Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems

[Yard Ape]

Yard Ape: the concept and ORBAT you propose has some strong similarities to the USMC.

The similarities were not intentional, but are typically pointed out when I talk about this with others.  I would suggest that the USMC in many ways is like a regiment (though very large).  To those who suggest a single pan-Canadian regiment, I would like to know if they think the USMC would be as proud if it were [just] another Corps of the US Army.  Much of the Corps' pride comes from the fact that it is not just like everybody else.  This is why I propose keeping regiments despite thier risk of mafia.  However, buy mixing the manouver arms the regiments would no longer be bastions of inter-arm rivalry.  Regiments would fight both infantry & armour perspectives. 

Much like the BGs we send overseas Arty, Engrs, Cbt Sp, & CSS would wear thier own cap badge.  I see it this way because members of these MOCs often serve in more than just one of our current brigades (or they serve in Air or Sea units).  By not tying these MOCs to specific regiments, thier corps will still have the flexibility to move pers as needed.

 

[ArmyRick]

Not trying to steer this conversation in another direction but it is related to army structure.
I read some interesting articles recently from senior officers about revamping the regimental system. I can see both pro and cons with this.
The pro: CF always deploy combined arms battle groups when deploying combat arms, this could make overall C & C easier as well admin if the battle groups were permament organizations
Cons? Thats alot of regimental and corps history and traditions to just simply dismiss or change overnight. What do you guys think?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Exploring a new regimental system from two points of view
Friday, November 05, 2004

http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?id=312

Present security operations require Western armies to engage in high-speed interventions, urban asymmetric fighting, and stability engagements.


OTTAWA, Ontario â ” The Canadian Army Journal Volume 7.1 Spring 2004 featured an article "The New Regimental system (NRS)" by Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy. Included were comments by retired Lieutenant-Colonel David Banks.

LCol Bondy is responsible to generate concepts and discussion papers to shape Army culture. His ideas on the regimental system are aimed at developing specific force structure and personnel policy options for debate by the broader Army and Canadian Forces community.

LCol Bondy developed a concept paper, which proposes that the Army abandon its historical practice of maintaining separate Combat Arms pure-branch regiments and supporting units for a single Combat Branch. Focus on making the best use of all available capabilities in order to produce the most flexible and combat effective force possible. The current force structure and personnel strategy has become out of date since the WWII and does not suit our defence needs in the post-Cold War. It's food for thought and debate says LCol Bondy.

"A set of opposing camps dug in holding on to traditional roles or worse, specific pieces of equipment," says LCol Bondy of the Land Personnel Concepts and Policies office. When a culture gets that deeply ingrained, only an abrupt change to its force structure and personnel policies can initiate meaningful cultural transformation.

Brigade-sized regiments must be all-arms, all the time, cohesive, adaptable, and maneuverable on the scale of the battle group and combat team. The New Regimental system provides cohesion, stability, experience and focused professional soldiers required for today's operational requirements.

Why do we need a new regimental system?

LCol Bondy: Since the end of the Cold War, the defence tasks and deployments have changed. Present security operations require Western armies to engage in high-speed interventions, urban asymmetric fighting, and stability engagements. In order to meet the challenges, the Army not only must adapt and modernize with the latest technology and tactics but also change its culture.

Every operational and tactical deployment since 1992 has been all-arms, combined teams; it is time for a restructure so that the Army can meet the full range of post Cold War security tasks. Armies in Sweden, Poland and Austria have made similar reforms.

The argument is that military culture determines the pace and ultimately the success of Army Transformation. Research shows that personnel policies that affect postings, promotions, and selection have the greatest impact on military culture. Our personnel strategy has to change if the army is to succeed in transforming its culture, technology and tactics.

The active posting season shifts people between units for no real gain in efficiency. Again research shows that any one person does not make much difference to a unit. Constant turnover only weakens unit cohesion and performance. Cohesion strengthens group moral and combat effectiveness, and this comes from realistic repetitive training and stable relationships, and informal communication that build reputations. As much as possible, people stay at one location, in the New Regiment.

