Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[McG]

In fact, we should look at the complete military as a whole.  Do we really need three undermanned regular force battallions for each regiment?  I can see more budget being freed as well there.

However, it is too quick to say, amalgamante the reserves.  As I pointed it out, lead by example and start with the military as a whole.  Cut, slash, and merge everything. 

Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.

I am sure you would come up with a bigger bag of gold coins than nit picking at the reserves.  Maybe I am losing the focus of the goals in our thread.

...

Is the priority to find more money, or Gather all the sheep under one to make the crowd look like a bigger reserve military?  If we do anything, it must be a complete restructure of the Military, not bits and pieces.

But, to sum up my point, we do an overhaul of everything, and go forward.  Starting witht he Regular force, then moving down to the local reserve units.

Tess,
1.  The goal is a more effective & capable reserve force.  Money savings (if any) would be small & not part of the objective.  Therefore, searching for cost savings in other parts of the CF is a red herring & distraction from the real discussion.
2.  The compress the regular force structure discussion is alive and well in other threads.  Try taking it here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html
3.  Improvements to the reserve structure & improvements to the regular force structure are not mutually exclusive.  Suggesting that nothing can happen to the reserves until it has happened to the regular force is a farce.

Amalgamation is a very short term and short sighted fix.  In a few years, the amalgamated units will have dropped in numbers, just as current units have seen.  Many of the reasons for this have already been stated by recceguy and others.

Recruiting in the Reserves and the CF is cyclic.  The thing that isn't cyclic, is funding.  When Unit strengths decrease, so does funding.  When they again increase in strength, funding does not.  This becomes a morale issue and Units loose people.

Michael

If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?

In the past we have seen large numbers in our Militia Regiments.  As numbers fell in the 1970s, they did away with some of their outlying Rural Sqns and Coys.  Come to the present, their numbers are once again down, and there is talk of amalgamation to solve the numbers problem.  Where will we be in the future (not the near future) when the numbers drop again? 

A totally different question:  Is there the potential of reversing amalgamation further down the road if numbers rise drastically.........should there be funding to do so?

In following this thread, it has often been presented that reserve numbers are (for the most part) not a problem of recruiting or retention.  As a collective whole, the reserve force is hitting its manning ceiling.  If the manning ceiling needs to be raised, that can be done as part of a coherent restructure.  However, if he CF has the manning ceiling right (or as good as it's going to get with available funding) then our structure should intelligently match that personnel size limit.  Currently, it does not.

At the same time, you are correct that any reduction of units to to match the authorized manning levels should be done with an understanding of the growth mechanism should the day come that it is required/possible.

Whatever is planned, there better be a lot of buy in, consideration, and consultation.

Absolutely.  However (and despite not fully knowing the plan which prompted the article on the new roles), I think buy-in should be possible .... especially if units which must re-role are given some flexibility in selecting that new role from what capabilities need to be established.

If reducing the number of units & establishing multi-regimental battalions is part of the plan, I also think this can be sold to reservists.  In fact, this is exactly the type of change I wanted to see while I was in the reserves. 

That being said, if a unit provides a role which is not required by the Army then that unit must accept a new role.  Some people may quite because they can no longer be MOSID X.  Some of these people might have been outstanding NCO or officers.  Their loss will be unfortunate, but in the end the reserve force does not exist for the entertainment of its members.  Reserve units must be relevant to the CF.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Tess,
1.  The goal is a more effective & capable reserve force.  Money savings (if any) would be small & not part of the objective.  Therefore, searching for cost savings in other parts of the CF is a red herring & distraction from the real discussion.

Re-rolling would avoid creating new manpower & infrastructure demands on the reserves (at least to some extent if not entirely), and it would reduce the new equipment demends.

If your question is 'how do we get units to turn out in strenght' then the answer is (as stated several times through the life of this thread) combine multiple regiments under a single unit HQ with a common role. 

So your idea is to reduce the senior staff as they demand manpower and infrastructure demands.
By doing this, we will increase the number of troops on the ground. 

An effective plan, to say the least.  As Recceguy stated, and when I started chiming here, unless you give a reason for them to show up, people would rather go to the local chess club.  Eliminating a few senior positions, is not going retain people.  Are you then willing to eliminate a bulk of soldiers, and rebuild the entire reserve system?  My comparison to the Regular force structure, was, if we are not going to take this action with undermanned regular force units, why would we attempt to do this with the reserves?

