Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems

[Kirkhill]

To borrow a line from Nike shoes...why not "Just do it".

Form Battle groups in garrison from multiple cap badges.   Give each one a separate shoulder patch to complement their brigade patches as McG suggests and watch the lines of communication form naturally.   Soon enough, 2 years, 5 years 10 years the soldiers within the groups will be wondering what all these different badges and hat colours are all about.   Then you can think about rationalizing the badges.

 

[McG]

Now we may be into word games.  We are looking at three changes

1) Occupational Structures (merging the Cbt branches and introducing a common officer MOC)
2) Organisational Structure (transposing regimental identities to the formation and introducing all arms units)
3) Attitude (getting the soldiers to embrace & accept change)

I think 1 & 2 will have to come first.

 

[Kirkhill]

I would say the order likely would work best 2,1,3

Make the structural or organizational change immediately with what you have, adjust the MOCs and Training to suit the needs the wait, as McG suggests, for the attitudes to change.

 

[pbi]

I think we are on to something here, and I would be willing to bet that alot more of our comrades in arms (Reg and Reserve) are open to thinking beyond the Regtl system than some people would have us think. The Regimental system as we know it is something we inherited from the British Army. The British system did not always look the way we think it does: it really began to take on its "traditional" shape with the Cardwell Reforms (after Crimea IIRC) that grouped numbered battalions into Regiments and then affiliated most of them (but not all of them...) with particular geographic locations such as counties. There was great resistance to the loss of the numbers that the units carried, as it was felt that the number was a clear indication of the unit's seniority in the order of battle. Since that time the British Regtl system has undergone countless mergers and disbandments, and has even gone through a "Brigade" phase in which Bde capbadges were worn instead of unit badges. These changes have continued, through "Options For Change" right up to the present day, and they are not done yet.

So, the "Mother of the Regimental System" seems to be able to adapt to change and carry on producing some of the world's finest soldiers who regularly prove their mettle in ops all over the world. What's our problem? Why have we so bitterly resisted the "A" word? Why, especially, when so many people actually dont seem to oppose amalgamation/restructure if you sit down and talk with them about it. And yet, when our Bde proposed two sets of amalgamations under LFRR PhII, the Army ran and hid, and abandoned the stage to the likes of Reserve 2000 who foamed at the mouth and called our Bde Comd everything except a traitor. What's the issue, especially when we consider that almost all Reserve units today are the products of amalgamations or conversions or redesignations somewhere in their past? Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

PBI, I think the problems you identified have something to do with the "empires" that Rusty Old Joint alluded to.  :-\

 

[Infanteer]

Now we may be into word games.   We are looking at three changes

1) Occupational Structures (merging the Cbt branches and introducing a common officer MOC)
2) Organisational Structure (transposing regimental identities to the formation and introducing all arms units)
3) Attitude (getting the soldiers to embrace & accept change)

You're right, this may be semantics, but I think my distinctions between Human Affairs and Military Affairs are important, so I'll justify my use of terms and my assignment of characteristics; so bear with me now....

With my "Military Theory-lite" model I put forth, I used the term "Structural" to denote things that you put under the "occupational ".   However, I would contend that things that fall under the "structural" category go beyond occupational notions - things related to "Human Affairs" have an impact on the Fighting Power (as Van Crevald defines it) of an Army.

I think the term "Structural" would include notions such as pay and leave, education, the "image" the military sells to the people, and command relationships and ideas on leadership.

The "Organizational" category - directly related to "Military Affairs" (for lack of a better term - I'm interested if someone can find a better definition) - is more focused on the quantitative aspects of Combat Power.   Notions such as How many Tanks?, How many soldiers?, Who is in Command?, C2 Systems?, What kind of Equipment?, and Divisional Slices (tooth-to-tail ratios).

You included "transposing regimental identities to the formation level" under the organizational field; I'd argue that it is "Structural" rather than "Organizational".   The Regimental System is not one of organization but rather one of affiliation.   In changing the regimental system we are not changing the way we organize our different MOCs and our units (we do so anyways with adhoc Battlegroups and mixed Regiment Brigade Groups) but rather we are changing perceptions of who soldiers view as "us" and "them", who they share lineage with, who they can expect to work with and deploy with.   Changing the Regimental system seems to be much more qualitative then quantitative (hence why I termed it a structural characteristic).

Now, to carry on my "Military Theory-lite" model to the next step, perhaps it can be said that the overall capability of a fighting force is its Military Effectiveness.   The sum of Military Effectiveness is made up by the characteristics of both the "structural" and the "organizational" domains.

