Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[foresterab]

A very sound basis for a robust Reserve/Militia/Guard force, and for avoiding things like the neverending Afghanistan mission.

Perhaps use some federal funding arm-twisting or bribery, whichever seems more effective, to establish Reserve footprints on every major campus in the country: combination recruiting, training, and administrative hubs, with a robust side of liaison and outreach, to attract and retain students as CAF members.

Pte Bloggins who joined the CSCOTR, took their first couple of years of schooling at VIU, and is now at UBC, intending to return home to Nanaimo, should be provided the tools and minor incentives necessary to continue as a member.

Was thinking of the changes to international student enrollment and wonder if there is a window for RES (and possibly REG) members to attend and make up some of the missing enrollment numbers.

In a nut shell ROTC for any enlistee, where tuition is also compensated with military service, and those student numbers are tied federal funding allowing consistency for college/university programs. It might not work with RES personnel as the invested cost would most likely mean at minimum a short term 4 year REG commitment but was thinking of the following scenario.

Private Bloggins - 18 year old grad wants to join the CAF. Enlists under a hybrid terms of service for 6 years....4 years serving in the local reserve unit + summer employment (CAF trade training + exercises etc.). Following graduation from local university Bloggins transfers from his Reserve unit to Regular Force and serves out the remainder of his contract as a trained member. If it's a college program maybe it's a year less to account for less schooling costs incurred. These would then be competitive job offers with the CAF choosing the school and could be aligned to the desired skill sets desired (Thinking trades but not solely...also GIS mappers, AI computer programmers, medical nurses etc.)

Difference from RMC and ROTC is that this is focused on enlisted personnel and could be used to help bulk up units (if Reserve unit is having issues recruiting in say...Thunder Bay, ON) or accelerate skill training input streams for CAF members especially in technical skill sets like mechanics. RCN could partner with coastal schools (St. Xavier, Turo Agriculture College, UVic) while RCAF would have a different pool of schools and most broadly the Army.

Random thoughts but anything to encourage more critical skills entering the CAF to avoid burnout of the few remaining.

 

[FJAG]

I don't think that kind of coercion would matter much.

Having suffered through several COs who had just emerged from the Reg F to command a Reserve unit, I can assure you that the leadership strengths required to be the successful CO of a Reserve Unit do not come naturally to most Reg F Senior Officers.

To put it mildly.

OTOH, most Res F COs could not command and manage a full time operational units. Their experience is limited, their ignorance is outstripped by their arrogance.

The Army Res F tends to fixate on what they think is cool,rather than developing proper skills and awareness that Army missions last longer than 48 hours.

You both turn to the extreme but, unfortunately, there is a lot of truth in both positions.

A half century of unaddressed systemic failure has brought the army to this point. In any profit based industries, the CEOs and upper management would have been replaced long ago. Canada is perpetuating incompetence on how it manages its human capital with a resulting capability far below what it could be.

The immutable fact is that you can’t be a combat commander at the LCol level with the training and experience ResF officers get. Capt, yes. Maj? Maybe. LCol? No. But then, we don’t have ResF battalions anyway. Platoons with a band don’t really need a real LCol anyway.

The whole system is weak beyond the ability to generate Class Bs and the odd Class C.

Canada’s army should aspire to more than what it is.

 

[Kirkhill]

A significant piece of the puzzle is meeting military demands domestically.

Enter Turkey(Turkiye).

 

[GR66]

A significant piece of the puzzle is meeting military demands domestically.

Enter Turkey(Turkiye).

With Canada having a pretty extensive aerospace industry you'd think that UAV's and loitering munitions would definitely be areas where we could be competitive. It would likely require CAF buy-in (literally) to kick start the industry by providing enough demand to allow companies to scale up production and gain efficiencies.

If drone (and counter-drone) warfare are going to play a key role in future conflict then the CAF should have a significant annual budget for these systems. We should use them, lose them and practice destroying them on a regular basis so that not only do we gain the skills required to use them effectively but also keep up enough demand to support a domestic industry.

 

[KevinB]

With Canada having a pretty extensive aerospace industry you'd think that UAV's and loitering munitions would definitely be areas where we could be competitive. It would likely require CAF buy-in (literally) to kick start the industry by providing enough demand to allow companies to scale up production and gain efficiencies.

