CBH99 said:
But you had mentioned various factors, re: manning and organizational issues, regarding the force generation for the CH-148. Is there any way you can elaborate (Just a bit) on what you mean?
For example, when you say 12 Wing will need some time to build up manning?
It's not just 12 Wing, it's all of them to varying degrees; the RCN is also suffering from similar issues. The details are different but the theme is the same (it's why when Canada was thinking of the Mistrals my plan was to use them as training ships for a couple of years).
The Wings are FG pipelines, there is a continuous flow of people out the back, to other postings and releases, so there needs to be a continuous flow in the front, through the training squadron and then the ops squadron for advanced FG. The stated highest priority for 12 Wing is FG, and if you read between the lines, for the RCAF as a whole. 12 Wing has some particular challenges as advanced FG is dependant on the RCN providing sea time.
This shouldn't come as no surprise : it's easy to argue that the Allies number one priority in Jun 44 was FG, even as the assault divisions were crossing the beach. By Mar 45 all the line units were feeling why...
Two things have created the particular issues for MH:
- waiting for the (on paper) more effecient Cyclone pipeline to start; and not keeping Sea King O&M high enough because "Cyclone is right around the corner"
- blowing the FG stagger for Operation Apollo in the early 2000s
When I first started (finished the OTU at 406 Dec 92) we had around 10-12 det equivalents in 8ish dets. Now they've officially dropped below 5, although holding at 6 has been problematic for a while. As I said, the establishment is for 15 in 11.
However, it's worse than that... all three squadrons had robust standards, readiness, and ops cells, which also provided depth of manning to the dets. We actually kept a small manning pool in readiness. As well, 406 was more robustly manned (although for back enders maintaining the two aircraft types, A and B, was biting), as was Wing Ops. All of that was centralized and made smaller in or around 2005 by Op Transform, in order to free up pers for transition. But it was done too early (to be more precise, delays set in), and those extra pers were whittled away.
The abortion that started as SCTF also bit into the FG, and planning model, especially for the back end crew.
Unfortunately all of this hasn't resulted in a robust HOTEF either... when I retired last fall they were really at 3 crews (1.5 dets) plus overhead, although I hear they've bulked up. When I was in HOTEF on OJT in 90-91 we were the same (EH-101 was "coming"), and when I was there in both 98-00, 06-07, and 09-11 the manning was always about the same.
12 Wing Mission Support and Ops Support are also a pressure on manning, and will need to bulk up over time.
So, it us imperative that the 1.1 acceptance goes well, they pull of a mini miracle with OT&E, and they get the pipeline started. Once they can bulk up the whole issue of capability development becomes easier...
Ediited to add: I remebered a quote from a recent article that illustrates the challenges of FG, albeit from a diffeent fleet. Ref Espirit De Corps Volume 23 Issue 1 Feb 16 page 3: '... the acquisition o fthe fleet of Chinooks was a rare procurement success in that Boeing deliver the 15 choppers on time and on budget. In fact, the rapid rate of delivery has to date outpaced the RCAF's ability to train qalified Aircrew. "At present we have eight and a half trained crew," said 450 Squadron Commander...'