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TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

I'm just a weather guy with mostly "surface level" 😉 knowledge of oceanography, but I'm guessing they were in the same spot because it was the best layer to hide from other subs...

As you said, eventually, when everybody is trying to be in the same layers, there will be conflicts.
Just an infantry guy but I understand why things like this happen. An AESOP tried to explain it to me. I told him I read alot of Tom Clancy.
He then decided I knew stuff ..,
 
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SSBN operations are deliberately compartmentalized. Their patrol areas, routes and schedules are among the most closely guarded national secrets, including from allies.

Exactly. SSBN operations are compartmentalized. Which means SSBN deployments will be missing from any NATO underwater management.

The same, to a lessor extent, is true for SSNs, which may have clandestine missions that are nationally not considered approprite to share will all of NATO nations. Such submarine deployment information, other than participations in NATO exercise, is unlikely to be present in any NATO underwater management.

I am all for NATO co-ordination to avoid inappropriate and unintentional interaction between NATO country submarines. But IMHO you massively overstated what is in place - I noted such above, and to which, I think you may agree, re: SSNs and SSBNs.

What transpired 2 decades ago with SSBNs colliding is in part due to NATO underwater management not extending to include such submarines. I seriously doubt that NATO underwater management fidelity has changed in that regard today.

It is reasonable to assume that Britain and France reviewed the incident and refined their procedures.

Exactly - and its far more likely that billateral agreements on shared submarine deployment information is in place than relying on NATO underwater management.

Classification in regards to further detail on this likely precludes more in depth discussion and debate, regardless as to which view / persective one may have on the matter.

But getting back to the topic, re Type-212CDs for Canada, this IMHO will have strategic implications, not only in regard to NATO underwater management, but even more so in regards to Canada(RCN)-US(USN) and Canada(RCN)-UK (RN) bilateral agreements in regards to the Arctic and submarines.
 
There is RCN history for this though. The first 6 subs were numbered. HMCS CC-1, HMCS CC-2, HMCS CH-14, HMCS CH-15, HMCS U-190, and HMCS U-889. So name the subs HMCS CU-1 through HMCS CU-12, no one is offended and the earliest origins of the RCN’s submarine service is honoured.
But I thought that submarines wanted to avoid being seen?
 
On the topic of submarines, to put the RCN planned procurement into perspective in regards to NATO countries, I thought to compare the RCN to some other NATO countries submarine fleets ... (where note, this list of mine may not be 100% accurate):

I think the ten NATO countries with the largest submarine fleets, ordered (approximately) from the most to least, including their active classes, quantities, and propulsion types.

1. United States​

  • Total Submarines: ~64–66
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Ohio-class (SSBN/SSGN): 14 active
    • Virginia-class (SSN): 22 active
    • Los Angeles-class (SSN): 24 active
    • Seawolf-class (SSN): 3 active

2. United Kingdom​

  • Total Submarines: 10
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Vanguard-class (SSBN): 4 active
    • Astute-class (SSN): 6 active (with newer hulls progressing through trials)

3. France​

  • Total Submarines: 9–10
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Triomphant-class (SSBN): 4 active
    • Suffren-class / Barracuda-class (SSN): 3 active (plus additional hulls progressioning through sea trials and delivery), progressively replacing the Rubis-class
    • Rubis-class (SSN): 1 active (nearing retirement, being phased out)

4. Turkey​

  • Total Submarines: 12
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric) — with ongoing AIP integration
    • Reis-class (Type 214TN): 2 active (equipped with AIP; TCG Piri Reis and TCG Hızır Reis operational, with subsequent hulls like Murat Reis proceeding through trials)
    • GĂŒr-class (Type 209T2/1400): 4 active (non-AIP)
    • Preveze-class (Type 209/1400): 4 active (non-AIP)
    • Atılay-class (Type 209/1200): 2 active remaining (non-AIP; older hulls actively drawing down as new Reis units commission)

5. Italy​

  • Total Submarines: 8
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Todaro-class (Type 212A): 4 active (equipped with AIP)
    • Sauro-class: 4 active (non-AIP)

