Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

Back in my Res Armd Recce days, we made good use of Cl A trg nights. Even after we went to 1 trg night/week (Thurs). Eg - est a Mtd Op Screen, to exercise all steps of BP. At 2100hrs on a Trg night, issue a Wng O with task of Est Mtd Op Screen by Tp Ldr. BP - starts, ends at 2200hrs. Enough time to get things rolling.

Next Thurs night, BP continues. Drivers and Obs are at veh park, crew commanders are recieving orders, etc. Issue orders at veh park. Move out, establish Mtd OP screen by H-hour. Once last OP Report is sent - ENDEX. Return to armouries, de-kit veh's, return kit to lockers, Stables as needed, hot wash in the Mess with a cold one and a slice of pizza.

Morale was pretty good back in those days. Of course, there was enough veh's to field 7 car Recce tps, and those veh's had comms. Double-banked comms, even.

Imagine that.

Jan - winter indoc/warface. One trg night, go over tent group kit, march discipline and all that stuff. tobaggans ready to go. Next trg night, everyone brought in FMO, got into tent groups, did a short march, up pole/down pole, march back. sort kit back out, wpns secured, Wng O issued for winter indoc/warfare FTX that started 1800 the next night. It (Cl A trg nights) worked well, IMO...with motivated leaders.

After Stables on Sunday, there was always pizza and an open mess.

We'd usually be in the high 90%s for attendance back on those days...

And that's exactly how it should go!

The (constantly changing) reality that I and others frequently had to face was somewhat different, however

 

[markppcli]

You can bicker over the details, unit naming and the assignments, but this is basically what many/most Reserve Napkin force submitters here have been suggesting for years..."right size" the Reserve Regiments as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries to reflect their actual strength.

Once you accept this fact you can tinker with Reg Force/Reserve Force augmentation levels, specific roles, etc.

I think all observers, and most members frankly, see the same thing. Pity that doesn’t result in action.

 

[childs56]

Was there a point to this beyond trying to grand stand on our casualties ? I was a reservist augmentee in 2008. We did 10 months with 1 VP before we deployed. Hard to call us “mitiatmen” at that point I’d think. You obviously know that no one can answer your first question because no inquiry will ever say “soldier x wasn’t adequately trained” so your just trying to create a manufactured outrage. Be an adult.

Not grandstanding
My point is there is a lot of complaining about how poorly trained the Reserves are. Yet they are cleared to go on operations, have been for many years. Will be for many years to come. The fact that casualties can not be attributed to the poor training and or the lack of training for a Reservist says something.
We did 6 months work ups alongside the Regular Force, we put guys on Driver courses, MG courses gun conversion etc. at the end of the 6 months there was very little difference between the Reserves and the Regular Force other then hearing firetrucking Mos all the time. Attitudes from most of the Reservists I witnessed was a can do attitude as opposed to a drunking screw this from the Regs.
If we are to equip the Reserves so they have the same tools as the Regular Force then things can happen. What happens is the Reserves get shorted on most everything. Have to make due with what they have. Dam we use to wrap rocks, to go through grenade drills because we couldn't get training grenades. But when we finally went to the grenade range we did pretty good.

If we look at 2RCHA right now they are training the local Reserve Artillery Units, have been for a while. They recognized a short fall in their own staffing, asked how to fix it for the time being. They put their money where their mouth was and got they local units up to standards for things they could not do otherwise. Those Gunners have deployed over to Europe with the Regiment. Not much time is spent overall. Motivation, hope things will get better keeps a Citizen Soldier coming back, especially after some of the crap many of them go through.

 

[markppcli]

Not grandstanding

Then why bring it up?

My point is there is a lot of complaining about how poorly trained the Reserves are.

Where ? At what level?

Yet they are cleared to go on operations, have been for many years. Will be for many years to come.

After proper work up yes

The fact that casualties can not be attributed to the poor training and or the lack of training for a Reservist says something.

What does it say? Where would that have been brought up, in what kind of inquiry and we both know that would never be the stated reason.

If I said Cpl X died because of his bad drills I’d be bad mouthing one of our dead. And I’d be deeply p lacking in human decency, which I’m sure you’d point out. So fuck off with that because we both know it’s a bad faith line.

We did 6 months work ups alongside the Regular Force, we put guys on Driver courses, MG courses gun conversion etc. at the end of the 6 months there was very little difference between the Reserves and the Regular Force other then hearing firetrucking Mos all the time. Attitudes from most of the Reservists I witnessed was a can do attitude as opposed to a drunking screw this from the Regs.

