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Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

This is actually the scope of ambition being looked at. It's a genuine, "How would we fight for years?" Question.

And as we go through this there's a realization government wide (not just CAF) of how daunting the task is.

It's all the way from basics (getting the CAL DAL right) to how would we manage strategic comms to mobilize society in the age of AI fakes, to how do we manage the mismatch between weeks to mobilize PRes to months to mobilize Strat/Mob Res to years to mobilize industry. All of this kinda stuff is actually being staff checked with outputs on everything from legislative changes proposed to procurement to changing force design to changing mandates of agencies. CCG moving to DND, for example, is just the first step in looking at underwater infrastructure protection. There's discussions, for example, on what legislative changes might be needed to enable more reserve service as part of creating that mobilization reserve and growing PRes substantially.

But it's like eating an elephant. This is easily a decade long project.
perhaps they need to reconsider their gun laws if they really want to establish an effective militia. The Swiss and the Israelis are two that I know of that keep military weapons in the front closet and carry them on the bus (Israel). Kinda dumb to confiscate an effective weapon on one hand and then ask the owner to join with defending his country on the other.
 
There's discussions, for example, on what legislative changes might be needed to enable more reserve service as part of creating that mobilization reserve and growing PRes substantially.

But it's like eating an elephant. This is easily a decade long project.
I'm glad to hear that it may finally be happening. The quote I made above about the "great host" was made in 2005 by the panel doing a ten year review of the progress on the reserve restructure that was put forward in 1995. Ten years of nothing followed by 20 years of nothing. You'll need to excuse me if I'm not excited yet. I started in this game in '65 and have been excited and then disappointed so many times that I've lost count and my cynicism has grown exponentially.

I tend to agree it will take DND a decade to sort things through. And that's the problem. Do you know how you speed up eating an elephant? Rather than one bite at a time, you have thousands of people all eating at the same time. Gunners have several buzz words/phrases - one is "concurrent activity." But that needs a firm vision and a great plan with a massive Gantt chart with a clearly defined critical path and a robust public information program to make sure the nation knows that you are moving the yardsticks. I honestly don't think we have a decade of committee meetings.

Honestly, those mandate question examples you gave above should have all been asked and answered and put into the "plan" Belzile said the forces didn't have in 2005 At the very latest they should have started to plan seriously in 2014 and again exactly four years ago on February 24, 2022 when the Russians crossed the start line.

Incidentally, the legislative changes needed to make an effective reserve force are easy and few. The regulatory, directive and policy changes, however, are significant. More important, the RegF will to change the reserves into an effective "reserve" force rather than an "augmenting RegF office overload" is critical. That will has been noticeably absent for over a half a century (and lets stop blaming honourary colonels for that)

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I'm glad to hear that it may finally be happening. The quote I made above about the "great host" was made in 2005 by the panel doing a ten year review of the progress on the reserve restructure that was put forward in 1995. Ten years of nothing followed by 20 years of nothing. You'll need to excuse me if I'm not excited yet. I started in this game in '65 and have been excited and then disappointed so many times that I've lost count and my cynicism has grown exponentially.

Fully understand. And honestly, I'm a little skeptical at the numbers I hear thrown around. I can't imagine what pay and benefits have to be to hit the numbers being talked about. But I do think it's a worthy goal and if we'll even get to 50% that will be an exponential improvement in what we have today.

I tend to agree it will take DND a decade to sort things through. And that's the problem. Do you know how you speed up eating an elephant? Rather than one bite at a time, you have thousands of people all eating at the same time. Gunners have several buzz words/phrases - one is "concurrent activity." But that needs a firm vision and a great plan with a massive Gantt chart with a clearly defined critical path and a robust public information program to make sure the nation knows that you are moving the yardsticks. I honestly don't think we have a decade of committee meetings.

I personally don't think we can do it all. I think at some point, the government will have to prioritize what it wants done.

Incidentally, the legislative changes needed to make an effective reserve force are easy and few. The regulatory, directive and policy changes, however, are significant. More important, the RegF will to change the reserves into an effective "reserve" force rather than an "augmenting RegF office overload" is critical. That will has been noticeably absent for over a half a century (and lets stop blaming honourary colonels for that)

The one thing that the reserves have going for them this time is jobs. Construction, maintenance and support contracts all over the country. And the more the Reserves grow the more generous those contracts. And of course, those reservists are basically local stimulus.
 
My one question at work always is, "when are we getting a new defence policy?"

ONSAF was written before Carney and this ambition. And now we're basically operating off script. Reading ONSAF it seems quaint now. 1.76% in 29/30.

If we're really going to 5% including resiliency, we're looking at a whole different world with very different options. Even a world where we hit 3% is different. This is a world where we could envision carriers or amphibs, where we build substantial defence infrastructure in the Arctic. Maybe a third navy MOB. Or even some real offensive space capabilities (my favourite). So I really want to know what the government wants to do.

A world where we hit 5% and aren't paying for a nuke deterrent is a world where we basically have like 70% of conventional UK capabilities given that maintenance of their deterrent costs them 1% of GDP per year.

I'd really like some small wins from Uncle Mark. Like can we just grow existing orders? Exercise the options for the two P-8s. And maybe buy a few more. Make the truck order for the CA bigger. Order a third or even a fourth AOR for the RCN. New tools. New vehicles to every maintenance shop. Make CAF IT 2026 relevant. Etc. All things we can do while sorting out the big stuff.
 
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"Commanders describe brigades hollowed out to half strength or worse. Frontline units often operate at 50% to 60% of authorized manning, some as low as 30%.

"In some sectors, a maximum of 12 fighters hold 5 to 10 kilometers of front, far below what Cold War-era NATO planning assumed for high-intensity defense."