6. Greece​

  • Total Submarines: 8
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Papanikolis-class (Type 214): 4 active (equipped with AIP)
    • Type 209/1100 & 209/1200 (Poseidon/Glafkos-classes): 4 active (non-AIP)

7. Germany​

  • Total Submarines: 6 [where Germany with the Type-212CD coming could end up with more than 6 total for a while].
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Type 212A: 6 active (equipped with AIP)

8. Norway​

  • Total Submarines: 6 [where I believe Norway will replace its Ula class on a one-for-one basis with Type-212CD]
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Ula-class (TKMS Type-210): 6 active (non-AIP)

9. Spain​

  • Total submarines: 2
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric) — with retroactive AIP integration planned for early hulls
    • S-80 Plus class (Isaac Peral-class): 1 active (non-AIP currently; lead boat Isaac Peral is in service operating on standard diesel-electric power, pending its scheduled future overhaul to receive the BEST-AIP system. Later boats will incorporate the system during construction.) A total of four boats are planned
    • Galerna-class (Agosta-class): 1 active (non-AIP; retained as a transitional asset while the S-80 program matures).

10. Canada​

  • Total Submarines: 4
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Victoria-class (ex-Upholder): 4 active (non-AIP)

From that, I think it makes a valid point that Canada, in going from quantity four aging old ex-Upholder (Victoria) class, to quantity twelve Type-212CD submarines is a very very big leap. A fleet of twelve Type 212CD submarines equipped with AIP and lithium-ion batteries would likely constitute one of NATO's most capable conventional submarine forces (although likely only 1/2 of these boats may be based out of Halifax - with other half based out of Esquimalt, and TBD number assigned to Arctic as opposed to the Atlantic or Pacific).

Obviously the above is just my own deliberations.

Edit: Not listed were Sweden (with 4 AIP equipped boats), Netherlands (with 3 boats) and Portugal (with 2 AIP equipped boats) and Poland (1 Kilo class submarine) are the remaining NATO countries with submarines as best I recall. Likely Sweden should have been listed in the above.
 
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On the topic of submarines, to put the RCN planned procurement into perspective in regards to NATO countries, I thought to compare the RCN to some other NATO countries submarine fleets ... (where note, this list of mine may not be 100% accurate):

I think the ten NATO countries with the largest submarine fleets, ordered (approximately) from the most to least, including their active classes, quantities, and propulsion types.

1. United States​

  • Total Submarines: ~64–66
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Ohio-class (SSBN/SSGN): 14 active
    • Virginia-class (SSN): 22 active
    • Los Angeles-class (SSN): 24 active
    • Seawolf-class (SSN): 3 active

2. United Kingdom​

  • Total Submarines: 10
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Vanguard-class (SSBN): 4 active
    • Astute-class (SSN): 6 active (with newer hulls progressing through trials)

3. France​

  • Total Submarines: 9–10
  • Propulsion: Nuclear (100%)
    • Triomphant-class (SSBN): 4 active
    • Suffren-class / Barracuda-class (SSN): 3 active (plus additional hulls progressioning through sea trials and delivery), progressively replacing the Rubis-class
    • Rubis-class (SSN): 1 active (nearing retirement, being phased out)

4. Turkey​

  • Total Submarines: 12
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric) — with ongoing AIP integration
    • Reis-class (Type 214TN): 2 active (equipped with AIP; TCG Piri Reis and TCG Hızır Reis operational, with subsequent hulls like Murat Reis proceeding through trials)
    • GĂŒr-class (Type 209T2/1400): 4 active (non-AIP)
    • Preveze-class (Type 209/1400): 4 active (non-AIP)
    • Atılay-class (Type 209/1200): 2 active remaining (non-AIP; older hulls actively drawing down as new Reis units commission)

5. Italy​

  • Total Submarines: 8
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Todaro-class (Type 212A): 4 active (equipped with AIP)
    • Sauro-class: 4 active (non-AIP)

