CAF Security Forces [Split from RCN Anti Drone Weapon]

[brihard]

That kind of risk acceptance, translated into ROE, in North American military and political systems would be highly unlikely IMHO ....

... kinda like 9/11

Shrug not my F-35. The pilot was probably insufferable anyway.

 

[dimsum]

I didn't know that.

How does it compare to say passenger jets at say Edmonton or Saskatoon or Quebec?

Far, far louder.

When I was deployed in KAF (the world’s best airshow, btw) one could almost pick out the aircraft taking off based on sound alone.

Fighters, especially turbojets, are ear-splittingly loud.

 

[brihard]

Far, far louder.

When I was deployed in KAF (the world’s best airshow, btw) one could almost pick out the aircraft taking off based on sound alone.

Fighters, especially turbojets, are ear-splittingly loud.

Especially those two French Air Force bastards who had a patrol starting every goddamned morning at 5 am.

 

[dimsum]

Especially those two French Air Force bastards who had a patrol starting every goddamned morning at 5 am.

Yeah, those were the turbojets I was referring to.

Stupid Mirage 2000s.

 

[brihard]

Yeah, those were the turbojets I was referring to.

Stupid Mirage 2000s.

Our tent lines were between New Canada House and the Role 3, pretty close to the east end of the airstrip. If they were awake, we were awake…

 

[Furniture]

Agreed. When do we plan for war time requirements?

Well, being Canada, about a week after the war starts...

I'm not suggesting having a capable and well trained AD capability in the Reg and Res world is a bad idea. I'm just saying they are a separate problem from the security forces we need in a couple of years for our air bases and dockyards.

Hordes of missiles coming across the North Pole may not be high on the list, but a herd of UAVs - both recce and weaponized - launched from inside the country by domestic terrorists and saboteurs would probably be high on any threat assessment. Which branch/service operates C-UAS may be debateable but I would think it would be part of any security force.

I'm guessing it will be assessed, and deemed an unlikely threat without solid Int to highlight a specific threat at a specific time. In which case, bringing in the AD folks is likely smarter/more effective than training security guards to be AD pers as well.

If you want them to do all things at once, you'll need a huge number of pers to keep things running 24/7.

 

[Kirkhill]

Well, being Canada, about a week after the war starts...

I'm not suggesting having a capable and well trained AD capability in the Reg and Res world is a bad idea. I'm just saying they are a separate problem from the security forces we need in a couple of years for our air bases and dockyards.


I'm guessing it will be assessed, and deemed an unlikely threat without solid Int to highlight a specific threat at a specific time. In which case, bringing in the AD folks is likely smarter/more effective than training security guards to be AD pers as well.

If you want them to do all things at once, you'll need a huge number of pers to keep things running 24/7.

Which leads me back to an earlier thought.

Air Defence seems to comprise three components: Control, Sensors and Effectors.
Civilian air space is managed by: Control and Sensors.

In peace time the air space is managed controllers watching sensors and issuing commands to flying objects that follow orders.
The issue is what happens when the flying object doesn't follow orders and becomes a nuisance? How quickly can an effector be brought on line? Who mans it, maintains it and fires it?

And I am sure there are all sorts of laws to be written and debated to permit an airfield to be equipped on a permanent basis with kinetic effectors. But putting that aside how many uniformed personnel would have to be added to the current permanent Air Traffic Control staff? And how about the "half-measures" effectors like lasers and EW systems?

Rheinmetall

Rheinmetall's drone defence toolbox helps to protect civilian and military infrastructure, and is applicable for various threat environments.

www.rheinmetall.com

Incidents with drones in civilian environments and the constantly rising relevance of off-the-shelf drones in military operations generate an ever-growing demand for adequate, tailored solutions.

After concluding a series of trials and tests, Rheinmetall deploys a broadly based range of sensors and data processing technologies, which are applicable for various scenarios and threat environments. As a result, a combination of different radars in X- and S- band mode, passive emitter locators, commercial identification technologies such as ADS-B and 360° cameras with laser range finders as well as infrared and TV cameras in various spectrums.
The generated signals are processed, fused, and classified by our in-house command and control system "Skymaster" in order to provide a comprehensible, coherent recognized air picture. Further integration to systems in a higher echelon of commercial or military air operation centres significantly adds to the efficiency of the system and its operators.

One option is to equip airports with "military capable" air space control system into which the military can plug lethal effectors if the threat level is deemed high enough.

 

[Ostrozac]

If memory serves, way back when, we also had "enhanced" security for the CF-101's and the Genie missiles.
I realize that this only was only at a couple of bases (three?)