2.  The compress the regular force structure discussion is alive and well in other threads.  Try taking it here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/62540.0.html

So what you are saying, the two have nothing in common, and since it is distracting your goal here, I should take my thoughts elsewhere…nice.  I think I stated my reason for bringing up the Regular force structure.

3.  Improvements to the reserve structure & improvements to the regular force structure are not mutually exclusive.  Suggesting that nothing can happen to the reserves until it has happened to the regular force is a farce.

Why. 


I will tell you why I believe that is a statement I can not agree on.

Because the two go hand in hand.

We man all of these fanciful regular force battalions, all undermanned, and then supplement with a hodge podge of reservists that volunteer to go.  All of it a random lottery on who puts their name in, and how fast the Regular force unit can get them up to speed, in the sense of gelling with the rest of the Battalion.  Reserve regiments scramble, and then are left weakened because elements of their experienced members are gone, supplemented to another unit.

You want to create amalgamated units, reducing the senior staff, but all you are doing is gathering all the troops under one roof.  Create a regular force structure that is self sufficient, and they will not interfere with the training and reserve for missions.  If you want to have reservists that want to go operational, you do one of two things.  Create a concept, where your amalgamated units are thrown into the rotations of tours, or ask the individual reservist to then make a choice, regular or reserve.

You wnat to make them relevent, then proceed to integrate what the future plan is for them.  As I said, cutting/slashing/merging is not the end all and be all. 

So, before you give me the back handed swipe and tell me to trundle along, lay out a plan that is overall more effective, and present it properly. Using a fancy phrase like rollover to answer every post, just does not cut it.


dileas

tess

 

[tango22a]

MCG:

Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!"

tango22a

 

[McG]

So your idea is to reduce the senior staff as they demand manpower and infrastructure demands.
By doing this, we will increase the number of troops on the ground. 

Absolutely not.  My idea is to ensure that every Section Commander has a full Section, every Pl Comd has a full Pl, each OC has a full sub-unit, and each CO has a full unit ... and at each level the full headquarters complement also exists (which is not there in the skeletal unit & sub-unit HQs today).

... unless you give a reason for them to show up, people would rather go to the local chess club.  Eliminating a few senior positions, is not going retain people. 

I have not suggested that creating more fully sized battalions is supposed to be a mechanism to improve retention.  It is to improve capability & improve training.

Create a regular force structure that is self sufficient, and they will not interfere with the training and reserve for missions.  If you want to have reservists that want to go operational, you do one of two things.  Create a concept, where your amalgamated units are thrown into the rotations of tours, or ask the individual reservist to then make a choice, regular or reserve.

The regular force interferes with the training of reserves for missions?!  If I understand you right, you are suggesting that formed reserve units should be part of the tour rotation (unlikely as a realistic/feasible option), or they should be divorced from operations (in which case the reserves becomes irrelevant)?

So what you are saying, the two have nothing in common, and since it is distracting your goal here, I should take my thoughts elsewhere…nice.  I think I stated my reason for bringing up the Regular force structure.

...

Because the two go hand in hand.

Yes, the two structures should be complimentary.  However, you are trying to deflect suggestions for improvement to the reserves by demanding changes to the regular force in isolation.

We can have a nine battalion regular force or a six battalion regular force.  Either way, the requirement from the reserve for will be basically the same for international operations:  individual augmentation & (occasionally) up to formed sub-units.  In the nine regular force battalion concept there may be a greater need for the individual augmentation.  That is an argument for a higher manning ceiling which might result in a few more companies within the multi-regimental battalions.  A do nothing until the regular force are done argument is purely a distraction to avoid discussing the reserve topic (which you will notice is the theme of the thread & not just 'my goal').

The Army wants to give a greater responsibility for lead of domestic operations to the reserves.  A more capable reserve force structure (such as what I've suggested) would also put the force in a good position to take on that role.

Reserve regiments scramble, and then are left weakened because elements of their experienced members are gone, supplemented to another unit.

More robust unit structures will be better able to accommodate the temporary loss of individuals to operations. 

 

[McG]

Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!"

