TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

[daftandbarmy]

We've had Arctic deployments of submarines in the past, reportably including forays under the ice. Rest assured the RCN will do everything in a slow dilliberate manner with max safety. Keep in mind that it is a conventional submarine that do not have the power to surface through the ice like a nuke. I would think its safe to say, MIZ, ice edge will be the main zones of concern. I doubt we'll be transiting the NW passage submerged. The Arctic is just one area we'll be using these boats.

Like the GIUK gap, I'm guessing...

Geopolitics of the GIUK Gap: Past, Present, and Future​

Geopolitics of the GIUK Gap: Past, Present, and Future

The GIUK Gap – a mainstay of 20th century naval strategy – is taking on new importance amid mounting Russian naval activity, Arctic expansion, and emerging hybrid threats.

www.geopoliticalmonitor.com

 

[GR66]

Is there an urgent need for our submarines to deploy extensively under the ice pack? Russian SSBN's can launch from safely in Russian waters. Is any nation going to risk their SSN's attempting to transit the constricted and shallow NWP with its tricky currents under the ice pack? In the ice-free season we can guard the entrances with various aerial, surface and sub-surface assets.

I'd suspect our Atlantic fleet would focus on monitoring Baffin Strait and the Labrador Sea (and possibly the GIUK Gap) for anyone trying to exit into the Atlantic rather than operating under ice in the Arctic Ocean.

In the Pacific, neither the Chinese or Russians need to transit the Bering Strait to threaten our coast, so I imagine there we'll focus more on patrolling the approaches than transiting to the Arctic.

 

[Kirkhill]

Surveys with Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs)

Surveys with Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs)

science.gc.ca

 

[oldcpu]

We've had Arctic deployments of submarines in the past, reportably including forays under the ice. Rest assured the RCN will do everything in a slow dilliberate manner with max safety. Keep in mind that it is a conventional submarine that do not have the power to surface through the ice like a nuke. I would think its safe to say, MIZ, ice edge will be the main zones of concern. I doubt we'll be transiting the NW passage submerged. The Arctic is just one area we'll be using these boats.

That is interesting. I agree unlikely to have transiting the NW passage totally submerged.

Even with AIP/Lithium batteries, there are major limitations with a conventional submarine in the Arctic.

A submarine can only go for so far with using the AIP, before the submarine runs out of embarked AIP reactants (liquid oxygen (LOX) and hydrogen). And to the best of my knowledge, there is no submarine tenders nor replenishment ships in the world (? yet ? ) that replenish such. Nominally such replenishment of reactants have to be done at a shore facility (mind you - I could be wrong here).

That means, I believe, in the Arctic, even an AIP/Lithium battery submarine will need to snorkel (or simply surface) and use diesel engines so not to consume too much of the AIP reactants (and save the AIP reactants for under ice or other deliberate under water operation). I made a rough back of the envelope calculation reference AIP/lithium battery range (without using diesel engines) and my calculation suggested a Type-212CD could not patrol the Arctic without spending a fair amount of time snorkeling or on the surface using diesel engines. If it uses the AIP too much, it will consume its AIP reactants too soon.

It did have me pondering other aspects on this ... and how such aspects could lead to new projects or activities needing to be started sooner rather than later, but I have spammed this group a lot with such ... so maybe I should wait a day or two re posting about such.

 

[oldcpu]

Is there an urgent need for our submarines to deploy extensively under the ice pack?

Hopefully not. Extensively is difficult - which i discovered after some back of the envelope calculations on AIP reactant consumption.

I'd suspect our Atlantic fleet would focus on monitoring Baffin Strait and the Labrador Sea (and possibly the GIUK Gap) for anyone trying to exit into the Atlantic rather than operating under ice in the Arctic Ocean.

In the Pacific, neither the Chinese or Russians need to transit the Bering Strait to threaten our coast, so I imagine there we'll focus more on patrolling the approaches than transiting to the Arctic.

That makes a lot of sense to me. Still, I think even if patrolling in those locations is the plan, ... the training and skill to operate under the ice for as much as a couple of weeks, could be something that goes along with such an operation.

Obviously that is my speculation.

It gets into questions, if in peace time, a Russian nuclear submarine is spotted at a bottleneck, going through the entrance to the North West passage, is it trailed for a few days under the ice? or is it wished a nice voyage using the underwater telephone? ( I jest - obviously ).

 

[YZT580]

Hopefully not. Extensively is difficult - which i discovered after some back of the envelope calculations on AIP reactant consumption.



That makes a lot of sense to me. Still, I think even if patrolling in those locations is the plan, ... the training and skill to operate under the ice for as much as a couple of weeks, could be something that goes along with such an operation.

Obviously that is my speculation.

