TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

[oldcpu]

(3) Regardless, given the potential advantages of being able to replenish AIP reactants from a mobile platform (including an Arctic platform), that it is worth doing a serious study on such a possibility, where I would go a step further perhaps than you would go, and I would note such such an assessment include scaled (down) representative testing to validate such (or to prove such is far too unsafe, if that should be the case).

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

 

[KevinB]

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

100%
Which is why I have been on SSN’s for the RCN for decades.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

Realistically in times of peacetime competition, safety restrictions on AIP subs from working under the ice pack make sense -- the USN patrols in their with SSN’s, and frankly UUV’s and Sensor Networks will work to shrink the useable area for Russian subs.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

Pretty much anyone who knows me, knows that I am fairly cavalier on risk. BUT Underwater Operations are something I believe need to be rigorously and realistically assessed.
I am not a submariner - but I am/was a diver.
When stuff goes wrong underwater it is really bad, as we can’t breathe underwater -- if you are under ice and things go wrong, unless you have a method of getting through that ice BOKYAGB.

Conventional Subs are not designed with ice strengthens sails and upper hulls, nor are they big and strong enough to emergency breach the ice pack
So any mission sending something like a 212CD under multi-year pack ice would be NLI to justify the risk to personnel and equipment, and would get buried in Secrecy for many many decades.

 

[Underway]

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.

Can they? Are you sure? You know the depth and sailing conditions underwater for those routes? Also does it matter that the Russians can get submarines waaaay up north to the wasteland part of the arctic? Russian subs (attack subs) need to attack shipping and interdict transit routes for trade to effect war in Europe. All the transit routes aside from the NWP are southern.

Russian bombers/boomers never leave their protected zones in Russian waters (despite the Hunt for Red October lore). They stay where they can be protected by Russian air and shore based help behind a screen of Attacks subs deployed further out. They also stay where they can always fire their missiles (thin ice or open water) to preserve their second strike capability. Their entire existence is for second strike and pushing them out past their protected zone is risking that second strike capability.

And as far as AIP subs at the choke points, the subs are also there to deal with surface contacts as well. They are not subsurface only. The entrances to the NWP are where the main threat accesses are. And in more navigable seasons there is no reason for a RCN sub won't travel further into the NWP or take up positions at different places. The NWP choke points are And for those other less navigable routes the CAF is looking at a multitude of sensors, both permanent and disposable to be placed.

None of that however means your ideas of arctic replenishment is not valid. It absolutely is. The ability to top submarines off is excellent. However it there are multiple attack angles here to increase arctic presence. Not just the subs.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Underway beat me to it.

 

[oldcpu]

Can they? Are you sure? You know the depth and sailing conditions underwater for those routes?

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

 

[Stoker]

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

Russian submarines can approach the Canadian Arctic directly from the Arctic Ocean. The Bering Strait and the Greenland and Atlantic approaches are principally gateways between the Arctic and the Pacific or Atlantic. They are not barriers sealing Russia out of the Arctic. That said, reaching the Canadian Arctic and operating freely throughout the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are two different things. Depths, narrow channels, ice conditions and hydrography still impose very real limitations.

On AIP replenishment, I concede that Canada may eventually examine whether AIP reactants could be replenished in area or another northern location. If it can be done safely and economically, it could certainly increase patrol persistence and I believe we'll eventually do this at a Canadian port. But I think people are getting well ahead of where the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project actually is.

I recently spoke with someone very heavily involved in the project and specifically asked whether submarine tenders were being considered and whether there was any serious thought being given to replenishing AIP reactants in the Arctic. His response was basically a laugh, followed by two very important points.

A. We do not even know how many submarines Canada is ultimately going to acquire.

B. There are an enormous number of moving parts that have to be resolved first, including training, crewing, sustainment, maintenance facilities, infrastructure and the entire support system for whichever submarine is selected.

His view was that submarine tenders, and particularly theoretical Arctic replenishment of AIP reactants, are issues that, if they are ever seriously examined, are probably 10 to 15 years down the road. There are simply much more fundamental decisions that have to be made first.

One area where planning is considerably further along is submarine rescue. SUBSMASH equipment is intended to be carried aboard the AOPVs, and that capability has already been trial fitted. Canada will also rely on arrangements with the United States and other allies to provide access to submarine rescue capabilities. That makes considerably more sense than Canada trying to duplicate every element of an extremely specialized rescue system itself.

