Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

Looks like the US Army continues to depend on National Guard combat arms units to deploy into foreign theatres.

[urlhttps://www.stripes.com/news/us/carolina-army-guard-troops-move-into-eastern-syria-with-bradley-fighting-vehicles-1.605423[/url]

Note that while the 4-118th are part of the 218th Manouvre Enhancement Brigade (formerly 218th Infantry Brigade) of the South Carolina National Guard, they were attached to and deployed to Kuwait as part of the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team which is garrisoned in North Carolina and has units from the North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia National Guard and is equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 155mm M109A6 Paladin SPs

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30754/army-national-guard-bradley-fighting-vehicles-are-in-syria-guarding-oil-and-gas-fields

:cheers:

Another good example of why this is one of the most interesting periods of international conflict in recent history. I’m looking forward to reading about the Post 911 period in history books ... about 50 years from now

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I'm all for simple and inexpensive field vehicles, particularly trucks, but what I mean by "simple" is the difference between our old 6-wheel AVGP and today's LAV.  My guesses are that in adjusted dollars, a LAV costs much more than an AVGP; that a LAV and all of its hardware is more complex to learn to use properly; and that a LAV requires a greater breadth and depth of maintenance skills and time to look after all of the aforementioned hardware.

Another guess is that the Res F, while continually improving, has not improved as fast as some of our equipment.  What the Res F in 1990 could do with contemporary equipment is - again mostly a guess - beyond what the Res F in 2020 can do with contemporary equipment.  Comparisons to what other nations achieve highlight to me that the explanation must lie in differences between them and us: so look to the money, the training and time commitment (again, the money), etc.

I'd restructure the Res F as it stands to see whether it improves itself before committing to more equipment and facilities.  To provide the latter up front is an unjustifiable leap of faith.  Some of the people arguing for change back in my day were also some of the people arguing that each proposed change was impractical, insulting, un-doable, etc.  If the only possible changes are their preferred changes, don't bother trying.

The generations that fought WWII and Korea and whose 1950s and 1960s Res F experience I did think deserved to be heard (larger units, experienced leadership) are pretty much gone from the associations and other points of influence.  Another guess: most of the senior Res-side people who weigh in going forward will just be people who grew up in the Res F as it is, with very few true veterans of multiple operational deployments.  It's past time to stop giving much weight to the opinions that tend to favour status quo.

You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently.

We tried to field Grizzlies with reserve units... they wound up being deployed mainly to the shop at the CFB for servicing and repairs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

We tried to field Grizzlies with reserve units... they wound up being deployed mainly to the shop at the CFB for servicing and repairs.

Was there a maintainer at the unit on Class b who's job it was to maintain them? I am guessing a lot of the down time was waiting for parts. When my unit was ops task, we had a mechanic with a 5/4 full of parts to maintain our vehicles, funny enough the rate of serviceable vehicle shot up.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Was there a maintainer at the unit on Class b who's job it was to maintain them? I am guessing a lot of the down time was waiting for parts. When my unit was ops task, we had a mechanic with a 5/4 full of parts to maintain our vehicles, funny enough the rate of serviceable vehicle shot up.

As I recall, no, there was a 100% reliance on a Naval support base for the effective maintenance of four armoured personnel carriers....

 

[MilEME09]

You could make a 6x6 armoured vehicle (think Saxon) on a commercial chassis with a ramp and a turret like Grizzly had. That would be simple enough to maintain and move. If Reserve units cannot maintain that sort of vehicle, then we are completely doing it wrong. It would mean investing in the infrastructure of the Reserves, shooting several sacred cows and allowing Brigade maintainers to shop locally for parts, hence the reason for using commercial truck parts. That investment would also pay dividends across the various vehicle fleets as well. Then issue the vehicles to select units that have been resourced and shown they have a plan in place to run them efficiently.