The aggregate of "Structural" characteristics (the often intangible aspects related to morale and mentality) can be called Fighting Power.   Fighting Power is the spirit and confidence that a force has in its ability to meet enemies in combat.   Fighting power is the stuff of stoic defences, high morale, and underdog-victories.

The characteristics of the "Organizational" domain are the more tangible ones; I'll call them Combat Power.   Combat power can be the "heavy metal" of the equation.   How advanced is the technology of a fighting force?   How much of it do they have?   Are the units of a force organized properly to exploit that technology?   How many "boots-on-the-ground" is a force capable of quickly delivering?   Is the headquarters and support a smooth and efficient force multiplier, or a large, rear-echelon parasite?   Being much more visual, Combat Power is usually seen to be the currency of military might - however, doing so at the expense of Fighting Power may have bad consequences (The US in Vietnam).

Thus:   Military Effectiveness = Fighting Power + Combat Power.

As I stated in my original post, trying to push transformational change one can be ineffective.   Change must be equally focused on both to avoid having the equation go out of wack, which reduces Military Effectiveness.

As for #3 (Attitude), I think that an institution like the military, which is inherently conservative, will usually pretty adverse to change.   Transformation must usually be evolutionary rather then revolutionary lest the ideas of transformation flop on their face (The nature of the instigator of Transformation usually can determine the speed - ie: Napoleon, a military genius and in total command of the State, was able to successfully utilize the transformational effects of the Revolution in a rapid and successful manner).

That being said, even the most profound transformations take time and are not immediately warmly received.   Reading the biography of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who can be credited with creating the modern, professional Officer's Corps, one sees that even though his ideas took root in the institution and some were instituted right away (The Kreigsakadamie), many took time to develop and become accepted (The notion of a meritocracy open to any Prussian) or were ignored all together (the notion that the Prussian Army should belong to the people rather then the monarch).   The nature of the military institution usually means that the attitude towards change will be the last to follow (military success can help act as a catalyst to attitudes on change).

Well, does this make sense?   It's just the relationships I've been drawing in my head.

I'll stand down from the "Clausewitz for the night box" now....

Infanteer

 

[canuck101]

Well I would like to see the army have five active regiments. This would mean adding two new regiments. This is only if the government ever  gives the Forces enough money.  Fully man the regiments that we have now ie. PPCLI, RCR, The Royal 22e Regimént and perhaps reactivate the airborne and activate one of the reserve regiments for example maybe the The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada to full active status. That is my two cents for today comment away.

 

[Infanteer]

Again, rhetoric but no substance.

You say activate "regiments", do you understand that the regiment is not a field formation (ie: it is not bound by TO&E).

Try and understand what you are talking about before you go making proposals in this forum.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Back to the future?

Just so you know where I'm coming from, let me describe some of 'the way we were' when I first joined a battalion:

"¢ We all expected to command rife platoons, as 2nd lieutenants and/or lieutenants, for a bare minimum of two years before being assigned any other duties - three or four were normal.   Our platoons were not up top strength - sections, typically, had seven or so men - a corporal, a lance corporal and five - one being the lance corporal Bren gunner's ammunition pack mule.   The corporal were as young as 20 to as old as 35 - most platoon sergeants were in the early 30s - but there were a handful of real old sweats' - usually one per company - in their '40s but still fit and tough and great teachers;

"¢ One of two subalterns were aspiring Provost Corps (military police) officers.   There were only two ways to become a provost officer - CFR (from a staff sergeant) or from the ranks of infantry subalterns.   The key job of the Provost Corps was road movement control - traffic planning and control; it is vital when large formations, especially their logistical 'tails' must manoeuvre on limited roads.   The second job was looking after POWs; the third was assisting regimental officers in maintaining discipline.   Policing was done by policemen - members of the RCMP;

"¢ The quartermaster was a regimental officer - usually a CFR'd WO1.   Almost all the storesmen and absolutely all the clerks were regimental soldiers.   There were a few Ordnance Corps storesmen in e.g the munitions stores (and almost all of them were former artillery and armoured storesmen) - there were a largish number of RCEME tradesmen - mostly vehicle mechanics and armourers, a few medics, a couple of apy clerks and a small number of Signals operators and radio mechanics.   There was one each a Signals Officers, Medical Officer and RCEME Maintenance Platoon commander - all were, usually captains.   There was, in some units, a Signals subaltern but he was always a rifle platoon commander.   This Signals Officer 'thing' was unique to the Canadian Army - our British counterparts had a specially trained infantry captain as battalion (or regimental in armoured/artillery units) signal officer, he was assisted by a Signal Corps subaltern and sergeant; and

"¢ Some of our officer went, after a few years, to the Intelligence Corps - that corps was like the Provost Corps: no 'direct entry'- not for NCOs, either.   All Intelligence Corps personnel came from other corps - both arms and services.