At least 5 bases had nuclear weapons storage at the peak of the program — the Voodoo squadrons in Comox, Chatham and Bagotville and the Bomarc missile sites in North Bay and Mont Tremblant. Plus the sites in Germany, and possibly even more that I’ve missed. I own Sean Maloney’s book on the subject, but I don’t have it readily at hand.

These weapons were all secured by military police, who currently seem collectively uninterested in the task.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

At least 5 bases had nuclear weapons storage at the peak of the program — the Voodoo squadrons in Comox, Chatham and Bagotville and the Bomarc missile sites in North Bay and Mont Tremblant. Plus the sites in Germany, and possibly even more that I’ve missed. I own Sean Maloney’s book on the subject, but I don’t have it readily at hand.

These weapons were all secured by military police, who currently seem collectively uninterested in the task.

Not precisely.

The weapons were US property and secured by USAF personnel.

The outer perimeter was Canadian MPs.

 

[Ostrozac]

Not precisely.

The weapons were US property and secured by USAF personnel.

The outer perimeter was Canadian MPs.

Agreed. We might simply be splitting hairs on the definition of security. The official role of the USAF 425th Munitions Maintenance Squadron dets in Canada was “Custodial and Maintenance functions for US material in Canada” and to my mind custody doesn’t include security. There were no USAF Security Police Squadrons in Canada; this was the role fulfilled by RCAF/CF MP’s and the role that we now need to revitalize.

 

[KevinB]

Which leads me back to an earlier thought.

Air Defence seems to comprise three components: Control, Sensors and Effectors.
Civilian air space is managed by: Control and Sensors.

In peace time the air space is managed controllers watching sensors and issuing commands to flying objects that follow orders.
The issue is what happens when the flying object doesn't follow orders and becomes a nuisance? How quickly can an effector be brought on line? Who mans it, maintains it and fires it?

Civilian Air Traffic Control Radars are not Military Air Defense Radars.
In the NCR here (as opposed to your NCR) the Air Zone is monitored by 7 three letter agencies, the Secret Service, the FAA, and DoD/USAF.
It is located at Dulles, but not in the control towers - and issues get flagged and dealt with as required.
There are NASAM, Stingers, Avengers for Ground Based AD, as well as USAF Aircraft that can be scrambled to deal with more direct threats.

I do not believe the other regions have the same readily available assets for response - but that is way out of my prevue.

And I am sure there are all sorts of laws to be written and debated to permit an airfield to be equipped on a permanent basis with kinetic effectors. But putting that aside how many uniformed personnel would have to be added to the current permanent Air Traffic Control staff? And how about the "half-measures" effectors like lasers and EW systems?

Rheinmetall

Rheinmetall's drone defence toolbox helps to protect civilian and military infrastructure, and is applicable for various threat environments.

www.rheinmetall.com

One option is to equip airports with "military capable" air space control system into which the military can plug lethal effectors if the threat level is deemed high enough.

The issue is what threat are you trying to neutralize?
Enemy AC, a Hijacked Airliner(s) like 9/11, or UAS systems?

Should the threat increase to a level that it is deemed acceptable, then EW and DE systems would probably be the best option to protect commercial airports.

 

[Furniture]

Agreed. We might simply be splitting hairs on the definition of security. The official role of the USAF 425th Munitions Maintenance Squadron dets in Canada was “Custodial and Maintenance functions for US material in Canada” and to my mind custody doesn’t include security. There were no USAF Security Police Squadrons in Canada; this was the role fulfilled by RCAF/CF MP’s and the role that we now need to revitalize.

My uncle was an MP that worked in Chatham, the Canadian MPs were definitely the public facing security forces there. If Americans were also doing security it was behind the initial screen of armed Canadians.

 

[Kirkhill]

Civilian Air Traffic Control Radars are not Military Air Defense Radars.

Upgrade the civilian radars

In the NCR here (as opposed to your NCR) the Air Zone is monitored by 7 three letter agencies, the Secret Service, the FAA, and DoD/USAF.
It is located at Dulles, but not in the control towers - and issues get flagged and dealt with as required.
There are NASAM, Stingers, Avengers for Ground Based AD, as well as USAF Aircraft that can be scrambled to deal with more direct threats.

As you say, not is our NCR or any of our other air space. And there are no NASAMS, Stingers, Avengers or any other GBAD. Nor is there the same broad coverage by NG F16s so I am going to guess that US response times are shorter than ours.

I do not believe the other regions have the same readily available assets for response - but that is way out of my prevue.

I expect you are right.

The issue is what threat are you trying to neutralize?
Enemy AC, a Hijacked Airliner(s) like 9/11, or UAS systems?

