TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

[oldcpu]

(3) Regardless, given the potential advantages of being able to replenish AIP reactants from a mobile platform (including an Arctic platform), that it is worth doing a serious study on such a possibility, where I would go a step further perhaps than you would go, and I would note such such an assessment include scaled (down) representative testing to validate such (or to prove such is far too unsafe, if that should be the case).

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

 

[KevinB]

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

100%
Which is why I have been on SSN’s for the RCN for decades.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

Realistically in times of peacetime competition, safety restrictions on AIP subs from working under the ice pack make sense -- the USN patrols in their with SSN’s, and frankly UUV’s and Sensor Networks will work to shrink the useable area for Russian subs.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

Pretty much anyone who knows me, knows that I am fairly cavalier on risk. BUT Underwater Operations are something I believe need to be rigorously and realistically assessed.
I am not a submariner - but I am/was a diver.
When stuff goes wrong underwater it is really bad, as we can’t breathe underwater -- if you are under ice and things go wrong, unless you have a method of getting through that ice BOKYAGB.

Conventional Subs are not designed with ice strengthens sails and upper hulls, nor are they big and strong enough to emergency breach the ice pack
So any mission sending something like a 212CD under multi-year pack ice would be NLI to justify the risk to personnel and equipment, and would get buried in Secrecy for many many decades.

 

[Underway]

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

Can they? Are you sure? You know the depth and sailing conditions underwater for those routes? Also does it matter that the Russians can get submarines waaaay up north to the wasteland part of the arctic? Russian subs (attack subs) need to attack shipping and interdict transit routes for trade to effect war in Europe. All the transit routes aside from the NWP are southern.

Russian bombers/boomers never leave their protected zones in Russian waters (despite the Hunt for Red October lore). They stay where they can be protected by Russian air and shore based help behind a screen of Attacks subs deployed further out. They also stay where they can always fire their missiles (thin ice or open water) to preserve their second strike capability. Their entire existence is for second strike and pushing them out past their protected zone is risking that second strike capability.

And as far as AIP subs at the choke points, the subs are also there to deal with surface contacts as well. They are not subsurface only. The entrances to the NWP are where the main threat accesses are. And in more navigable seasons there is no reason for a RCN sub won't travel further into the NWP or take up positions at different places. The NWP choke points are And for those other less navigable routes the CAF is looking at a multitude of sensors, both permanent and disposable to be placed.

None of that however means your ideas of arctic replenishment is not valid. It absolutely is. The ability to top submarines off is excellent. However it there are multiple attack angles here to increase arctic presence. Not just the subs.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Underway beat me to it.

 

[oldcpu]

Can they? Are you sure? You know the depth and sailing conditions underwater for those routes?

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

 

[Stoker]

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

Russian submarines can approach the Canadian Arctic directly from the Arctic Ocean. The Bering Strait and the Greenland and Atlantic approaches are principally gateways between the Arctic and the Pacific or Atlantic. They are not barriers sealing Russia out of the Arctic. That said, reaching the Canadian Arctic and operating freely throughout the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are two different things. Depths, narrow channels, ice conditions and hydrography still impose very real limitations.

On AIP replenishment, I concede that Canada may eventually examine whether AIP reactants could be replenished in area or another northern location. If it can be done safely and economically, it could certainly increase patrol persistence and I believe we'll eventually do this at a Canadian port. But I think people are getting well ahead of where the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project actually is.

I recently spoke with someone very heavily involved in the project and specifically asked whether submarine tenders were being considered and whether there was any serious thought being given to replenishing AIP reactants in the Arctic. His response was basically a laugh, followed by two very important points.

A. We do not even know how many submarines Canada is ultimately going to acquire.

B. There are an enormous number of moving parts that have to be resolved first, including training, crewing, sustainment, maintenance facilities, infrastructure and the entire support system for whichever submarine is selected.

His view was that submarine tenders, and particularly theoretical Arctic replenishment of AIP reactants, are issues that, if they are ever seriously examined, are probably 10 to 15 years down the road. There are simply much more fundamental decisions that have to be made first.

