Canadian Armoured Cavalry

[TangoTwoBravo]

I imagine that MOCs will pretty much remain as is for the foreseeable future.  Crewmen are the experts on mounted operations and infnatry are the experts on dismounted operations, but there is overlap that goes both ways.  The Recce Sqn Assault Troop was an outstanding organization but we have lost our Assault Troop here (for the same rationale as the Infantry lost their combat support platoons).

What has changed is the concept of Regimental Battle Groups deploying on operations.  The "plug and play" concept of putting various sub-units under a generic BG HQ will most likely be the model for the next few years.  The pros or cons of this could be discussed elsewhere, but the Armoured Cavalry concept fits this new model.  The Regimental system will continue (I believe and hope), but deployments will be a mix of capbadges and MOCs. 

As an aside, the US Armored Cavalry Squadrons and Regiments did not have infantry in them when I was in the States (except for the mortarmen in the Cav Tps).  The ACRs have artillery in their Squadrons (one battery per Battalion-sized Squadron) and there are considerable Aviation assets in the various outfits, but the M3 Bradleys are crewed by Armoured soldiers (same MOC as the tankers but with a different speciality code to identify them as scouts).  The two dismounts in the back of each M3 are Cavarly as well.  Could every soldier in my proposed Armoured Cavalry Task Force be armoured (011s)?  Yes.  Will they?  Probably not.  My proposal is full of real-world compromises in order to make it as realistic as possible.

Thanks to all for contributing so far.  I've got a lot to chew on here and some issues/concerns that I had not thought of right away.

Cheers and have a good leave, and especially to our deployed soldiers please have a Merry Christmas! 

2B

p.s. To any of our fellows at Camp Julien, is my Buffallo Bills pennant still hanging in the old ISTAR CP?

 

[a_majoor]

Just a small update, this diagram proposes the use of a "recce missile" for quick, short and medium range data gathering. Substitute small UAV or FOG-M and you can envision how this might work with currently available technology. Naturally, this is a supplement to the other systems on the ground, and ultimately the commander will need boots on the ground to check out the highest priority targets.

 

[Brad Sallows]

>but Cavalry connotates the dashing charge with lances or sabres flashing in the sun

That would be (to me) the assault/shock function we currently associate with the tank branch of evolution of the cavalry (ultimately, "manoeuvre arm") tree...cavalry also connotates raids, recce, screen & guard, pursuit, mounted infantry...

My meandering thoughts:

If this is just a modification of a recce sqn/regt (eg. obtain and deny information), why not keep that name ("recce")?  If it is truly to be "Cav", the role, tasks, and organization must also be suited to occasional straight-up fighting.  I would be inclined to have at least three identical mixed (manoeuvre) sub-units rather than three different specialized (manoeuvre or manoeuvre support) ones.  Depending on mission they might operate independently or together.

>a.  should there always be integral fire support (guns and mortars) in the Task Force?

Yes; size of AO.  Mortars (120mm) at the unit level, established on basis of minimum of 2 tubes and 1 MFC per manoeuvre sub-unit.

>b.  should there be integral engineers and if so at what level?

Yes; unit; established on basis of minimum of 1 armd engr sect per manoeuvre sub-unit.

>c.  should the sub-units be pure recce and pure LAV infantry or have each sub-unit be a mixture of both?

As above.  I am inclined to follow the US M3 model, but to use a LAV with integral crew (3) plus 4 dismounts (thus 1 ptl dismounts a sect of 8).  I would elect MGS (ideally, tanks, right?) over TOW, particularly if something dismountable with a longer range than Eryx is added to the menu to go into the back of the "cars".

...Hm.  I see myself describing an inf btl gp which is a little lighter on the inf side, with a significantly different mission skill set.

Since this is potentially only one of many collection assets, I incline to keeping some of the ISTAR/EW (particularly the "I" and the "EW") functions in different elements of the formation.

 

[Kirkhill]

Hi Brad, haven't heard from you for a while.  Glad you're back.

Reference your comments about the differences between your Cavalry Force and an Infantry Force disappearing, I think you are right.  I also think that is part of our problem.  Our Infantry, with its LAV IIIs  has moved more towards a light armoured Cavalry formation, thus squeezing the Armoured guys out of a job and at the same time not leaving enough Infantry strength in our field organization.