As much as I would love to say we can do this, what I see on the shop floor in a PRes service battalion,does  not paint a pretty picture towards us having the institutional capability to maintain anything, due to lack of tooling (easier said then done to buy, its like pulling teeth), and a institution set up so a PRes maintainer isn't allowed to do their trade without a Reg Force tech watching over our shoulder, that tech is on leave? sorry no training for you then, doesn't matter if you have 22 years and a operational tour as a vehicle tech(and are a civi mechanic), and the reg force guy is fresh off his QL5. There has to be massive fundamental change in the Reserve force if we are to any tangible work that has a positive effect on the army as a whole.

 

[FJAG]

As much as I would love to say we can do this, what I see on the shop floor in a PRes service battalion,does  not paint a pretty picture towards us having the institutional capability to maintain anything, due to lack of tooling (easier said then done to buy, its like pulling teeth), and a institution set up so a PRes maintainer isn't allowed to do their trade without a Reg Force tech watching over our shoulder, that tech is on leave? sorry no training for you then, doesn't matter if you have 22 years and a operational tour as a vehicle tech(and are a civi mechanic), and the reg force guy is fresh off his QL5. There has to be massive fundamental change in the Reserve force if we are to any tangible work that has a positive effect on the army as a whole.

Totally agree with this statement with one caveat: There also has to be a fundamental change in the Regular Force. The system is broken. The problem is that the senior leadership doesn't see it as a problem worth spending too much time on. The last time they did was around 2001/2 and that didn't work out so well.

:worms:

 

[dapaterson]

The Army Reserve structure, defended to the death by the Army Reserve's senior personnel (note I am not using the word leaders) will be the death of the Army Reserve.

About 1 in 3 members of the A Res are Infantry; in the Reg F, that's 1 in 4.

The Reg F ratio of Inf to Veh Techs is about 3:1; in the A Res it's closer to 16 to 1.

So, want Res F mechanics to maintain the Res F veh fleet?  (A) it's not done that way in peer militaries, where they rely mostly on contracted support, and (B) we still need to scrap a large chunk of the existing Res F Infantry structure (designed to feed warm bodies into WWI / WWII attritional warfare) and replace it with more support functions.

But that would mean that the storied Second Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Western Mukluks, which parades fewer than 50 trained soldiers, might disappear, and god forbid we make any change.


The biggest threat to the continued existence of the Army Reserve is the Army Reserve... refusing to ever make difficult choices, and believing its own Potemkin facades to be reality.


Mind you, the Reg F is also spiraling the same drain.  With only 37 M777, we could field at maximum a single regiment of artillery (four firing batteries of six guns) which, in a peer or near-peer environment, would be rendered combat ineffective within 24 hours.  (Assuming we retain a reference model, and two batteries for training).  Smiling and putting up a brave face about our critical shortfalls across the Army is not a Reg / Res either /or.

 

[FJAG]

The Army Reserve structure, defended to the death by the Army Reserve's senior personnel (note I am not using the word leaders) will be the death of the Army Reserve.
...
The biggest threat to the continued existence of the Army Reserve is the Army Reserve... refusing to ever make difficult choices, and believing its own Potemkin facades to be reality.

Mind you, the Reg F is also spiraling the same drain.  With only 37 M777, we could field at maximum a single regiment of artillery (four firing batteries of six guns) which, in a peer or near-peer environment, would be rendered combat ineffective within 24 hours.  (Assuming we retain a reference model, and two batteries for training).  Smiling and putting up a brave face about our critical shortfalls across the Army is not a Reg / Res either /or.

I'll take that on in two respects - one important; one petty.

I tend to believe much of what is written in "Relentless Struggle" insofar as that the Regular Force, because it holds the power and for numerous other reasons, is the reserves' biggest enemy. Where I do agree with you is that the army reserves' leadership (including the retired ones in Reserve 2000) despite the good things that they've done are also the biggest obstacle particularly in how they insist on expanding the reserves and not allowing consolidation into fewer, bigger units. Firstly, I'm not sure we can generate 40,000 reservists; secondly, using the current reserve force model, it would still be an ineffective organization (I'm of the view that we need a paradigm shift to lift the reserves out of the rut they are in); thirdly, consolidation into fewer, fully manned units organized into fewer and more effective brigades, each with clearly defined roles and resources is such a logical step that any resistance to it makes little sense (but that all depends on the plan and so far the regular force hasn't generated any good ones to back up consolidation-consolidation by itself will not solve the problem without many other concurrent changes). I expect Reserve 2000's position is that even when consolidated, the regular force will still deny the reserves the appropriate funding, role, equipment etc and therefore they would just be one step closer to withering away.

