TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

[Gordon Dundas/]

I 100% agree with your words. I hope Germany does not screw us over.

The government is afraid quite frankly . The choice of the South Korean SSK would have led to many hard decisions in both the foreign and defence.
The Government is used to dealing with Europe it's feels like it is in it's comfort zone. We've spent most of this country's history it seems trying to avoid the Pacific. Aside from some tentative steps.
So I think we took the easy way out I just hope that doesn't bite us in the ass in a few years.
Is it just me by the way or does it now seem that we're virtually ignoring the South Koreans?
That also bothers me on several levels.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The government is afraid quite frankly . The choice of the South Korean SSK would have led to many hard decisions in both the foreign and defence.
The Government is used to dealing with Europe it's feels like it is in it's comfort zone. We've spent most of this country's history it seems trying to avoid the Pacific. Aside from some tentative steps.
So I think we took the easy way out I just hope that doesn't bite us in the ass in a few years.
Is it just me by the way or does it now seem that we're virtually ignoring the South Koreans?
That also bothers me on several levels.

Their new tanks and SP guns are pretty cool...

 

[oldcpu]

On a (somewhat distant but) related note to this topic of Arctic operation of submarines, I note in a recent CNR Broadsides: the following:

Xue Long (Snow Dragon) and Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 2 sailed north through the US exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea in July. .... China says the ships are in the region is strictly for peaceful scientific research, environmental monitoring and global climate change studies. There is suspicion, however, that the ships are deploying advanced sonar and telemetry buoys which can track environmental changes and undersea topography, but also submarine activity.

where that article references a CBC Article: Canada, U.S. shadow Chinese research ships in the Arctic as concern grows over Snow Dragons' presence

Both Canada and the U.S. have been quietly shadowing two Chinese icebreaking research ships in Arctic waters off Alaska over the last couple of weeks.

The Xue Long (Snow Dragon) and Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 2 sailed north through the U.S. exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea in July, according to the U.S. Coast Guard.
...
Buoys can track submarine activity

When asked about the Chinese ships on Thursday, Defence Minister David McGuinty said the Canadian military actively monitors the country's waters.
...
Both research ships, however, have been known to deploy advanced sonar and telemetry buoys. Western defence officials say these devices not only track environmental changes and undersea topography, but are also useful in tracking submarine activity.
...
The federal government has begun investing heavily in the construction of new destroyers and begun the process of acquiring Arctic-capable submarines. It also plans to deploy an undersea network of sensors.

...
However if one reads the CBC article that is claimed to be about "Arctic-capable submarines", it only refers to the submarines being located at "western approaches to Canada's Arctic coast and archipelago".

So that is a bit of a stretch (unless there is more known not stated) to state "Arctic capable submarines". Just because a submarine has an AIP system, in itself, does not make a submarine 'arctic-capable' in my view.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Their new tanks and SP guns are pretty cool...

And I hope that before we buy new tanks/SP guns/MCAV we actually go out in the field and test them rather than relying on the manufacturers propaganda. Or because someone in Ottawa wrote the RFIs to favour a specific manufacturer.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

When has there not been political reasons behind any procurement decision?

Of course, but are those decisions for the RIGHT political reasons is what we are discussing?

I've got a different view of where our political, military, economic, industrial priorities should be.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I've got a different view of where our political, military, economic, industrial priorities should be.

As do I, my friend. But neither of us has decided to stand for Parliament.

 

[childs56]

And I hope that before we buy new tanks/SP guns/MCAV we actually go out in the field and test them rather than relying on the manufacturers propaganda. Or because someone in Ottawa wrote the RFIs to favour a specific manufacturer.

As long as the thing starts and works decently. We are going to Canadianize it anyways. Most of Koreas are carefully pieced together best of European/ US equipment anyways, lets add our air conditioner/ heater to it and carry on.

To me the benefit of buying SK is that they are willing to set up actual production here, where Germany is not.
SK is looking at long term defense contracts across the board as an entire industry. Germany is looking at one contract at a time for a specific piece of kit.

Honestly if it is good enough for Our European Allies it should be good enough for us.

 

[KevinB]

The Koreans are no joke. They are still at war with the North, and they take equipment very seriously.

 

[oldcpu]

On the topic on whether the 'common design' of the Type-212CD might be tuned to be more Arctic capable for all three nations (Norway, German, and Canada) I am coming to the view that such may be unlikely. It may need to be Canada only if such implemented. Why?

