On the topic on whether the 'common design' of the Type-212CD might be tuned to be more Arctic capable for all three nations (Norway, German, and Canada) I am coming to the view that such may be unlikely. It may need to be Canada only if such implemented. Why?
Since the 2009 NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, Canadian defence policy has remained unchanged under successive governments, with Canada indicating in 2009 that it preferred a firm boundary regarding NATO alliance operations in North America. Prime Minister Stephen Harper (I believe according to wiki leaks) privately warned NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in January 2010 that the alliance had no role in the Arctic, arguing that Canada's good working relationship with Russia could be undermined by greater NATO involvement and warning that attempts to expand the alliance's role could backfire by exacerbating tensions with Moscow. Against this backdrop, Ottawa has likely emphasized Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic and the Northwest Passage, while favouring a North American defence framework based primarily on Canadian responsibility and bilateral air-defence only cooperation with the United States through NORAD, rather than a NATO command role in the region.
I speculate that if still in place, such a strategic posture could be seen as having some impact on allied procurement dynamics, particularly for joint programs like the Type 212CD submarine. Because Germany and Norway operate within the European High North—where operations center on open waters, deep channels, and marginal ice zones near Svalbard and the Barents Sea—their navies do not natively require severe under-ice hardware. Knowing that Canada has historically rejected NATO-flagged support patrols inside the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, I suspect that both Berlin and Oslo have little strategic nor financial incentive to co-fund any "Arctic-hardening" implementations for their own baseline Type-212CD submarine fleets. I speculate that from their perspective, specialized modifications—such as upward-looking ice-profiling sonar, reinforced sail structures, ice-deflecting periscope masts, and hardened propellers—are non-standard requirements that are not part of the stated operational requirements for the "Common Design" for their navies that expect to operate independently of Canadian internal waters.
I am also thinking thou - one possible caveat: the geopolitical environment has fundamentally shifted since year 2009, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden. With the European Arctic more solidified now as a unified NATO flank (with Finland and Sweden), given that Russia may be increasing militarization of its northern bases, makes me ask myself if Canada's policy of keeping NATO at arm's length in the High North may benefit from renewed scrutiny - where such might lead to a stronger willingness for Type-212CD submarine Arctic hardening.