On the petty side, most nations have artillery battalions of three six-gun batteries (and also some general support stuff to back that up) so 37 guns should provide us with two equipped regiments (which still leaves us one short, not to mention general support) But that's just math. And don't get me started on our tank situation and whether or not the LAV6.0 is a fighting vehicle that can operate with tanks (or just a battlefield taxi).

More in line with the topic of this thread:

About 1 in 3 members of the A Res are Infantry; in the Reg F, that's 1 in 4.

The Reg F ratio of Inf to Veh Techs is about 3:1; in the A Res it's closer to 16 to 1.

So, want Res F mechanics to maintain the Res F veh fleet?  (A) it's not done that way in peer militaries, where they rely mostly on contracted support, and (B) we still need to scrap a large chunk of the existing Res F Infantry structure (designed to feed warm bodies into WWI / WWII attritional warfare) and replace it with more support functions.

I agree with you here in general because I believe we still require some combat oriented reservists in fully manned and equipped formations to provide more lethality for our forces in general. Our much vaunted three regular brigades are so ill equipped and manned, so rife with critical capability deficiencies, that we have very little staying power in a peer-to-peer conflict (and I use the term loosely because we are well below peer level with our most likely opponent) On a rough estimate my view is that we need two fully staffed reserve (or mixed) manoeuvre brigade groups to augment the other three.

More importantly we need more support capability. I've run some numbers and establishments on that and come up with three support brigades: one artillery, one manoeuvre enhancement and one sustainment using the current/achievable strength of the army reserve. I add quite a lot of Class A and B maintainers in that equation. If I saw any possibility of expanding the size of the army reserve it would clearly be by adding more support brigades as I think our overall need will be there. I think the ratio of support brigades to manoeuvre should be roughly 2.5 to 1. The only reason that I see that we can get by with three support brigades is that I think we will never be able to deploy more than 1.5 or maybe 2 manoeuvre brigade groups at any given time in any event. Regardless. We need a lot more usable maintainers, truckers and sup techs to name a few.

:stirpot:

 

[OldSolduer]

And the vast majority of Canadians could care less if they could. Defence matters are not a priority until the caskets start arriving in Trenton. Then those matters start to matter, until its over.

Forgive me for my somewhat bitter negative tone.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Does the army accept any of the outside trade qualifications for Reserve personal? So if they have air tickets, electrical or mechanic from a reputable org, that translate directly into a army qualification? If not make it happen and that eases your training burden, along with increasing the number of available techs at minimal costs. Then add 1 Class b maintainer to each Svc Battalion, issue tools and give the unit authority to order spare parts and locally source others. Vehicle dependent units like artillery, armour and Combat Engineers are next in line for Class B maintainers. this will benefit the Infantry as more of the Brigade vehicles will be serviceable and can be borrowed as required.

 

[dapaterson]

Yes, civilian quals translate to mil quals; I recall enrolling a Veh Tech who got PLAR'd everything up to his 6s (it's been a while, so I may be off a bit).

Please stop proposing "solutions" at the unit level.  There are minimums for safety, supervision, development etc... a single maintainer is useless; two can do something, but a critical mass is what's necessary - a half dozen (IC, control, four wrench benders) is what I'd consider the bare minimum.  Add Wpns, EO and comms techs as well if you want a realistic shop, plus a few sup techs. 

Or do the onesies and twosies that most units will load down with secondary duties like mess manager that take up 90+% of their available time, and we'll not have moved at all.

 

[a_majoor]

After reading and re reading parts of this thread, I might suggest a bit of a frame change.

While I am all for economies of scale and logistical compatibility, the political will and institutional ability to augment our fleet of LAV's (even for the Regular Force) simply isn't there. The time to have bought 1400 LAV's was when the program started.

