• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

(3) Regardless, given the potential advantages of being able to replenish AIP reactants from a mobile platform (including an Arctic platform), that it is worth doing a serious study on such a possibility, where I would go a step further perhaps than you would go, and I would note such such an assessment include scaled (down) representative testing to validate such (or to prove such is far too unsafe, if that should be the case).

I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.
 
I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.
100%
Which is why I have been on SSN’s for the RCN for decades.
I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.
Realistically in times of peacetime competition, safety restrictions on AIP subs from working under the ice pack make sense -- the USN patrols in their with SSN’s, and frankly UUV’s and Sensor Networks will work to shrink the useable area for Russian subs.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.
Pretty much anyone who knows me, knows that I am fairly cavalier on risk. BUT Underwater Operations are something I believe need to be rigorously and realistically assessed.
I am not a submariner - but I am/was a diver.
When stuff goes wrong underwater it is really bad, as we can’t breathe underwater -- if you are under ice and things go wrong, unless you have a method of getting through that ice BOKYAGB.

Conventional Subs are not designed with ice strengthens sails and upper hulls, nor are they big and strong enough to emergency breach the ice pack
So any mission sending something like a 212CD under multi-year pack ice would be NLI to justify the risk to personnel and equipment, and would get buried in Secrecy for many many decades.
 
I am tempted to upload a map of the Arctic as seen with the North Pole in the center of the map.

Looking at such a map, in my view, makes it clear that the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea are not the only access areas for Russian submarines to reach the Canadian Arctic. The Russians can deploy directly from their northern fleet bases into the deep Arctic. From there, their nuclear submarines can transit undetected under the ice pack—crossing the basins such as Nansen Basin, Amundsen basin, and Makarov basin—to emerge directly on the Canadian side of the Arctic ocean.

I think the idea of limiting future RCN AIP-equipped submarines, to just what some post as the choke points of the Bering Strait and the Hudson Strait/Labrador Sea, totally misses the point as to how Russian submarines, can access the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean. Further, with global warming, more of the Arctic is anticipated to open up.

From my perspective, this re-enforces my view that longer deployment duration in the Arctic for AIP equipped submarines (and not only sitting silent on the edge of 2 different western hemisphere choke points), may be important, and I think for an AIP equipped submarine this means having a means of AIP replenishment in the Arctic. Such replenishment capability opens up a lot more time in Arctic waters, and if achieved, then possible aspects other than only AIP replenishment could then become the main limiting factors.
Can they? Are you sure? You know the depth and sailing conditions underwater for those routes? Also does it matter that the Russians can get submarines waaaay up north to the wasteland part of the arctic? Russian subs (attack subs) need to attack shipping and interdict transit routes for trade to effect war in Europe. All the transit routes aside from the NWP are southern.

Russian bombers/boomers never leave their protected zones in Russian waters (despite the Hunt for Red October lore). They stay where they can be protected by Russian air and shore based help behind a screen of Attacks subs deployed further out. They also stay where they can always fire their missiles (thin ice or open water) to preserve their second strike capability. Their entire existence is for second strike and pushing them out past their protected zone is risking that second strike capability.

And as far as AIP subs at the choke points, the subs are also there to deal with surface contacts as well. They are not subsurface only. The entrances to the NWP are where the main threat accesses are. And in more navigable seasons there is no reason for a RCN sub won't travel further into the NWP or take up positions at different places. The NWP choke points are And for those other less navigable routes the CAF is looking at a multitude of sensors, both permanent and disposable to be placed.

None of that however means your ideas of arctic replenishment is not valid. It absolutely is. The ability to top submarines off is excellent. However it there are multiple attack angles here to increase arctic presence. Not just the subs.
 
Back
Top