On this idea of 'containerized AIP generation for replenishment" ... my thinking was that by having such, say distributed across 3 to 4 large containers, being relatively mobile, means it could potentially be moved to different piers in Shearwater/Halifax and Esquimalt, and not force the RCN to only replenish AIP reactants from one fixed single submarine pier on each Canadian coast. I see that 'single pier' approach as potentially risky from an operational perspective.
Further if mobile, it opens up the possibility to have a 3rd or 4th system deployed to the Arctic, in a fixed Arctic deep sea port, or perhaps on TBD ship (modified (?) JSS, G-LAAM, or other auxiliary ship, where if polar class ice-cable, such a ship would help in ensuring more Arctic presense by a future RCN Canadian patrol submarine).
So while this thread is focused on Canada and on the potential future Canadian patrol submarine with an AIP system for propulsion, there are also other countries navies that operate or are actively acquiring PEM fuel cell AIP submarines that rely on LOX and hydrogen reactants, making a containerized replenishment infrastructure possibly of interest to them. Having other countries potentially interested could mean its possible Canada need not go alone here - or mean there is an international market for such a system if developed in Canada with TKMS help.
1. German navy: Type 212A (and upcoming Type 212CD).
- AIP Fleet Size: 6 active Type 212As, with 6 Type 212CDs on order/under construction (shared development with Norway) and possibly 3 more Type-212CDs.
- Relevance: currently tied to a single fixed facility at Eckernförde for AIP reactant replenishment, potentially making mobile containerized solutions an attractive fix for logistical flexibility.
2. Norwegian Navy: Type 212CD (future).
- AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats on order.
- Relevance: Shares a long Arctic-adjacent geography as Canada. A fixed-base limitation at Haakonsvern creates a possible strategic vulnerability.
3. Italy (Marina Militare)
- Submarine Classes: Todaro-class (derived from the German Type 212A design).
- AIP Fleet Size: 4 active boats.
- Relevance: Operates primarily in the Mediterranean ( submarine force operations and technical support primarily between Taranto (Ionian Sea/Taranto Gulf hub) and La Spezia (Ligurian Sea/North-West hub) ; containerized replenishment could allow out-of-area or allied port servicing and more flexibility for the Marina Militare AIP reactant replenishment for their submarines.
4. South Korea (Republic of Korea Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Son Won-yil-class (Type 214 variant) and the larger Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III).
- AIP Fleet Size: Over 9 Type 214s active/built, plus newer KSS-III boats equipped with indigenous fuel cells and lithium-ion systems.
- Relevance: South Korea has a massive industrial shipbuilding base, but restricts multi-base hydrogen logistics between Jinhae (the historic primary submarine command, training, and maintenance base) and Jeju Naval Base (the southern blue-water strategic hub)) . A more flexible AIP replenishment structure could be beneficial - providing more survivability.
5. Spain (Spanish Navy)
- Submarine Classes: S-80 (Isaac Peral-class).
- AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats planned/delivering (using a bio-ethanol reformer-based PEM fuel cell system).
- Relevance: Even though they reform bio-ethanol to produce hydrogen on board rather than storing pure compressed/metal-hydride hydrogen externally, shoreside logistic support for reactant purity and auxiliary servicing is likely still an operational requirement. Spain supports its new S-80 AIP submarines only from the Cartagena Naval Base.
6. Singapore (Republic of Singapore Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Invincible-class (Type 218SG).
- AIP Fleet Size: 4 custom-designed fuel-cell AIP boats.
- Relevance: Operating out of a geographically constrained island nation with intense strategic maritime traffic, having the addition of modular logistics and flexible basing options may hold some appeal. Singapore replenishes its custom Invincible-class boats only out of Changi Naval Base.
7. Israel (Israeli Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Dolphin-class (Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II) and upcoming Dakar-class.
- AIP Fleet Size: 3 AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs active, with newer boats on the way.
- Relevance: Israel conducts its submarine AIP replenishment (for the AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs) only from Haifa Naval Base
8. India (Indian Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Kalvari-class (Scorpène derivatives undergoing indigenous fuel-cell AIP retrofits).
- AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats scheduled for AIP module integration during mid-life refits starting in 2026.
- Relevance: An indigenous fuel-cell program is likely planned for only Visakhapatnam and Mumbai naval bases. Other ports would offer more flexibility and survivability.
9.