While we are debating merging or mixing infantry and armour, it seems to me that one of the things we - you, serving people - should discuss is the proliferation of specialists in the battalion - and not just gunners keeping their numbers up by manning infantry mortar platoons.   Unless something really major has changed there is nothing about the logistics stores or admin/clerical duties which cannot be taught to a good infantry soldier in a relatively short, specialist course.   Ditto, today, for most of the signals jobs - I understood the requirement to have some signals specialists when they copied Morse code; there was little, normally nothing, to choose between specialist signals soldiers and infantry signallers when that one skill was taken out of the mix; well they no longer do Morse code and there is, therefore, no justification for signals operators in the battalion, although we do, still, need the radio mechanics.

The aims of reducing the specialists are twofold:

"¢ To provide a better range/mix of jobs in the battalion for the combat soldiers which has the added 'value' of   improving cohesion; and

"¢ To 'reserve' some percentage of the specialist corps/branch 'slots' for soldiers who re-muster from the combat trades.   Thus: "Why,â ? I asked a friend who had been a Signals officers, "are there any privates in the ranks of your technical tradesmen?   Why are those really great jobs not 'reserved' for good combat arms soldiers who re-muster after they are well trained soldiers and have made a commitment to the army?   You,â ? I said, "would have a better corps of people and we, all of us, would have a better army.â ?

 

[canuck101]

Sorry for the lack of research and knowledge that i showed. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were reduced to nil strength and the combined manpower was amalgamated to form the new 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment on 1 July 1970.  Activate may have not been the right word that i was looking for but i still think having five regular infantry regiments instead of three would be better.

 

[Infanteer]

Again, "regiments" doesn't mean much.  We could have 9 active Infantry regiments right now, if we affiliated each separate infantry battalion with an regular force battalion.

Is there any logic or rationale for your proposal for "5 active regiments"?  Perhaps you mean Brigades (the formation unit above the battalion)?

 

[Infanteer]

"¢    One of two subalterns were aspiring Provost Corps (military police) officers.   There were only two ways to become a provost officer - CFR (from a staff sergeant) or from the ranks of infantry subalterns.   The key job of the Provost Corps was road movement control - traffic planning and control; it is vital when large formations, especially their logistical 'tails' must manoeuvre on limited roads.   The second job was looking after POWs; the third was assisting regimental officers in maintaining discipline.   Policing was done by policemen - members of the RCMP;

This is something I've wondered about as well.   Perhaps the CF should contract out local base/investigative matters to the RCMP (much like provincial/municipal governments do) and let the MP's (Provost) stick to the military end of things.

All-in-all, good post.   Good examples of military institutions that still follow out many of the ways you alluded to in your post would be the Aussies and the Royal Marines.   After all, as an all-professional military taking recruits who increasingly more and more proficient at multiple tasks (find a 20-year old who doesn't know how to work MS Windows technology) would be able to "cross-train" across MOC's.   We've had this discussion re: Medics in the CSS forum; I'm sure it could be extended to other fields as well.

The aims of reducing the specialists are twofold:

"¢    To provide a better range/mix of jobs in the battalion for the combat soldiers which has the added 'value' of   improving cohesion; and

"¢    To 'reserve' some percentage of the specialist corps/branch 'slots' for soldiers who re-muster from the combat trades.   Thus: "Why,â ? I asked a friend who had been a Signals officers, "are there any privates in the ranks of your technical tradesmen?   Why are those really great jobs not 'reserved' for good combat arms soldiers who re-muster after they are well trained soldiers and have made a commitment to the army?   You,â ? I said, "would have a better corps of people and we, all of us, would have a better army.â ?

We've debated these concepts before (especially number 2) - contentious, yes; but if still workable, I think it can go a long ways in reducing the tooth-to-tail ratios without hurting our sustainment capabilities.

 

[canuck101]

yes that is what i meant i will shut up now.

 

[McG]

canuck101,
Have a read through this post (and skim the rest of the thread):   Platoons, Brigades, Divisions Oh My! How the Army is structured.

Then re-read this thread.

It may help formulate whatever argument you are trying to make.