Transfer all the LAV IIIs to the blackhats I say.....with or without blackhat dismounts.  Reattach to infantry battlegroups as the need warrants.  If the infantry needs an armoured truck then lets buy them something like the Stryker APC so that they can maintain section integrity and uniformity of tactics and training.

Cheers, Chris.

 

[a_majoor]

Kirkhill, if I am reading you right, then a future armoured regiment will resemble a current LAV Infantry battalion? Three squadrons of LAVs with (say) four man "dragoon" teams in the back, plus a Coyote surveillance squadron and a Headquarters squadron. The LAV squadron might be further subdivided into 3 LAV troops, I MGS troop and the Admin troop.

I am a bit of a heritic and agree the Infantry really don't need the Delco turret on their LAVs (I am an Infantryman myself BTW), but the OWS does need either a HMG or an AGL, and perhaps a mounting point for a Javelin anti-tank weapon. CASR has a conceptual drawing of a LAV III with a 25mm on an OWS mount http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-lavpws.htm to give you an idea of what it might look like.

This is getting back towards doctrine, but we have let the cart drive the horse for such a long time our "doctrine" is being writtent to accomodate what we have in the inventory, rather than buying the kit that supports the doctrine. At least Cavalry is a flexible doctrinal model, and applicable in many situations and force structures.

 

[Kirkhill]

Art you have me 5x5.

In fact I would even suggest that the "4th Brigade" if it were ever to happen would be better of being a concentration of the RCDs, Strats and RBCs and dedicated to the manoeuvre battle.  Have them prepare detached Squadrons to support infantry Battle Groups in their parent Brigades when necessary for the mission.  Light Infantry (Sorry, lets call them Line Infantry seeing as how Light now connotes Special) Line Infantry is still the basic requirement for all Interventions.

For those of you that aren't fed up with me citing Brit examples (Hey, if Infanteer can keep harping on about PanzerGrenadiers, who lost, then I should be allowed to refer to the guys that won - and besides unlike many other Forces, they have a plan, they publish the plan and they work the plan.)

Here is the Brit play book:

Small Enduring Mission -

1 Eng Rgt
2 Infantry Battalions
1 Light Armd Recce Tp
1 Lt CS Arty Bty
10 Ground Attack Aircraft

Small Assault -

As above plus

2 GS Arty Btys
1 AD Bty
8 AH-64
6 Air Def Aircraft

Medium Enduring Mission

1 Reinforced Engr Rgt
3 Infantry Bns
3 Armd Sqns
1 Lt Armd Recce Sqn
3 Med CS Arty Btys
2 GS Arty Btys (STA, UAV, and/or MRLS)
8 AH-64
10 Gd Atk AC

Medium Asslt

As above plus

3 Engr Regts (Reinforced)
4 Inf Bn
5 Armd Sqns
3 Lt CS Arty Btys
1 Med CS Arty Bty
12  AH-64
22 Gd Atk AC
16 AD AC

Large Assault

6 Engr Regiments
19 Inf Bns
16 Armd Sqns (4 Regts)
9 Lt Armd Recce Sqns (3 Regts)
6 Lt CS Btys (2 Regts)
10 Med CS Btys (3 Regts)
11 GS Btys (including up to 4 MRLS Btys plus STA and UAV Btys)
36 AH-64
64 Gd Atk AC
2 AD Regts
16 AD AC

The obvious observation concerning these forces are that they are Infantry heavy forces with a small but capable Armoured force, heavily supported by Firepower when the need arises.  (Air Defence is available but obviously considered a low threat)

Right, wrong or disagree this is the structure that is driving the UK Force Plan and resulting in a force with 39 Infantry battalions (incl the 3 RM Commandos) - 40 if the 1 Para SAS-Lite Unit is included.

This inf force, only includes 6 or 7 heavy Warrior IFV battalions and 6-9 medium Saxon WAPC battalions, is a predominately Light force of 20 to 25 light Battalions and their "elites"  are the lightest of the lights.

Armour has been down-sized and shifted from Heavy to Lt, Arty has been down-sized and shifted from weight of shot to surveillance, speed of response and range.  The Airforce has been radically downsized and shifted from Air Defence to Ground Atk.

This is their foot-print for a Force that can conduct Sustain Constabulary missions and also fight its way out of problems and contribute meaningfully to High End coalition operations.