Greece (Hellenic Navy):
- Submarine Classes: Papanikolis-class (Type 214).
- AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats active.
- Relevance: AIP repactant replenisment from only Salamis. Having an island-heavy Aegean geography means containerized logistics could offer forward-servicing flexibility and redundancy
10. Turkey (Turkish Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Reis-class (Type 214TN derivatives built locally).
- AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats planned, with units progressively commissioning out of Gölcük.
- Relevance: Restricted entirely to fixed cryogenic facilities at Gölcük Naval Shipyard (Sea of Marmara) and Aksaz Naval Base (Mediterranean/Aegean approaches); mobile containerized refuelling could potentially eliminate the tactical vulnerability of being bound exclusively to these two permanent military hubs and enable forward servicing across dispersed secondary ports.
11. Portugal (Portuguese Navy)
- Submarine Classes: Tridente-class (Type 214 variant).
- AIP Fleet Size: 2 boats active.
- Relevance: Restricted to fixed cryogenic and industrial gas infrastructure at the Alfeite naval installation; the concept of mobile containerized refueling if implemented, could remove the vulnerability of relying exclusively on this single domestic hub for Atlantic operations and expeditionary deployments..
That list may not be all inclusive (and I may have some of my naval ports wrong), but that is my initial understanding.
Again, the concept is to shift from a fixed, single-site replenishment base, fixed always to one pier, instead to a more flexible system of mobile, containerized hydrogen and LOX generation units, where such a containerized system be relocated to many different commercial and military piers. By doing so, any of these navies could theoretically decouple their AIP submarine fleet from a replenishment "single point of failure", enabling safe replenishment at secondary ports, forward operating bases, or potentially even directly alongside auxiliary support ship that has the containers embarked. (for example, one of the containers could be a large generator).
Of course one of the elephant's in the room, could be that such a system of containerized AIP reactant replenishment, spread across multiple containers (located on demand to pier side, or on to an appropriately sized ship) may not be feasible or simply possibly not practical. Development is likely needed - although I do believe there are industrial commercial examples today of both containerized LOX generation and containerized hydrogen generation.
I do thou think this deserves
immediate consideration by Canada, given Canada's unique geography.
I say 'immediate' consideration, as it may be more prudent in the current TKMS-RCN negotiations to scope the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment not as a fixed installation, but as something more mobile. My hope is the RCN/TKMS assess this, and accept or simply dismiss the concept, but only after consideration, ... definitely do give it the appropriate consideration - and not ignore and simply say - something for the future consideration. Considering now is important - and such consideration means potential synergy with the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment plans.
The central problem with this proposal is that it treats an AIP reactant replenishment facility as though it were simply three or four ISO containers that could be dropped beside any convenient pier and connected to a submarine. It is nothing of the sort.
A TKMS fuel cell AIP submarine does not merely take hydrogen and oxygen from a pair of commercial generators. Liquid oxygen must be produced or delivered, stored and transferred as a cryogenic oxidizer. The hydrogen must be exceptionally pure and transferred under carefully controlled conditions into the submarine’s metal hydride storage cylinders. Filling those cylinders is also a managed thermal process because hydrogen absorption generates heat. That requires cooling, monitoring, pressure control and certified transfer connections. It is not simply a matter of running a couple of hoses from a container and in a half hour its done.
Containerizing individual pieces of machinery does not make the complete facility genuinely mobile. A functioning replenishment site would still require substantial electrical power, cooling, cryogenic storage, high purity gas handling, hazardous area zoning, safety distances, grounding, ventilation, fire protection, emergency shutdown systems, spill and vent management, environmental approvals, security, trained operators and a pier approved for the evolution.
Once all of that has been installed, the supposedly mobile arrangement has effectively become another fixed industrial facility. Moving the containers would be the easy part. Recreating, inspecting and certifying the entire site around them would not.
Nor does a fixed facility necessarily mean one submarine, one hose and one vulnerable pier. Redundancy can be provided through separated reactant storage, duplicated pumps and transfer equipment, alternate submarine berths, protected distribution systems, road delivered industrial gases and facilities on both coasts. Before declaring the proposed TKMS support system a “single point of failure,” someone would first need to know what that system actually consists of. That information is not publicly available and I doubt it ever will be.