On the other hand, there are arguments for smaller, lighter, less expensive vehicles which can do many of the jobs that the LAV is supposed to do. The STK "Light Strike Vehicle" is an example of this class of vehicle, weighing 1800kg, and being 4.9m long by 2.1m wide by 1,8m tall. The Mk II version can be used as a troop carrier with a crew of 6, or as a weapons carrier mounting a variety of weapons, from 40mm grenade launchers to Spike ATGM's and even the STK 120mm mortar. As a logistics/utility vehicle, it can carry 1000kg of stores.

Vehicles like this are obviously not front line, but then again, a great deal of what we do does not really require a full LAV 6.0. Changes in technology, like "smart" rounds from 120mm mortars capable of attacking armoured targets or soft recoil 105mm's that can be mounted in the back of an HMMVW could even free many vehicles from the need to carry heavy direct fire weapons, and of course lots of roles like recce, liaison and so on don't require a LAV at all. The STK is about the smallest and lightest vehicle out there, but there are plenty of other vehicles which have the sort of size and cross country performance to augment LAVs in many roles, preserving the LAVs for their primary use. They are also simple enough to provide a much lighter logistics footprint, maybe not enough to be present on Reserve armoury floors, but much more available to both regular and reserve units in terms of numbers, availability and uptime.

Even doctrinally, the STK makes more sense than the TAPV (carries more people, and is far more versatile and can fill multiple roles), so finding a vehicle with similar performance characteristics and perhaps a larger size (STK Bronco, SC Jaguar or a host of other choices) should be a priority. We certainly cannot go on waiting for the skies to open and deliver new LAV 6.0's.

 

[dapaterson]

I have not yet read Relentless Struggle, but as the staff officer responsible for Army Reserve funding and establishments from '03-08, I can state that (a) my name would show in any document review of Army Reserve documents from that period and (b) the author made no effort to contact me.

Thus, I am at best skeptical about the contents of that work... others I know who were in the Army HQ at the time were also not interviewed.

My experience in the Army HQ convinced me that the Reg F largely wants a successful, viable Res F as a base to draw personnel, and as a source of augmentation.  It is senior Res F personnel who lack understanding of the CAF, its processes, and the limits, both in time and money, of its personnel who inflict ongoing damage to the institution (by accident, not by design).

 

[MilEME09]

Does the army accept any of the outside trade qualifications for Reserve personal? So if they have air tickets, electrical or mechanic from a reputable org, that translate directly into a army qualification? If not make it happen and that eases your training burden, along with increasing the number of available techs at minimal costs. Then add 1 Class b maintainer to each Svc Battalion, issue tools and give the unit authority to order spare parts and locally source others. Vehicle dependent units like artillery, armour and Combat Engineers are next in line for Class B maintainers. this will benefit the Infantry as more of the Brigade vehicles will be serviceable and can be borrowed as required.

Some are but PLRs are a case by base basis, I see it more with v tech's and cooks then anything else.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Yes, civilian quals translate to mil quals; I recall enrolling a Veh Tech who got PLAR'd everything up to his 6s (it's been a while, so I may be off a bit).

Please stop proposing "solutions" at the unit level.  There are minimums for safety, supervision, development etc... a single maintainer is useless; two can do something, but a critical mass is what's necessary - a half dozen (IC, control, four wrench benders) is what I'd consider the bare minimum.  Add Wpns, EO and comms techs as well if you want a realistic shop, plus a few sup techs. 

Or do the onesies and twosies that most units will load down with secondary duties like mess manager that take up 90+% of their available time, and we'll not have moved at all.

My life was at the unit level so that is my focus, we had a Class B maintainer along with Class b QM and RSS staff, we all helped the maintainer when they needed it. Many of the repairs are minor and can be done in house and quickly. We also started doing maintenance on our guns including exercising the recoil system, something that made the gun plumbers in Chilliwack happy. I have given up on "big fixes" and go for the little bites. All the power to you if you can make your idea work. 

 

[garb811]

My life was at the unit level so that is my focus, we had a Class B maintainer along with Class b QM and RSS staff, we all helped the maintainer when they needed it. Many of the repairs are minor and can be done in house and quickly. We also started doing maintenance on our guns including exercising the recoil system, something that made the gun plumbers in Chilliwack happy. I have given up on "big fixes" and go for the little bites. All the power to you if you can make your idea work.