I don't doubt this.  I know reserves are capable of much.  I don't think we should be hampering them toward this end by leaving in place a sub-optimal reserve force structure. 

 

[George Wallace]

MCG:

Give the PRes equipment, training and a reasonable chance at gainful AND useful employment and they will knock your sox off!! As Recceguy has said "a lot of the guys are not here for money, they are here because they WANT to be here!"

tango22a

Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.

 

[dapaterson]

Bill Gates ate my last attempt at a post.  Here's a recap:

By Extra-regimental employment I mean class A employment for Sgt-MWO and Capt-Maj.  TRaining positions - for a three year posting you will work for the Bde delivering training - and that's all - no unit double or triple hatting.  Some planning staff (still part-time) for exercises etc.  Getting broader experience and broader exposure to the rest of the Army is an incredibly valuable experience.  Plus, it provides more leader positions, broadening the base to draw upon.

Experience is a key pillar of development we deny too many leaders - we rush them through to meet the grind of a new LCol every 3 years.  Give more time, and more breadth of experience, and we will get a better product.

Better leaders build better soldiers.

 

[dapaterson]

Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.

As I said - there was money; we wasted the opportunity.  There is still money for some things, but it's a harder sell now - "We gave you money to restructure - what did you do with it?"

 

[George Wallace]

Money for vehicles and radio installations?  Money for infrastructure?  Money for equipment X, Y and Z?

 

[tango22a]

MCG, dapaterson, Michael O'Leary:

You aren't going to change your minds about the PRes and I won't change mine about this thread, so I guess that I'll just leave Tess and George Wallace to carry on.

Tess and George keep up the good fight!

Cheers,

tango22a

 

[Brad Sallows]

>Realistically remembering my time, every Sqn I have been in, in the RCD, has numbered just over 100 pers, and was commanded by a Major

I realize by tradition (and by template) sub-units are commanded by Majors in our military culture, but I question the necessity for reserve sub-unit-sized elements.  Everything in the essential unit administration tool kit for a reserve officer is learned (formal training) or accumulated (experience) by the time captain-qualifying courses are complete, unless the officer hasn't been carrying much in the way of regimental duties.  While there may surely be exceptions of which I am unaware, the higher level post-captain courses (ACT/MCSC to my last knowledge) are almost, if not entirely, focused on operational command/staff matters at the sub-unit/unit level (ACT) and then the unit/higher HQ level (MCSC).  If there are not a lot of places on reserve establishments to hold majors, and fewer to hold LCols, then not very many will be held; unless the higher adults are pleased to play patronage games, not very many should be undeserving or advanced on the basis of completing training and maintaining a pulse.

 

[Michael OLeary]

It may surprise you that when I joined, I CHOSE my Regiment because I wanted to be an ARMOURED soldier.

tango22a

It wouldn't surprise me at all.  It does tell me you joined in an area where you had a choice of units.

If you didn't have that choice, would you have never joined?

 

[Michael OLeary]

MCG, dapaterson, Michael O'Leary:

You aren't going to change your minds about the PRes and I won't change mine about this thread, so I guess that I'll just leave Tess and George Wallace to carry on.

Tess and George keep up the good fight!

Cheers,

tango22a

You do realize that I began my career as a Reserve NCM and I parade as a Class "A" officer now, right?

Don't be so quick to categorize my opinion as anti-Reserve just because I don't agree with you.

Edit to add - my 5-hour break in posting was because I parade an hour's drive from my house.  My property backs onto the ASU London fence-line, I parade in Stratford because I was asked to fill a shortfall there. 

So please, put away the Militia martyr act.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Unfortunately this is a problem that neither the CF or DND can fix, unless Treasury Board and the Government allocate the funds.  We can reconstruct and reinvent ourselves to death on paper, but without the funding, we get nowhere.

As long as the argument keeps coming back to "just give us [the Reserves] more money but don't try to change our organization" it's all a waste of time trying to identify more effective ways to employ the available resources.

It was stated above, it takes "buy in" at the grass roots level.  For the Reserves to find more effective structures and approaches, the ideas will have to come from the Reserves to get the support they need.  Mourning lost companies in towns that no longer exist is not a recipe for future success.

 

[dapaterson]

Money for vehicles and radio installations?  Money for infrastructure?  Money for equipment X, Y and Z?

