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TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

I 100% agree with your words. I hope Germany does not screw us over.
The government is afraid quite frankly . The choice of the South Korean SSK would have led to many hard decisions in both the foreign and defence.
The Government is used to dealing with Europe it's feels like it is in it's comfort zone. We've spent most of this country's history it seems trying to avoid the Pacific. Aside from some tentative steps.
So I think we took the easy way out I just hope that doesn't bite us in the ass in a few years.
Is it just me by the way or does it now seem that we're virtually ignoring the South Koreans?
That also bothers me on several levels.
 
The government is afraid quite frankly . The choice of the South Korean SSK would have led to many hard decisions in both the foreign and defence.
The Government is used to dealing with Europe it's feels like it is in it's comfort zone. We've spent most of this country's history it seems trying to avoid the Pacific. Aside from some tentative steps.
So I think we took the easy way out I just hope that doesn't bite us in the ass in a few years.
Is it just me by the way or does it now seem that we're virtually ignoring the South Koreans?
That also bothers me on several levels.

Their new tanks and SP guns are pretty cool...
 
On a (somewhat distant but) related note to this topic of Arctic operation of submarines, I note in a recent CNR Broadsides: the following:

Xue Long (Snow Dragon) and Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 2 sailed north through the US exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea in July. .... China says the ships are in the region is strictly for peaceful scientific research, environmental monitoring and global climate change studies. There is suspicion, however, that the ships are deploying advanced sonar and telemetry buoys which can track environmental changes and undersea topography, but also submarine activity.

where that article references a CBC Article: Canada, U.S. shadow Chinese research ships in the Arctic as concern grows over Snow Dragons' presence

Both Canada and the U.S. have been quietly shadowing two Chinese icebreaking research ships in Arctic waters off Alaska over the last couple of weeks.

The Xue Long (Snow Dragon) and Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 2 sailed north through the U.S. exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea in July, according to the U.S. Coast Guard.
...
Buoys can track submarine activity

When asked about the Chinese ships on Thursday, Defence Minister David McGuinty said the Canadian military actively monitors the country's waters.
...
Both research ships, however, have been known to deploy advanced sonar and telemetry buoys. Western defence officials say these devices not only track environmental changes and undersea topography, but are also useful in tracking submarine activity.
...
The federal government has begun investing heavily in the construction of new destroyers and begun the process of acquiring Arctic-capable submarines. It also plans to deploy an undersea network of sensors.
...
However if one reads the CBC article that is claimed to be about "Arctic-capable submarines", it only refers to the submarines being located at "western approaches to Canada's Arctic coast and archipelago".

So that is a bit of a stretch (unless there is more known not stated) to state "Arctic capable submarines". Just because a submarine has an AIP system, in itself, does not make a submarine 'arctic-capable' in my view.
 
And I hope that before we buy new tanks/SP guns/MCAV we actually go out in the field and test them rather than relying on the manufacturers propaganda. Or because someone in Ottawa wrote the RFIs to favour a specific manufacturer.
As long as the thing starts and works decently. We are going to Canadianize it anyways. Most of Koreas are carefully pieced together best of European/ US equipment anyways, lets add our air conditioner/ heater to it and carry on.

To me the benefit of buying SK is that they are willing to set up actual production here, where Germany is not.
SK is looking at long term defense contracts across the board as an entire industry. Germany is looking at one contract at a time for a specific piece of kit.

Honestly if it is good enough for Our European Allies it should be good enough for us.
 
On the topic on whether the 'common design' of the Type-212CD might be tuned to be more Arctic capable for all three nations (Norway, German, and Canada) I am coming to the view that such may be unlikely. It may need to be Canada only if such implemented. Why?

Since the 2009 NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, Canadian defence policy has remained unchanged under successive governments, with Canada indicating in 2009 that it preferred a firm boundary regarding NATO alliance operations in North America. Prime Minister Stephen Harper (I believe according to wiki leaks) privately warned NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in January 2010 that the alliance had no role in the Arctic, arguing that Canada's good working relationship with Russia could be undermined by greater NATO involvement and warning that attempts to expand the alliance's role could backfire by exacerbating tensions with Moscow. Against this backdrop, Ottawa has likely emphasized Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic and the Northwest Passage, while favouring a North American defence framework based primarily on Canadian responsibility and bilateral air-defence only cooperation with the United States through NORAD, rather than a NATO command role in the region.

I speculate that if still in place, such a strategic posture could be seen as having some impact on allied procurement dynamics, particularly for joint programs like the Type 212CD submarine. Because Germany and Norway operate within the European High North—where operations center on open waters, deep channels, and marginal ice zones near Svalbard and the Barents Sea—their navies do not natively require severe under-ice hardware. Knowing that Canada has historically rejected NATO-flagged support patrols inside the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, I suspect that both Berlin and Oslo have little strategic nor financial incentive to co-fund any "Arctic-hardening" implementations for their own baseline Type-212CD submarine fleets. I speculate that from their perspective, specialized modifications—such as upward-looking ice-profiling sonar, reinforced sail structures, ice-deflecting periscope masts, and hardened propellers—are non-standard requirements that are not part of the stated operational requirements for the "Common Design" for their navies that expect to operate independently of Canadian internal waters.

I am also thinking thou - one possible caveat: the geopolitical environment has fundamentally shifted since year 2009, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden. With the European Arctic more solidified now as a unified NATO flank (with Finland and Sweden), given that Russia may be increasing militarization of its northern bases, makes me ask myself if Canada's policy of keeping NATO at arm's length in the High North may benefit from renewed scrutiny - where such might lead to a stronger willingness for Type-212CD submarine Arctic hardening.
 