I was posted to a MP Pl in a previous life. We had a Reg Force MCpl maintainer with a full bay and all the tools he needed. If he needed assistance on something, he could tap into the MP on strength and if it was something too technical, he could ask either HQ&Sigs or Svc Bn to get parts and/or hands. He had 10 x Iltis and trailers, 4 x LSVW and trailers and 1 x MLVW with a water buffalo. He could barely keep ahead of things at times, many times we were at a 50% VOR, not due to a lack of parts or anything, simply because he just couldn't keep up with the required inspections, let alone the flood of repairs that would result from a month of abuse in the field. Throw in the paperwork and it was more than a single guy could handle at times. 

Talked to the "current" guy a few years ago and his time turning wrenches was pretty much non-existent with a down-sized fleet (G-Wagons didn't replace Iltis 1/1 and the MLVW was waiting for disposal), he'd essentially become a control office due to DRIMIS and the work was being conducted by QL3s from the Svc Bn working on their QL4s. The MP at the Pl were useless to him for anything other than pretty much driver maintenance due to the fact that even the basic vehicles aren't basic anymore.

Take from that what you will but dapaterson is right, there is no way, from my experience, that a single Veh Tech is going to give any kind of useful maint capability.

 

[CBH99]

I know this is off topic -- pls forgive, my intent isn't to derail this thread at all. 


I was having a chat with members from 2 US Army National Guard units about 6 months ago, and they had similar problems.  So while they absolutely have the manpower, kit, and weapons at the unit level to deploy as a self-sufficient unit & contribute as a unit to an AO, they had ample vehicle issues of their own.

Different guard units had different models of Bradleys, which meant - in some cases - different engine parts & components, as well as different mechanisms in the turrets, tracks, etc.


So while they all had "Bradleys" - some units had updated comms, some didn't.  Some had slightly different or upgraded engines, some didn't.  Some had different little mechanical bits here and there, while others didn't.  They had more maintenance issues than I ever imagined.


Like everything else US military related...similar problems, just on a whole other level than "We only have 2 working MilCots". 


*Random tangent over*

 

[FJAG]

...
My experience in the Army HQ convinced me that the Reg F largely wants a successful, viable Res F as a base to draw personnel, and as a source of augmentation.  It is senior Res F personnel who lack understanding of the CAF, its processes, and the limits, both in time and money, of its personnel who inflict ongoing damage to the institution (by accident, not by design).

Once again you have put your finger right on the problem which is that the Regular Force is looking for augmentees to fill holes either as day-to-day administrative Class Bs or as surge operational Class Cs.

With respect, that is a limited view of what the reserves could be capable of if properly organized and trained. The current system relegates them to an "office overload" position which does nothing to expand the capabilities of the total force which quite frankly is a bloody weak organization at best because Regular Force personnel costs are sapping the organization of money for critical equipment and operations and maintenance.

To quote a much used phrase "reserves add depth and breadth". Augmentation is only depth. Reserves currently provide only very limited breadth. It could provide much more.

:cheers:

 

[McG]

Once again you have put your finger right on the problem which is that the Regular Force is looking for augmentees to fill holes either as day-to-day administrative Class Bs or as surge operational Class Cs.

... or is the problem a Reserve Force with ambitions to deploy itself internationally in formed sub-units, units, and formations even in the absence of a requirement?

[The Total Force] is a bloody weak organization at best because Regular Force personnel costs are sapping the organization of money for critical equipment and operations and maintenance.

So your proposal is to cut the Regular Force?

To quote a much used phrase "reserves add depth and breadth". Augmentation is only depth. Reserves currently provide only very limited breadth. It could provide much more.

Just because a thing can be done, it does not follow that the thing should be done.  What is the requirement for (and what problem is being fixed by) getting third-rate armoured fighting vehicles and establishing support brigades for the reserves?  Do we think that we could mobilize units in a Saxon or Grizzly like vehicle and deploy these without catastrophic results against a peer enemy?  Or would we really be buying these for the glory of the units which would park them at the armouries?