Maybe the size of their Force is beyond us (although that could be argued but that is another thread) but the shape of the Force is something that I think merits our close consideration.

In the words of an ancient Brit song contest...."I loike it!!"

Cheers


http://www.mod.uk/issues/security/cm6269/chapter5.htm

Here's the Brit planning guide for Force structure.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Brad,

Glad to see that you still post (I remember you well from two other boards)!  The introduction of LAV III and the departure of the Leopard have certainly caused some "task creep" between the Armoured and Infantry.  Could we just take a LAV BG, give it a Coyote Sqn and call it a Cavalry Task Force?  Probably (I suggested as much in the old CF Board).  I see the Cavarly Task Force as a realistic force employment option for our Army that does not require wholesale reorganization or the acquisition of new equipment.  I am going to reserve judgement on the whole MGS thing until I actually see on in the field.  I certainly see potential for it in the Cavalry role.

As long as the Task Force has an all-arms ISTAR Coordination Centre I would be content.  Other assets could then plug-in for certain missions or tasks without having the other issues associated.  I see TUAVs (Tactical UAVs) as a sub-unit of their own and not simply as an attached Tp.  Perhaps a "Cadillac" Cavalry Task Force has one or two Recce Sqns, one or two LAV Companies and a TUAV Battery (but drop the ISTAR Sqn)?

I am not fixed on the name, but I am a firm believer that we must change or expected roles on the "mounted" battlefield.  The Cavalry role (protecting other forces) is one that we can do with our current "stable."  We could probably stand up in a defensive engagement, but assaults etc should be taken out of our playbook.

Kirkhill/A Majoor,

The LAV III could have "scouts" placed in the back instead of "infantry" and assume a role similar to that of the M3 in a US Heavy Cavalry Troop.  This would mean a rather radical shift in how the Canadian Army is organized.  For now, I would like to see a Task Force where the Recce Sqns find the enemy and the LAV Company(s) are there to enable the Recce to do its job while also destroying the enemy's recon assets. 

Cheers and Happy Holidays,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Merry Christmas 2B.  And to all the rest of you.

Cheers

 

[a_majoor]

The LAV III could have "scouts" placed in the back instead of "infantry" and assume a role similar to that of the M3 in a US Heavy Cavalry Troop. This would mean a rather radical shift in how the Canadian Army is organized. For now, I would like to see a Task Force where the Recce Sqns find the enemy and the LAV Company(s) are there to enable the Recce to do its job while also destroying the enemy's recon assets.

.

So a "Cavalry" regiment could be built by having a Coyote squadron attached to a LAV Infantry battalion, and reorganize the HQ element to include or incorporate an ISTAR cell? This sounds good from the point of view of minimum reorg, plus the three companies of mounted Infantry would provide lots of flexibility including mounted/dismounted patrols and the ability to fight a counter recce battle with on board weapons and the dismounted Infantry weapons.

I am not fixed on the name, but I am a firm believer that we must change or expected roles on the "mounted" battlefield. The Cavalry role (protecting other forces) is one that we can do with our current "stable." We could probably stand up in a defensive engagement, but assaults etc should be taken out of our playbook.

My big fear is that if we are not prepared to do assaults, we will be caught with our pants down. Waiting for the Air Cav or UA Heavy to show up could lead to a situation where we are defeated in detail, and always hands the initiative to the enemy (the exact opposite of Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine). Drawing from various other threads; bolt some fire and forget weapons on the LAV turrets; upgrade the LAV-TOW, gain through tube missiles for the MGS...Just so long as we are not bringing a "knife to a gunfight".

 

[a_majoor]

This is the dismounted analogue to what I see as a future "Cavalry" unit or "Future Combat Team"  Thanks to Kirkhill

http://army.ca/forums/threads/23740.0.html

It seems that these guys are fed up with "seeing" and not being able to "do".   Effective, precision fire, at long range, with little collateral damage and a very short OODA loop.

Interesting that their secondary tasking is training Designated Marksmen - it seems that the rifleman, as opposed to the assault trooper and machine gunner, is making a comeback.

Rainbow Division Deploys 'Intel Snipers' to Iraq
 
 
(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Jan. 15, 2005)
 
 
FORT DRUM, N.Y. --- The 42nd Infantry Division has deployed to Iraq with what leaders term a powerful, yet subtle, combat-multiplier â ” the sniper-trained Soldiers of the division's 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment, and their newly-issued M-14 rifles.  

