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CAF Security Forces [Split from RCN Anti Drone Weapon]

They actually provided a fairly reliable percentage pool of full-time people representing in excess of 15% of the force we had in Afghanistan from 2006 through 2011 and afterwards. And that was in a situation with a very poor ARes structure which we had then and continue to have now. In a properly designed structure they could do much better.
Yup, I was one of them, and I stand by it. Particularly taking into account the various incentives for an operational deployment overseas in an actual conflict versus babysitting Cold Lake. I could certainly see a role for reservists as Class B or C augmentees to help backfill or boost numbers, but not as the core manning of the task. Afghanistan was also the focus of the army, and reserve units that DID contribute a lot of people, mine included, did so at their own expense. Which is as it should be- but it was a known finite thing. The Force Pro task will be forever in organizational terms.

That's actually a bit of a misunderstanding of the term. You need to first take a look at the accompanying element which is "officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for ... ." Civilians initially enroll for either continuing full-time or other than continuing full-time service. In the normal context that continues, but there are instances where the situation changes when reservists are called out on service or placed on active service. The point with that is that the full-time service that they have been "mobilized" for has a temporary nature to it albeit that the length of that period may be for a considerable period of time.

Yup, and I appreciate the correction of nuance. But since we’re speaking to a permanent, largely predictable, full time establishment, I don’t think I’m out of the ball park on this entirely.

Augement with reservists, but build an intentionally sufficient and sustainable RegF construct.
 
I have no idea if something similar could happen now. The Army is much smaller, and the loss of half a dozen soldiers from a Unit for three years will be hard to take.
However the security force requirement is addressed, it must be done with dedicated PYs. No source unit will go short for a few years, because the soldiers will leave behind vacancies for the CM to fill.
 
We were pretty loud in Calgary too. A lot of good that did us. Or Summerside.
Different engines, therefore different noise levels. The F-35 is louder than the F-18.

There are traces around airfields for all sorts of things (heights of buildings for clearance, etc). Part of it is for noise abatement.
 
To make my position clear.

I am not contemplating a Wednesdays and Weekends manning plan. I am contemplating a 24/7 manning plan. I am also talking about a discrete number of venues. I am also talking about a low level of probability which is suggestive of a low level of manning. Finally, I am talking about the occasional idiot chucking a few targets in a short raid at a high value facility with no warning.

RCAF FP Squadrons are fine by me. Especially when talking about RCAF Bases.

On the other hand I would like to generate the ability to manage a larger number of venues (Vital Points) over a longer term, (1 month to multiple years).

To that end I concur with @FJAG's Trenton option (more widely applied) to generate a body of willing, trained and equipped people capable of managing the domestic airspace in a martial emergency.

And I will continue to assert that any unit that practices defending an airfield in Canada will develop a lot of skills useful to an expeditionary force in the event that the government deems it so and the army calls for reinforcement.
 
Different engines, therefore different noise levels. The F-35 is louder than the F-18.

There are traces around airfields for all sorts of things (heights of buildings for clearance, etc). Part of it is for noise abatement.

So the problems can be managed.
 
I am also talking about a low level of probability which is suggestive of a low level of manning
Low expectations will always result in low, 'small-s' security. If there is little to no expectation of a threat, why not use Commissionaires? I suspect the owners of the tech (which is the main reason we are concerned at all) would be less than satisfied.
 
Low expectations will always result in low, 'small-s' security. If there is little to no expectation of a threat, why not use Commissionaires? I suspect the owners of the tech (which is the main reason we are concerned at all) would be less than satisfied.

Can you teach the Commissionaires to man an anti-aircraft battery if the threat level increases?
 
Can you teach the Commissionaires to man an anti-aircraft battery if the threat level increases?
No, and GBAD isn't the primary role our security forces will be employed in.

The security forces will mostly be about ensuring access to sites is controlled, and the technology at those sites stays secure.

Wartime/emergency vital point security at ports and airports is an entirely different beast, with entirely differen requirements.
 
No, and GBAD isn't the primary role our security forces will be employed in.

The security forces will mostly be about ensuring access to sites is controlled, and the technology at those sites stays secure.

Wartime/emergency vital point security at ports and airports is an entirely different beast, with entirely differen requirements.

Agreed. When do we plan for war time requirements?
 
So the problems can be managed.
Sort of. The way to manage it is “well you guys knew there was an airport when you bought/rented the place”, or to limit where the aircraft can operate.