Can that be leveraged?

Can a brigade be built around a defensive battalion, after the fashion of the older Anti-Tank Regiments, but upgraded to handle the tools the Ukrainians are currently managing? Then leave the infantry and armoured units to focus on manoeuvre?
 

"Army brigades are struggling to overcome electronic warfare and AI-generated disinformation in wargames at the National Training Center, a Rhode Island-sized swathe of the Mojave Desert where a full-time Opposing Force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, puts visiting units through the wringer with simulated bullets and real radio jamming.

"Visiting units often lack the technical versatility and, even more important, the mental adaptability to keep fighting effectively with backup systems once their high-tech networks go down, current and former OPFOR officers told Breaking Defense in a series of interviews."
 

"Army brigades are struggling to overcome electronic warfare and AI-generated disinformation in wargames at the National Training Center, a Rhode Island-sized swathe of the Mojave Desert where a full-time Opposing Force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, puts visiting units through the wringer with simulated bullets and real radio jamming.

"Visiting units often lack the technical versatility and, even more important, the mental adaptability to keep fighting effectively with backup systems once their high-tech networks go down, current and former OPFOR officers told Breaking Defense in a series of interviews."

We do a version of this. And boy is it fun to see how mad people get.

 
I was there, I don't think many people were mad, because they didn't notice, because it wasn't very effective.

We should definitely doing more of this. By not training defence/immediate actions on jamming and other electronic attacks we are setting our forces up for failure. Wishing away all our comms problems on exercise (especially validation exercises) is negligence almost to the degree of being criminal.

Having said that, what was done at MR23 had zero training value for the PTA (I hope the space force guys used it to gather data on how to better integrate into future collective training events). To be clear, nothing against the guys who showed up. That teams was very small, with what appeared to be not great equipment, on the ground for a very limited time. They worked hard with what they had, hats off to them but they weren't able to do much to prepare the PTA to deal with this stuff in the future.

To be effective we need to be training these scenarios along the entire road-to-high-readiness, not just try to bolt it on during level 6/7. I really wish this capability was organic to CMTC, like it is with NTC. Let units know EW and Space Folks are in Wainwright, waiting for you to show up, in order to fuck with your shit, so be prepared for that before you arrive.

Additionally, we need to work with the government to allow jamming in the RTA. Adjust legislation, regulations, and the political will to allow us to do so. Tell the farmers around Wainwright "The GPS on your farm equipment may be wonky from this date to this date, here is some money for your trouble" and expand the no fly zone way past the training area boundaries so planes aren't falling out of the sky.

To sum up: I am jealous of all the things the yanks can do on their exercises. To properly train our soldiers we need to do the same things. However, we need to do it right (read: big) for it to be effective. Not the usual last minute, as an after thought, small scale that all training of support and enablers ends up being.
 
I was there, I don't think many people were mad, because they didn't notice, because it wasn't very effective.

We should definitely doing more of this.

To sum up: I am jealous of all the things the yanks can do on their exercises. To properly train our soldiers we need to do the same things. However, we need to do it right (read: big) for it to be effective. Not the usual last minute, as an after thought, small scale that all training of support and enablers ends up being.

Fully agree. And to be fair, it was a nascent Wing initiative back then. It's slowly growing as a capability. And unfortunately they get tasked to support more than CA training. Hoping things like this all get rolled up in the Future Warfighting Concept to address those gaps.
 
My one question at work always is, "when are we getting a new defence policy?"

ONSAF was written before Carney and this ambition. And now we're basically operating off script. Reading ONSAF it seems quaint now. 1.76% in 29/30.

If we're really going to 5% including resiliency, we're looking at a whole different world with very different options. Even a world where we hit 3% is different. This is a world where we could envision carriers or amphibs, where we build substantial defence infrastructure in the Arctic. Maybe a third navy MOB. Or even some real offensive space capabilities (my favourite). So I really want to know what the government wants to do.

A world where we hit 5% and aren't paying for a nuke deterrent is a world where we basically have like 70% of conventional UK capabilities given that maintenance of their deterrent costs them 1% of GDP per year.

I'd really like some small wins from Uncle Mark. Like can we just grow existing orders? Exercise the options for the two P-8s. And maybe buy a few more. Make the truck order for the CA bigger. Order a third or even a fourth AOR for the RCN. New tools. New vehicles to every maintenance shop. Make CAF IT 2026 relevant. Etc. All things we can do while sorting out the big stuff.
I want to see a NSS type program for vehicles in the CAF. Buy X amount of various types every year and when we max out on that type, stick the oldest in reserve for a 5 years and then dispose of them, just keep repeating so things like LAV's are no older than 15 years, something like the Roshel, 10. Milcots 5 years. Also reverse the 1 for 2 vehicles we have been doing since the 1970's and start issuing 2 for 1 to start bringing numbers up. By keeping the fleet young, we reduce maintenance and repair issues. We will also start treating vehicles as disposables and not capital assets.
 
Sounds very terrain-dependent.

How so?

TTPs or METT-TC will vary but the fundamental concept of using available technologies to maximum benefit over the largest area with the fewest resources applies.

The fewer people you have to expend holding an area the more people you can keep off the line and available for hasty and planned assaults.
 
How so?

TTPs or METT-TC will vary but the fundamental concept of using available technologies to maximum benefit over the largest area with the fewest resources applies.

The fewer people you have to expend holding an area the more people you can keep off the line and available for hasty and planned assaults.
My guess is that a low troop density as a tripwire/OP line only works when the few troops can observe over long distances. At the bottom end, 12 guys in a forest won't do jack over 5 km.
 
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