Step 1 is identifying the aerial threat (ICBMs, IRBMs, Cruise Missiles, Aircraft of all sorts, UAS, birds, airbursts, weather)
Adding capable sensors to the watchlist of the existing duty staff seems like a no brainer to me.
Those duty staff then get to manage the traffic and airspace accordingly.

Your ancient civil and military systems relied on separate monitors bought for separate agencies trained to separate standards with separate sensors and separate effectors for some of the places some of the time with the expectation that when things go pear shaped you would instantly buy the next gee-whiz solution.

I am saying to optimize the capabilities of the existing investment in airspace control and traffic management rather than having to train and equip a duplicate military entity that will never achieve the level of competence the current civilian monitors manage.

The day war breaks out those civilian monitors are not going to lose their jobs. Nor are the NORAD ones for that matter. Those two groups already have a modus vivendi that works well. When things move beyond the civilians abilities to respond they reach out to the military, or the military jumps in on top of them and supplies lethal kinetic effectors.

I am proposing more of the same, that the military focus on supplying more lethal effectors to supplement the existing civilian systems.
For expeditionary work the military is going to try to replicate, in smaller scale, what happens over North American airspace every day.

Should the threat increase to a level that it is deemed acceptable, then EW and DE systems would probably be the best option to protect commercial airports.

Here I agree than EW and DE would probably get used before guns and rockets.

On board a ship, in the CIC, where the OC has a large panoply of resources available to manage threats to the ship and its surrounding area, do they immediately go to the biggest rocket they have? Or do they manage the threats with graduated weapons release authorities?

The most ubiquitous aerial threat to air space operations, other than the weather? Birds.

Evaluation of the Efficacy of Products and Techniques for Airport Bird Control (03/1998) - TP 13029

Evaluation of the Efficacy of Products and Techniques for Airport Bird Control (03/1998) - TP 13029

tc.canada.ca

A UAS is little more than a mechanical bird.

 

[lenaitch]

Upgrade the civilian radars



As you say, not is our NCR or any of our other air space. And there are no NASAMS, Stingers, Avengers or any other GBAD. Nor is there the same broad coverage by NG F16s so I am going to guess that US response times are shorter than ours.



I expect you are right.



Step 1 is identifying the aerial threat (ICBMs, IRBMs, Cruise Missiles, Aircraft of all sorts, UAS, birds, airbursts, weather)
Adding capable sensors to the watchlist of the existing duty staff seems like a no brainer to me.
Those duty staff then get to manage the traffic and airspace accordingly.

Your ancient civil and military systems relied on separate monitors bought for separate agencies trained to separate standards with separate sensors and separate effectors for some of the places some of the time with the expectation that when things go pear shaped you would instantly buy the next gee-whiz solution.

I am saying to optimize the capabilities of the existing investment in airspace control and traffic management rather than having to train and equip a duplicate military entity that will never achieve the level of competence the current civilian monitors manage.

The day war breaks out those civilian monitors are not going to lose their jobs. Nor are the NORAD ones for that matter. Those two groups already have a modus vivendi that works well. When things move beyond the civilians abilities to respond they reach out to the military, or the military jumps in on top of them and supplies lethal kinetic effectors.

I am proposing more of the same, that the military focus on supplying more lethal effectors to supplement the existing civilian systems.
For expeditionary work the military is going to try to replicate, in smaller scale, what happens over North American airspace every day.



Here I agree than EW and DE would probably get used before guns and rockets.

On board a ship, in the CIC, where the OC has a large panoply of resources available to manage threats to the ship and its surrounding area, do they immediately go to the biggest rocket they have? Or do they manage the threats with graduated weapons release authorities?

The most ubiquitous aerial threat to air space operations, other than the weather? Birds.

Evaluation of the Efficacy of Products and Techniques for Airport Bird Control (03/1998) - TP 13029

Evaluation of the Efficacy of Products and Techniques for Airport Bird Control (03/1998) - TP 13029

tc.canada.ca

A UAS is little more than a mechanical bird.

I'm not sure the issue is the radars. As far as I am aware, NORAD and NAVCAN/FAA see the same things inside of the NWS and Coastal Radar (no doubt the US NCR is different). The vast majority of this country is monitored by ground-based nothing, especially at lower altitudes. Civilian ATC manages legitimate traffic within their airspace; military surveillance monitors unknowns/threats. Do we want the civilians ATC to monitor threats and have their finger on the trigger or do we want the military to manage air traffic? Enhanced airspace surveillance may or may not be included in the NORAD upgrade project.

Besides, the discussion seems to have grown from enhanced site security because the owners of the tech (the US) that we have ordered will be demanding it, to something much broader.