6. Greece​

  • Total Submarines: 8
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Papanikolis-class (Type 214): 4 active (equipped with AIP)
    • Type 209/1100 & 209/1200 (Poseidon/Glafkos-classes): 4 active (non-AIP)

7. Germany​

  • Total Submarines: 6 [where Germany with the Type-212CD coming could end up with more than 6 total for a while].
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Type 212A: 6 active (equipped with AIP)

8. Norway​

  • Total Submarines: 6 [where I believe Norway will replace its Ula class on a one-for-one basis with Type-212CD]
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Ula-class (TKMS Type-210): 6 active (non-AIP)

9. Spain​

  • Total submarines: 2
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric) — with retroactive AIP integration planned for early hulls
    • S-80 Plus class (Isaac Peral-class): 1 active (non-AIP currently; lead boat Isaac Peral is in service operating on standard diesel-electric power, pending its scheduled future overhaul to receive the BEST-AIP system. Later boats will incorporate the system during construction.) A total of four boats are planned
    • Galerna-class (Agosta-class): 1 active (non-AIP; retained as a transitional asset while the S-80 program matures).

10. Canada​

  • Total Submarines: 4
  • Propulsion: Conventional (Diesel-Electric)
    • Victoria-class (ex-Upholder): 4 active (non-AIP)

From that, I think it makes a valid point that Canada, in going from quantity four aging old ex-Upholder (Victoria) class, to quantity twelve Type-212CD submarines is a very very big leap. A fleet of twelve Type 212CD submarines equipped with AIP and lithium-ion batteries would likely constitute one of NATO's most capable conventional submarine forces (although likely only 1/2 of these boats may be based out of Halifax - with other half based out of Esquimalt, and TBD number assigned to Arctic as opposed to the Atlantic or Pacific).

Obviously the above is just my own deliberations.

Edit: Not listed were Sweden (with 4 AIP equipped boats), Netherlands (with 3 boats) and Portugal (with 2 AIP equipped boats) and Poland (1 Kilo class submarine) are the remaining NATO countries with submarines as best I recall. Likely Sweden should have been listed in the above.

More importantly, will we stand up a RCN Submarine Force Reserve "The Underwavy Navy" (I just invented that, please steal it if it already isn't a thing)...

... maybe based on the old Victoria boats - to augment and sustain our new, huge, sub force.
 
More importantly, will we stand up a RCN Submarine Force Reserve "The Underwavy Navy" (I just invented that, please steal it if it already isn't a thing)...

... maybe based on the old Victoria boats - to augment and sustain our new, huge, sub force.
you are ambitious aren't you? From everything I have heard or read by the time we have the 212CD boats the Victoria's probably won't be safe to take to sea without spending beaucoup to cash just to keep them capable of going down and most importantly coming back up again. Just a guess.
 
you are ambitious aren't you? From everything I have heard or read by the time we have the 212CD boats the Victoria's probably won't be safe to take to sea without spending beaucoup to cash just to keep them capable of going down and most importantly coming back up again. Just a guess.

Good point... better give them to CANSOFCOMM instead ;)
 
From that, I think it makes a valid point that Canada, in going from quantity four aging old ex-Upholder (Victoria) class, to quantity twelve Type-212CD submarines is a very very big leap. A fleet of twelve Type 212CD submarines equipped with AIP and lithium-ion batteries would likely constitute one of NATO's most capable conventional submarine forces (although likely only 1/2 of these boats may be based out of Halifax - with other half based out of Esquimalt, and TBD number assigned to Arctic as opposed to the Atlantic or Pacific).

Obviously the above is just my own deliberations.

Edit: Not listed were Sweden (with 4 AIP equipped boats), Netherlands (with 3 boats) and Portugal (with 2 AIP equipped boats) and Poland (1 Kilo class submarine) are the remaining NATO countries with submarines as best I recall. Likely Sweden should have been listed in the above.
You are overthinking things. Submarines are not going to be "assigned" to any particular region aside from the coast they are ported in. Their deployments will depend on any number of eventualities and changes. Ships/boats by their very nature are flexible.

