have mobile heavy support from the air, and an ability to insert quickly.

 

[davidk]

there could be a resurgence of aircav, where we would have mobile heavy support from the air, and an ability to insert quickly.

Resurgence of aircav? Correct me if I'm wrong, but Canada never had anything of the like - sure, TacHel has been around for a while, but not as dedicated infantry vehicles.

What are you suggesting by "mobile heavy support"? A Griffin, even with the new minigun, isn't going to the do the job of the 25mm.

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

Highlander Islander,
No, I believe you are correct that Canada never had aircav. I was meaning in a sense of using it by Canada, since it did have some success with the Americans and the Brits still have a component of the infantry called air assault. Yes you are also correct that we would have not even close to the fire power of mechanized support with griffins, but what if we were thinking of changing the materials used? We could then think of acquiring a gunship for ground support and support the aircav itself. Just a thought,
MPF

 

[Michael OLeary]

Highlander Islander,
No, I believe you are correct that Canada never had aircav. I was meaning in a sense of using it by Canada, since it did have some success with the Americans and the Brits still have a component of the infantry called air assault. Yes you are also correct that we would have not even close to the fire power of mechanized support with griffins, but what if we were thinking of changing the materials used? We could then think of acquiring a gunship for ground support and support the aircav itself. Just a thought,
MPF

OK, now you get referred to this thread.

Let's try to put this thread back on it's core topic.


MIlnet.ca Staff

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

Seen thanks for the reference,

MPF

 

[daftandbarmy]

These two videos are pretty instructive with respect to what really happens during the infantry attack. They happen to be Royal Marines, but there are similar videos out with Canadians doing pretty much the same things under fire.

In these film clips, as opposed to grand flanking movements or daring frontal 'pepper poitting' type assaults, we see small groups (sections) moving together quickly - led from the front - while covered by other sections and support weapons. They close with the enemy, as sections, firing and moving. I find it odd that, during many of our infantry training courses, we avoid training troops at the section level to operate in this 'realistic' fashion, and tend to favour the 'grand startegy at the section level' approach.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FcXWZ0XVuw&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UIqRxzgtyo&feature=related

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

It's interesting, since the method of moving in to attack in sections with a firebase is about the same as it has been since WW2, we have changed our doctrine to use pepper potting to get more lead downrange, but sacrificing a bit of momentum and cover in order to do so. Well the video says it all, we use the non pepper potting technique.

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

Just to add to what I said, the best way to move into a TIC or to take a position would be as fast as possible (as long as there are preparations for this speed). So to move in and take the enemy as fast as possible requires a sacrifice of a bit of protection. Isn't that why in pepper-potting (I may be wrong here) the Brits never go prone, they stay kneeling to be able to move faster. So with the heavy support of a firebase and of the LAV-III, then there is enough heavy lead to make quickly and sacrifice a bit of cover. Just putting it out there,
MPF

 

[ArmyRick]

Yes you are wrong, the brits use prone just as much as we do. Look at the video plus I have trained with brits and they were not shy about hitting the dirt. Next time on the range, at 200 or 300 meters, check out how easy it is to hit the upper half of the fig 11 target and then ask yourself if prone position is valuable. the answer should be a clear yes.

 

[Trooper Hale]

Just to add to what I said, the best way to move into a TIC or to take a position would be as fast as possible (as long as there are preparations for this speed). So to move in and take the enemy as fast as possible requires a sacrifice of a bit of protection. Isn't that why in pepper-potting (I may be wrong here) the Brits never go prone, they stay kneeling to be able to move faster. So with the heavy support of a firebase and of the LAV-III, then there is enough heavy lead to make quickly and sacrifice a bit of cover. Just putting it out there,
MPF

As a cavalry dismount, i work, almost always with LAV's within direct support. For us, the biggest part of it is the ground we're moving through and the fire support behind us. I teach the boys to use cover and pick fire positions appropriate to the ground around us. Our job is to find the enemy for the LAV's to destroy in detail. And all the 25mm's in world wont help you if you've already been cut apart because your standing up. Like Army Rick said, the top half of a figure 11 target is pretty big, especially if your the figure 11!
We make it dependant on the ground we're in, however. In Australia and where we train, we have a lot of jungle or simply long, tall grass and bush. If in tall grass, our SOP is to take a knee so as to be able to still have battlefield awareness and be able to take a sight picture. Sometimes in the prone, all you'll be doing is a really bad impersonation of a lawn mower, you wont be able to see the enemy and, more importantly in training, you wont be able to see your mates. This is obvious though. All i'm really trying to say is that often it'll be dependant on the ground and the cover avaliable. Again though, like ArmyRick said, for the most part, getting on your guts is your best bet to avoid perforation. Its just that it's not always simple.

 

[Fide et Fortitudine]

Well obviously I don't really know what I am saying. Thanks for the corrections I should read more into how things are being done over there,
MPF

 

[ArmyRick]

Don't worry padawan, keep soldiering on. You will learn with every exercise, course or operation you go on. I was "sorted out" many times by my Cpls, MCpls and SGTs many a times. Now I am an infantry sgt that has taught several DP1 courses and I still mentor young soldiers. Its part of developing as a grunt.