The rifles are â Å“part and parcelâ ? of the changing LRS(D) mission, said the unit's commander, Capt. Michael Manning.  

â Å“This is not a detachment of snipers,â ? said Manning. â Å“This is a detachment of highly trained intelligence collectors. We have sniping capability. Now we can acquire targets, identify targets, and destroy targets with organic direct fire weapons. That's the big change. That's what these weapons allow us to do.â ?  

Manning said LRS(D)'s mission used to be strictly reconnaissance and surveillance working in small groups 80 to 100 kilometers beyond friendly lines, reporting information on enemy movements and the battlefield to a higher command. The enemy and battlefield have changed, so the mission has changed, according to Manning.  

â Å“We're not training for the Fulda Gap anymore,â ? said Manning, referring to the area in Germany that NATO forces were assigned to defend against Russian maneuver brigades. â Å“We're fighting insurgents who operate in small groups. That drives the way we conduct operations.â ?  

Manning described the new mission as reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in other words, LRS(D) will be assigned to observe areas for improvised explosive devices and indirect fire activity and, if ordered by the combatant commander, eliminate insurgents with their sniper rifles. The M-14, commented Manning, has redefined the unit's mission. â Å“It's a tremendous force multiplier. It's a tremendous asset on the battlefield.â ?  

Equipping and training LRS(D) on the M-14 rifles was a joint effort of the 42nd Infantry Division, the 1215th Garrison Support Unit at Fort Drum, the First Army Small Arms Readiness Group, or SARG, and FORSCOM, according to Lt. Col. Richard Ellwanger, chief of personnel, 1215th Garrison Support Unit.  

â Å“Our mission is to support the mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves,â ? said Ellwanger. â Å“We work with the post to provide an infrastructure for the National Guard and Reserves while they're here at Fort Drum.â ?  

The M-14 rifles will increase LRS(D) Soldiers' ability to neutralize targets without collateral damage, said Ellwanger. â Å“The rifle gives the Soldiers the ability to engage targets out to 800 meters. Once the word gets out to the insurgents that the Soldiers have that capacity, they will be less likely to get inside the 400- to 500-meter range and engage with RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) or medium machine guns.â ?  

The instruction of the SARG team was superb, according to Manning. â Å“These guys are superb marksmen. They instilled in LRS(D) the techniques, tactics and procedures that make them good marksmen. They're professional. To a man, they're first-rate marksmen.â ? Most of the training took place at Fort Drum's Range 21, where the sniper-trained LRS(D) Soldiers zeroed and engaged targets with their iron sights, and zeroed the scopes on their rifles.  

â Å“By virtue of going through this training, LRS(D) Soldiers now have the confidence in themselves that they can effectively operate this weapon system,â ? said Manning. â Å“What the 42nd Division has done, by virtue of outfitting LRS(D) with M-14 rifles, is make us the cutting edge of the LRS(D) community.â ?  

But the real edge in LRS(D)'s sniping capability are the LRS(D) Soldiers behind the newly issued M-14 rifles â ” graduates of the four-week National Guard Sniper School at Camp Robinson, Ark. With their M-14 training complete, the LRS(D) soldiers became trainers themselves, turning Soldiers from other 42nd Infantry Division units into designated marksmen.  

â Å“We're a combat multiplier because we can give the division planners nearly real-time information, and a picture of the battlefield,â ? said LRS(D) sniper-trained Staff Sgt. Tim Halloran. â Å“If we're on a mission and we acquire a high-value target, we can not only report it to higher [headquarters], we can eliminate it.â ?  

â Å“Hopefully we can interdict the people placing the IEDs,â ? said LRS(D) Assistant Team Leader Cpl. Wayne Lynch, who, along with LRS(D) Team Leader Staff Sgt. Thomas O'Hare, served a tour in Iraq last year.  

â Å“That's all I thought about when we were in Iraq last year: 'how do we stop these people who are placing the IEDs?' Now that we've got snipers in LRS(D), we're able to do surveillance and take direct action,â ? Lynch said.  