Since the 2009 NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, Canadian defence policy has remained unchanged under successive governments, with Canada indicating in 2009 that it preferred a firm boundary regarding NATO alliance operations in North America. Prime Minister Stephen Harper (I believe according to wiki leaks) privately warned NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in January 2010 that the alliance had no role in the Arctic, arguing that Canada's good working relationship with Russia could be undermined by greater NATO involvement and warning that attempts to expand the alliance's role could backfire by exacerbating tensions with Moscow. Against this backdrop, Ottawa has likely emphasized Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic and the Northwest Passage, while favouring a North American defence framework based primarily on Canadian responsibility and bilateral air-defence only cooperation with the United States through NORAD, rather than a NATO command role in the region.

I speculate that if still in place, such a strategic posture could be seen as having some impact on allied procurement dynamics, particularly for joint programs like the Type 212CD submarine. Because Germany and Norway operate within the European High North—where operations center on open waters, deep channels, and marginal ice zones near Svalbard and the Barents Sea—their navies do not natively require severe under-ice hardware. Knowing that Canada has historically rejected NATO-flagged support patrols inside the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, I suspect that both Berlin and Oslo have little strategic nor financial incentive to co-fund any "Arctic-hardening" implementations for their own baseline Type-212CD submarine fleets. I speculate that from their perspective, specialized modifications—such as upward-looking ice-profiling sonar, reinforced sail structures, ice-deflecting periscope masts, and hardened propellers—are non-standard requirements that are not part of the stated operational requirements for the "Common Design" for their navies that expect to operate independently of Canadian internal waters.

I am also thinking thou - one possible caveat: the geopolitical environment has fundamentally shifted since year 2009, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden. With the European Arctic more solidified now as a unified NATO flank (with Finland and Sweden), given that Russia may be increasing militarization of its northern bases, makes me ask myself if Canada's policy of keeping NATO at arm's length in the High North may benefit from renewed scrutiny - where such might lead to a stronger willingness for Type-212CD submarine Arctic hardening.

 

[oldcpu]

I am thinking more to have containers (which I believe commercially exist) embarked on a larger suitable ship (larger than an AOPS) so to generate the reactants and replenish from such. Very hypothetical - and given safety aspects plus Arctic cold complexities, it may not be viable. But given the scope of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and given the game-changer aspect if such is viable, i believe it should be thoroughly investigated to assess if feasible.

On this idea of 'containerized AIP generation for replenishment" ... my thinking was that by having such, say distributed across 3 to 4 large containers, being relatively mobile, means it could potentially be moved to different piers in Shearwater/Halifax and Esquimalt, and not force the RCN to only replenish AIP reactants from one fixed single submarine pier on each Canadian coast. I see that 'single pier' approach as potentially risky from an operational perspective.

Further if mobile, it opens up the possibility to have a 3rd or 4th system deployed to the Arctic, in a fixed Arctic deep sea port, or perhaps on TBD ship (modified (?) JSS, G-LAAM, or other auxiliary ship, where if polar class ice-cable, such a ship would help in ensuring more Arctic presense by a future RCN Canadian patrol submarine).

So while this thread is focused on Canada and on the potential future Canadian patrol submarine with an AIP system for propulsion, there are also other countries navies that operate or are actively acquiring PEM fuel cell AIP submarines that rely on LOX and hydrogen reactants, making a containerized replenishment infrastructure possibly of interest to them. Having other countries potentially interested could mean its possible Canada need not go alone here - or mean there is an international market for such a system if developed in Canada with TKMS help.

1. German navy: Type 212A (and upcoming Type 212CD).​

• AIP Fleet Size: 6 active Type 212As, with 6 Type 212CDs on order/under construction (shared development with Norway) and possibly 3 more Type-212CDs.
• Relevance: currently tied to a single fixed facility at Eckernförde for AIP reactant replenishment, potentially making mobile containerized solutions an attractive fix for logistical flexibility.

2. Norwegian Navy: Type 212CD (future).​

• AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats on order.
• Relevance: Shares a long Arctic-adjacent geography as Canada. A fixed-base limitation at Haakonsvern creates a possible strategic vulnerability.

3. Italy (Marina Militare)​

• Submarine Classes: Todaro-class (derived from the German Type 212A design).
• AIP Fleet Size: 4 active boats.
• Relevance: Operates primarily in the Mediterranean ( submarine force operations and technical support primarily between Taranto (Ionian Sea/Taranto Gulf hub) and La Spezia (Ligurian Sea/North-West hub) ; containerized replenishment could allow out-of-area or allied port servicing and more flexibility for the Marina Militare AIP reactant replenishment for their submarines.