LCol Banks: Changes made since the 1960's must be rolled back to support force structure and professionalism. In order to achieve this goal, the CF needs to de-unify the forces and focus on operational jointness instead of administrative unification. LCol Banks supports exploring a single combat branch to replace the existing armour, artillery and infantry but through different approaches. If the Army cannot maintain armour and artillery branches that provide significant support that a modern and complete infantry unit could generate, these branches should be reduced to sub-military occupational classifications (MOCs) or employment streams within a single, centralized MOC.

Branches for a reason, not invent reasons for branches. He says the stage is set for this exploration. LCol Banks does not see how implementation of a new, decentralized personnel strategy would create a better Army as a whole.
This concept paper will create more problems beyond even what the Army is faced with now says LCol Banks.

What is the proposed New Regiment (NR)?

LCol Bondy: Each new regiment would have officers and soldiers belonging exclusively to it, that is, one cap badge for every member. Each new regiment is a combined arms, brigade-sized battle group, including logistics, administration and finance support. Sub-units vary in size from battalions to sections that are custom-sized for tasking, training, and detachments. Each regiment would be identified by its own name. In the event of a section tasking or peacekeeping mission, a temporary name such as Task Force Palladium would identify that specific group.

Every officer and soldier in the Army will spend the first 10-15 years of their service life with the New Regiment. This phase of army training and adapting to army culture is the best way to make everyone a soldier first. They are recruited from the surrounding region to reduce moves for personal reasons. Everyone is deployable. Civilians provide all non-deployable office and technical support. New Specialist Corps and New General Staff subgroups provide support to the NR and monitor, guide and direct other aspects of their culture, technology and tactics.

LCol Banks: The Army should be structured for flexibility and balance, and organized to meet the full range of post Cold War security tasks. He says that LCol Bondy offers a weak basis for his proposal. The Army should use proven facts and lessons learned to perform the necessary checks to determine the truth. There is a lack of stability in combat arms units and it has been a serious problem for years.

However, it is not clear how this proposed system of endless regrouping for various task forces would strengthen cohesion, especially at the unit level. Leaving a member in one job for more then three years and having a rigid promotion system could lead to general stagnation. This is the current situation â ” officers are too frequently extended or recycled and others serve in units for years due to a severe lack of personnel.

Restricting soldiers' careers within one single Combat branch does not create an agile, flexible, adaptable force. He supports a personnel system in which soldiers of all ranks remain at the same location for several years, much of that time with the same battalion. He concedes that there may be something to part of LCol Bond's concept.

What is the new general staff?

LCol Bondy: The New General Staff (NGS) is a small group of officers responsible for strategy, civilian-military relations and developing technological, tactical and cultural changes that fit contemporary security policy. The New General Staff sets the policy for individual and collective training, equipment use and other issues, to create balance and interoperability among the New Regiments. They are not responsible for the day to day management, that is left to the New Regiments or the civilian office.

LCol Banks: This idea is flawed and is likely to contribute to an Army with little esprit de corps or cohesion. The proposal to only allow for mid-career transfer from one unit to another would produce a field army led by officers limited in experience and knowledge who are detached from the reality of operations.

What is the new specialist corps?

LCol Bondy: A series of separate New Specialists Corps would be formed around traditional professions, and the new general staff social professions to provide the kind of discipline that makes Canadians such good soldiers. The New Specialist Corps would include: military law, chaplains, personnel selection, social work, counseling, family services, medical and dental care. The NSC uses a separate rank structure and wears uniform distinct from the NR and NGS. LCol Bondy's argument in this issue is summarized in the Canadian Army Journal.

LCol Banks: Based on my experience, says LCol Banks, supporters work best with and for the field army when they look, sound and act like the soldiers they are supporting. It is an excellent idea to have the supporters belong to the New Regiment but why not go further and ensure that those who serve in the Army are taught that they are a "soldier first, tradesman or support second."

All told, it is interesting to contrast LCol Bondy's article that draws upon research from writing on military affairs and social science and LCol Banks' article that relies on his personal experience and military career.

Article by Sgt Derek Scott

-------------------------------------------------

Interesting read.  The full article can be viewed at the Canadian Army Journal site:
http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_7/CAJ_vol7.1_e.pdf

PBI,

I tend to agree with your viewpoint regarding the New General Staff and the New Specialist Corps.  Officers within the New General Staff would likely become strict academics with little real-world experience that is necessary when determining defence strategy and policy. 
The New Specialist Corps would further drive the wedge that currently exists between support and combat arms soldiers.