I am thinking more to have containers (which I believe commercially exist) embarked on a larger suitable ship (larger than an AOPS) so to generate the reactants and replenish from such. Very hypothetical - and given safety aspects plus Arctic cold complexities, it may not be viable. But given the scope of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and given the game-changer aspect if such is viable, i believe it should be thoroughly investigated to assess if feasible.

On this idea of 'containerized AIP generation for replenishment" ... my thinking was that by having such, say distributed across 3 to 4 large containers, being relatively mobile, means it could potentially be moved to different piers in Shearwater/Halifax and Esquimalt, and not force the RCN to only replenish AIP reactants from one fixed single submarine pier on each Canadian coast. I see that 'single pier' approach as potentially risky from an operational perspective.

Further if mobile, it opens up the possibility to have a 3rd or 4th system deployed to the Arctic, in a fixed Arctic deep sea port, or perhaps on TBD ship (modified (?) JSS, G-LAAM, or other auxiliary ship, where if polar class ice-cable, such a ship would help in ensuring more Arctic presense by a future RCN Canadian patrol submarine).

So while this thread is focused on Canada and on the potential future Canadian patrol submarine with an AIP system for propulsion, there are also other countries navies that operate or are actively acquiring PEM fuel cell AIP submarines that rely on LOX and hydrogen reactants, making a containerized replenishment infrastructure possibly of interest to them. Having other countries potentially interested could mean its possible Canada need not go alone here - or mean there is an international market for such a system if developed in Canada with TKMS help.

1. German navy: Type 212A (and upcoming Type 212CD).

  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 active Type 212As, with 6 Type 212CDs on order/under construction (shared development with Norway) and possibly 3 more Type-212CDs.
  • Relevance: currently tied to a single fixed facility at Eckernförde for AIP reactant replenishment, potentially making mobile containerized solutions an attractive fix for logistical flexibility.

2. Norwegian Navy: Type 212CD (future).

  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats on order.
  • Relevance: Shares a long Arctic-adjacent geography as Canada. A fixed-base limitation at Haakonsvern creates a possible strategic vulnerability.

3. Italy (Marina Militare)

  • Submarine Classes: Todaro-class (derived from the German Type 212A design).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 active boats.
  • Relevance: Operates primarily in the Mediterranean ( submarine force operations and technical support primarily between Taranto (Ionian Sea/Taranto Gulf hub) and La Spezia (Ligurian Sea/North-West hub) ; containerized replenishment could allow out-of-area or allied port servicing and more flexibility for the Marina Militare AIP reactant replenishment for their submarines.

4. South Korea (Republic of Korea Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Son Won-yil-class (Type 214 variant) and the larger Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III).
  • AIP Fleet Size: Over 9 Type 214s active/built, plus newer KSS-III boats equipped with indigenous fuel cells and lithium-ion systems.
  • Relevance: South Korea has a massive industrial shipbuilding base, but restricts multi-base hydrogen logistics between Jinhae (the historic primary submarine command, training, and maintenance base) and Jeju Naval Base (the southern blue-water strategic hub)) . A more flexible AIP replenishment structure could be beneficial - providing more survivability.

5. Spain (Spanish Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: S-80 (Isaac Peral-class).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats planned/delivering (using a bio-ethanol reformer-based PEM fuel cell system).
  • Relevance: Even though they reform bio-ethanol to produce hydrogen on board rather than storing pure compressed/metal-hydride hydrogen externally, shoreside logistic support for reactant purity and auxiliary servicing is likely still an operational requirement. Spain supports its new S-80 AIP submarines only from the Cartagena Naval Base.

6. Singapore (Republic of Singapore Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Invincible-class (Type 218SG).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 custom-designed fuel-cell AIP boats.
  • Relevance: Operating out of a geographically constrained island nation with intense strategic maritime traffic, having the addition of modular logistics and flexible basing options may hold some appeal. Singapore replenishes its custom Invincible-class boats only out of Changi Naval Base.

7. Israel (Israeli Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Dolphin-class (Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II) and upcoming Dakar-class.
  • AIP Fleet Size: 3 AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs active, with newer boats on the way.
  • Relevance: Israel conducts its submarine AIP replenishment (for the AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs) only from Haifa Naval Base

8. India (Indian Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Kalvari-class (Scorpène derivatives undergoing indigenous fuel-cell AIP retrofits).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats scheduled for AIP module integration during mid-life refits starting in 2026.
  • Relevance: An indigenous fuel-cell program is likely planned for only Visakhapatnam and Mumbai naval bases. Other ports would offer more flexibility and survivability.

9. Greece (Hellenic Navy):
  • Submarine Classes: Papanikolis-class (Type 214).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats active.
  • Relevance: AIP repactant replenisment from only Salamis. Having an island-heavy Aegean geography means containerized logistics could offer forward-servicing flexibility and redundancy
10. Turkey (Turkish Navy)
  • Submarine Classes: Reis-class (Type 214TN derivatives built locally).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats planned, with units progressively commissioning out of Gölcük.
  • Relevance: Restricted entirely to fixed cryogenic facilities at Gölcük Naval Shipyard (Sea of Marmara) and Aksaz Naval Base (Mediterranean/Aegean approaches); mobile containerized refuelling could potentially eliminate the tactical vulnerability of being bound exclusively to these two permanent military hubs and enable forward servicing across dispersed secondary ports.
11. Portugal (Portuguese Navy)
  • Submarine Classes: Tridente-class (Type 214 variant).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 2 boats active.
  • Relevance: Restricted to fixed cryogenic and industrial gas infrastructure at the Alfeite naval installation; the concept of mobile containerized refueling if implemented, could remove the vulnerability of relying exclusively on this single domestic hub for Atlantic operations and expeditionary deployments..
That list may not be all inclusive (and I may have some of my naval ports wrong), but that is my initial understanding.