It gets into questions, if in peace time, a Russian nuclear submarine is spotted at a bottleneck, going through the entrance to the North West passage, is it trailed for a few days under the ice? or is it wished a nice voyage using the underwater telephone? ( I jest - obviously ).

perhaps this conversation is identifying one of the potential benefits of the Korean option: that is converting the last 4 subs to nuclear powered; a potential option that I don't believe the 212 can deliver

 

[Swampbuggy]

With regards to JSS being used as sub support vessels…

I think I read somewhere on these threads that a true support vessel for submarines would require dynamic positioning. I stand to be corrected, but I don’t believe the BERLIN/BONN/JSS class are equipped with that. Nor are the AOPS for that matter, if one were to try and employ them that way.

Genuinely curious if there’s an alternative answer that makes the dynamic positioning less important?

 

[Underway]

With regards to JSS being used as sub support vessels…

I think I read somewhere on these threads that a true support vessel for submarines would require dynamic positioning. I stand to be corrected, but I don’t believe the BERLIN/BONN/JSS class are equipped with that. Nor are the AOPS for that matter, if one were to try and employ them that way.

Genuinely curious if there’s an alternative answer that makes the dynamic positioning less important?

Arctic is shallow. Finding an anchoring area where dynamic positioning is irrelevant works. Ideally that's better than dynamic.

Years ago I was talking to someone and he felt the minimum number of replenishment vessels was around six if we're being serious.

We aren’t all that serious. Are we?

4 is the correct answer. 6 is too many given current expected fleet numbers and mission sets. If Canada had significant overseas responsibilities then 6 would be the right number, but we don't.

I think we all hope the same.

I confess to having a fear that the shift the RCN will face, going from only 1 operational active sea going submarine (out of quantity 4) to having instead having up to 4 to 5 operational active seagoing more capable AIP/Lithium battery propulsion submarines (out of quantity 12) will be a difficult to adjust to major culture shock internal to the navy reference the new capabilities, with 'ripples' up and down the structure of the command chain, the training chain, and the maintenance chain (and "ripples" through to both recruitment and retention efforts). Its a big and potentially exciting challenge ahead for the navy.

I for one welcome the culture change. Shock is to negative, its going to be a change and one for the better.

Um. Observation.

The RCN has a group called "Route Survey" who retain high quality Klein tow-fish side-scan SONAR systems that are capable of generating high accuracy bathymetry.

This group sailed somewhat regularly on MCDVs, and would focus on Q-Route surveys (harbour entrances mostly) to do comparison updates and such.

I suspect that with the AOPS having some ice capability, they may find themselves with an in-house RCN capability to conduct some under-ice surveys to help generate updated charts.

With newer semi or fully autonomous UUVs, they may be able to do stand-off surveys from the edge of the ice even.

That may help submarines with their under-ice navigation a lot.

Also - they accuracy capability of modern RLGNs (Ring Laser Gyro Navigators) has come a long way since the old MK.29 we had originally on the CPF's. The MK 49 on the Frigates is pretty darn good.

What they may have nowadays...? I'm sure it's even better with the following generations (MK 49 is 25+ years old)

NS

There is work going on to have public charts and protected charts now. The RCN is keeping their surveys to themselves in a number of places.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I suspect that Nares Strait and Davis Strait on the West coast of Greenland may be of interest. A lot of depth there for subs to hide in.

The Bering Strait on the other hand would be a nerve wracking place to take a sub.

 

[Nvlgzr]

4 is the correct answer. 6 is too many given current expected fleet numbers and mission sets. If Canada had significant overseas responsibilities then 6 would be the right number, but we don't.

If we need more AOR’s and we are going to increase our Arctic presence; wouldn’t it make sense to think about an AOR that has some ice class rating such has New Zealand’s Aotearoa

 

[lenaitch]

There is quite a few Canadian companies that can be used to chart the Arctic to a higher degree and there are efforts ongoing to improve that knowledge. However I doubt much of the focus is on where our new subs will operate and more on ensuring commercial and surface naval traffic can navigate safely. We are far behind on knowing our own backyard thanks to the fine Canadian tradition of procrastination and being too cheap.

Ocean Infinity Armada vessels are designed to operate with only 16 people onboard, perhaps one or two vessels based on their design can be acquired to help Canada/RCN/CCG fulfil that requirement?

Don't we ('we' as in Canada - somebody, not necessarily the RCN) have to have detailed surveys and mapping to support our UN Arctic territorial waters claim?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Don't we ('we' as in Canada - somebody, not necessarily the RCN) have to have detailed surveys and mapping to support our UN Arctic territorial waters claim?