Deployed to Iraq with the 119th Military Police Company, Rhode Island National Guard, Lynch said he and O'Hare made it their job to find IEDs. Lynch said he hopes LRS(D) will be tasked with interdicting terrorists placing IEDs. He's been a member of the unit for nine years and loves it. He does not regret going back to Iraq. â Å“I'm going with a unit I've trained with,â ? he said. â Å“I'm honored to go to war with them.â ?  

Based in Rhode Island, LRS(D) ruckmarches to the north summit of New Hampshire's Mount Mooslacki every year. All members of LRS(D) are airborne qualified, and nine are ranger qualified. They have to do a jump every three months to maintain their airborne status.  

â Å“We train on a higher plain,â ? said LRS(D) sniper-trained Soldier Spc. Richard O'Connor. â Å“Most units do five-mile rucksack marches. We do 15-mile rucksack marches. Other units have 45-pound rucksacks. We have 80-pound rucksacks. We have to march farther and faster than anyone else.â ?  

O'Connor was a scout/sniper with the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division. He's been on real-world missions to Tunisia and Liberia, and took part in the rescue of Air Force Pilot Capt. Scott O'Grady, who was shot down over Bosnia in 1995.  

â Å“Anticipation of the mission is awesome,â ? said O'Connor. He described the job as a â Å“rushâ ?, and said LRS(D) team members must be physically fit, mature, and disciplined, and must know each other's jobs. Part of that job is going â Å“subsurfaceâ ?? patrolling to a location outside friendly lines, digging a hole, and living in it while observing enemy activity.  

â Å“They might live in that hole for two to four days,â ? said Manning. â Å“It takes an unbelievably disciplined individual to do this job.â ?  

â Å“We're just guys with rifles,â ? said O'Connor. â Å“You have to have absolute confidence in everyone on your team. There's nothing else in the Army I want to do.â ?  

-ends-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

Since tanks and shock action are "out" for a while, substitute high mobility through the use of medium AFVs, excellent SA through a combination of effective tactics, surveillence equipment and "plug ins" to higher level systems, and enhanced leathality through the agressive use of PGM fire to take out hostile targets at the maximum possible range.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Is a sniper an ISTAR asset or a direct fire weapon?  I guess he can be both (almost anything with optics and comms can be an ISTAR asset).  I take it that these guys are not "snipers" but perhaps this is an exercise in sematics.  Adding the ability to "act" to the assets dedicated to "sense" can be useful (although it does pose problems0.  One thing that I like about Coyote OPs is their ability to use firepower if required (not so much for the vehicle hooked up to the surv gear, but the second one is available).  In PSO or stability operations this capability can be very handy since other assets may not be immediately available.  I saw several situations where the firepower potential of a Patrol of Coyotes deployed to an OP was a "good thing."

Precision firepower is in vogue today for many reasons.  In our "Three Block War" environment the ability to take out an opponent with minimum collateral damage is critical.  The combination of infantry snipers and armoured recce has been done on operations.  Looking at the larger context, my proposed Cavalry Task (or a Wheeled Battlegroup) could try to pick apart a defensive position with long range fires while avoiding close range engagements.  Perhaps a series of rapier thrusts as opposed to our old battleaxe...

I examined something like this on the old CF board by looking at ways for a LAV BG (with MGS, TOW, ADATs and artillery) could try to fight a conventional opponent in offensive operations.  We could conceivably use the Coyotes, UAVs and EW to identify enemy positions and then destroy them with precise long range fires.  Those fires could be from ADATS (MMEV), TOW, MGS, artillery or fast air/aviation.  FOOs, Coyotes and UAVs could act as the sensor (especially if we give Coyotes the ability to laser designate).  We would essentially "snipe" the enemy to death.  The trick would be to be able to engage the enemy outside of his own weapons engagement band.  Heavy forces resolve this by having the ability to withstand hits from enemy AT systems.  We do not have this luxury (and we never did).

While it could work I saw (and see) a few problems.  The enemy may not be accomodating in his selection of positions.  Good concealment (whether with reverse slopes, vegetation, urban areas or civilians) will probably mean that some positions will go undetected.  I came across an interesting article regarding Op ANACONDA which stated that while the battlefield was the subject of an intense pre-battle ISTAR effort many of the enemy positions were only found by bumping into them.  Our army wants to go away from the advance to contact but I am afraid that sometimes we will still find the enemy by his firing at us.