One area where planning is considerably further along is submarine rescue. SUBSMASH equipment is intended to be carried aboard the AOPVs, and that capability has already been trial fitted. Canada will also rely on arrangements with the United States and other allies to provide access to submarine rescue capabilities. That makes considerably more sense than Canada trying to duplicate every element of an extremely specialized rescue system itself.

So I am not dismissing Arctic AIP replenishment entirely. By all means study it when the time comes. But right now it is a theoretical support concept for a submarine we have not selected, using an AIP system we have not selected, for a fleet size we have not yet determined. Before worrying about putting reactants into submarines in the Arctic, Canada first has to select the submarine, build the training and maintenance system, establish the support infrastructure and get the boats operational. Lets try that first.

 

[oldcpu]

On AIP replenishment, I concede that Canada may eventually examine whether AIP reactants could be replenished in area or another northern location. If it can be done safely and economically, it could certainly increase patrol persistence and I believe we'll eventually do this at a Canadian port. But I think people are getting well ahead of where the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project actually is.

I recently spoke with someone very heavily involved in the project and specifically asked whether submarine tenders were being considered and whether there was any serious thought being given to replenishing AIP reactants in the Arctic. His response was basically a laugh, followed by two very important points.

A. We do not even know how many submarines Canada is ultimately going to acquire.

B. There are an enormous number of moving parts that have to be resolved first, including training, crewing, sustainment, maintenance facilities, infrastructure and the entire support system for whichever submarine is selected.

Indeed the RCN has many fundamental issues to sort, and unfortunately 'the elephant' in the room is the serious manpower shortage of the Canadian Armed Forces, and particular the RCN shortages, means the 'moving parts' in themselves are going to be very big challenges given the current relatively limited trained personnel available now, with the need for these personnel to plan many important aspects for the future. Without question it must be very difficult to find the resources to plan much more.

His view was that submarine tenders, and particularly theoretical Arctic replenishment of AIP reactants, are issues that, if they are ever seriously examined, are probably 10 to 15 years down the road. There are simply much more fundamental decisions that have to be made first.

My own view is that it would be far better to start to seriously examine such (Arctic AIP replenishment) sooner, for once the feasibility is confirmed, it could take many years to implement such. However if the manpower is not present to consider/study AIP reactants in the Arctic, then likely nothing can be done now.

The manpower shortage is a major symptom of what I call the 'crisis of invisibility', which is having major impact on the RCN. And despite some progress, I don't believe the manpower issue can be sorted soon.

One area where planning is considerably further along is submarine rescue. SUBSMASH equipment is intended to be carried aboard the AOPVs, and that capability has already been trial fitted. Canada will also rely on arrangements with the United States and other allies to provide access to submarine rescue capabilities. That makes considerably more sense than Canada trying to duplicate every element of an extremely specialized rescue system itself.

The RCN has history re: SUBSMASH going back decades ... and I glad to read this is further along.

Canada first has to select the submarine, build the training and maintenance system, establish the support infrastructure and get the boats operational. Lets try that first.

There is no question the aspects you note are incredibly important. I thou, also view AIP replenishment as part of the support infrastructure.

While the support infrastructure planning, and while the plans for AIP replenishment are being made (for Halifax and Esquimalt) , that is also a good time to learn about cold weather constraints, and consider applicability re:the Arctic for the future. Again, my view, is if one were to ignore such now, if one doesn't ask the questions now, one is missing a learning opportunity, that could put the RCN further ahead re future possibilities.

I am amazed, given the personnel shortages, that the RCN has accomplished what they have accomplished thus far, and I, for one, wish the RCN the very very best in the future. Its been a long time coming and both the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and the Canadian Surface Combatant Project, are long overdue, exciting projects, to read about moving forward.
.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

My sense is that the Russian Navy is much like everyone else: they can run nuclear submarines under the polar ice cap if they want to, but they prefer not to unless they have a really good reason.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

100%
Which is why I have been on SSN’s for the RCN for decades.

Realistically in times of peacetime competition, safety restrictions on AIP subs from working under the ice pack make sense -- the USN patrols in their with SSN’s, and frankly UUV’s and Sensor Networks will work to shrink the useable area for Russian subs.