The New Regiment idea however is something that is worth exploring given the drawdown of the Armour and Artillery branches.

 

[a_majoor]

My own thoughts on the matter are we can get the many of same benefits without the radical surgery Col Bondy is proposing.

Step one might be to treat the Brigade battlegroup in the same manner as a US Cavalry Regiment or Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Units and branches will still remain, but are de emphasised in favor of the Brigade (i.e I'm with Duke's Coy of 2 Battlegroup) as part of the cultural realignment.

Step two follows from the ever increasing convergence of weapons systems. When the Anti-Armour platoon can attempt engagements from 8+ Km away (ADATS MMEV, or alternatively ground launched Hellfires replacing the TOW), and sensor fused munitions could potentially give an MGS commander to ability to shoot a target 10+ km away, then the physical distinctions between Armour, Artillery and Infantry become moot. "Manoeuvre Battalions" can be formed with a mix of direct and indirect fire platforms, teamed with mounted Infantry soldiers to provide escort, close protection, target acquisition and sensing and close combat duties. Essentially each "company" will be a self contained combat team.

An Armoured Squadron is a good organizational starting point. It has a square structure of four symmetrical troops, and an administration troop for sustainment in battle. A Manoeuvre Battalion company could have a troop (platoon) of direct fire platforms, a troop (platoon) of indirect fire platforms and two troops (platoons) of mounted Infantry, as well as the administration troop (platoon). Our current mix of LAV systems shows the way, although the fire platform needs a lot of work. Alternative fire platforms might include 120mm turret mounted mortars with "smart" munitions, gun tanks firing through tube missiles and so on. Old regimental titles could still be kept, but the functional distinctions between the units will be gone. Each unit in the Battlegroup will have 3 "Manoeuvre companies", a Headquarters company and an ISTAR company (for example) regardless of its historical title.

My own view of staffs is they need to support direct "sensor to shooter" links, support horizontal communications between the deployed manoeuvre companies and do the thinking and planning in the background to "set up" logistics and support in an unobtrusive manner, so the company commander isn't innundated with requests for information from above, nor "info-dump" from higher. This is an idealized vision of how things are supposed to work now.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There is an ailment called age related macular degeneration which causes old folks to not see too much or too well.   I, like many of my generation, may have difficulty in 'seeing' the requirements of the 21st century army; we - some of us, anyway - tend to view our past and our army through rose coloured glasses which also smooth out all the rough edges.   With that caveat, here are some random thoughts:

"¢ The regimental system has been around since Roman times; things which last that long tend to be useful.   We have understood, for a couple of millennia, that soldiers will endure any privation and they will fight against hopeless odds for their mates, and, with almost the same intensity, for the eagles and colours and other symbols and even ideas which tell them that they and their mates belong to this family and everyone else belongs to other families - some friends, some enemy.   We, generations of leaders going back to the mists of time, have exploited this very human attribute - one which is well known to every minor hockey coach.   Radical change may be desirable, even necessary but let us approach changes with caution - not fear, just caution;

"¢ The Canadian regimental system circa 2004 is not sacrosanct; some people - me included - will say that it is in urgent need of reform.   The regimental system has ebbed and flowed over the centuries.   The one we have was designed to exploit the religious, racial, linguistic and cultural differences which plagued 18th/19th century India and Britain, too - consider, as I have said elsewhere, the requirement for the Cameronians so that covenanters did not need to serve beside Church of England and, even, Church of Scotland apostates.   We have changed in the past we can - will - change in the future;

"¢ There is, equally, nothing sacred about the infantry and the cavalry - except that we have believed, for about 2,000 years, that they should be organized into different 'regiments' for training and to take account of their different attributes.   Maybe the distinctions between those attributes are disappearing;