Another issue is time.  Deliberately picking the enemy apart will require lots of time and I am not sure that we will be able to afford this luxury.  Finally, if our Cavalry our wheeled forces meet obstancles we will be sorely pressed to breach them.

Based on this, I believe that while we could find the enemy and perhaps destory his security elements I do not think that assaults should remain an option for our mounted forces.  I'm afraid that the assault will have to be left to the armies that still have "battleaxes."  We can still play an important part, however, by guiding that blow.  My worry is that our Army will simply substitute MGS/MMEV for tank in our doctrine and carry on.  The Cavalry Task Force could probably hold off an attack quite well but I do not envision it as an assault force in a convential battle.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Good Analogy a_majoor and thanks for the nod.

2Bravo as to the use of Snipers as an ISTAR or DF wpn, I would argue that the answer is situational.  Having the capability, especially a relatively cheap one like a rifle and scope, does not mean that the capability has to be used.  It is available if the situation demands it, for example time is short or the target is of sufficiently high value, but more often than not Binos/TI/II/LRF/GPS and Comms are going to be more valuable along with that "priceless" asset, an undisclosed hide.

So the question becomes one of, regardless of the nature of the platform, Coyote or Black Caddy's, can you see farther than the distance at which you are seen and can you bring fire down on a target farther than the range at which you can be hit?

In this type of scenario, as opposed to the "shock and awe" assault.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I agree with you completely regarding the situational nature of ISTAR vs DF.  Doing one should not preclude being the other.

The trick with seeing without being seen is that line of sight is reciprocal.  We can try to get around the risk element through technical means (UAVs, masts, robots etc) but we cannot depend on these 100%.  If we are advancing this will be a bigger problem.  Range is also an issue since the terrain will not always give us the luxury of observing outside of the enemy's weapon range.  We should still strive to see without being seen, but we also need to have some protection when this is not possible.

Cheers,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

PGM fire is not always LOS. If we were to say Gill/Spike/Dandy instead of ADATS we have a system of fire and forget weapons which also offer a FOG-M man in the loop option. The ability to hand off target data from forward observers will also go a long way to reducing exposure to enemy fire and counter-fire.

The concept Kirkhill showed us combines some of the best features of "sneak and peek" recce with the ability to influence the battle. A Cavalry unit or Future Combat Team would have some sort of recce/scout element working the AOR (maybe even troops trained like the ones in the article), as well as technical means to survey the battlespace operating in tandem. Together they would scout out the area, and direct the mounted troops and PGM fire onto enemy targets that are identified either before they see us, or as a result of contact.

By preference, I would vote for a "Fennick" or other small scout vehicle for the scout/recce elements, but a LAV Recce without the mast but with a dismounted scout team would also work. Various versions of the LAV/LAV TOW/MGS/MMEV or other armoured vehicles (even traditional tanks and IFVs) will supply the muscle to deal with larger formations or strong points, with the proviso the lighter the vehicle family, the less ability to prosecute contacts by shock battle.

The combination of observation, mobility and firepower in the unit Kirkhills article describes sort of negates the question about ISTAR or DF asset: it is an "inside loop" unit, which reports to the "outside loop" to assist in framing the larger battlespace and for logistics support.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

As long as we need an observer we will deal with LOS issues, but I do see the value in the FOG and other such systems.  I still don't see them as making us able to assault defended positions.

I see Cavalry at its root as a force that protects a supported formation by getting information and stopping the enemy from doing the same.  I see ait as a combination of "sense" capabilities with some capability to "act", but that "act" function is only to support the sense mission or hinder the sense function of the enemy.  In this respect the long range observer with a sniper rifle is somewhat analagous.  We need to be careful, however, as virtually any direct fire system could be considered as having "sense" and "act" functions.

If we are in a scenario where the Cavalry has identifed a line of enemy resistance that cannot be bypassed it can support the attack by Coaltion heavy forces.  In addition to identifying Assy Areas, Fire Bases, LDs etc (and providing guides) it could use the Coyotes, FOOs and possibly UAVs and EW to bring in precision fires to support the attack. These fires do not have to be organic.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. I am not one who worries about whether a sniper is for shooting or observing.  I sure am happy, however, that our snipers are on our side!