Pretty much anyone who knows me, knows that I am fairly cavalier on risk. BUT Underwater Operations are something I believe need to be rigorously and realistically assessed.
I am not a submariner - but I am/was a diver.
When stuff goes wrong underwater it is really bad, as we can’t breathe underwater -- if you are under ice and things go wrong, unless you have a method of getting through that ice BOKYAGB.

Conventional Subs are not designed with ice strengthens sails and upper hulls, nor are they big and strong enough to emergency breach the ice pack
So any mission sending something like a 212CD under multi-year pack ice would be NLI to justify the risk to personnel and equipment, and would get buried in Secrecy for many many decades.

I am guarded about getting too excited about any of the recent announcements. The Govt makes lots of announcements, but follow-through is what counts.

Germany has had some fairly recent highly-publicized failures with its submarine & surface fleet.

https://www.navylookout.com/the-german-navy-downsizes-its-frigate-ambitions/

Germany's Navy Is a Total Embarrassment

The German Navy’s current condition is a true “Schande;” an embarrassment for Europe’s wealthiest country. The German Navy needs to immediately advocate to increase its budget and capabilities. In a country where good news stories about the military are few and far between, recent years have...

nationalinterest.org

The Koreans have actual follow-through and a pedigree for delivering a top notch product on time and on budget. They do what they say they will do, and they do it well. The KSS-III is already in the water, while the German Type 212CD is a paper design.

South Korean Arms Makers Invade Europe

Hanwha breaks ground on its first European defense manufacturing base

www.asiasentinel.com

KSS-III arrives in Canada as Hanwha Ocean intensifies push for Canadian submarine program

After a more than 7,500-nautical-mile trans-Pacific deployment, the Republic of Korea Navy submarine Dosan Ahn Changho has arrived at CFB Esquimalt in British Columbia, marking a significant step in South Korea’s campaign to secure Canada’s future submarine program. The visit is being positioned...

dailymare.com

The key selling feature IMO that the Koreans offered was the speed with which they promised to deliver their product. Given the fact our overlords have told us we need to be ready for the BIG ONE by 2028-2030 timeframe:

https://news.sky.com/story/we-have-to-get-ready-for-large-scale-conflicts-says-canadas-military-chief-13530556

The timeline for the Type 212CD's seems very unambitious. Also, the lack of VLS or ability to launch missiles at standoff is a massive concern for me in the contemporary operating environment. Choosing a sub that isn't equipped with stand-off attack and strategic deterrence as a core capability isn't fit for the contemporary environment we find ourselves operating in.

Anyways, that's my opinion and it's worth exactly 1 Euro!

 

[Stoker]

I am guarded about getting too excited about any of the recent announcements. The Govt makes lots of announcements, but follow-through is what counts.

Germany has had some fairly recent highly-publicized failures with its submarine & surface fleet.

https://www.navylookout.com/the-german-navy-downsizes-its-frigate-ambitions/

Germany's Navy Is a Total Embarrassment

The German Navy’s current condition is a true “Schande;” an embarrassment for Europe’s wealthiest country. The German Navy needs to immediately advocate to increase its budget and capabilities. In a country where good news stories about the military are few and far between, recent years have...

nationalinterest.org

The Koreans have actual follow-through and a pedigree for delivering a top notch product on time and on budget. They do what they say they will do, and they do it well. The KSS-III is already in the water, while the German Type 212CD is a paper design.

South Korean Arms Makers Invade Europe

Hanwha breaks ground on its first European defense manufacturing base

www.asiasentinel.com

KSS-III arrives in Canada as Hanwha Ocean intensifies push for Canadian submarine program

After a more than 7,500-nautical-mile trans-Pacific deployment, the Republic of Korea Navy submarine Dosan Ahn Changho has arrived at CFB Esquimalt in British Columbia, marking a significant step in South Korea’s campaign to secure Canada’s future submarine program. The visit is being positioned...

dailymare.com

The key selling feature IMO that the Koreans offered was the speed with which they promised to deliver their product. Given the fact our overlords have told us we need to be ready for the BIG ONE by 2028-2030 timeframe:

https://news.sky.com/story/we-have-to-get-ready-for-large-scale-conflicts-says-canadas-military-chief-13530556

The timeline for the Type 212CD's seems very unambitious. Also, the lack of VLS or ability to launch missiles at standoff is a massive concern for me in the contemporary operating environment. Choosing a sub that isn't equipped with stand-off attack and strategic deterrence as a core capability isn't fit for the contemporary environment we find ourselves operating in.