Oh there it is lol. “Bar room layabouts,” much like in every other industry, peoples enthusiasm comes and goes. When augmentees show up they are excited to start a new experience, the guys in that company have been doing that exact same grind for 4 plus years straight, less that thrilled to train up new guys and that shouldn’t be a shock.

If we are to equip the Reserves so they have the same tools as the Regular Force then things can happen. What happens is the Reserves get shorted on most everything. Have to make due with what they have. Dam we use to wrap rocks, to go through grenade drills because we couldn't get training grenades. But when we finally went to the grenade range we did pretty good.

Have done this in the regs; we’re all hurting for equipment.

If we look at 2RCHA right now they are training the local Reserve Artillery Units, have been for a while. They recognized a short fall in their own staffing, asked how to fix it for the time being. They put their money where their mouth was and got they local units up to standards for things they could not do otherwise. Those Gunners have deployed over to Europe with the Regiment. Not much time is spent overall. Motivation, hope things will get better keeps a Citizen Soldier coming back, especially after some of the crap many of them go through.

All soldiers are also citizens. Hate to break it to you. Just a question but if a reg force guy has a job on the side is he also twice the citizen ? Or does that only work one way?


You presented nothing but an anecdote and chip on your shoulder. You asked a questions month ago about “what makes the regs so special” and when I gave you a schedule and an answer about differences you didn’t even comment back. You have a problem with some one giving you a hard time but have no actual imput.

 

[childs56]

Then why bring it up?


Where ? At what level?


After proper work up yes

Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?

What does it say? Where would that have been brought up, in what kind of inquiry and we both know that would never be the stated reason.

If I said Cpl X died because of his bad drills I’d be bad mouthing one of our dead. And I’d be deeply p lacking in human decency, which I’m sure you’d point out. So fuck off with that because we both know it’s a bad faith line.

After Action reviews often cover training, equipment, co-ordination etc.

Oh there it is lol. “Bar room layabouts,” much like in every other industry, peoples enthusiasm comes and goes. When augmentees show up they are excited to start a new experience, the guys in that company have been doing that exact same grind for 4 plus years straight, less that thrilled to train up new guys and that shouldn’t be a shock.

4 plus years doing the same grind. I can only speak for the Artillery side. But going to the field living in the Biv site for a week before actually shooting really is more of a pain, sweeping the gun park floors and kicking the gun box for days on end. Doing some stores checks every other day and equipment maintenance. Paid to Exercise every other morning and over the year get some courses. Sounds kind of familiar. But not much more.

Have done this in the regs; we’re all hurting for equipment.

All soldiers are also citizens. Hate to break it to you. Just a question but if a reg force guy has a job on the side is he also twice the citizen ? Or does that only work one way?

In that case the Reserve Soldier would be three times and some cases four times the soldier. The Term Citizen Soldier often refers to Reserve Soldiers. Hence why I used the term.

You presented nothing but an anecdote and chip on your shoulder. You asked a questions month ago about “what makes the regs so special” and when I gave you a schedule and an answer about differences you didn’t even comment back. You have a problem with some one giving you a hard time but have no actual imput.

I must have missed that information. I will try to look for it.

No Chips on my shoulders but I must have struck a nerve with you. That was not my intent. It is what it is, I cant tread around lightly worried about hurt feelings or struck nerves. As I am sure you do not either.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?

I didn't. I deployed to AFG the first time after a month of WUP training and a couple weeks leave.

And the second time was a year of WUPs with most of it holding down a pick-nick table while the reserves were brought up to speed administratively and professionally.

 

[markppcli]

Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?

Interesting way of explaining that you don’t understand how training cycles work.

After Action reviews often cover training, equipment, co-ordination etc.

4 plus years doing the same grind. I can only speak for the Artillery side. But going to the field living in the Biv site for a week before actually shooting really is more of a pain, sweeping the gun park floors and kicking the gun box for days on end. Doing some stores checks every other day and equipment maintenance. Paid to Exercise every other morning and over the year get some courses. Sounds kind of familiar. But not much more.

Sorry could you rephrase this in some kind of coherent English?

In that case the Reserve Soldier would be three times and some cases four times the soldier. The Term Citizen Soldier often refers to Reserve Soldiers. Hence why I used the term.