Again, the concept is to shift from a fixed, single-site replenishment base, fixed always to one pier, instead to a more flexible system of mobile, containerized hydrogen and LOX generation units, where such a containerized system be relocated to many different commercial and military piers. By doing so, any of these navies could theoretically decouple their AIP submarine fleet from a replenishment "single point of failure", enabling safe replenishment at secondary ports, forward operating bases, or potentially even directly alongside auxiliary support ship that has the containers embarked. (for example, one of the containers could be a large generator).

Of course one of the elephant's in the room, could be that such a system of containerized AIP reactant replenishment, spread across multiple containers (located on demand to pier side, or on to an appropriately sized ship) may not be feasible or simply possibly not practical. Development is likely needed - although I do believe there are industrial commercial examples today of both containerized LOX generation and containerized hydrogen generation.

I do thou think this deserves immediate consideration by Canada, given Canada's unique geography.

I say 'immediate' consideration, as it may be more prudent in the current TKMS-RCN negotiations to scope the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment not as a fixed installation, but as something more mobile. My hope is the RCN/TKMS assess this, and accept or simply dismiss the concept, but only after consideration, ... definitely do give it the appropriate consideration - and not ignore and simply say - something for the future consideration. Considering now is important - and such consideration means potential synergy with the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment plans.
 
On this idea of 'containerized AIP generation for replenishment" ... my thinking was that by having such, say distributed across 3 to 4 large containers, being relatively mobile, means it could potentially be moved to different piers in Shearwater/Halifax and Esquimalt, and not force the RCN to only replenish AIP reactants from one fixed single submarine pier on each Canadian coast. I see that 'single pier' approach as potentially risky from an operational perspective.

Further if mobile, it opens up the possibility to have a 3rd or 4th system deployed to the Arctic, in a fixed Arctic deep sea port, or perhaps on TBD ship (modified (?) JSS, G-LAAM, or other auxiliary ship, where if polar class ice-cable, such a ship would help in ensuring more Arctic presense by a future RCN Canadian patrol submarine).

So while this thread is focused on Canada and on the potential future Canadian patrol submarine with an AIP system for propulsion, there are also other countries navies that operate or are actively acquiring PEM fuel cell AIP submarines that rely on LOX and hydrogen reactants, making a containerized replenishment infrastructure possibly of interest to them. Having other countries potentially interested could mean its possible Canada need not go alone here - or mean there is an international market for such a system if developed in Canada with TKMS help.

1. German navy: Type 212A (and upcoming Type 212CD).

  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 active Type 212As, with 6 Type 212CDs on order/under construction (shared development with Norway) and possibly 3 more Type-212CDs.
  • Relevance: currently tied to a single fixed facility at Eckernförde for AIP reactant replenishment, potentially making mobile containerized solutions an attractive fix for logistical flexibility.

2. Norwegian Navy: Type 212CD (future).

  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats on order.
  • Relevance: Shares a long Arctic-adjacent geography as Canada. A fixed-base limitation at Haakonsvern creates a possible strategic vulnerability.

3. Italy (Marina Militare)

  • Submarine Classes: Todaro-class (derived from the German Type 212A design).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 active boats.
  • Relevance: Operates primarily in the Mediterranean ( submarine force operations and technical support primarily between Taranto (Ionian Sea/Taranto Gulf hub) and La Spezia (Ligurian Sea/North-West hub) ; containerized replenishment could allow out-of-area or allied port servicing and more flexibility for the Marina Militare AIP reactant replenishment for their submarines.

4. South Korea (Republic of Korea Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Son Won-yil-class (Type 214 variant) and the larger Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III).
  • AIP Fleet Size: Over 9 Type 214s active/built, plus newer KSS-III boats equipped with indigenous fuel cells and lithium-ion systems.
  • Relevance: South Korea has a massive industrial shipbuilding base, but restricts multi-base hydrogen logistics between Jinhae (the historic primary submarine command, training, and maintenance base) and Jeju Naval Base (the southern blue-water strategic hub)) . A more flexible AIP replenishment structure could be beneficial - providing more survivability.

5. Spain (Spanish Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: S-80 (Isaac Peral-class).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats planned/delivering (using a bio-ethanol reformer-based PEM fuel cell system).
  • Relevance: Even though they reform bio-ethanol to produce hydrogen on board rather than storing pure compressed/metal-hydride hydrogen externally, shoreside logistic support for reactant purity and auxiliary servicing is likely still an operational requirement. Spain supports its new S-80 AIP submarines only from the Cartagena Naval Base.

6. Singapore (Republic of Singapore Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Invincible-class (Type 218SG).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 custom-designed fuel-cell AIP boats.
  • Relevance: Operating out of a geographically constrained island nation with intense strategic maritime traffic, having the addition of modular logistics and flexible basing options may hold some appeal. Singapore replenishes its custom Invincible-class boats only out of Changi Naval Base.

7. Israel (Israeli Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Dolphin-class (Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II) and upcoming Dakar-class.
  • AIP Fleet Size: 3 AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs active, with newer boats on the way.
  • Relevance: Israel conducts its submarine AIP replenishment (for the AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs) only from Haifa Naval Base

8. India (Indian Navy)

  • Submarine Classes: Kalvari-class (Scorpène derivatives undergoing indigenous fuel-cell AIP retrofits).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats scheduled for AIP module integration during mid-life refits starting in 2026.
  • Relevance: An indigenous fuel-cell program is likely planned for only Visakhapatnam and Mumbai naval bases. Other ports would offer more flexibility and survivability.