Proper charting is an important step in securing a territorial claim, Canada as usually dicked around and hoped no one noticed or cared enough and for awhile that worked. Now we have to do everything at once, because of failures of leadership from both sides of the house over the last 60 years.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Don't we ('we' as in Canada - somebody, not necessarily the RCN) have to have detailed surveys and mapping to support our UN Arctic territorial waters claim?

You have to have surveys, not necessarily "detailed", but sufficient to beat everybody else's publicly reported survey to show that you are the one working the territory. But that is only one way to provide for the proof that you are in control/possession of the territory. On the other hand, the military needs maps that give them an edge over everybody else, especially where underwater features are concerned ( if you have more than 50 feet of depth, surface ships don't care how good you underwater survey is, but submarines do). Those maps are classified.

 

[Cloud Cover]

You have to have surveys, not necessarily "detailed", but sufficient to beat everybody else's publicly reported survey to show that you are the one working the territory. But that is only one way to provide for the proof that you are in control/possession of the territory. On the other hand, the military needs maps that give them an edge over everybody else, especially where underwater features are concerned ( if you have more than 50 feet of depth, surface ships don't care how good you underwater survey is, but submarines do). Those maps are classified.

And, in order to show ownership one must prove possession and a manifest intent to exclude all others. Mere occupation is not enough. This is what Argentina found out after Britain schooled them in 1982. In our case, just because we can draw a better map based on what lands and waters the British Crown granted 160 years ago, doesn’t establish either. Right now anybody can sail up to X0E 0Z0 and claim a vacant, undefended island full of Muskox and evict some startled Inuit. The good news is they’ll die from cold, darkness and isolation while Inuit take a JTAC course .

 

[oldcpu]

I suspect that Nares Strait and Davis Strait on the West coast of Greenland may be of interest. A lot of depth there for subs to hide in.

The Bering Strait on the other hand would be a nerve wracking place to take a sub.

In considering AIP reactant consumption given a hypothetical 'wait silently at choke point' strategy, I speculate it could be something like:

(1) Monitor at chokepoint: The Type-212CD, floating underwater the entire time, at geographic static choke point listening / monitoring for underwater contacts. After 3 weeks, say a submarine contact of interest is finally detected. At that point, possibly only 30% or 40% of the Type-212CD total AIP reactant has been used, so the Type-212CD still has ample reserve left to follow the contact, if desired, for a short while.

(2) Follow (tactical shadow) the contact. AIP consumption increases as the Type-212CD starts following at 3 to 5 knots speed (I am assuming the 'contact' is also moving slowly). I suspect this following could be maintained for 7 to 10 days, using up another 35% to 45% of reactant.

(3) Transit back to home base. At this point, with 15% to 25% reactant left, the Type-212C could turn away from the submarine it is following, and at an appropriate time (fairly soon) come to periscope depth and snorkel, and head back on diesel engine/battery mix, much like the current non-AIP equipped submarines need to do. I suspect the presence of ice or lack of ice, would dictate the turn around timing.

Obviously there is massive speculation in the above, by me. Using diesel engines more often (instead of AIP) would change the numbers.

 

[oldcpu]

Even with AIP/Lithium batteries, there are major limitations with a conventional submarine in the Arctic.

A submarine can only go for so far with using the AIP, before the submarine runs out of embarked AIP reactants (liquid oxygen (LOX) and hydrogen). And to the best of my knowledge, there is no submarine tenders nor replenishment ships in the world (? yet ? ) that replenish such. Nominally such replenishment of reactants have to be done at a shore facility (mind you - I could be wrong here).

That means, I believe, in the Arctic, even an AIP/Lithium battery submarine will need to snorkel (or simply surface) and use diesel engines so not to consume too much of the AIP reactants (and save the AIP reactants for under ice or other deliberate under water operation). I made a rough back of the envelope calculation reference AIP/lithium battery range (without using diesel engines) and my calculation suggested a Type-212CD could not patrol the Arctic without spending a fair amount of time snorkeling or on the surface using diesel engines. If it uses the AIP too much, it will consume its AIP reactants too soon.

It did have me pondering other aspects on this ... and how such aspects could lead to new projects or activities needing to be started sooner rather than later, but I have spammed this group a lot with such ... so maybe I should wait a day or two re posting about such.

Good points are being raised that AIP/Lithium battery equipped submarines are limited in any potential Arctic operation. One can only travel so far with an AIP system before its reactants (LOX and hydrogen) run out.

Nominally replenishing such can only be done from a shore facility but even that is not without complications.

My understanding is that naval bases around the world, for navies that currently operate fuel-cell Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines, do not typically manufacture liquid oxygen (LOX) nor manufacture high-purity hydrogen on-site. Instead, navies buy both of these reactants from commercial gas companies, which deliver them to the naval bases in heavy transport trucks. Liquid oxygen arrives in refrigerated tanker trucks and is either held temporarily in base storage yards or pumped directly into the submarine's internal insulated tanks. Hydrogen gas arrives in high-pressure tube trailers. Because the submarine's storage metal gets extremely hot as it absorbs hydrogen gas, the base hooks up a cooling system that pumps cold water around the external tanks while the hydrogen is being transferred.