How does that work exactly? 4 times the soldier ?

I must have missed that information. I will try to look for it.

No Chips on my shoulders but I must have struck a nerve with you. That was not my intent. It is what it is, I cant tread around lightly worried about hurt feelings or struck nerves. As I am sure you do not either.

No I have less that 0 tolerance for the kind of human excrement that would try and use a fallen soldier as some kind of leverage to make a point.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Curious as to why the Regular Force needs work up times if they are that better trained then the Reserves?

The Reg Force needs very little actual training time to deploy hastily for an operation overseas or domestically because the Regular Force is constantly training.

A Task Force could be given a warning order and be out the door in days to weeks. I have seen and participated in this type of cycle myself a couple of times.

But if time and space are an available luxury, why not use it?

Reservists aren't the same because the units they are in aren't an actual operational unit, they are more akin to a holding unit.

Military Organizations fight as collectives, not as individuals. An individual Reservist might be a skilled soldier but the unit they are in is not a well-oiled machine.

It could be made into one, but that would take a lot of time and require full mobilization.


Semi-related:

You guys think the difference between a worked up Battalion and a Reserve Unit/Unit in Reconstitution are night and day? You should see what a worked up Warship Crew vs a non-worked up Warship Crew looks like.....




The best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.

Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:

The fleet standard is 5 minutes. My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.

When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors. The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong. That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.

Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:

The fleet standard is 5 minutes. My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.

When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors. The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong. That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.

Making a meal while cleaning your rifle while changing your socks enters the chat

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Making a meal while cleaning your rifle while changing your socks enters the chat

BTDT

Won't lie, I miss that part of the Infantry.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The best part about working up a Warship is almost everything you do is quantifiable with timings, etc so you can actually see your labour bear fruit.

Take a Man Over Board Exercise for instance:

The fleet standard is 5 minutes. My personal record as a Watchkeeper was 3 minutes 45 seconds but that was with a worked up crew that had been sailing together for close to 18 months at that point.

When turnover happened, I stayed on and did a FG Sail with a brand new crew of mostly new sailors. The first Man Over Board we did took the crew 12 minutes with basically everything going wrong. That's the difference between a well trained unit and an untrained unit.

We kick 3 ships out the door for Op Apollo in a week or two. WUPs on the way over MoFos

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

We kick 3 ships out the door for Op Apollo in a week or two. WUPs on the way over MoFos

Yup, we did continuity work the entire way over when I went to the Gulf. It's easy to do TMST when you've got a seven week transit to the theatre of operations. Great time to drill your boarding, ops and bridge teams, build mission packs, conduct rehearsals and continuity training, etc.

It's even easier when you don't have a bunch of useless cocktail parties you have to plan and dedicate your efforts towards prepping for the actual operation

The OROs, OOWs and Warfare Directors also did a bunch of specific training and planning for certain other operations we did.

"Hey, we are transiting through the SCS, we should probably wargame this collectively together, come up with a plan and then gain blessing from the skipper so we can drill it and not be surprised when we inevitably have an interaction with a certain non-friendly Navy".

 

[FJAG]

Don't bring that weak sauce. You have A Res CBG Commanders and higher with the A Res. And you have DGen Army Reserve. Don't try and deflect the current state of things without owning your portion.

If the organization wants to be a player it needs to help is self first. The first step is to propose a self reorganization into something rational and coherent.

The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.

I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.

I'm going around right now and SIVing units with an ES of 25 troops. Yet they have a compliment of command positions and staff. Re-dick-you-lous.

Break the cabals and mafias.

I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.

I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.

I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.

Why is that a joke? You have 10 Cols, and DGen Res to advocate to the Div commanders as to how they can be be organized / support their Div commanders intent. What does a “real seat at the table” look like to you? Do you need equal representation ? Where is that going to come from?

It has to come from a knowledgeable and strong MND supported by his PM with a mandate for meaningful reform and not just cost cutting. It ought to be the priority. Everyone knows that you need a solid core of full-timers to develop doctrine, practice it and take care of the day-to-day discretionary defence deployments that we choose to take on and at the same time have a larger, well-trained and equipped, low cost part-time force to call on when a problem is no longer discretionary but has to be addressed with a military solution. The CAF is currently focussing on the former while marginalizing the latter.

To better create argument and bickering. I once again submit my proposed reorganization of the reserves into regional Bdes and roughly provincial regiments.