To be clear, I am not saying that we should keep our fighters in Cold Lake and Bagotville regardless of the reason. There are QRA locations around the country but they aren’t designed for a squadron-sized footprint.
 
Sort of. The way to manage it is “well you guys knew there was an airport when you bought/rented the place”, or to limit where the aircraft can operate.

To be clear, I am not saying that we should keep our fighters in Cold Lake and Bagotville regardless of the reason. There are QRA locations around the country but they aren’t designed for a squadron-sized footprint.

So who is responsible for security at the QRAs and FOLs?
 
I didn't know that.

How does it compare to say passenger jets at say Edmonton or Saskatoon or Quebec?

:unsure:
Depends on who's on board and how loud they are when expressing their opinions.

(More serious, passenger jets have very different noise levels; last time I flew I was very pleasantly surprised by how quiet the Embraer E195E2 is in operation)
 
No, and GBAD isn't the primary role our security forces will be employed in.
Hordes of missiles coming across the North Pole may not be high on the list, but a herd of UAVs - both recce and weaponized - launched from inside the country by domestic terrorists and saboteurs would probably be high on any threat assessment. Which branch/service operates C-UAS may be debateable but I would think it would be part of any security force.

🍻
 
Hordes of missiles coming across the North Pole may not be high on the list, but a herd of UAVs - both recce and weaponized - launched from inside the country by domestic terrorists and saboteurs would probably be high on any threat assessment. Which branch/service operates C-UAS may be debateable but I would think it would be part of any security force.

🍻
Yup. I think the domestic security posture isn’t really going to be arrayed against a conventional military threat, but rather asymmetric sabotage. Highest realistic threat these days in that context is probably fiber optic guided FPVs with enough of a warhead to smash up an aircraft. Second place would probably be some sort of violence extremist gone active shooter on-base but outside the high security perimeter.

The system will need to be robust enough that, on that super boring quiet afternoon where nothing happened in years and when a high value aircraft just happens to be taxiing, the MCpl or Sgt on duty in charge of a det or section is ready to act RIGHT NOW with no further clarification or direction to shoot down an unidentified SUAS encroaching on a controlled area.
 
Can you teach the Commissionaires to man an anti-aircraft battery if the threat level increases?
In theory, you should be able to train just about anybody to do just about anything. The problem starts with the exercise of force and authority. What would give them the authority to use said battery? I don't know their relationship on CAF property but as far as I know, they are otherwise a private security company. You can't militarize someone who isn't military.

I didn't know that.

How does it compare to say passenger jets at say Edmonton or Saskatoon or Quebec?

:unsure:
How loud is subjective but there is a fair bit of local angst regarding the Vermont ANG's F-35As out of Burlington VT who used to fly F-16s that nobody seemed to mind.

Sort of. The way to manage it is “well you guys knew there was an airport when you bought/rented the place”, or to limit where the aircraft can operate.

To be clear, I am not saying that we should keep our fighters in Cold Lake and Bagotville regardless of the reason. There are QRA locations around the country but they aren’t designed for a squadron-sized footprint.
It's been an ongoing issue for years around Pearson since both the airport and airport have expanded from its sleepy Malton roots. Some newer subdivisions that are right under flightpaths are designated 'noise areas' but I don't know if it is a zoning thing or appended to land title documents.

It remains an ongoing issue at Toronto Island (Billy Bishop) where there is a 'no jets' clause in the airport agreement, even though new small jets are quieter than the turboprops than currently use it (and moot point to many -they just want the airport gone).

I suspect restricting operating hours wouldn't really work in a military situation.
 
Yup. I think the domestic security posture isn’t really going to be arrayed against a conventional military threat, but rather asymmetric sabotage. Highest realistic threat these days in that context is probably fiber optic guided FPVs with enough of a warhead to smash up an aircraft. Second place would probably be some sort of violence extremist gone active shooter on-base but outside the high security perimeter.

The system will need to be robust enough that, on that super boring quiet afternoon where nothing happened in years and when a high value aircraft just happens to be taxiing, the MCpl or Sgt on duty in charge of a det or section is ready to act RIGHT NOW with no further clarification or direction to shoot down an unidentified SUAS encroaching on a controlled area.

That kind of risk acceptance, translated into ROE, in North American military and political systems would be highly unlikely IMHO ....

... kinda like 9/11
 
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