4. South Korea (Republic of Korea Navy)​

• Submarine Classes: Son Won-yil-class (Type 214 variant) and the larger Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III).
• AIP Fleet Size: Over 9 Type 214s active/built, plus newer KSS-III boats equipped with indigenous fuel cells and lithium-ion systems.
• Relevance: South Korea has a massive industrial shipbuilding base, but restricts multi-base hydrogen logistics between Jinhae (the historic primary submarine command, training, and maintenance base) and Jeju Naval Base (the southern blue-water strategic hub)) . A more flexible AIP replenishment structure could be beneficial - providing more survivability.

5. Spain (Spanish Navy)​

• Submarine Classes: S-80 (Isaac Peral-class).
• AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats planned/delivering (using a bio-ethanol reformer-based PEM fuel cell system).
• Relevance: Even though they reform bio-ethanol to produce hydrogen on board rather than storing pure compressed/metal-hydride hydrogen externally, shoreside logistic support for reactant purity and auxiliary servicing is likely still an operational requirement. Spain supports its new S-80 AIP submarines only from the Cartagena Naval Base.

6. Singapore (Republic of Singapore Navy)​

• Submarine Classes: Invincible-class (Type 218SG).
• AIP Fleet Size: 4 custom-designed fuel-cell AIP boats.
• Relevance: Operating out of a geographically constrained island nation with intense strategic maritime traffic, having the addition of modular logistics and flexible basing options may hold some appeal. Singapore replenishes its custom Invincible-class boats only out of Changi Naval Base.

7. Israel (Israeli Navy)​

• Submarine Classes: Dolphin-class (Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II) and upcoming Dakar-class.
• AIP Fleet Size: 3 AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs active, with newer boats on the way.
• Relevance: Israel conducts its submarine AIP replenishment (for the AIP-equipped Dolphin-IIs) only from Haifa Naval Base

8. India (Indian Navy)​

• Submarine Classes: Kalvari-class (Scorpène derivatives undergoing indigenous fuel-cell AIP retrofits).
• AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats scheduled for AIP module integration during mid-life refits starting in 2026.
• Relevance: An indigenous fuel-cell program is likely planned for only Visakhapatnam and Mumbai naval bases. Other ports would offer more flexibility and survivability.

9. Greece (Hellenic Navy):

• Submarine Classes: Papanikolis-class (Type 214).
• AIP Fleet Size: 4 boats active.
• Relevance: AIP repactant replenisment from only Salamis. Having an island-heavy Aegean geography means containerized logistics could offer forward-servicing flexibility and redundancy

10. Turkey (Turkish Navy)

• Submarine Classes: Reis-class (Type 214TN derivatives built locally).
• AIP Fleet Size: 6 boats planned, with units progressively commissioning out of Gölcük.
• Relevance: Restricted entirely to fixed cryogenic facilities at Gölcük Naval Shipyard (Sea of Marmara) and Aksaz Naval Base (Mediterranean/Aegean approaches); mobile containerized refuelling could potentially eliminate the tactical vulnerability of being bound exclusively to these two permanent military hubs and enable forward servicing across dispersed secondary ports.

11. Portugal (Portuguese Navy)

• Submarine Classes: Tridente-class (Type 214 variant).
• AIP Fleet Size: 2 boats active.
• Relevance: Restricted to fixed cryogenic and industrial gas infrastructure at the Alfeite naval installation; the concept of mobile containerized refueling if implemented, could remove the vulnerability of relying exclusively on this single domestic hub for Atlantic operations and expeditionary deployments..

That list may not be all inclusive (and I may have some of my naval ports wrong), but that is my initial understanding.

Again, the concept is to shift from a fixed, single-site replenishment base, fixed always to one pier, instead to a more flexible system of mobile, containerized hydrogen and LOX generation units, where such a containerized system be relocated to many different commercial and military piers. By doing so, any of these navies could theoretically decouple their AIP submarine fleet from a replenishment "single point of failure", enabling safe replenishment at secondary ports, forward operating bases, or potentially even directly alongside auxiliary support ship that has the containers embarked. (for example, one of the containers could be a large generator).

Of course one of the elephant's in the room, could be that such a system of containerized AIP reactant replenishment, spread across multiple containers (located on demand to pier side, or on to an appropriately sized ship) may not be feasible or simply possibly not practical. Development is likely needed - although I do believe there are industrial commercial examples today of both containerized LOX generation and containerized hydrogen generation.

I do thou think this deserves immediate consideration by Canada, given Canada's unique geography.

I say 'immediate' consideration, as it may be more prudent in the current TKMS-RCN negotiations to scope the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment not as a fixed installation, but as something more mobile. My hope is the RCN/TKMS assess this, and accept or simply dismiss the concept, but only after consideration, ... definitely do give it the appropriate consideration - and not ignore and simply say - something for the future consideration. Considering now is important - and such consideration means potential synergy with the Esquimalt and Halifax/Shearwater AIP reactant replenishment plans.