The current use case is as I stated earlier. 4 subs at sea 80% of the time. Two on each coast. Their deployment locations will vary with the seasons, the threat other sensor capability and various other factors. And they are not (despite media to the contrary) arctic submarines. They are submarines that can go under ice for short periods of time. Their expected patrol zones will include the two Arctic approaches, the Pacific approaches and the Atlantic approaches. This is why the RCN wants 12 submarines. That plan will have to change if we don't end up getting all 12.

As far as arctic capable sub tenders... no. You won't be tending a submarine in the ice. And the submarines will not be under the ice far enough that they can't escape if they need too. So any support vessels will not need to be ice capable.

As for arctic mobile bases, that's quite literally a pie in the sky discussion and has no bearing right now. Those wouldn't be procured for just the subs, but as a CAF wide service and support project.

Lets get the subs in the water, see what they can do, use the existing AOR's as support in the short term and see if we even need submarine tenders. My guess is that we would probably just get two more PRO class instead. If there are special sub support capabilities needed the last two could be modified or the RCN could just develope a modular sub support package.
 
As for arctic mobile bases, that's quite literally a pie in the sky discussion and has no bearing right now. Those wouldn't be procured for just the subs, but as a CAF wide service and support project.
In the interim, utilizing Nuuk I think would make alot of sense until we come up with our longer term game plan.
 
You are overthinking things.

No.

12 conventional submarines - if that many procured - will be significant. Anyone who does not consider such in my view is failing to appreciate such. Given that significance, - A failure to think ahead (and says "overthinking" ) IMHO risks the capability of these boats being under used.

Clearly we disagree.


Submarines are not going to be "assigned" to any particular region aside from the coast they are ported in. Their deployments will depend on any number of eventualities and changes. Ships/boats by their very nature are flexible.


Obvious. And just as obvious is their home port will restrict where they are nominally (and nominally "IS" the operative word) assigned out of, restricting to some degree their nominal deployment.


The current use case is as I stated earlier. 4 subs at sea 80% of the time. Two on each coast.

I also hope they can achieve 2 boats operational with 6 on each coast. I hope that it is doable, but having only 1 operational out of 4 submarines is not uncommon. For example, there was a time when Germany with 6 TKMS boats, had none operational.


Their deployment locations will vary with the seasons, the threat other sensor capability and various other factors. And they are not (despite media to the contrary) arctic submarines. They are submarines that can go under ice for short periods of time. Their expected patrol zones will include the two Arctic approaches, the Pacific approaches and the Atlantic approaches. This is why the RCN wants 12 submarines. That plan will have to change if we don't end up getting all 12.

Yes agreed.

Which is also why, I believe if the RCN wants to have their submarine seasonal deployment time in the Arctic increased, then the RCN should consider a seasonal mobile base ship with submarine tender capability, in the Arctic, to support the submarines. That obviously will be costly and RCN will need to assess if such viable given anticipated submarine deployment and other factors.

As far as arctic capable sub tenders... no. You won't be tending a submarine in the ice. And the submarines will not be under the ice far enough that they can't escape if they need too. So any support vessels will not need to be ice capable.

In the ice? No. Of course not.

In icy waters, yes.

So we disagree. Even spring season can have icy waters. Weather can change conditions quickly. Support vessels will benefit from being ice capable to some degree. Even Harry de Wolf class have a polar class classification.

So again, we disagree.

As for arctic mobile bases, that's quite literally a pie in the sky discussion and has no bearing right now. Those wouldn't be procured for just the subs, but as a CAF wide service and support project.

Again, I disagree. Its far from being "pie in the sky".

IMHO treating such as "pie in the sky" is how navies land themselves into big trouble by not sorting out long lead procurements far in advance. Those who believe in "pie in the sky" and don't look ahead, IMHO risk finding themselves behind the 8 ball.

Lets get the subs in the water, see what they can do, use the existing AOR's as support in the short term and see if we even need submarine tenders.

Waiting until subs are in the water is IMHO a very poor approach, given the lead time for naval procurements. Given the time needed to discuss and sort concepts.