 

[a_majoor]

I think the only real area of disagreement is how much "act" should a Cavalry formation be able to do? American Armoured Cavalry is the "high end" of the scale, having lots of integral assets to launch assaults when required.

My fear is that as long as we shy away from the need for the formation to "act", there is a big danger of losing the initiative at the point of contact. I think we all accept the fact that LAV or Stryker type vehicles are ideal for the Cavalry screen role but not well suited for the assault role. Since we must accept the LAV as our primary platform for some time to come, we can forgo the ability to do assaults and accept we might get into situations where this puts us at a disadvantage, or find a substitute means of "acting". PGM fire allows us to "snipe" the enemy and take out even hardened targets like AFVs or bunkers. Since the enemy will probably be operating in low force to space ratios, the ability to snipe hard points might be all we need to maintain freedom of movement and maintain the initiative. Infantry who can stay with the armoured elements of the Cavalry formation (Liddel-Hart's "Tank Marines") provide the close protection and provide the flexibility to deal with difficult terrain or "non permissive" environments.

Looking at the UA Heavy thread, I noticed that formation is square. I think a Cavalry formation might need to operate with a 1:2 armoured to infantry ratio in order to have the flexibility needed to deal with close terrain or non permissive environments.

 

[George Wallace]

If we review combat footage of the battles fought in the last two Gulf Wars, one will soon come to the conclusion that vehicles armoured in the same fashion as LAV will loose in any Combat engagement.  We are setting ourselves up for a "Fall" 

The Americans have a much larger Armed Forces and much larger budget taking up a greater percentage of the GDP.  They can have the luxury of Light, Medium and Heavy Forces, with various "specialities" in each of their Branches, etc.  We do not have those luxuries and must maintain an all round "General" capability, which by no means makes us look at "Light" or niche roles as the only way.  Light or niche roles will degenerate our Armed Forces, with time, to be totally incapable to contribute in any endeavors other than Domestic non-military/combat tasks.

We will have to look at the American Cavalry and its' flexibility and structure and reevaluate our "on the cheap" policies.

GW

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

AMajoor,

I took the US Army Cavalry Leader's Course back in '98, and one of the things they emphasized was that while the Heavy Cav have lots of combat power they are not intended for assaults.   There are no infantry, as the Bradleys all carry Scouts.   There are lots of anti-tank weapons and artillery (mortars and guns, depending on the organization) along with varying degrees of aviation but the intent is not to assault enemy positions.   In defensive operations (a key consideration in the Cold War) they could certainly fight a holding action and could devastate an opposing mechanized force.   In offensive operations they can conduct a very robust zone reconnaissance that includes the destruction of enemy security elements but they still prefer to leave the assault to the Armor/Mech Inf boys.   It is true, however, that if a Heavy Cav Tp came across a enemy tank battalion leagured in the open deset they could certainly do something about it.

One advantage of this propose Armoured Cavalry is the presence of organic infantry.   It still do not see assaults happening without tanks, but having the infantry component does bring certain advantages.   This Cavalry Task Force would not be trying to fight the whole war on its own.   If some company position needed assaulting then the commander of the supported formation would assign the appropriate assets based on the information gained by the Cavarly.   If the enemy presses against our force (ie attacks it), then I think that the organic infantry and TOW/MGS and possible MMEV would enable us to fend off the attack.   Again, this is along the lines of the US Civil War Cavalry (tipping my hat to Buford) and our Boer War cavalry (as you have mentioned here and elsewhere).   The TOW/MGS/MMEV and Fire Support that could be included in the Cavalry (TOW and some form of supporting artillery at a minimum) would definately by used to neutralize enemy AT systems in the security zone or in lightly defended area with a view to permitting the recce tps/sqns freedom to maneuvre.

The ratio of Recce to Infantry is flexible and you are correct that it would probably need to be higher in complex terrain.   That being said, in an urban or compartmentalized environment I would like to see 2:2.   The coverage of our ISTAR assets is constrained by urban terrain, so I think that we'd end up needing even more Recce.

