You have now repeated three times that the question should be studied, assessed and debated. Fine. Nobody is arguing that the RCN should refuse to examine future options. What is being challenged is the leap from “perhaps worth studying” to “the RCN is letting down the taxpayer unless it pursues my preferred mobile Arctic AIP filling station.”
And let us stop rewriting the history of Nanisivik. The possible refuelling and support of submarines was always part of the broader potential value of an Arctic naval facility. Nanisivik did not fail because Arctic submarine support was never considered, nor because fixed Arctic support is inherently impossible. It failed because Canada chose a poor location, inherited a bad jetty and then developed the site with almost no long-term vision. Throw in some Covid-19 and there you have it. The original concept was steadily reduced until what remained was little more than a seasonal fuel stop with severe limitations. That is not proof that an Arctic base cannot work. It is proof that a badly located, badly scoped facility built around an inadequate jetty will predictably deliver an inadequate result.
Nor does one former Commander RCN mentioning a mobile support concept magically turn it into an endorsed capability plan. I will let you in on a little secret: senior officers say a lot of things. Some become projects. Some become studies. Some disappear the moment the PowerPoint presentation ends. Everything I have heard suggests an Arctic mobile base ship has not progressed anywhere close to an actual funded program.
You also keep treating “three oceans” as though it means every Canadian submarine must be capable of spending weeks prowling beneath the central Arctic ice pack. It does not. Canada can defend its Arctic approaches, monitor choke points, collect intelligence, support NORAD and NATO operations and operate in seasonally accessible Arctic waters without pretending a conventional submarine is an SSN.
The Arctic Ocean is not a bathtub with only one entrance. Russian submarines crossing under the pole do not suddenly appear unobserved in Hudson Bay. They still have to pass through geographically constrained approaches, which can be monitored by submarines, aircraft, satellites, seabed sensors, surface ships and allied assets. That is called layered surveillance. It is somewhat more sophisticated than parking a hydrogen and oxygen factory on an ice capable barge and hoping for the best.
St. John’s is not necessarily the only option either. Depending on the mission, submarines could operate from or receive support through Halifax, Nuuk, Iqaluit or allied facilities. A future support arrangement in Greenland may make considerably more sense than designing an enormously expensive Canadian mobile base solely to refill AIP reactants during an under ice patrol that may rarely, if ever, be required.
There is also nothing preventing Canada from eventually revisiting the fixed base concept at a better location, with a proper harbour, a suitable jetty, aviation access, storage, maintenance capacity and an actual strategic plan. The lesson from Nanisivik should not be “fixed bases do not work.” The lesson should be “do not build another half-measure in the wrong place and then act surprised when it underperforms.”
How do you know none of those options are already being examined simply because they have not been announced publicly?
The phrase “game changer” is also doing a heroic amount of work here. Replenishing cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen related reactants at sea, in Arctic conditions, alongside a submarine, from a mobile support vessel, would introduce major safety, engineering, certification, training, storage and environmental challenges. The support ship itself would require protection, aviation support, specialized personnel and likely its own escort. At some point the “solution” becomes more complicated and expensive than the operational problem it supposedly solves.
And no, spending tens of billions over the full life of a submarine fleet does not mean every theoretical mission must be supported, regardless of cost. By that logic, unless the submarines can operate under the North Pole, launch satellites, conduct mine clearance and deliver Amazon parcels to Resolute, the taxpayer has somehow been cheated.
Canada needs to manage expectations. Even after the new submarines arrive, it will probably be years before the RCN cautiously expands operations farther into the Arctic, develops procedures, proves equipment and builds crews with the required experience. Nobody sensible is going to take a newly delivered conventional submarine and immediately send it deep beneath the ice simply because a procurement press release mentioned three oceans.
Study it? Certainly. Model it? Absolutely. Conduct limited trials if the engineering case supports them? Perhaps.
Reconsider a properly located and properly designed Arctic support facility? That would make considerably more sense than repeating the mistakes made at Nanisivik. But declaring that the RCN is “letting down the taxpayer” because it has not yet committed billions to an undeveloped, hazardous and possibly unnecessary mobile AIP replenishment concept is not holding the Navy accountable.