Since terms such as "pie in the sky" are being used, I counter by saying calling it "pie in the sky" risks being called such by those with a "head in the sand approach" until someone comes up and gives one a good kick. Not a good way forward. Its better to avoid the 'kick'. Discuss concepts/ideas in advance. Don't wait until its already costing one for not considering things ahead of time.

Obviously we again have a very strong disagreement here.

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Speaking of under ice operations by AIP equipped submarines, this is the Portuguese language video about the Portuguese conventional AIP equipped submarine operation under ice journey during a NATO exercise.


I have the text translated to English (by Google) ... I am tempted to post (share) some of the tidbits here from that translation, about aspects the video noted re conventional submarine operation under ice, ... , but part of me suspects such will be treated as spam by some on this forum, ... so I am hesitant to do so. But I can post some extracts of the (google) translation if any on the forum are interested - where in particular such may be useful for any who don't want to waste time and fight with youtube to setup a subtitle translation video and then sit through the entire video.
 
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Lets get the subs in the water, see what they can do, use the existing AOR's as support in the short term and see if we even need submarine tenders. My guess is that we would probably just get two more PRO class instead. If there are special sub support capabilities needed the last two could be modified or the RCN could just develope a modular sub support package.

Or, if we reach the aimed target of approx. 20 CDC, 15 RCD, 2-3 AOR and 12 submarines, which is a sizeable and deployable force, we resuscitate the old "fleet" tenders, such as CAPE SCOTT and CAPE BRETON were, that can basically move a reduced manning but full capability FMG shops around the world as needed to support the fleet there. It need not be restricted to supporting the subs.
 
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Lets get the subs in the water, see what they can do, use the existing AOR's as support in the short term and see if we even need submarine tenders.

Getting up in the morning , let me rephrase my previous wording in response to this.

Waiting for Canada to receive the subs, waiting to use them, and only then trying to use existing AOR's to support, is indeed an approach.

Its not one I would adopt for a project of this scale and strategic importance. Some numbers been thrown about for the cost of the Canadian Submarine Patrol Project is $100-billion Cdn$ over the entire lifetime of the project, and between $24-billion to $30-billion for only the submarines procurement costs. I see that as too expensive to wait until the boats are in the water and only then assess how we can support such.

Rather as noted, I think the various ideas should be explored prior - debated fiercely, examined in terms of assessed costs and financial and operational trade offs, long before any boats first show up. Learn what we can from existing submarine tenders around the world, learn what we can from the Portuguese submarine under ice excursion (which I note had a Canadian submariner on board (who is now. I believe. the CO of a Canadian submarine) and also had US scientists on board who had USN under-ice Arctic experience on USN SSNs). Consider what scientists say about global warming and how the Northwest Passage may be in 6 to 10 years (taking such with a lot of grains of salt). Consider what some high ranking RCN officers have stated about financial tradeoffs of a mobile base ship (supporting all classes of Canadian warships) vs the costs of an Arctic base (where RCN has real history in regards to massive expense of an Arctic base attempt that did not work out well). Consider what the RCN wants (if anything) in terms of a surface vessel for submarine rescue.

Make all those considerations long prior to the 1st type-212CD boat arriving. And dependent on the outcome of such deliberations, initiate any new procurements (only if believed optimal) such that such is ready when the boats arrive, or initiate any modifications to existing ships such as the new JSS or other ships such that is ready for when the boats arrive.

It need not be there for the first boat ... but if the Canadian PM is correct to expect 4 boats by 2034, that suggests to me 4 boats potentially operational by 2035. Procuring new ships (IF required, and maybe not required) can take a decade or maybe if rushed, a few years less. Hence now is the time for such aspects to be debated in the classified/RCN closed door meetings.

Obviously - mine is just another opinion, just like we all have one. In summary, I note your view to wait for Canada to receive the subs and only then see what Canada can do - I just don't believe, given the cost of the program ($100-billion) and the RCN responsibility to the Canadian government and hence the Canadian people, ... don't believe that is the best way forward to ensure Canada gets best use, for the amount of money being spent.

This is IMHO a good discussion to debate pros and cons.
 