 

[canuck101]

Thank you for the help i will read them and use for future reference.

 

[ArmyRick]

I am in favor of forming Battle Groups...
Thats what we deploy for the most part.
My idea would see brigades being disolved and in place of what we have noew would be 6 LAV or mechanized battle groups and 3 Quick Reaction Battle Groups (light but can still fight)..
Each battle group (LAV/Mech) would have..
-BG HQ (Command, sigs, ISTAR co-ord, Info, CIMIC, Psy Ops, etc)
-3 x Infantry Company
-Cavalry Squadron (tank squadron is out dated in another year or two)
-Artillery battery (LG1 or MAVS)
-Engineer Squadron (can never too many sappers)
-Service Support Company

A Light BG would have the same but switch the CAV SQN with a TAC helicopter squadron (even if it is the Grief-fin, LOL)

Battalions or Regiments would be folded as well (Oh my, wash that man's mouth out with soap for such foul words, I can hear the protest)
Instead your OC and CSM would look after you. You would be posted to a company, squadron or battery.
Oh yeah, the mortars? I say give them back to the infantry and place them directly in the companies.
What about Canada deploying a brigade? Come on and stay with it. When have we deployed a brigade?(not a BG with other assets)

 

[McG]

What about Canada deploying a brigade? Come on and stay with it. When have we deployed a brigade?(not a BG with other assets)

We have deployed Bde HQs (Op ATHENA roto 0 and 1) and we have a UN commitment for a Bde HQ.  We have also deployed unit sized Bde assets (eg: CANENGBAT to UNPROFOR).

 

[BillN]

From todays BBC News.......


Battalions go in troops shake-up

Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon has outlined details of wide-ranging structural changes to the British Army.
He told the Commons reductions in heavy armour, heavy artillery and the infantry will be accompanied by an increase in specialists.

The number of infantry battalions will fall from 40 to 36, including a new "super-regiment" for Scotland, which will include the Black Watch.

Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Ancram said it was a "dark day" for the Army.


Voicing Tory criticisms, he said the changes were driven by a desire to cut costs and were "dangerous" as they would leave the Army overstretched.

Britain's senior Army officer, General Sir Mike Jackson, said: "The Army has never stood still. It has always evolved to meet new challenges and it must do so again."

Mr Hoon's statement comes after Army chiefs met last Monday to discuss the restructure.

Changes

The following changes were among those announced by the defence secretary:


The Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers will merge, and with four other battalions, including the Black Watch, will form the Royal Regiment of Scotland.

The 19th Mechanised Brigade, based in Catterick, will start conversion to a light brigade in January.

The 4th Armoured Brigade based in Germany will be converted to a Mechanised Brigade in 2006.

The King's Own Royal Border Regiment, the King's Regiment and the Queen's Lancashire Regiment will merge to form two new battalions within the new King's Lancashire and Border Regiment.

One battalion will also be taken from the Prince of Wales's Division in the south of England.
Mr Hoon, whose statement was greeted by Tory jeers, told the Commons: "These plans will make the Army more robust and resilient, able to deploy, support and sustain the enduring expeditionary operations that are essential for a more complex and uncertain world.

"The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments that these changes bring about is the only sustainable way in which to structure the infantry for the long term."

The defence secretary said he understood the importance of regimental traditions but the changes needed to be seen in the wider context of "re-balancing the Army".

But Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Ancram condemned the "dismal statement".

He said: "It is a dark day for our armed forces. It is also a day of shame for this discredited and ineffective defence secretary.

"Our armed forces deserve better than to be betrayed in this appalling manner by their government."

SNP MP Annabelle Ewing was ordered out of the Commons chamber by the Speaker after calling Mr Hoon a "backstabbing coward".

Sir Mike Jackson, the Army's Chief of General Staff, said: "We have inevitably had to make some tough choices to keep within the resources allocated.

"The underpinning rationale is based on an operational need for a more agile and flexible force."

The final decision on the restructuring was made by Mr Hoon and the prime minister after a recommendation by senior defence figures.

 

[McG]

"The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments that these changes bring about is the only sustainable way in which to structure the infantry for the long term."

Hey, we're already there.

I knew that several British regiments were "multi-battalion."  How many were only one battalion?

 

[Kirkhill]

There were 19 Single Battalion Regt's McG, out of a total of 40 battalions.  The Government had available also 3 Royal Marine Units and the RAF Regiment which supplies something like 7 or 8 Squadrons of Ground Pounders.  Each Squadron is an independently deployable and sustainable lt inf combat tm for VP protection.