Vehicles - Yes.  No requirements definitions were done.  We did slightly increase the number of G Wagons bought for the Reserve armoured recce units

Radios - No.  Production lines for TCCCS were closed; only off the shelf products would have been possible.

Infra - Yes.  Beginning construction now, once PWGSC resolved issues with acquisition of land.

X, Y and Z - if defensible requirements had been identified and developed, yes.  Lacking those, nothing was done.


The canine was engaged carnally.  Key work was never done.  And funding was never spent - or, in many cases, never even requested, even though it was in a protected reserve to support Reserve Force Expansion.  In part, the problem was too many people not knowing or caring to know the DND/CF systems - and by not engaging them ("We're different!") things didn't get done.  There are rules to follow when you want to spend nine figure amounts, whether you like it or not.


PS = just back from parading class A.  I want to improve the institution I've spent the past 20 years working in.  And status quo is not a viable option.

 

[Monsoon]

You suggest the PRes, go with a national merit board, with regards to rank and position, simmilar to that of the the naval reserve.

You know when I meant numbers, I was talking overall, not individual units.

I see what you meant now - I thought you were talking about unit sizes.

I suppose the meriting could be done by Brigade Group or Land Force Area if doing it nationally would be too much of a logistical challenge.

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting sparring match - my only comment pertains to RC's comment below which has become a bit of a peeve of mine:

Make all the grandiose plans you wish, but if you don't include or get inclusion from, that young troop on the floor, you've simply lost the best asset you ever had.

I heard the same arguement over the latest round of amalgamation in the British Army.  The fact of the matter is that every young kid who joins the day after (and others mentioned, there are lots of those who just want to serve) really doesn't feel that "Fall on My Sword!" mentality for the old capbadge that many have stated exists.

A good reading on the Regimental System over the last 150 some odd years shows that the system can constantly undertake change in order to remain relevant and survive as a local institution.

Some will quit, but many others will just say "heh, let's see how it goes" and keep on putting on the uniform.

 

[Michael OLeary]

The boogeyman of mass releases gets called up time and again to ward off discussion of change.  It's been a favoured approach because politicians can be swayed to believe in it and make political noise over suggested changes to force structures and localizations.

The Army has evolved over many decades to meet changes in demographics, population and perceived force structure requirements and it's still here today.

Militia units were disbanded when the towns that held their companies dried up in the face of industrialization of farming and men moved to towns.  Town units reduced in size as the balance between available funding (NO, NOT BECAUSE THE REG F STOLE IT), willing manpower and national need for numbers and size of units evolved.  And the Reserves are still there.

Amalgamations have happened, sometimes even in mass with changes of unit names, locations and strength ceilings.  And the Reserves are still there.

Reg F units have been moved from place to place.  Despite the cries of mass resignations, both 1RCR and 2 PPCLI still existed after their moves.

Most soldiers, Reg or Res, probably can't give an accurate synopsis of the amalgamations, perpetuations, moves and structure changes to their own Regiment, so how can we say that only an unchanging structure will be supported by the soldiers on the parade square?  The structure has never been completely static and we are probably the first generation to serve full careers with minimal changes to the units we served in or with.  The past 30-40 years has been the anomalous period, not the standard.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Speaking of roles, here's something on the latest attempt to reintroduce the 'hook and ladder' brigades to the reserve world. I'll have to watch 'Outbreak' again to remind myself how to cordon off an infected city...

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971

 

[R. Jorgensen]

Speaking of roles, here's something on the latest attempt to reintroduce the 'hook and ladder' brigades to the reserve world. I'll have to watch 'Outbreak' again to remind myself how to cordon off an infected city...

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1353971

That makes some sense. Think about it, Reservists are part-time and usually "State-side" (just like the US National Guard) so it would be the smart thing to train Reservists in Homeland Defence and Security. Thing is, would they be "action ready"? Could reservists be counted on to immediately respond to a domestic threat at the drop of a pin? I dunno...

It's like Aid to the Civil Power. Is it something that is really necessary? They are trained to know how to be able to do it right? Then I guess it is necessary.

My father remembers Aid to the Civil Power exercises when the Strathcona's were still in Calgary.

So the question is "Why participate in Local threats, but not all domestic threats?"