9. Greece (Hellenic Navy):
  • Submarine Classes: Papanikolis-class (Type 214).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats active.
  • Relevance: AIP repactant replenisment from only Salamis. Having an island-heavy Aegean geography means containerized logistics could offer forward-servicing flexibility and redundancy
10. Turkey (Turkish Navy)
  • Submarine Classes: Reis-class (Type 214TN derivatives built locally).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats planned, with units progressively commissioning out of Gölcük.
  • Relevance: Restricted entirely to fixed cryogenic facilities at Gölcük Naval Shipyard (Sea of Marmara) and Aksaz Naval Base (Mediterranean/Aegean approaches); mobile containerized refuelling could potentially eliminate the tactical vulnerability of being bound exclusively to these two permanent military hubs and enable forward servicing across dispersed secondary ports.
11. Portugal (Portuguese Navy)
  • Submarine Classes: Tridente-class (Type 214 variant).
  • AIP Fleet Size: 2 boats active.
  • Relevance: Restricted to fixed cryogenic and industrial gas infrastructure at the Alfeite naval installation; the concept of mobile containerized refueling if implemented, could remove the vulnerability of relying exclusively on this single domestic hub for Atlantic operations and expeditionary deployments..
That list may not be all inclusive (and I may have some of my naval ports wrong), but that is my initial understanding.

Again, the concept is to shift from a fixed, single-site replenishment base, fixed always to one pier, instead to a more flexible system of mobile, containerized hydrogen and LOX generation units, where such a containerized system be relocated to many different commercial and military piers. By doing so, any of these navies could theoretically decouple their AIP submarine fleet from a replenishment "single point of failure", enabling safe replenishment at secondary ports, forward operating bases, or potentially even directly alongside auxiliary support ship that has the containers embarked. (for example, one of the containers could be a large generator).

Of course one of the elephant's in the room, could be that such a system of containerized AIP reactant replenishment, spread across multiple containers (located on demand to pier side, or on to an appropriately sized ship) may not be feasible or simply possibly not practical. Development is likely needed - although I do believe there are industrial commercial examples today of both containerized LOX generation and containerized hydrogen generation.

I do thou think this deserves immediate consideration by Canada, given Canada's unique geography.

I say 'immediate' consideration, as it may be more prudent in the current TKMS-RCN negotiations to scope the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment not as a fixed installation, but as something more mobile. My hope is the RCN/TKMS assess this, and accept or simply dismiss the concept, but only after consideration, ... definitely do give it the appropriate consideration - and not ignore and simply say - something for the future consideration. Considering now is important - and such consideration means potential synergy with the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment plans.
The central problem with this proposal is that it treats an AIP reactant replenishment facility as though it were simply three or four ISO containers that could be dropped beside any convenient pier and connected to a submarine. It is nothing of the sort.

A TKMS fuel cell AIP submarine does not merely take hydrogen and oxygen from a pair of commercial generators. Liquid oxygen must be produced or delivered, stored and transferred as a cryogenic oxidizer. The hydrogen must be exceptionally pure and transferred under carefully controlled conditions into the submarine’s metal hydride storage cylinders. Filling those cylinders is also a managed thermal process because hydrogen absorption generates heat. That requires cooling, monitoring, pressure control and certified transfer connections. It is not simply a matter of running a couple of hoses from a container and in a half hour its done.

Containerizing individual pieces of machinery does not make the complete facility genuinely mobile. A functioning replenishment site would still require substantial electrical power, cooling, cryogenic storage, high purity gas handling, hazardous area zoning, safety distances, grounding, ventilation, fire protection, emergency shutdown systems, spill and vent management, environmental approvals, security, trained operators and a pier approved for the evolution.

Once all of that has been installed, the supposedly mobile arrangement has effectively become another fixed industrial facility. Moving the containers would be the easy part. Recreating, inspecting and certifying the entire site around them would not.

Nor does a fixed facility necessarily mean one submarine, one hose and one vulnerable pier. Redundancy can be provided through separated reactant storage, duplicated pumps and transfer equipment, alternate submarine berths, protected distribution systems, road delivered industrial gases and facilities on both coasts. Before declaring the proposed TKMS support system a “single point of failure,” someone would first need to know what that system actually consists of. That information is not publicly available and I doubt it ever will be.

There is also an obvious question the proponent keeps avoiding. Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal, South Korea, Israel and Turkey have collectively accumulated decades of experience operating TKMS fuel cell AIP submarines. Not one operates a mobile containerized reactant replenishment system that can be moved casually from pier to pier. Not one routinely replenishes AIP submarines from an auxiliary ship. These countries understand dispersal, redundancy, submarine logistics and base vulnerability just as well as Canada does.

Why does anyone suppose none of these experienced operators has adopted this apparently obvious solution?

It is probably because containerizing some of the equipment does not make the complete operation safe, portable or operationally worthwhile. These navies have not simply overlooked an easy answer while waiting for someone on Army.ca to discover it. They have actual submarines, experienced engineers, established safety authorities and working replenishment infrastructure.

The absence of this concept across every established operator does not prove that some form of deployable facility could never be engineered. It is, however, powerful evidence that it offers far less mobility and considerably more complexity than its advocates imagine.

The Arctic argument is also built around a facility that is disappearing. Nanisivik is being removed from operational use because DND determined that it was no longer fit for purpose. Its short seasonal access window, construction problems, reduced scope and costly jetty repairs provided limited operational benefit. It was never a submarine base, and it certainly will not become an AIP reactant replenishment facility now.