"¢ I, personally, believe that one attribute of a 'good' (effective at enhancing individual and unit combat effectiveness) regimental system is that it must be large enough to prevent a monopoly.   We saw a monopoly, and some of its ill effects in 1990 during Lewis MacKenzie's testimony at the Somalia inquiry.   MacKenzie testified that after the brigade commander (Ernie Beno) had fired the R22eR CO then he (MacKenzie, the Area Commander) and Gord Reay (Commander of   the Command) and John de Chastelain (CDS) - the complete chain of command - all sat together to decide what to do next.   They decided that the best thing to do was to send the best infantry lieutenant colonel to Petawawa, quickly; then they amended that to the best available lieutenant colonel (so as not to take serving COs out of their units, etc); and then, when they looked at the list, they decided to pick the best available R22eR lieutenant colonel because they (all three PPCLI) were concerned (I think that's the word Lew used - it is what he meant) that it would appear that the PPCLI mafia was ganging up to serve its own interests.   The problem is: they were right - many, maybe most people would have thought just that.   It is my belief that the system needs, at least about ten, maybe a dozen regiments in addition to the artillery, logistics, engineers and signals (the latter two having provided a disproportionately large share of senior officers, including CGS/CDS in the post WWII army/CF) to prevent monopolization of the chain of command.   I think we might be, just barely, OK if we had five or ten single (permanent force) battalion infantry regiments plus four or five (or more) cavalry regiments; and

"¢ Good, effective regiments are expensive and they are easy targets when budgets are being cut.   Regiments need museums and the like and 'resources' to keep the 'regiment' in the soldiers' mind.   It even extends to clothing and equipment - polyester and plastic will, I think, degrade esteem and spirit de corps, if we want serge and polished leather performance then we have to pay for it.

 

[a_majoor]

I fully agree. The Regimental system has many benefits, but what Col Bondy is saying is the current structure is inefficient and inflexible. A larger "regiment" like the Cavalry/IBCT is one way of creating a bigger "gene pool" of talent and ideas; maintaining regimental titles and traditions on a 21rst century version of the combat team/battlegroup is another option.

I agree more with Col Banks that the proposed supporting structures of a "New General Staff" and a "New Specialist Corps" will probably cause more problems than they are intended to solve. I have also noticed the NR/NGS/NSC concept seems rather self contained. Has Col Bondy published any follow ups to how this structure will operate as part of Joint Expeditionary Force packages?

 

[rifleman]

Here's an idea,

How about keep the regiments and create combat teams and battle groups as they are needed. (or we can spend alot of money and resources on new names, terminology and cap badges)

Another great idea is to have everyone wear the same uniform (perhaps all green, maybe red pants and white shirts so everyone can tell we are canadians)

We could also create one big military city and put all the forces there. think of the savings

 

[Matt_Fisher]

I'm eagerly awaiting the summer issue of the Canadian Army Journal to be put online as I don't have access to the hard copy edition down here in the US.

 

[Kirkhill]

About the time the Cameronians were being raised the latest fashion in military thinking was the Dragoon.  A mounted commoner on an adequate horse equipped as both an infanteer with a musket and as a cavalryman with a sword. They were raised to patrol the countryside and to keep anti-government elements in line.  King James VI used this type of soldier to subdue the Anglo-Scots border, Bonnie Dundee used similar forces to subdue the Covenanters and the Sun King (Louis XIV) used them (the first named Dragons/Dragoons) to subdue the Huguenots.

The force was considered an abomination by military traditionalists.  They were poor infantry and they weren't "Good" enough to be aristocratic cavalry.  However over time they were accepted into the Cavalry family as suitable outfits for the lesser gentry to command.  They tended to think of themselves as Cavalry and not Mounted Infantry.

By the time of the Boer War, Britain need mounted forces to dominate the countryside in South Africa.  They created Mounted Infantry units from line infantry regiments and brought in mounted colonial forces like the Aussie Light Horse regiments and the Lord Strathcona's which was heavily recruited from the Northwest Mounted Police (started life as the Northwest Mounted RIFLES).  Interestingly enough the Royal Canadian Dragoons was at least appropriately named for the role requested of it.

In WWI Cavalry didn't see much action in Europe but horse soldiers were in demand under Allenby in the Middle East.  

There was an interesting Australian movie about the Light Horse under Allenby.  The centre-piece of the movie was the flanking manoeuvre and assault to take the wells at BeerSheba to the south of Jerusalem.  The approach was made successfully but then the assault had to be put in, in daylight across a large plain with no cover.  The Light Horse, acting as mounted infantry and armed with Lee-Enfields and bayonets were tasked.  The Cavalry types armed with swords objected that if any charging was to be done then they should be the ones to do it.  The Light Horse conducted the assault.