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I have the text translated to English (by Google) ... I am tempted to post (share) some of the tidbits here from that translation, about aspects the video noted re conventional submarine operation under ice,

In the end, I decided to copy selected translations from the Portugese language video about the Portuguese Navy's "NRP ArpĂŁo (TKMS Type-214 variant AIP-lead-acid battery) submarine under ice journey. I note from what I read, also onboard was:

  • Danish naval officer
  • Canadian naval officer (submariner) who is now CO of a Canadian Victoria class submarine
  • US Navy civilian scientists, who have experiece in under ice travel on SSNs and in part acted as under-ice pilots.

Here are selected Google translations from the video – where my not speaking Portuguese means I can not certify the translation is accurate. I have approximate times in which the comments are stated in the Portuguese language video.

--- start of extracts from text of video ---

[02:51] Regarding the internal part and personnel, there was a need to train people for navigation that is not normally done in submarines—that is, navigation under the ice. There was training, study, and instruction, and this gave us a certain guarantee that conditions were met at the training level so the crew could perform this mission.


[03:14] At the material level, small adaptations were made to these submarines, specifically regarding the periscope and optronics, which were reinforced in the event that, in an emergency situation, the ship had to surface and be better prepared to withstand a potential impact.


[03:31] At the logistical level, we have the issue of projecting material and equipment to the submarine should the need arise. Naturally, there was prior preparation to equip the submarine with a batch of spare parts for what was foreseen might need replacement. However, the fact that the submarine was operating in a port with a relatively small dimension in Nuuk, Greenland, brought added complexities, but they were all studied and analyzed, making it easy to comply with these requirements.


[04:52] Therefore, during the planning phase, we revisited the ship's systems together with the manufacturer. We installed protections on top of the tower for the masts protruding from the tower structure to prevent the initial contact with any piece of ice from being made directly by these masts, on the one hand; and on the other hand, we installed upward-looking sonar, which allowed us to look up.


[05:22] The submarine did not have this very robust capability; it did not have this capability very robustly. By installing this sonar, we gained the ability to look upward in a much safer and firmer way than we had previously. Those were the two major changes we made to the ship.


[05:56] Expectations for the mission: being a novelty, with little experience regarding the Arctic and the ice. From there, when we started navigating, when we arrived near Greenland and started hearing certain sounds—which is a different experience in the ice, since the sounds we hear are new—and they were new, we learned a lot. We made several recordings so that in the future, whether for our own submarines or our allies, they can also have help from us, just as we had help from the American and Canadian navies who navigate in those areas.


[08:18] To prepare ourselves for the extreme conditions of this mission, which involves navigating in an Arctic environment, we started by reading and studying all available doctrine and publications concerning this type of navigation and what it's like to be at such high latitudes.
...
[08:33] Specifically, as the head of the operations department of our submarine, I prepared myself to study how our sensors would behave in an environment different from what we are used to. We also assembled and installed different, specific sensors to be able to detect and track ice, and we trained and established methods and procedures to be able to navigate safely in the ice.


[10:13] Within the scope of the Arctic voyage, the big novelty and the great challenges were the unknown—not knowing how we were going to navigate. We know that when navigating under the ice, there is no noise and we have silence. We didn't know how that transition would take place. It was necessary to install a new sonar on top of the tower; it was necessary to know what the actual operation and the actual echoes of the ice on the sonar would be. All of these were novelties that we had to try to explore before reaching the ice and try to mitigate.


[11:31] The most striking moment of this voyage for me was when we performed the periscopic depth maneuver in the middle of the marginal zone. The marginal zone is an intermediate area where we have the solid ice sheet, and then the ice degrades until it becomes open waters.


[11:50] Managing to perform the periscopic depth maneuver in that spot, to everyone's astonishment, was undoubtedly the high point of this mission. And that was only possible because it was recognized by the American ice pilots—who are submarine ice navigation specialists accompanying all American submarines navigating under the ice, who were embarked with us—who recognized that we were capable, felt confidence in it, and they were the ones who also helped us.