That leaves very few realistic northern locations. The only credible shore based possibilities would be somewhere such as Iqaluit, if Canada were prepared to build the necessary port and industrial infrastructure, or Nuuk through an agreement with Denmark and Greenland. Neither is currently an AIP submarine support base, and converting either into one would be a major infrastructure, diplomatic, regulatory and financial undertaking.

There is one variation that might be technically possible. Canada could have a commercial vessel purpose built or heavily modified to carry the reactants and specialized transfer equipment, allowing it to move the replenishment capability closer to the Arctic. Such a ship might anchor in a sheltered Greenland fjord or operate from a suitable location along the Labrador coast.

However, that would not be a submarine tender. It would essentially be a specialized mobile industrial gas facility, and it would introduce an entirely new set of risks. The vessel would require purpose designed separation, ventilation, structural protection, hazardous electrical zoning, cryogenic storage, hydrogen handling equipment, cooling systems, firefighting arrangements, emergency shutdowns and certified submarine transfer systems. It would also need to conduct a hazardous alongside evolution with a submarine in an austere location, potentially far from suitable emergency and technical support.

Weather, sea state, ice, navigation, security and the ability to hold both vessels safely alongside would all become limiting factors. A sheltered fjord might reduce some environmental risks, but it would not eliminate the dangers associated with hydrogen and cryogenic oxygen transfer. Nor would the ship provide the maintenance, weapons handling, crew support, repair capability and extensive technical services expected of an actual submarine tender.

Could Canada engineer such a vessel? Probably. Given enough money, almost anything can be engineered. But that is very different from demonstrating that it is operationally necessary, acceptably safe or more economical than properly designed shore infrastructure and sensible voyage planning.

AIP itself also needs to be understood properly. Fuel cell AIP provides relatively modest power for extremely quiet, low speed submerged endurance. Its hydrogen and oxygen are finite, and batteries remain necessary for higher power manoeuvring. It does not provide unlimited under ice endurance, high sustained submerged speed or the ability to surface through heavy ice. Planning an Arctic submarine concept around an unproven mobile reactant factory is starting at the wrong end of the operational problem.

There is nothing wrong with asking TKMS what proven replenishment options are available. What should be rejected is the insistence that Canada must give this speculative concept “immediate consideration” during supposedly ongoing RCN TKMS negotiations whose technical details the public does not know.

The RCN should define the operational requirement and have TKMS, submarine engineers, logisticians, explosive safety authorities and Arctic specialists determine the appropriate infrastructure. It should examine the proven arrangements already used by experienced AIP operators and build sensible redundancy into the Canadian support system.

Canada’s geography does not repeal physics, cryogenic handling requirements or explosive safety regulations. Before demanding that the RCN restructure a multibillion dollar submarine program around this proposal, its advocate should explain why every navy with real experience operating this technology has declined to do it.

Les, you are pushing this idea everywhere, and no one is biting. I showed the proposal to an experienced submariner who is still in, whose immediate observation was just how little you “skimmers” actually understand about submarine procurement, submarine operations and the specialized infrastructure required to support these boats. Repeating the same speculative proposal across multiple threads does not make it technically sound, operationally necessary or deserving of “immediate consideration.”

Frankly, I cannot see Canada doing it.
 
The central problem with this proposal is that it treats an AIP reactant replenishment facility as though it were simply three or four ISO containers that could be dropped beside any convenient pier and connected to a submarine. It is nothing of the sort.

A TKMS fuel cell AIP submarine does not merely take hydrogen and oxygen from a pair of commercial generators. Liquid oxygen must be produced or delivered, stored and transferred as a cryogenic oxidizer. The hydrogen must be exceptionally pure and transferred under carefully controlled conditions into the submarine’s metal hydride storage cylinders. Filling those cylinders is also a managed thermal process because hydrogen absorption generates heat. That requires cooling, monitoring, pressure control and certified transfer connections. It is not simply a matter of running a couple of hoses from a container and in a half hour its done.

Containerizing individual pieces of machinery does not make the complete facility genuinely mobile. A functioning replenishment site would still require substantial electrical power, cooling, cryogenic storage, high purity gas handling, hazardous area zoning, safety distances, grounding, ventilation, fire protection, emergency shutdown systems, spill and vent management, environmental approvals, security, trained operators and a pier approved for the evolution.

Once all of that has been installed, the supposedly mobile arrangement has effectively become another fixed industrial facility. Moving the containers would be the easy part. Recreating, inspecting and certifying the entire site around them would not.

Nor does a fixed facility necessarily mean one submarine, one hose and one vulnerable pier. Redundancy can be provided through separated reactant storage, duplicated pumps and transfer equipment, alternate submarine berths, protected distribution systems, road delivered industrial gases and facilities on both coasts. Before declaring the proposed TKMS support system a “single point of failure,” someone would first need to know what that system actually consists of. That information is not publicly available and I doubt it ever will be.

There is also an obvious question the proponent keeps avoiding. Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal, South Korea, Israel and Turkey have collectively accumulated decades of experience operating TKMS fuel cell AIP submarines. Not one operates a mobile containerized reactant replenishment system that can be moved casually from pier to pier. Not one routinely replenishes AIP submarines from an auxiliary ship. These countries understand dispersal, redundancy, submarine logistics and base vulnerability just as well as Canada does.

Why does anyone suppose none of these experienced operators has adopted this apparently obvious solution?

It is probably because containerizing some of the equipment does not make the complete operation safe, portable or operationally worthwhile. These navies have not simply overlooked an easy answer while waiting for someone on Army.ca to discover it. They have actual submarines, experienced engineers, established safety authorities and working replenishment infrastructure.

The absence of this concept across every established operator does not prove that some form of deployable facility could never be engineered. It is, however, powerful evidence that it offers far less mobility and considerably more complexity than its advocates imagine.