Point of this historical excursion?


Regimental roles have changed and changed back many times.  Novelty is always opposed by the entrenched.  Even when novelty means going back to the future.

Ultimately I don't think the Regiment is about role, kit or uniform.  I think it is about continuity.  It is about staying connected with your ancestors and saying if they could sit under the guns at Blenheim, dying while having lunch and waiting for the order to assault, if they could pick up roses to stick in their hats while advancing at Minden, then maybe I can withstand the noise around me now and wait for orders.

Everything else is about how best to maintain that continuity.

 

[a_majoor]

Col Bondy's article and Col Bank's reply are in CAJ Vol 7 No 1 Spring 2004. If you are having difficulty finding a copy Matt, contact me off-line.

Kirkhill has said it far better than I could have, rifleman. A regiment is an organization and a place for people. The jobs they do and how they do them will change with time, just like it does everywhere else. Imagine trying to build cars today using the organization of Ford Motor Company in 1920. Because our jobs are different, the strength of the organization is far more important than it would be to a labourer in a civvie factory.

 

[Edward Campbell]

A few more random thoughts:

"¢ Re: exploiting differences - we probably must have some form of the classic regimental system in Canada because of our linguistic divide.   We will have French speaking regiments and they will become more and more different no matter what sort of uniformity someone might want to impose.   Better, I am saying, to get on with â ?doin' what come natcherly;â ?

"¢ I would go a bit farther.   If we are going to reform, as I think we must, and if reform includes enlargement, as I think it must, then I would prefer to see us adopt and then exploit good ol' Canadian regionalism.   Back in about 1920 it was decided that the small permanent force (peacetime, regular army) would be slightly larger than its 19th century predecessor: three (single PF battalion) regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry; it was also decided that they would be 'national' rather than regional and that one of the infantry regiments would be a French Canadian (rather than a Québec) regiment: RCD, LdSH, RCR, PPCLI and R22eR.   Post World War II, in 1949 actually, the big expansion too place - and three new, but still 'national' regiments of infantry were added.   Now, a bit of history is important.   Guy Simmonds was CGS and he was a notorious anglophile so he insisted that we be as British as possible: his pet project was the Regiment of Canadian Guards; he insisted that 1 Canadian Highland Battalion in Hannover be made into the Black Watch and he selected the Queens' Own Rifles as the most 'national' (and most British) of the light infantry regiments.   The VIII New Brunswick Hussars were renamed VIII Canadian Hussars and, somehow, the Fort Gary Horse snuck in as the only faintly 'regional' regiment in the army.   I thought Simmonds was wrong; I thought we should have added 'regional' regiments to the mix, but ...

"¢ I agree 100% with Kirkhill that regiments are about continuity but I think we err if we pay too little attention to 'buttons and bows' and, especially, to the quality of our ceremonial endeavours.   It is my experience that soldiers work bloody hard to make big ceremonial events 'work' well and that they derive considerable, albeit quiet personal satisfaction from having been on the 'best ever' trooping, etc.   I think they would rather polish a good leather belt than wear a plastic one ... I'm old, so treat that with more suspicion than usual; I also usually had a batman so the 'satisfaction' I derived from being well turned-out didn't cost me too much time and effort.

 

[Kirkhill]

I also agree with Rusty Old Joint about Buttons and Bows and Ceremonial.  Those are the tokens and talismen that supply constant reminders of our ancestors.  They are critical to maintaining continuity.  It is a large part of the reason that the Strats have a mounted troop, the RCR wear's Wolseley pattern helmets and the King's Troop Royal Horse Artillery still rides around Hyde Park firing highly polished and obsolete 13-pounders. It's the reason for kilts and pipes.  It is all about maintaining those links.

Sorry ROJ, it wasn't ceremonial kit I was knocking.  It was a focus on the musket and pike, horse and elephant type of kit I was referring to.  Sorry for the confusion.

Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Good topic.  I'm currently reading a pretty good attempt at a Regimental History of the X Legion "Fretensis".  The nuances of the Roman system of raising and maintaining legions gives some pretty interesting insights in the way to organize combat units in a Regimental (tribe or clan like) fashion.

More to follow as a collect my thoughts....