So I am not dismissing Arctic AIP replenishment entirely. By all means study it when the time comes. But right now it is a theoretical support concept for a submarine we have not selected, using an AIP system we have not selected, for a fleet size we have not yet determined. Before worrying about putting reactants into submarines in the Arctic, Canada first has to select the submarine, build the training and maintenance system, establish the support infrastructure and get the boats operational. Lets try that first.

 

[oldcpu]

On AIP replenishment, I concede that Canada may eventually examine whether AIP reactants could be replenished in area or another northern location. If it can be done safely and economically, it could certainly increase patrol persistence and I believe we'll eventually do this at a Canadian port. But I think people are getting well ahead of where the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project actually is.

I recently spoke with someone very heavily involved in the project and specifically asked whether submarine tenders were being considered and whether there was any serious thought being given to replenishing AIP reactants in the Arctic. His response was basically a laugh, followed by two very important points.

A. We do not even know how many submarines Canada is ultimately going to acquire.

B. There are an enormous number of moving parts that have to be resolved first, including training, crewing, sustainment, maintenance facilities, infrastructure and the entire support system for whichever submarine is selected.

Indeed the RCN has many fundamental issues to sort, and unfortunately 'the elephant' in the room is the serious manpower shortage of the Canadian Armed Forces, and particular the RCN shortages, means the 'moving parts' in themselves are going to be very big challenges given the current relatively limited trained personnel available now, with the need for these personnel to plan many important aspects for the future. Without question it must be very difficult to find the resources to plan much more.

His view was that submarine tenders, and particularly theoretical Arctic replenishment of AIP reactants, are issues that, if they are ever seriously examined, are probably 10 to 15 years down the road. There are simply much more fundamental decisions that have to be made first.

My own view is that it would be far better to start to seriously examine such (Arctic AIP replenishment) sooner, for once the feasibility is confirmed, it could take many years to implement such. However if the manpower is not present to consider/study AIP reactants in the Arctic, then likely nothing can be done now.

The manpower shortage is a major symptom of what I call the 'crisis of invisibility', which is having major impact on the RCN. And despite some progress, I don't believe the manpower issue can be sorted soon.

One area where planning is considerably further along is submarine rescue. SUBSMASH equipment is intended to be carried aboard the AOPVs, and that capability has already been trial fitted. Canada will also rely on arrangements with the United States and other allies to provide access to submarine rescue capabilities. That makes considerably more sense than Canada trying to duplicate every element of an extremely specialized rescue system itself.

The RCN has history re: SUBSMASH going back decades ... and I glad to read this is further along.

Canada first has to select the submarine, build the training and maintenance system, establish the support infrastructure and get the boats operational. Lets try that first.

There is no question the aspects you note are incredibly important. I thou, also view AIP replenishment as part of the support infrastructure.

While the support infrastructure planning, and while the plans for AIP replenishment are being made (for Halifax and Esquimalt) , that is also a good time to learn about cold weather constraints, and consider applicability re:the Arctic for the future. Again, my view, is if one were to ignore such now, if one doesn't ask the questions now, one is missing a learning opportunity, that could put the RCN further ahead re future possibilities.

I am amazed, given the personnel shortages, that the RCN has accomplished what they have accomplished thus far, and I, for one, wish the RCN the very very best in the future. Its been a long time coming and both the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and the Canadian Surface Combatant Project, are long overdue, exciting projects, to read about moving forward.
.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Its always a challenge on an unclassified forum as this to provide information without running one's self into trouble in regards to classified areas where once one may, or may not, have had access.

So if I may offer some unclassified links

- from year 2011 : CBC: Soviets familiar with Canada's Arctic waters

It mentions Nares Strait (may I suggest you check it on the map).

Better thou, is this 1986 !! (pdf) article : https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160006-3.pdf

Are you saying you don't believe the Russians can access the Canadian Arctic directly ? I assume you are not saying such, but if that the case, I confess am puzzled why you ask if I am sure? Are you not?

The 'Greenland/Laborador' and 'Bearing Strait' "chokepoints" are mostly to limit access to The Pacific and Atlantic from the Arctic,... they don't stop Russian access to the Arctic.

... anyway - I really do not want to be dragged down into debating geography.

I do concede replenishing AIP reactant in the Arctic will be very difficult, but if it can be done, it will significantly increase the potential use/tasking of the AIP equipped Canadian Patrol submarine missions. Hence I maintain my viewpoint that the RCN really needs to take a very serious look to see if this (AIP reactant replenishment in the Arctic) can be done.
.

My sense is that the Russian Navy is much like everyone else: they can run nuclear submarines under the polar ice cap if they want to, but they prefer not to unless they have a really good reason.