I agree fully with the basic concept of amalgamation and I know that it works in the US with their ARNG.

Where I would deviate is that I would remove artillery and engineers from the manoeuvre brigades and have them in their own brigades so that these specialty skills could be properly supervised and developed across the entire Army in a consistent and purposeful manner. I would leave the manoeuvre basically as infantry and recce/armour organizations so that they could concentrate on those combined arms skills.

Service support is too important to leave in little enclaves. It's one of the primary needs of an Army that is required to deploy beyond the routine peacetime deployments. A significant effort should go into creating ResF service support battalions and formations that are capable of supporting a brigade or larger deployed force and augmenting smaller RegF deployments. If we do not plan to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we do not need a ResF brigade service battalion, just a peacetime, full-time maintenance establishment commensurate with the brigade's equipment holdings. If we do get to the point where we want to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we need to have or to be able to rapidly form a brigade service battalion. Regardless, we need to have at least one, better yet two, ResF sustainment brigades.

I'll get back to basics. I've come to the view that both warfighting and administration has become too complex to be handled by a part-time leadership. If we pool the ResF into more concentrated brigades and units (especially if we also reduce the number of division headquarters to a more reasonable two) but maintain the full-time RSS and brigade and division staffs in their current numbers then we already have a start at a core for a full-time leadership/administrative cadre. (That shouldn't stop us from also simplifying our administrative system)

On the other hand, I do not think that is enough. I do not think that amalgamation brings enough experience or equipment to the reservists to allow them to do proper individual and collective training. For that I think you need something in the nature of a 30/70 battalion where you have one CO responsible for training his fully equipped full-time company and his partially equipped, part-time companies using the resources that he is given. Resource sharing and management within a battalion is much easier to accomplish than Army wide. Additionally the full-time company and battalion headquarters is still available for peacetime deployment rotos fleshed out to an extent by it's own reservists.

All that to say that the ResF is in dire need to be fixed but incapable of fixing itself. Not just because it's stubborn or cliquish (which it is) but because it does not have the control over itself or the resources to the extent that is needed to really fix the problem.

 

[childs56]

Interesting way of explaining that you don’t understand how training cycles work.

Fully understand how the cycle works for all three elements.

Sorry could you rephrase this in some kind of coherent English?

How does that work exactly? 4 times the soldier ?

You said a Regular Force member would be twice the soldier if they had another job. Many Reservist have other jobs some multiple along with attending school.

No I have less that 0 tolerance for the kind of human excrement that would try and use a fallen soldier as some kind of leverage to make a point.

Yup the same person that would not look at the facts of the overall situation and try to fix any issues of relevance in relation to the incident.
The Airforce is pretty good at investigating all incidents and relating them to training, equipment, system failure or other issues. Putting the focus on the issues. It can be a hard reality but one that should be looked at.

You don't have to agree but it can and does save lives.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.

I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.

If the A res wants to be more than a social club and holding unit for partially trained soldiers I think it needs to start the change itself. The first step would be to recognize the disfunction and present a plan to the CAF and Reg Army that makes sense. And IMHO that includes vast reducing the command structure overhead that currently exists.

I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.

Absolutely, but I think the subject of this thread is the A Res. So I am trying to stay on point.

I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.

Part of the issue, I agree, is that I think we are placing unreasonable expectations on our A Res. I have RQs/SQs that aren't Sup Techs, in fact only 3 of my units have Sup Techs as an RQ/SQ and one is a reserve Cpl, who is trying their best. And we expect the same writ and returns from them; and Supply Management competency as a Reg Force MWO RQ at a Reg Bn. Its ridiculous. And completely unreasonable.

I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.

Again, and Ill be honest. The A Res has to lead the change to be the organization it wants to be. Dont sit around waiting for the Reg Force to do it. The Reg Force wont pay them any mind until until they assert themselves and are honest about their own make up and structure. I work with a ton of great people who want to do great things. In many ways the A Res has been refreshing. Its nice to be around people who actually want to be here. But the change needs to come within. Only then, I think, will you get churn from big brother.

 

[GR66]

The problem that you face with this is long standing corporate memory. There had been a number of such amalgamations and rationalizations all of which led to reduced manning and capability. When this was floated in the late 1990s in Ontario it ended up with a revolt of the honouraries and direct bickering to the MND and the PM.