Canada however doesn't have a Military Industry, at least a domestic one.
So while some of Canada's items are going into Military UAS, Canada isn't an integrator, thus no domestic end product.

If drone (and counter-drone) warfare are going to play a key role in future conflict then the CAF should have a significant annual budget for these systems. We should use them, lose them and practice destroying them on a regular basis so that not only do we gain the skills required to use them effectively but also keep up enough demand to support a domestic industry.

Any idiot can make a UAS - the problem is Canada isn't big enough, the CAF isn't big enough, nor does DND spend enough IRD money to be a early adopter.

Canada should look for international JV's to build materials in Canada, and also offer large areas for training on UAS, and C-UAS warfare.

 

[GR66]

Canada however doesn't have a Military Industry, at least a domestic one.
So while some of Canada's items are going into Military UAS, Canada isn't an integrator, thus no domestic end product.

Any idiot can make a UAS - the problem is Canada isn't big enough, the CAF isn't big enough, nor does DND spend enough IRD money to be a early adopter.

Canada should look for international JV's to build materials in Canada, and also offer large areas for training on UAS, and C-UAS warfare.

The two highlighted comments seem to contradict each other

Joint Venture or domestic end product doesn't matter to me. It's domestic production to me that counts. We need a secure domestic supply so that product is available when we need it.

Agreed 100% that volume is a big key to this which is why we'd need CAF buy-in and a significant recurring annual procurement budget both for training and to build up our stocks. Obviously even better if the domestic production lines are also building for our allies.

Love the idea of a large NATO UAV/C-UAV "Centre of Excellence" with a large training area. Allied militaries could send their UAV/C-UAV forces to train and experiment with new products and tactics. Canada (in partnership with industry) could provide the Red Force.

 

[KevinB]

The two highlighted comments seem to contradict each other

I should have said while any idiot can make a UAS, it isn't as easy to make a economic blue UAS.

Joint Venture or domestic end product doesn't matter to me. It's domestic production to me that counts. We need a secure domestic supply so that product is available when we need it.

JV spreads risk, and as Canada is a pretty erratic actor in terms of actually buying stuff on time...

Agreed 100% that volume is a big key to this which is why we'd need CAF buy-in and a significant recurring annual procurement budget both for training and to build up our stocks. Obviously even better if the domestic production lines are also building for our allies.

There are multiple different types and subtypes of UAS these days, I think the best options would be to spread out production across allies of different versions, and have as much in common in the bill of materials as possible that one factory can built other types as needed/desired.

Love the idea of a large NATO UAV/C-UAV "Centre of Excellence" with a large training area. Allied militaries could send their UAV/C-UAV forces to train and experiment with new products and tactics. Canada (in partnership with industry) could provide the Red Force.

You have an ass ton of land -- why not use it.

 

[Kirkhill]

With Canada having a pretty extensive aerospace industry you'd think that UAV's and loitering munitions would definitely be areas where we could be competitive. It would likely require CAF buy-in (literally) to kick start the industry by providing enough demand to allow companies to scale up production and gain efficiencies.

If drone (and counter-drone) warfare are going to play a key role in future conflict then the CAF should have a significant annual budget for these systems. We should use them, lose them and practice destroying them on a regular basis so that not only do we gain the skills required to use them effectively but also keep up enough demand to support a domestic industry.

Best analogy that occurs to me is skeet shooting.

Somebody has to make the guns and shot.
Somebody has to make the skeets.

 

[childs56]

I should have said while any idiot can make a UAS, it isn't as easy to make a economic blue UAS.


JV spreads risk, and as Canada is a pretty erratic actor in terms of actually buying stuff on time...

There are multiple different types and subtypes of UAS these days, I think the best options would be to spread out production across allies of different versions, and have as much in common in the bill of materials as possible that one factory can built other types as needed/desired.



You have an ass ton of land -- why not use it.

Medicine hat has a Large UAV test area. Formost Airspace. They can also utilize CFB Suffield.

 

[Brad Sallows]

What number of days of a blended unit's Reg F CO would be occupied with whatever requires 60-100 Class A days for a Res F unit's Res F CO?

 

[KevinB]

What number of days of a blended unit's Reg F CO would be occupied with whatever requires 60-100 Class A days for a Res F unit's Res F CO?