There is also an obvious question the proponent keeps avoiding. Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal, South Korea, Israel and Turkey have collectively accumulated decades of experience operating TKMS fuel cell AIP submarines. Not one operates a mobile containerized reactant replenishment system that can be moved casually from pier to pier. Not one routinely replenishes AIP submarines from an auxiliary ship. These countries understand dispersal, redundancy, submarine logistics and base vulnerability just as well as Canada does.
Why does anyone suppose none of these experienced operators has adopted this apparently obvious solution?
It is probably because containerizing some of the equipment does not make the complete operation safe, portable or operationally worthwhile. These navies have not simply overlooked an easy answer while waiting for someone on Army.ca to discover it. They have actual submarines, experienced engineers, established safety authorities and working replenishment infrastructure.
The absence of this concept across every established operator does not prove that some form of deployable facility could never be engineered. It is, however, powerful evidence that it offers far less mobility and considerably more complexity than its advocates imagine.
The Arctic argument is also built around a facility that is disappearing. Nanisivik is being removed from operational use because DND determined that it was no longer fit for purpose. Its short seasonal access window, construction problems, reduced scope and costly jetty repairs provided limited operational benefit. It was never a submarine base, and it certainly will not become an AIP reactant replenishment facility now.
That leaves very few realistic northern locations. The only credible shore based possibilities would be somewhere such as Iqaluit, if Canada were prepared to build the necessary port and industrial infrastructure, or Nuuk through an agreement with Denmark and Greenland. Neither is currently an AIP submarine support base, and converting either into one would be a major infrastructure, diplomatic, regulatory and financial undertaking.
There is one variation that might be technically possible. Canada could have a commercial vessel purpose built or heavily modified to carry the reactants and specialized transfer equipment, allowing it to move the replenishment capability closer to the Arctic. Such a ship might anchor in a sheltered Greenland fjord or operate from a suitable location along the Labrador coast.
However, that would not be a submarine tender. It would essentially be a specialized mobile industrial gas facility, and it would introduce an entirely new set of risks. The vessel would require purpose designed separation, ventilation, structural protection, hazardous electrical zoning, cryogenic storage, hydrogen handling equipment, cooling systems, firefighting arrangements, emergency shutdowns and certified submarine transfer systems. It would also need to conduct a hazardous alongside evolution with a submarine in an austere location, potentially far from suitable emergency and technical support.
Weather, sea state, ice, navigation, security and the ability to hold both vessels safely alongside would all become limiting factors. A sheltered fjord might reduce some environmental risks, but it would not eliminate the dangers associated with hydrogen and cryogenic oxygen transfer. Nor would the ship provide the maintenance, weapons handling, crew support, repair capability and extensive technical services expected of an actual submarine tender.
Could Canada engineer such a vessel? Probably. Given enough money, almost anything can be engineered. But that is very different from demonstrating that it is operationally necessary, acceptably safe or more economical than properly designed shore infrastructure and sensible voyage planning.
AIP itself also needs to be understood properly. Fuel cell AIP provides relatively modest power for extremely quiet, low speed submerged endurance. Its hydrogen and oxygen are finite, and batteries remain necessary for higher power manoeuvring. It does not provide unlimited under ice endurance, high sustained submerged speed or the ability to surface through heavy ice. Planning an Arctic submarine concept around an unproven mobile reactant factory is starting at the wrong end of the operational problem.
There is nothing wrong with asking TKMS what proven replenishment options are available. What should be rejected is the insistence that Canada must give this speculative concept “immediate consideration” during supposedly ongoing RCN TKMS negotiations whose technical details the public does not know.
The RCN should define the operational requirement and have TKMS, submarine engineers, logisticians, explosive safety authorities and Arctic specialists determine the appropriate infrastructure. It should examine the proven arrangements already used by experienced AIP operators and build sensible redundancy into the Canadian support system.
Canada’s geography does not repeal physics, cryogenic handling requirements or explosive safety regulations. Before demanding that the RCN restructure a multibillion dollar submarine program around this proposal, its advocate should explain why every navy with real experience operating this technology has declined to do it.
Les, you are pushing this idea everywhere, and no one is biting. I showed the proposal to an experienced submariner who is still in, whose immediate observation was just how little you “skimmers” actually understand about submarine procurement, submarine operations and the specialized infrastructure required to support these boats. Repeating the same speculative proposal across multiple threads does not make it technically sound, operationally necessary or deserving of “immediate consideration.”
Frankly, I cannot see Canada doing it.