I believe this makes the point, that obtaining reactants for a Type-212CD submarines is not something available in every port of call. Just the contrary. This is a complex operation.

As Canada advances the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) to procure up to 12 conventionally powered, AIP equipped submarines—selecting the TKMS Type 212CD design as the preferred baseline—the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is likely to face logistical hurdles if sustained Arctic operations of this submarine are desired. Because the production and handling of LOX and hydrogen typically require specialized infrastructure that does not currently exist at any Canadian naval facilities — and given the lack of northern facilities capable of any Canadian naval support, evaluating mobile, forward-deployed reactant generation for a Type-212CD represents one potential operational concept worth considering.

One technical approach to examine is the integration of commercial containerized, sea-going reactant generation modules aboard future RCN auxiliary platforms, such as the Protecteur-class Joint Support Ships (JSS) or even into the design of future concept ships such as G-LAAM. Utilizing standard 20-foot or 40-foot ISO container footprints, modern water-electrolysis units, hydrogen and cryogenic air-separation units (for LOX) could theoretically be powered by a supply ship’s electrical grid and fed by its fresh-water desalination capacity. If this is proven to be viable, and if such commercial containerized modules are available, then embarking modular processing plants on an auxiliary vessel may establish an ocean-going replenishment capability for AIP, with reactants directly created on the mobile base ship or supply ship.

Evaluating this as a potential inclusion in an Arctic mobile base ship would also allow the RCN to assess the feasibility of resupplying AIP submarines in remote regions—such as the Arctic, or distant Indo-Pacific sectors—without relying on shore-based industrial gas infrastructure. Given the multi-year timelines required to study, possibly test, and integrate shipboard reactant systems into either new supply/G-LAAM ship design, or into existing ship refit planning, means early technical assessments would be necessary to determine the viability, cost, and most important, the safety implications of such an approach.

Obviously (again – like a number of my posts) there is truly massive amounts of speculation in the above.

 

[oldcpu]

We've had Arctic deployments of submarines in the past, reportably including forays under the ice.

Hi Stoker, Thanks for that, ... while I searched and could not find reference to that, I did find an RN account (in Canadian/US waters) that was interesting - and your post was instrumental in my searching to find this.

Purportedly, in March 1962, the Royal Navy conventional submarine HMS Alderney—operating alongside her sister boat HMS Astute and US Navy nuclear attack submarines like USS Nautilus and USS Sea Dragon—participated in an under-ice cold-weather exercise in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. From what I read, the deployment primarily served as an operational work-up for American forces preparing for deeper Arctic operations, while the British diesel boats also acted as targets to simulate Soviet-style patrols in restricted ice-edge environments.

i read that life inside the unstrengthened conventional submarine, beneath the ice canopy was austere and hazardous, characterized by freezing dampness, poor sonar conditions in the noisy marginal ice zone, and icicles forming directly on the interior of the pressure hull. Because these legacy boats relied on hinged, non-periscopic snorkel masts that required open water to ventilate and run their diesels, the crew faced severe constraints on battery endurance and also air management. The anxiety of diminishing battery power with no guaranteed escape route made survival and battery conservation the crew's priorities.

The operation provided a testament to the limits of conventional submarines under ice when purportedly Alderney was forced to forcefully "punch" through a thick sheet of ice to break out (due to a low battery), a perilous maneuver. A crew member account (see CNR link below) from the exercise highlighted that while brief, shallow incursions under fringe ice were possible, taking unstrengthened diesel-electric boats under extensive pack ice was a perilous and operationally questionable undertaking.

Here is a reference supporting the above:

Submarine under-ice oerations – Canadian Naval Review

While the above really highlights the difficulty of a conventional submarine with no AIP, when under ice, it also highlights MANY aspects that are fully applicable to an AIP Equipped Submarine and illustrating the difficulties. Albeit, that was over one-half century ago. Most interesting.

 

[Czech_pivo]

You have to have surveys, not necessarily "detailed", but sufficient to beat everybody else's publicly reported survey to show that you are the one working the territory. But that is only one way to provide for the proof that you are in control/possession of the territory. On the other hand, the military needs maps that give them an edge over everybody else, especially where underwater features are concerned ( if you have more than 50 feet of depth, surface ships don't care how good you underwater survey is, but submarines do). Those maps are classified.

The Russians could very well have some very detailed surveys of our waters from decades past. Some of them might even be in our hands today and are being used or have been used in the past. Fair statement?