Anyways, that's my opinion and it's worth exactly 1 Euro!

Yes I personally think there will be issues with the boats and the delivery timeframe. We'll see.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Yes I personally think there will be issues with the boats and the delivery timeframe. We'll see.

The word I use to describe the CAF is "Panglossian"

Panglossian: An optimism that blindly insists everything will work out perfectly, completely ignoring the structural flaws and failures happening right in front of them.

 

[oldcpu]

Conventional Subs are not designed with ice strengthens sails and upper hulls, nor are they big and strong enough to emergency breach the ice pack
So any mission sending something like a 212CD under multi-year pack ice would be NLI to justify the risk to personnel and equipment, and would get buried in Secrecy for many many decades.

I in part, agree with this, ... where clearly extra measures are likely needed for sail/fin strengthening, and also modifications needed such as upward looking sonar, and possible strengthening by propellers and extra measures (for cold weather/slush) for hull intakes ... but ... but ...

... but I don't fully agree where there is mention of hull (including upper hull) strengthening.

On a modern double-hull submarine like the Type-212CD I believe the "upper hull" people refer to is the outer casing or superstructure (the non-pressure steel plating that forms the hydrodynamic fairing over the top of the pressure hull). It doesn't bear the primary hydrostatic loads. While the upper casing needs to be rugged enough not to cave in if it gently brushes icy slush, it doesn't need massive structural steel plate reinforcement because it isn't taking the brunt of the load. Further ...

Further, ... I suspect the operational strategy for an AIP submarine (with weeks of under ice endurance) in the Arctic is not to smash through ice on top, but rather the strategy would be to head for locations where there are known polynya. I believe polynya can nominally be detected by synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. Some polynya only last for days, but others tend to seasonally re-occur in the very same locations and hence can be present for months.

So presumably, prior to submerging and entering 'under the ice' , up to date satellite radar imagery will have been received, with multiple polynya (primary & backups) locations identified, and then these locations passed to and received by communications (such as using satcom) by the submarine while outside the ice-field. If no suitable multiple location(s) of polynya are within a decent distance, I suspect any under-ice plans would be cancelled. If thou identified, the submarine could proceed ... and once proceeding under ice, the upward looking sonar would help precisely confirm when the submarine is under the exact planned polynya location.

For example (I am looking for unclassified references) for Arctic transit showing how SAR is beneficial : Read notes

"Iceberg reports—all of which offer excellent information for operational planning. (The NIC also works with the Canadian Ice Service to jointly produce the North American Ice Service products.) The NIC ocean ice and iceberg products are based principally on satellite passive microwave and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data. The ice charts include a rough characterization of ice thickness and types where available."

Clearly none of this will be easy ...

Reading the early accounts of USN nuclear submarine transits under the ice, and how at times they had to change their course, and try different routes (due to underwater ice blockage) is solid proof such is incredibly difficult. So clearly this would not be done lightly and planning, and experience would be needed.

I suspect the submarine, if under ice-transit is planned, would motor (snorkeling) to the edge of the ice-field on diesel engines, so to preserve AIP reactant for the under ice part of any travels.

It would not surprise me if the USN would if asked offer experience from the USN Arctic Submarine Laboratory (ASL) for any early missions, while the RCN obtained experience. I believe the NRP Arpão (S-161), a Tridente-class (Type 214 class AIP/lead-acid) diesel-electric submarine had an ASL Arctic Operations Specialist (AOS) [also referred to as an 'ice-pilot'] embarked for that submarine's very very brief under ice journey and surfacing at a polynya in an ice field .

Clearly this is 'far' in the future, but with procurement of the submarine now active, additional submarine equipment (strengthened fin/sail, upward looking sonar, additional protection over flush/hull sensors, and other Arctic equipment enhancement aspects) likely need to be assessed and agreed upon now in the final contract negotiation stage. Adding such later will IMHO result in a higher price tag.

... and if one can believe 'Global warming' reports ... its likely there will be more and more polynya in the future, as the Arctic ice melts a bit and the Northwest passage opens up more.