I'm not defending that but merely pointing out that there is an underlying division as between the RegF concept of reservists as folks to fill in the blanks on RegF units (which is heavily proven by the equipment holdings of the respective organizations) and the ResF view which is more long term and looking for a force capable of not just reinforcing the RegF but expanding it in time of need. Much of that is resource driven and caused by a lack of political understanding and leadership. Each side is protecting their own vision.


I know you want to break the ResF mafias; but much of the army's problem comes from the fact that it too is a Mafia with it's own sub-mafias which concurrently need breaking.

I've sat at the ResF big boys' table for over half a decade and you probably wouldn't be surprised at how much it feels like the little kids' table. There is very little that you actually get accomplished. Day-to-day you are just being fed info with a fire hose but any initiatives for change inevitably come from the RegF and are generally small order stuff that doesn't address the overriding issue.

I can pretty much guarantee that if we went to a model that greatly reduces the numbers of ResF BGens, Cols, LCols and CWOs, it wouldn't fundamentally change anything. You need to dig deeper than that and have the RegF reform its organizations, equipment policies, administrative policies and a whole hockey sock of other stuff that needs to be done to rationalize the leadership, training and mentoring process to the point where it has some positive effect. This is a whole of Army issue. Asking the ResF leadership to trim itself is asking them to deliver something that they are incapable of. It's like when Leslie was looking at Transformation in 2010/11 and found every department absolutely convinced that there was no way that their department could bear a cut or manage a reform. That's simply how bureaucracies function.


It has to come from a knowledgeable and strong MND supported by his PM with a mandate for meaningful reform and not just cost cutting. It ought to be the priority. Everyone knows that you need a solid core of full-timers to develop doctrine, practice it and take care of the day-to-day discretionary defence deployments that we choose to take on and at the same time have a larger, well-trained and equipped, low cost part-time force to call on when a problem is no longer discretionary but has to be addressed with a military solution. The CAF is currently focussing on the former while marginalizing the latter.


I agree fully with the basic concept of amalgamation and I know that it works in the US with their ARNG.

Where I would deviate is that I would remove artillery and engineers from the manoeuvre brigades and have them in their own brigades so that these specialty skills could be properly supervised and developed across the entire Army in a consistent and purposeful manner. I would leave the manoeuvre basically as infantry and recce/armour organizations so that they could concentrate on those combined arms skills.

Service support is too important to leave in little enclaves. It's one of the primary needs of an Army that is required to deploy beyond the routine peacetime deployments. A significant effort should go into creating ResF service support battalions and formations that are capable of supporting a brigade or larger deployed force and augmenting smaller RegF deployments. If we do not plan to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we do not need a ResF brigade service battalion, just a peacetime, full-time maintenance establishment commensurate with the brigade's equipment holdings. If we do get to the point where we want to mobilize a ResF manoeuvre brigade then we need to have or to be able to rapidly form a brigade service battalion. Regardless, we need to have at least one, better yet two, ResF sustainment brigades.

I'll get back to basics. I've come to the view that both warfighting and administration has become too complex to be handled by a part-time leadership. If we pool the ResF into more concentrated brigades and units (especially if we also reduce the number of division headquarters to a more reasonable two) but maintain the full-time RSS and brigade and division staffs in their current numbers then we already have a start at a core for a full-time leadership/administrative cadre. (That shouldn't stop us from also simplifying our administrative system)

On the other hand, I do not think that is enough. I do not think that amalgamation brings enough experience or equipment to the reservists to allow them to do proper individual and collective training. For that I think you need something in the nature of a 30/70 battalion where you have one CO responsible for training his fully equipped full-time company and his partially equipped, part-time companies using the resources that he is given. Resource sharing and management within a battalion is much easier to accomplish than Army wide. Additionally the full-time company and battalion headquarters is still available for peacetime deployment rotos fleshed out to an extent by it's own reservists.

All that to say that the ResF is in dire need to be fixed but incapable of fixing itself. Not just because it's stubborn or cliquish (which it is) but because it does not have the control over itself or the resources to the extent that is needed to really fix the problem.

I 100% agree that Role, Resources and Reorganization are equally important in producing an effective Army Reserve however that doesn't mean that they all have to be/can be done at the same time.

