Yup, I was one of them, and I stand by it. Particularly taking into account the various incentives for an operational deployment overseas in an actual conflict versus babysitting Cold Lake. I could certainly see a role for reservists as Class B or C augmentees to help backfill or boost numbers, but not as the core manning of the task. Afghanistan was also the focus of the army, and reserve units that DID contribute a lot of people, mine included, did so at their own expense. Which is as it should be- but it was a known finite thing. The Force Pro task will be forever in organizational terms.They actually provided a fairly reliable percentage pool of full-time people representing in excess of 15% of the force we had in Afghanistan from 2006 through 2011 and afterwards. And that was in a situation with a very poor ARes structure which we had then and continue to have now. In a properly designed structure they could do much better.
That's actually a bit of a misunderstanding of the term. You need to first take a look at the accompanying element which is "officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for ... ." Civilians initially enroll for either continuing full-time or other than continuing full-time service. In the normal context that continues, but there are instances where the situation changes when reservists are called out on service or placed on active service. The point with that is that the full-time service that they have been "mobilized" for has a temporary nature to it albeit that the length of that period may be for a considerable period of time.
Yup, and I appreciate the correction of nuance. But since we’re speaking to a permanent, largely predictable, full time establishment, I don’t think I’m out of the ball park on this entirely.
Augement with reservists, but build an intentionally sufficient and sustainable RegF construct.