Let be honest, there is not enough actual work for a PRes CO to occupy 60+ Class A days, unless he/she is intentionally taking work from the Lt-MAJ’s. Many seem to make work, but I can’t see the actual job requirements being that high.

 

[dapaterson]

Let be honest, there is not enough actual work for a PRes CO to occupy 60+ Class A days, unless he/she is intentionally taking work from the Lt-MAJ’s. Many seem to make work, but I can’t see the actual job requirements being that high.

So, my experience (which with $2 gets a coffee at Tim's):

Admin will suck up the equivalent of 1/2 to 1 day per week. There's a lot of things that CO can't delegate, or there are things where, even if delegated, the CO still has to review or at least maintain SA on. Assuming the average of those, that's 39 days a year. I'll include the monthly (in not more frequent) brigade meetings for an evening in that tally.

There's the infamous one weekend a month - call it 2.5 days for eight months of the year. That's another 20 days - some of which will be in unit, some will be Bde inflicted PD.

There are ceremonial and representational activities. Even at a half day a month, that's another 5-6 days a year.

And there are the pop-ups, the things that are not scheduled, not planned, like the MP investigations requiring a reply, the queries from much higher HQs about what Bloggins did; the summary proceedings etc etc that are easily a day every month, another 10-12 days a year.

That's easily 75+ days a year. If a CO commands a geographically dispersed unit, with subunits more than 150km away, add in travel days.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, my experience (which with $2 gets a coffee at Tim's):

Admin will suck up the equivalent of 1/2 to 1 day per week. There's a lot of things that CO can't delegate, or there are things where, even if delegated, the CO still has to review or at least maintain SA on. Assuming the average of those, that's 39 days a year. I'll include the monthly (in not more frequent) brigade meetings for an evening in that tally.

There's the infamous one weekend a month - call it 2.5 days for eight months of the year. That's another 20 days - some of which will be in unit, some will be Bde inflicted PD.

There are ceremonial and representational activities. Even at a half day a month, that's another 5-6 days a year.

And there are the pop-ups, the things that are not scheduled, not planned, like the MP investigations requiring a reply, the queries from much higher HQs about what Bloggins did; the summary proceedings etc etc that are easily a day every month, another 10-12 days a year.

That's easily 75+ days a year. If a CO commands a geographically dispersed unit, with subunits more than 150km away, add in travel days.

And then there are the 24/7/ 365 emails, phone calls, texts etc...

It's a huge, probably unreasonable, time commitment for someone with a full time job and a busy civilian life.

Alot of Captain and Majors take one look at that and go 'Nope, I'm good'.

 

[FJAG]

What number of days of a blended unit's Reg F CO would be occupied with whatever requires 60-100 Class A days for a Res F unit's Res F CO?

IMHO, not many. I'd estimate maybe 20-25 days with most dedicated to attending and supervising ResF subunit training activities. COs do not need to be there for every ResF training day - just the key ones like a summer concentration and live range days.

The issue here is to not simply try to merge the existing constipated ResF system into RegF establishment but to radically alter and simplify it.

Let be honest, there is not enough actual work for a PRes CO to occupy 60+ Class A days, unless he/she is intentionally taking work from the Lt-MAJ’s. Many seem to make work, but I can’t see the actual job requirements being that high.

I'll agree with you and disagree with @dapaterson here. My experience as an RSSO for two years almost five decades ago and over a half a decade as the senior ResF legal officer (which in the aggregate is worth about the same as his Tim's coffee) is that ResF COs tend to be Black Hole gravity wells that suck in work that can and should be done by others.

Much of the admin work being done by a ResF CO ought to be done by staff who are properly supervised. Even non-delegable work can be greatly reduced by proper staff preparation. Each ResF subunit should come with its own ResF OC and a small mixed RegF/ResF coy admin staff. In addition in a properly constructed 30/70 unit there is a RegF regimental admin staff including a DCO, Adj, OpsO, RSM, CC, RQ etc, etc One thing to keep in mind is that something in the nature of a 30/70 unit has over 60% fewer RegF subunits and personnel to administer than a current full-sized RegF unit. That, in and of itself, ought to free up time that the full-time RegF CO and his full-time staff can dedicate to his ResF elements.