The Arctic argument is also built around a facility that is disappearing. Nanisivik is being removed from operational use because DND determined that it was no longer fit for purpose. Its short seasonal access window, construction problems, reduced scope and costly jetty repairs provided limited operational benefit. It was never a submarine base, and it certainly will not become an AIP reactant replenishment facility now.

That leaves very few realistic northern locations. The only credible shore based possibilities would be somewhere such as Iqaluit, if Canada were prepared to build the necessary port and industrial infrastructure, or Nuuk through an agreement with Denmark and Greenland. Neither is currently an AIP submarine support base, and converting either into one would be a major infrastructure, diplomatic, regulatory and financial undertaking.

There is one variation that might be technically possible. Canada could have a commercial vessel purpose built or heavily modified to carry the reactants and specialized transfer equipment, allowing it to move the replenishment capability closer to the Arctic. Such a ship might anchor in a sheltered Greenland fjord or operate from a suitable location along the Labrador coast.

However, that would not be a submarine tender. It would essentially be a specialized mobile industrial gas facility, and it would introduce an entirely new set of risks. The vessel would require purpose designed separation, ventilation, structural protection, hazardous electrical zoning, cryogenic storage, hydrogen handling equipment, cooling systems, firefighting arrangements, emergency shutdowns and certified submarine transfer systems. It would also need to conduct a hazardous alongside evolution with a submarine in an austere location, potentially far from suitable emergency and technical support.

Weather, sea state, ice, navigation, security and the ability to hold both vessels safely alongside would all become limiting factors. A sheltered fjord might reduce some environmental risks, but it would not eliminate the dangers associated with hydrogen and cryogenic oxygen transfer. Nor would the ship provide the maintenance, weapons handling, crew support, repair capability and extensive technical services expected of an actual submarine tender.

Could Canada engineer such a vessel? Probably. Given enough money, almost anything can be engineered. But that is very different from demonstrating that it is operationally necessary, acceptably safe or more economical than properly designed shore infrastructure and sensible voyage planning.

AIP itself also needs to be understood properly. Fuel cell AIP provides relatively modest power for extremely quiet, low speed submerged endurance. Its hydrogen and oxygen are finite, and batteries remain necessary for higher power manoeuvring. It does not provide unlimited under ice endurance, high sustained submerged speed or the ability to surface through heavy ice. Planning an Arctic submarine concept around an unproven mobile reactant factory is starting at the wrong end of the operational problem.

There is nothing wrong with asking TKMS what proven replenishment options are available. What should be rejected is the insistence that Canada must give this speculative concept “immediate consideration” during supposedly ongoing RCN TKMS negotiations whose technical details the public does not know.

The RCN should define the operational requirement and have TKMS, submarine engineers, logisticians, explosive safety authorities and Arctic specialists determine the appropriate infrastructure. It should examine the proven arrangements already used by experienced AIP operators and build sensible redundancy into the Canadian support system.

Canada’s geography does not repeal physics, cryogenic handling requirements or explosive safety regulations. Before demanding that the RCN restructure a multibillion dollar submarine program around this proposal, its advocate should explain why every navy with real experience operating this technology has declined to do it.

Les, you are pushing this idea everywhere, and no one is biting. I showed the proposal to an experienced submariner who is still in, whose immediate observation was just how little you “skimmers” actually understand about submarine procurement, submarine operations and the specialized infrastructure required to support these boats. Repeating the same speculative proposal across multiple threads does not make it technically sound, operationally necessary or deserving of “immediate consideration.”

Frankly, I cannot see Canada doing it.

Stoker, thanks for the detailed response. I agree that a containerized LOX/H₂ replenishment system would be considerably more complicated than simply putting commercial equipment into ISO containers and dumping it on a jetty. It would require naval-grade integration, cryogenic storage and transfer, hydrogen handling, safety systems, certification, training, etc.

My point is that other Type-214/Type-212A operators may also have an interest in such a capability, and the fact that they aren't already doing it doesn't demonstrate that it is infeasible.

I can also point to Canadian companies that already produce commercial hydrogen-generation and GOX-generation equipment, including oxygen-liquefaction technology if you wish. I speculate you have not researched that.

The underlying technologies already exist in mobile/containerized form. The question is whether the RCN should assess—now, while the TKMS contract is being negotiated—whether these technologies could be integrated and qualified specifically for 212CD reactant replenishment.

Canada also has a different geographical requirement than the countries I noted. Canada is procuring the Canadian Patrol Submarine for operations across three oceans, including Arctic operations. A mobile/dispersable replenishment capability could provide redundancy within a naval port if a primary replenishment berth were unavailable, and potentially provide reactant support where permanent infrastructure doesn't exist—potentially making Arctic patrols considerably more practical.

I'm not arguing that Canada should automatically build such a system. You seem to misintrepet that as my post.

I'm arguing that it is sufficiently technically plausible and potentially valuable that it very much deserves a proper RCN/TKMS/Canadian-industry feasibility assessment while there is an opportunity to incorporate it into the program, into the current negotiations, rather than assuming fixed replenishment infrastructure can only be built and that initially made the only viable solution. I think this deserves more than some off the cuff rejection that it is too complicated.
 
There is nothing wrong with asking TKMS what proven replenishment options are available. What should be rejected is the insistence that Canada must give this speculative concept “immediate consideration” during supposedly ongoing RCN TKMS negotiations whose technical details the public does not know.

< snipped >

.... Repeating the same speculative proposal across multiple threads does not make it technically sound, operationally necessary or deserving of “immediate consideration.”

Frankly, I cannot see Canada doing it.