It is demanding that the Navy validate your solution before the operational requirement has even been proven.
First let me thank you (and others) for your post disputing the concept of AIP equipped submarine operations in the Arctic. I would like to see this debated, and by the replies/comments, that is taking place.
If I read your post correctly, we have agreement in a few areas:
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(1) AIP equipped submarines, without further logistics support, do not have the capability to patrol the Arctic, nor likely the capability to do a simple coast to coast Arctic transit (at least not at present, if/until global warming makes the Arctic more passable), and
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(2) Trying to replenish an AIP equipped submarine from a mobile (ship) platform is likely incredibly difficult, it probably has not been done by any navy yet, and further, to attempt such in the Arctic would make it even more difficult, (doubly difficult), and
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(3) Regardless, given the potential advantages of being able to replenish AIP reactants from a mobile platform (including an Arctic platform), that it is worth doing a serious study on such a possibility, where I would go a step further perhaps than you would go, and I would note such such an assessment include scaled (down) representative testing to validate such (or to prove such is far too unsafe, if that should be the case).
Where perhaps we disagree, is your characterization of my statements. There was no rewriting the history of Nanisivik. Point to me a document that specifically mentioned AIP reactant replenishment at Nanisivik. I looked. I could not find such ever being proposed. I would like to see such. There is a MASSIVE difference between diesel fuel replenishment and AIP reactent replenishment, and I found no reference to AIP reactant replenishment. So I am interested to read where and if you spotted that.
Second, we seem disagree as to what "three ocean" means in regards to operations. My take on your assessment is the 3rd ocean (Arctic) requirement means the submarine never enters the Arctic (the 3rd ocean), but only at most hovers at two of the choke points to the Arctic. My view is to call that Arctic operations is a massive stretch. I don't know your view there other than you assess stop at choke points to the Arctic. Never have an AIP equipped submarine go past a choke point. Is that your view?
Third, I think we disagree as you seem to believe there are two and only two checkpoints to the Arctic that should be monitored by RCN submarines and the other entrance to Arctic locations can more than adequately be done by aircraft, satellites, seabed sensors, surface ships. If that the case, why don't you also say: "don't bother putting Canadian submarines at any choke point - other assets cover such"? I deduce that by your logic such Canadian Arctic choke points is already adequately covered - no need for Canadian submarines to do such. Having typed that, I believe that is NOT your view, so I don't follow your logic.
And that leads to the fourth disagreement. You stated "
And no, spending tens of billions over the full life of a submarine fleet does not mean every theoretical mission must be supported, regardless of cost. By that logic" ... and just whom is that "NO" aimed at?? Where did I claim "
every theoretical mission must be supported"? I did not. My view? That is a nonsense reply.
So, ... what did I claim? OK? Lets step back. I pointed out some specific HLMR (which stand for High Level
Mandatory Requirements) that are to define the Canadian Patrol Submarine project submarine build. I remind you they are HLMR#2, HLMR#3, HLMR#5, HLMR#6, HLMR#15. Those MANDATORY requirements do not state 'rest silently by an Arctic choke points and never enter'. These are not written "OPTIONAL" requirements. These are not written "CHOKE POINT" requirements.... If you found where such is written, then please point such to me, as I would like to read that.
These are promising and exciting time for the RCN. I think we also agree there. My view is one should not arbitrary block off 3rd ocean (Arctic) access to the chosen Canadian Patrol submarine just because one thinks it is incredibly difficult.
Instead I believe serious consideration be made re: the possibility of Arctic AIP-reactant replenishment be made with a proper assessment, FULLY made and supported if/where possible by accurate scaled repesentative tests conducted, to more accurately assess if reactant replenishment in the Arctic north (including in an Arctic capable supply ship, such as a mobile base ship, or other suitable substantilly size support vessel) can be done.
For if this is possible, despite what I think is your dislike of the words I chose, this would be a game changer. A massive game changer.
Anyway - I do DEFINITELY appreciate your reply, ... Again - thank-you for such ... I appreciate ALL of your counterpoints. I do think this should be debated. It needs discussion. It needs counterpoints. My hope is the idea not shelved and forgotten, but it is given the serious major consideration that it is due.