 

[dapaterson]

IMHO, not many. I'd estimate maybe 20-25 days with most dedicated to attending and supervising ResF subunit training activities. COs do not need to be there for every ResF training day - just the key ones like a summer concentration and live range days.

The issue here is to not simply try to merge the existing constipated ResF system into RegF establishment but to radically alter and simplify it.

I'll agree with you and disagree with @dapaterson here. My experience as an RSSO for two years almost five decades ago and over a half a decade as the senior ResF legal officer (which in the aggregate is worth about the same as his Tim's coffee) is that ResF COs tend to be Black Hole gravity wells that suck in work that can and should be done by others.

Much of the admin work being done by a ResF CO ought to be done by staff who are properly supervised. Even non-delegable work can be greatly reduced by proper staff preparation. Each ResF subunit should come with its own ResF OC and a small mixed RegF/ResF coy admin staff. In addition in a properly constructed 30/70 unit there is a RegF regimental admin staff including a DCO, Adj, OpsO, RSM, CC, RQ etc, etc One thing to keep in mind is that something in the nature of a 30/70 unit has over 60% fewer RegF subunits and personnel to administer than a current full-sized RegF unit. That, in and of itself, ought to free up time that the full-time RegF CO and his full-time staff can dedicate to his ResF elements.

I am flattered that you find me inefficient and ineffectual.

In good legal terms, I am asserting that a CO needs about 240 billable hours a year for administration; 50 hours for representational and ceremonial work; 80-100 hours to address pop-ups and irregular items; and 160 hours for military training (FTXes / Bde PD etc).

 

[daftandbarmy]

I am flattered that you find me inefficient and ineffectual.

In good legal terms, I am asserting that a CO needs about 240 billable hours a year for administration; 50 hours for representational and ceremonial work; 80-100 hours to address pop-ups and irregular items; and 160 hours for military training (FTXes / Bde PD etc).

And about 500 hours for dealing with Regimental Senates who think that you're there to do their bidding

 

[KevinB]

I am flattered that you find me inefficient and ineffectual.

In good legal terms, I am asserting that a CO needs about 240 billable hours a year for administration; 50 hours for representational and ceremonial work; 80-100 hours to address pop-ups and irregular items; and 160 hours for military training (FTXes / Bde PD etc).

The point is that absolutely nothing the 70% PRes entity would offer is more than the 30% the RegF have.

A Hyrbid unit is not going to magically create more work than a full time one.

 

[FJAG]

I am flattered that you find me inefficient and ineffectual.

I don't. The system, as structured, is.

In good legal terms, I am asserting that a CO needs about 240 billable hours a year for administration; 50 hours for representational and ceremonial work; 80-100 hours to address pop-ups and irregular items; and 160 hours for military training (FTXes / Bde PD etc).

I won't quibble about the hours that it took you. I watched the two COs I supported as an RSSO lock themselves away in their offices every Tuesday and Thursday night for months on end while preparing the regimental ball and justifying the band grants. They didn't make any use of the 160 hours you allocated for exercises though. We actually did two 2.5 day weekends of training every month for ten months of the year they didn't show up for but did spend some of that time locked away in their offices beavering away.

But a RegF CO of a future hybrid unit has some 200+ work days per year (call that 1,500+ billable hours [using a civil servant's 7.5 hour working day and not a civilian lawyer's 15 hour working day]); the better part of a battalion's full-time regimental and coy admin staff; 1/3 of a battalion's RegF personnel to look after; and, if we do it right, a simplified administrative system.

And about 500 hours for dealing with Regimental Senates who think that you're there to do their bidding

A ResF senate is someone a CO should delegate appropriate work to and not receive work from.

If a CO can't sort that out - I know, I know it's a community thing - but hybrid units change that. Hybrid units also change the structure of RegF councils and senates (unless we do something silly like create 7 each of PPCLI, RCR and R22eR battalions). Honestly, the reason that in my napkin force each RegF infantry regiment is reduced to one battalion and the RegF arty and armoured to 1 RCHA and the RCD is to diminish the roles (and power) of these agencies.

The point is that absolutely nothing the 70% PRes entity would offer is more than the 30% the RegF have.

A Hyrbid unit is not going to magically create more work than a full time one.

That's my belief too.