[12:33] Navigating with a ceiling above us that is not a flat ceiling, because Arctic ice creates mountains that extend from the surface downward... we encountered mountains with 90 meters of ice extending downward. Therefore, you have to be careful not to hit any of these mountains, because we are used to navigating while worrying about the floor and not worrying about the upper part, because the upper part is water, and after the water is air—the atmosphere. In this case, it was a very particular situation: we had to operate between two constraints, one from above and one from below. But it was super interesting and super motivating.


[13:14] To the allied ice pilots, my gratitude. Without them, it would have been much more difficult to conduct the mission—not impossible, but much more difficult. We would have had more apprehensions because we didn't have the experience to help us face and plan the measures, those risk-mitigation measures for the crew.

---- end of video text translation extracts ---

For the moderators, feel free to delete if this if considered not appropriate.

What I wanted to point out about by this, is there are aspects that need considering before blanket off-the-cuff comment about under-ice operations, without actually examining in more detail what has been done, and has not been done.

For “the record” , I 100% agree an SSN is more capable in terms of under ice operations endurance. Whether it is better value for the money thou for under ice plus all other operation, is an entirely different question – and not at question that I am trying to cover here.

Rather given TKMS with the Type-212CD, has been selected by Canada as the preferred supplier for the RCN, I thought to add some information on the under-ice operation already known for an AIP equipped submarine.
 
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Next I thought it useful to compare this Portuguese Navy's NRP Arpão (TKMS Type 214 variant) to Canada’s preferred supplier TKMS with the Type-212CD – where I tried to confine myself to aspects relevant to Arctic operations.

From what I have read, the Portuguese Navy's NRP ArpĂŁo (TKMS Type 214 variant) differs significantly from the planned Type 212CD class slated for Canada.

- Dimensions/Displacement: In terms of dimensions and displacement, the NRP Arpão (a Tridente class (TKMS Type-214 variant)) measures roughly 67.7 meters in length with a beam of 6.35 meters, displacing about 1,700 tons surfaced and 2,020 tons submerged. Conversely, the Type 212CD is larger and heavier—measuring approximately 74 meters long with a wider beam and hull profile, yielding a surface displacement of around 2,500 tons and a submerged displacement nearing 2,800 tons. This sizing increase provides the Type 212CD with a larger internal volume and a distinctive diamond-shaped hull design which was engineered for enhanced acoustic stealth. Whether such increases quietness under ice is not something I will speculate on.

- Propulsion - both classes rely on a combination of diesel generators, Siemens permanent-magnet electric motors, and fuel-cell Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP). However, the Type 212CD modernizes this by integrating advanced lithium-ion battery technology alongside its fuel-cell system, marking a generational leap over the legacy fuel-cell and conventional battery setup found on the NRP ArpĂŁo (TKMS Type-214 variant) boat.

- Endurance/Range - While exact classified underwater ranges and endurance metrics vary, both classes are optimized for extended covert sub-surface loitering. Likely the range and endurance when snorkeling are similar, but for extended under water operation the Type-212CD with its AIP/Lithium battery combination likely has an underwater longer range/endurance than a typical Type-214 variant. This could be important for under ice operations.

- Crew - The NRP ArpĂŁo features a standard crew complement of 33 with limited room to spare, whereas the Type 212CD is designed for a baseline crew of around 28 to 30 but specifically incorporates an adaptable "28+x" berthing and space configuration, which may be useful if decided to embark under-ice specialists.

My conclusion, as one would hope, is that the Type-212CD, being a newer, larger submarine, with a believed superior propulsion system due to lithium batteries, should do just as well and likely much better than excellent proof of concept (of what I believe was a short under ice voyage) of Portuguese Navy's Tridente-class (Type 214 derivative) "NRP ArpĂŁo".
 
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Lets get the subs in the water, see what they can do, use the existing AOR's as support in the short term and see if we even need submarine tenders. My guess is that we would probably just get two more PRO class instead. If there are special sub support capabilities needed the last two could be modified or the RCN could just develope a modular sub support package.

Let's get more AORs and as @Oldgateboatdriver build new Fleet Tenders.
 
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