George,

We will certainly loose if we try to wield our LAV force in a battle trying to accomplish the tasks of tank/inf Battlegroups.   I still think that there is a "niche" for our mounted forces and that is as Cavalry.   As long as we are honest about our capabilities and do not try to fight as though we had tanks or that our ISTAR and potential PGGs could replace tanks then at least we can conduct meaningful operations.   Looking at the Americans, they have Light Cavalry (HMMVW based).   When I was in the states they were concerned about the protection of the HMMVWs (this is before Iraq but after Mogadishu).   They use the Light Cav for formations that deploy rapidly and this does involve some acceptance of risk.   Some US officers had seen the Coyote and saw it as an interesting alternative to the Light Cav.   The whole Stryker brigade concept has followed this path, although I have read that the Stryker ACR has become a casualty.

I see our Army being capable of conducting three types of operations:

   a.   Light operations in a warfighting context (although we need Chinooks)

   b.   Cavalry operations in a warfighting context (as described here)

   c.   Stability Operations (ISAF, SFOR)

We can still fight across the spectrum of conflict, but our contribution to the higher end will admitedly   be "niche."  

Cheers,

2B

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Admission One:   I'm a civvie, and my knowledge and viewpoint are not going to have nearly the depth of the majority of those partipating in this discussion.

That being said, I just read this entire thread and my impression is this is not so much a debate of "how do we create a truly effective force to best deal with theatres we are likely to encounter" but instead a discussion of "how can we best use the wrong kit we already own to do something useful".  

My primary concern is that the force structure discussed appears to be designed to face a conventional opponent which I would argue will be the exception to the rule in future deployments.   On the contrary, I would argue that for the stabilization/ peacemaking role our citizenry (and Liberal Government) expect you guys to handle, it is far more likely your theatre of operations would be an urban environment against irregular infantry with RPG's/IED's.

In that environment, using an armoured cavalry formation to destroy opposing force intelligence gathering appears questionable as in Iraq and Somalia before it, you had individuals (in many cases children) with cell phones calling regional insurgent commanders who were hidden in someone's basement in the middle of a city.

In essence, if the threatre I envision is going to be our dominant environment, we would need to accept we cannot eliminate the opposing force's intelligence gathering capability and accept that the enemy will know our force structure, composition and location at most times.  

With near-perfect intelligence, you are the target.   The enemy needs only to sit back and devise attack methods to "crack the nut".  
Engagements timing and location will much more often be dictated by that enemy and you will forced to take the first hit, and then react.

Bottom Line:   I find the model you're discussing horribly disconcerting as if deployed in that urban environment by our government, we could end up with a lot of brave men & women who don't make it home.   The only workaround is a force policy that if the enemy does possess RPG's/IED's/etc, that Canadian Forces are limited to deployment outside those urban areas where they have the safety of a defensive perimeter to keep thin-skinned vehicles from taking such attacks.   (City perimeter surveillance and convoy escort?)

My apologies in advance if I've stepped over any lines I don't know exist....I come to this board to learn from you guys.

Many thanks,



Matthew.  

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Fresh insight is most welcome!

You make some good points and have identified some critical weaknesses.  The Armoured Cavalry proposed here would certainly face severe limitations in a stand-up block by block streetfight.  I have outlined the "warfighting" bit to demonstrate what we could do if tasked to participate in an operation like the initial phase of OIF.  I am trying to find a role for our mounted troops now that the tanks are gone (and by mounted I include the LAVs).  As a serving junior officer I have no influence over what equipment we get but I can make suggestions as to how to use it.  Instead of throwing my hands up or wishing that we had Abrams I am trying to find meaningful roles that we can fulfill with the gear that we have and I think that the Armoured Cavalry is one.

Despite the constraints fo the environment, I think that the Armoured Cav (with LAVs and Coyotes) can make a very valuable contribution to urban stability operations.  A pair of Coyotes or LAVs is a much tougher proposition for insurgents than a pair of jeeps.  Our Coyotes were extremly useful and very busy in Kabul and I think that a force with LAVs and Coyotes would do also do well in Iraq (still need tanks if we want to go street fighting however).  They are certainly not invulnerable, but they give much better chances than HUMMVWs etc.  We can't just sit in our camps and hope for the best and having wheeled armoured vehicles gives us some additional options in the urban stability environment.  I was not really a believer in the LAVs and Coyotes until I went to Kabul.  The Coyote were busy from start to finish and were in demand from all contingents.  You still need to balance this with not looking like conquerers rolling around behind armour but it is nice to have the armour available.  Perhaps I am just a tanker trying to find a new home after I lost my last one!

Cheers,

Iain