Canada may not indeed do such. As you can clearly tell though, I strongly believe this needs to be seriously considered as part of the current negotiated contract. Not to build such now, but to define and assess and specify.

To answer your question as to why 'immediate' ... frankly, my concern, having worked in DND procurements in the past, is this may even be too late. Better would have been in the RFI/RFP.

The engineering complexity of mobile reactant handling is precisely why I believe that this must be addressed now, rather than deferred - and hence the word "immediate'.

The RCN is currently in a favorable political naval spending environment with contract negotiations with TKMS tracking toward a 2027 conclusion.
Waiting until the submarines are initially delivered in the 2030s, to figure out potential mobile AIP replenishment details, means a risk of facing a completely different fiscal and political landscape where funding for such a possibility may no longer exist even if perfectly feasible. In contrast, this as a definition/assessment could be part of the current contact, and could be compared against the current fixed base/pier Halifax/Shearwater and Esquimalt approach in terms of complexity, viability, safety, cost, redundancy, survivabilty, utility in the Arctic, and other aspects.

I fear if the RCN does not task TKMS to define, modify, navally certify, and work with Canadian industry on the interface protocols for a containerized AIP replenishment system within the current 2026/2027 contract framework, Canada will be permanently locked into a more limited, potentially vulnerable, two-pier AIP replenishment “garrison posture” for the next forty years - with limited funds to assess such. And no possibility of Arctic or other mobile deployment.

I see striking while the political iron is hot as a strategic necessity, not an engineering deferment to consider it later.

Clearly we will disagree here.

And that is not a surprise to me.

Putting off to tomorrow, what appears difficult to do today, is something I encountered all too often while I served in the RCN. I fear this the case now.
 
TKMS has been working for years on the development of a methanol reformer, so that hydrogen might be obtained (by chemical reactions) from methanol and not stored as metallic hydrides.
If the development is well ahead might be the 212 CDs submarines would use methanol, which would be easier to replenish and (IIRC) has a freezing point lower than naval fuel.

Spain on the other side bet for ethanol, which is a more difficult molecule to crack. This has caused delays on the development of their reformer and hence on the S80 program. The advantages of ethanol are the higher energy density and lower inherent hazard to health.
 
I fear if the RCN does not task TKMS to define, modify, navally certify, and work with Canadian industry on the interface protocols for a containerized AIP replenishment system within the current 2026/2027 contract framework, Canada will be permanently locked into a more limited, potentially vulnerable, two-pier AIP replenishment “garrison posture” for the next forty years - with limited funds to assess such. And no possibility of Arctic or other mobile deployment.
Isn't this exactly the kind of "Canadianization" trap that we regularly complain about driving up the costs of our military contracts? Asking the sub designer to "define, modify, navally certify" and work with industry to meet the requirements of a hypothetical system that does not currently exist?
Would it not be better (and much cheaper) to go with the base design and then have whomever we call on to design the replenishment system "define, modify, navally certify" the system to work with the existing submarine design. Otherwise you'll end up with an orphan system that will ONLY work with the specially modified Canadian subs and none of the ones from other countries that did not have this special modification.
 
Isn't this exactly the kind of "Canadianization" trap that we regularly complain about driving up the costs of our military contracts? Asking the sub designer to "define, modify, navally certify" and work with industry to meet the requirements of a hypothetical system that does not currently exist?
Would it not be better (and much cheaper) to go with the base design and then have whomever we call on to design the replenishment system "define, modify, navally certify" the system to work with the existing submarine design. Otherwise you'll end up with an orphan system that will ONLY work with the specially modified Canadian subs and none of the ones from other countries that did not have this special modification.

I see the opposite happening. If the RCN doesn't go for the sub designer to "define, modify, navally certify" and hold them accountable to that for the AIP reactant replenishment system, and if the RCN instead try on their own to fabricate some base RCN design requirement, without the active participation knowledge of TKMS, the RCN will end up paying 2x as much or more, and could very well end up with a system that doesn't work. I see TKMS being held responsible being key here - and that needs IMHO to be done by TKMS designing, modifying, ... etc - where they have existing commercialized Canadian containerized GOX/LOX generation and hydrogen generation systems to use as their basis.

The RCN has a window now, with an existing contract being negotiated - to attempt to get the most possible for the money to be spent - with solid milestone payments tied to the carefully designed deliverables.
 
I see the opposite happening. If the RCN doesn't go for the sub designer to "define, modify, navally certify" and hold them accountable to that for the AIP reactant replenishment system, and if the RCN instead try on their own to fabricate some base RCN design requirement, without the active participation knowledge of TKMS, the RCN will end up paying 2x as much or more, and could very well end up with a system that doesn't work. I see TKMS being held responsible being key here - and that needs IMHO to be done by TKMS designing, modifying, ... etc - where they have existing commercialized Canadian containerized GOX/LOX generation and hydrogen generation systems to use as their basis.

The RCN has a window now, with an existing contract being negotiated - to attempt to get the most possible for the money to be spent - with solid milestone payments tied to the carefully designed deliverables.

Birds in the hand etc.

We have an opportunity that has not presented itself in decades. That opportunity is to effectively address the sub-surface domain by buying new submarines.

Let us do that.

Once we have that in hand then we can continue with developing the concept. We will have time. It is going to be 10 years to get the first four new subs. By that time we will be confronted with a very different world.

Extinction Events - beloved of Hollywood and catastrophists. They are also genetic bottlenecks. They are points in time where something drastic happens that forces change.

The characteristic survival mechanism is wholesale mutation. Everything changes.

Some mutations survive while most mutations die off.

The process is anything but efficient and it most suredly is not planned.