I see no reason why the Reserves couldn't begin their Reorganization while the Reg Force does the same with their (eventual) Force 20XX plans. Once the Reorganization is completed the Army as a whole can then look at the building blocks that come out the other side of that process and determine what roles need to be filled to achieve our overall defence policy objectives (i.e. new Foreign Policy and Defence Policy White Papers required...hopefully developed with all-party - or at least Liberal and Conservative - input so that we don't have radical policy swings each time we get a new government).

At that point the Army can then tweak the structures as required and then equip the Army (Reg Force and Reserves) as required to fulfill their roles.

In the meantime CA Reserve units can focus on their primary skills (Light Infantry, Mounted/Dismounted Recce, etc.) and the Company/Squadron/Battery level. To my mind each "Regiment" should have the ability to at least generate and consistently field in training that sub-unit level of troops. Any existing unit that cannot meet that requirement should be amalgamated with another unit(s) so that they can.

These amalgamated Reserve units can then be grouped geographically into Battalions/Regiments and Brigades with Reg Force RSS leadership and/or integrated into 30-70 or 70-30 type "Total Force" units as determined by the eventual overall force structure devised by the Army.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I 100% agree that Role, Resources and Reorganization are equally important in producing an effective Army Reserve however that doesn't mean that they all have to be/can be done at the same time.

I see no reason why the Reserves couldn't begin their Reorganization while the Reg Force does the same with their (eventual) Force 20XX plans. Once the Reorganization is completed the Army as a whole can then look at the building blocks that come out the other side of that process and determine what roles need to be filled to achieve our overall defence policy objectives (i.e. new Foreign Policy and Defence Policy White Papers required...hopefully developed with all-party - or at least Liberal and Conservative - input so that we don't have radical policy swings each time we get a new government).

At that point the Army can then tweak the structures as required and then equip the Army (Reg Force and Reserves) as required to fulfill their roles.

In the meantime CA Reserve units can focus on their primary skills (Light Infantry, Mounted/Dismounted Recce, etc.) and the Company/Squadron/Battery level. To my mind each "Regiment" should have the ability to at least generate and consistently field in training that sub-unit level of troops. Any existing unit that cannot meet that requirement should be amalgamated with another unit(s) so that they can.

These amalgamated Reserve units can then be grouped geographically into Battalions/Regiments and Brigades with Reg Force RSS leadership and/or integrated into 30-70 or 70-30 type "Total Force" units as determined by the eventual overall force structure devised by the Army.

So how do you 'clean house' at the leadership levels first, so that any new initiatives aren't badly bungled or otherwise wasted effort?

 

[GR66]

So how do you 'clean house' at the leadership levels first, so that any new initiatives aren't badly bungled or otherwise wasted effort?

Somewhat ironically I think the best way to ensure some modicum of success (let's be honest...there will be LOTS of broken eggs to make this omlette) is initially political rather than military.

The leaders of the different political parties in both the US and Australia for example have for the most part come to some general, high-level agreement as to what the basic roles of their militaries are and broad agreement on the general level of funding required.

If the Conservative and Liberal parties could reach some similar type of accord then as a result our military leadership would not have to tip-toe around the politics of defence so much. A clearer sense of general direction and confidence that this is unlikely to radically change from election to election would allow the CDS and the rest of the CAF leadership to move more decisively toward the agreed upon objectives.

Clear direction from the political top would mean that it would be much harder for those down the chain to fight against the changes as they would have no strong political base of support to back them.

In no way however will any radical changes to the CAF be neat or pretty. It's in a very deep pile of doo-doo (some of it imposed from outside and some self-inflicted) and getting out of it will be messy and painful.

$.02

 

[dapaterson]

Fully agree that the Army Res C2 structure is inadequate, bloated, and too often filled with individuals of questionable competence.

But that same eye needs to be applied across the board. A navy with sixteen warships (with respect to their crews, KIN and AOPS are not warships) sounds like a flotilla where even a single Rear Admiral would be excessive. An Army writ large which under duress might be able to cobble together three brigades (Reg and Res combined) sounds suspiciously like a command for a MGen.

And so on throughout the structure...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Fully agree that the Army Res C2 structure is inadequate, bloated, and too often filled with individuals of questionable competence.

But that same eye needs to be applied across the board. A navy with sixteen warships (with respect to their crews, KIN and AOPS are not warships) sounds like a flotilla where even a single Rear Admiral would be excessive. An Army writ large which under duress might be able to cobble together three brigades (Reg and Res combined) sounds suspiciously like a command for a MGen.

And so on throughout the structure...

'Emperor's New Clothes' time