 

[Jungle]

MacKenzie testified that after the brigade commander (Ernie Beno) had fired the R22eR CO then he (MacKenzie, the Area Commander) and Gord Reay (Commander of   the Command) and John de Chastelain (CDS) â “ the complete chain of command - all sat together to decide what to do next.

Just for historical accuracy, LCol Morneault was PPCLI, not R22eR. His replacement (LCol Mathieu), however, was R22eR.
The first thing we should look at (at least in the RegF) is to untie the member from a specific Regt. Members should be able to be posted to any Battalion (language being a natural factor to look at) according to needs. This would probably make a smoother transition to any "new" Regt'l system.

 

[Infanteer]

The first thing we should look at (at least in the RegF) is to untie the member from a specific Regt. Members should be able to be posted to any Battalion (language being a natural factor to look at) according to needs. This would probably make a smoother transition to any "new" Regt'l system

So you're advocating a system more akin to the US Army, where members transfer in and out of different Regiments and Divisions throughout their career?  Or something akin to the Aussies, which have one big regiment (for the reg Infantry), the RAR.

 

[Jungle]

Either system is fine, in my opinion, but the US model would probably be easier to transition to in Canada.
In the end, we should look at the Aussie model closely; it has all the advantages of the British Regt'l system, with Regt'l "loyalties" going to a single capbadge for all (RegF) Infanteers.

 

[McG]

In the end, we should look at the Aussie model closely; it has all the advantages of the British Regt'l system, with Regt'l "loyalties" going to a single capbadge for all (RegF) Infanteers.

I think any new system should avoid the tradition of regiments being exclusive to one branch.  A future regimental system should tie both the infantry and cavalry together.  I don't think we need to look at a single regiment system either.  I would concur with the initial proposal to transpose regimental affiliations to the brigade level.

 

[Jungle]

Agreed, but we will probably have to take some interim measures before we reach the final organisation. I maintain that the first step has to be to untie the Soldier from a single Regt'l affiliation.

Actually, the CAR was probably ahead of it's time; every member of the Regt, regardless of trade, Corps etc... wore the same accoutrements. And it worked very well !!

 

[McG]

Actually, the CAR was probably ahead of it's time; every member of the Regt, regardless of trade, Corps etc... wore the same accoutrements. And it worked very well !!

However, the Airborne was able to draw a sense of pride and family through its unique role, high standards, and elite status.  In our current structure, seperating the soldier from the regiment would effectively eliminate the regiment.  Every soldier would find him/herself in "just another Army battalion."

To those who suggest a single pan-Canadian regiment, I would like to know if they think the USMC would be as proud if it were [just] another Corps of the US Army. Much of the Corps' pride comes from the fact that it is not just like everybody else.

 

[a_majoor]

Not all regiments will be "one size fits all", even in the fabulous future we are promised as part of the RMA.

My vision of Manoeuvre Battalions provides a form of flexible and mobile fighting power which is adaptable for everything from low to high intensity combat, hence their getting pride of place, even if they perpetuate older regimental titles and traditions.

A bit of "cutting and pasting" from existing regiments and battalions, allied with a modest increase in funding and manpower (yes, employing those 5000 troops we are promised) can give us the following:

The three Lib parachute companies combined with the resources currently at the Canadian Parachute Centre to create the "Canadian Parachute Battalion" (we will avoid the name Airborne Regiment for now to divert negative energy, and because it really will only be a battalion)

3 x LIBs (augmented with new companies to replace the parachute companies) combined with three squadrons worth of tactical helicopters and some innovative use of UAV's to create an airmobile capability (restyle the units as battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles). Those of you who know who I am will have have read this in the ADTB (The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, ADTB Vol 5 No 4)

The regimental affiliations do reflect the jobs we do now, and to a certain extent the jobs we could be doing tomorrow. If a soldier is a member of 1 RCR, it won't matter that much if the unit has evolved into one of the Manoeuvre Battalions in 2 CMBG. He is still a "Royal Canadian", and is busy cheering the regimental hockey team as it takes on the RCD's (another Manoeuvre Battalion), or complaining in the mess how "those guys" in 2 Canadian Mounted Rifles are always putting on airs...

This thread is starting to tilt a bit. The argument wasn't so much about the need for regiments, but rather what sort of organization we want or need for a Regimental system.