In my opinion WW1 and WW2 were events of that kind as were Crimea and the Franco-Prussian wars and we are living through a comparable period now.

In 10 years time we might be facing distributed thorium modular reactors on the sea bed acting as magnetic induction recharge stations. Or UUVs conducting submerged RAS ops with submarines.
 
Birds in the hand etc.

We have an opportunity that has not presented itself in decades. That opportunity is to effectively address the sub-surface domain by buying new submarines.

Let us do that.

Once we have that in hand then we can continue with developing the concept. We will have time. It is going to be 10 years to get the first four new subs. By that time we will be confronted with a very different world.

Extinction Events - beloved of Hollywood and catastrophists. They are also genetic bottlenecks. They are points in time where something drastic happens that forces change.

The characteristic survival mechanism is wholesale mutation. Everything changes.

Some mutations survive while most mutations die off.

The process is anything but efficient and it most suredly is not planned.

In my opinion WW1 and WW2 were events of that kind as were Crimea and the Franco-Prussian wars and we are living through a comparable period now.

In 10 years time we might be facing distributed thorium modular reactors on the sea bed acting as magnetic induction recharge stations. Or UUVs conducting submerged RAS ops with submarines.
i do wonder how similar boat number 12 will be to boat number 1. Lots of time in between and from now
 
TKMS has been working for years on the development of a methanol reformer, so that hydrogen might be obtained (by chemical reactions) from methanol and not stored as metallic hydrides.
If the development is well ahead might be the 212 CDs submarines would use methanol, which would be easier to replenish and (IIRC) has a freezing point lower than naval fuel.

Spain on the other side bet for ethanol, which is a more difficult molecule to crack. This has caused delays on the development of their reformer and hence on the S80 program. The advantages of ethanol are the higher energy density and lower inherent hazard to health.
That is interesting, but there is a fairly large jump from “TKMS has worked on a methanol reformer” to “the 212CD may use methanol.”

The 212CD design selected by Germany and Norway is already in production. TKMS publicly describes it as using fuel cell AIP, but has not announced that the contracted boats will replace their established stored hydrogen system with an operational methanol reformer. Unless someone can produce a current TKMS, German or Norwegian program document confirming that change, it remains speculation about a technology development program, not the configuration Canada is negotiating to purchase. Canada selected the 212CD precisely as a low risk, military off the shelf submarine within an existing multinational program, not as a platform on which to introduce an unproven AIP plant.


The Spanish comparison actually demonstrates the danger of assuming that reformer technology is easily inserted into a submarine. Spain’s bioethanol reformer required roughly a decade of development. The first two S-80s were delivered without operational AIP, and the first complete system was installed in the third boat, S-83. Even in June 2026, Navantia was only beginning integrated testing of that plant within the submarine section.


Methanol may be easier to store and reform than ethanol, but it does not eliminate the need for liquid oxygen, specialized transfer equipment, quality control, fire and toxicity precautions, exhaust product management, certification, training or shore infrastructure. Its freezing point relative to naval distillate is largely beside the point because neither fuel would simply be left sitting in an exposed hose at Arctic ambient temperature.


So yes, a future methanol reformer version of TKMS fuel cell AIP is technically plausible. No, that does not establish that the German, Norwegian or Canadian 212CDs will have it. Until TKMS confirms otherwise, Arctic replenishment planning must be based on the actual contracted AIP configuration, not on the possibility that an experimental technology might mature in time and be redesigned into the boats.
 
I see the opposite happening. If the RCN doesn't go for the sub designer to "define, modify, navally certify" and hold them accountable to that for the AIP reactant replenishment system, and if the RCN instead try on their own to fabricate some base RCN design requirement, without the active participation knowledge of TKMS, the RCN will end up paying 2x as much or more, and could very well end up with a system that doesn't work. I see TKMS being held responsible being key here - and that needs IMHO to be done by TKMS designing, modifying, ... etc - where they have existing commercialized Canadian containerized GOX/LOX generation and hydrogen generation systems to use as their basis.

The RCN has a window now, with an existing contract being negotiated - to attempt to get the most possible for the money to be spent - with solid milestone payments tied to the carefully designed deliverables.
Lee, as someone who worked in DND procurement, you should know that this is precisely how requirements creep and Canadianization begin.

Nobody is suggesting that the RCN independently invent a replenishment system and then present TKMS with a finished design. TKMS would obviously define the submarine’s approved interfaces and certify anything connected to the boat. That is normal integration support.

What you are proposing goes much further. You want Canada to make TKMS responsible now for defining, modifying and certifying a hypothetical mobile replenishment capability built around Canadian commercial equipment, before the RCN has established an operational requirement, selected the equipment, chosen where it would operate or demonstrated that the concept is worthwhile.

Commercial containerized hydrogen or oxygen equipment is not automatically suitable for naval AIP replenishment. The hard part is safely processing, storing, transporting and transferring submarine grade reactants under naval regulations, with the necessary purity, pressures, interfaces, hazardous area controls, redundancy, training and emergency procedures. Making TKMS the prime contractor does not eliminate those costs or risks. It merely embeds them in the submarine contract, along with TKMS’s engineering costs, contingency and profit margin.

The sensible approach is to procure the proven baseline 212CD and its established replenishment arrangements. If the RCN later validates a requirement for a mobile system, industry can design it around TKMS defined interfaces, with TKMS providing integration support and certification. The replenishment system should be adapted to the submarine, not the submarine modified around a Canadian system that does not yet exist.

A contract negotiation is not a temporary window during which every speculative future concept must be inserted before it “closes.” Milestone payments do not make an unnecessary requirement necessary, and holding TKMS accountable does not make an immature concept mature. Given your procurement experience, you should understand that better than most.
 
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