Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[dapaterson]

Problems, however, can arise when senior commanders (and their staffs) are RTFO when considering what is possible within the time constraint reservists have (class A reservists, that is).  It's not merely a case of throwing more money at the problem; as people rise up in a Reserve career they have other factors at play that limit the time they can commit to the Reserves.

When, say, an LFA Commander makes decisions that are fine for full-time personnel but place an inordinate burden on part-time personnel to execute, he sets things up for failure - either key things won't get done because the unit leadership follow the most recent direction to the detriment of more important responsibilities or people burn out because they can't maintain a work/military/homelife balance.

(Mind you, we need to breed better officers, more willing to rise up on their hind legs and say "No, that's stupid, here's why."  Too often it's "What a great idea sir!")

 

[daftandbarmy]

(Mind you, we need to breed better officers, more willing to rise up on their hind legs and say "No, that's stupid, here's why."  Too often it's "What a great idea sir!")

Ah yes, the infamous WAGI and WARGI.

A WAGI is ' what a good idea' and usually involves a standard level of foolishnes e.g., dress as nuns, get in a red cross van and dismount behind enemy lines to conduct raiding activities. A WARGI, however, is a truly wonderous idea to behold, involving things like the transcendence of the space time continuum, the redefinition of the laws of physics, chemistry and biology, compounded by an overwhelming sense of confidence fuelled by dreams of glory e.g., invade Iraq with a couple of divisions and hope to rely on 'shock and awe' for success...

 

[Grognard73]

So, let me rejuvinate this topic given whats going on today.  For the last 5 years the Reserves have provided substantial augmentation to the the mission in Afghanistan.  They have become an active resource for domestic operations from running MCDVs to Land operations.  They are an important part of the CF's operational capability.  On top of this there are approx 10,000 "full time" Class Bs working in the CF keeping it functioning day to day.  In fact many of the departments and branches could not function without them.  This dynamic accounts for almost one in three Reservists are working full time. This is an operational Reserve.  What is missing is the policy and systemic work to enhance this capability to allow for effective management of the resource.

At the same time, the CF has left he National Mobilization concept clearly behind.  The Strategic role of the Reserves and it is a very important one is the critical link to our communities across the country.  One could also argue that the basic structures of the Army Reserve and Navres provide a strategic expansion structure if required.

The pressures on the Reserves now have fundamentally changed its nature.  Sure reservists still parade on weekends and nights at their locations and sure there is a part time reality to the Given all of this and the fundamental change to the nature and use of the reservesservice but this reality has been impacted by large numbers of "Combat veterans" who are demanding more than the usual tuesday night parade.

As a direct result of these new roles, training and military education has moved to new levels of harmonization.  The Air Reserve and the NavRes now complete the same training as their regular components while the Army has made substantial advances to the same objectives.

Given all of this and the fundamental change to our understanding what should be the future?  What does the Reserve gain or lose by moving to a purely strategic resource or embracing a more operational role?

grognard73

 

 

[McG]

What does the Reserve gain or lose by moving to a purely strategic resource or embracing a more operational role?

I'm not sure that I am tracking the intent of your question?  Are you asking for opinions in what you see as polar opposite ways forward?

 

[TCBF]

... almost one in three Reservists are working full time.
...
At the same time, the CF has left he National Mobilization concept clearly behind.  ...

- If one in three reservists are doing full-time military service, I would say we are just about mobilized now. 

 

[McG]

I am curious as to what number of those full time reservists are deployed & preparing to deploy, what number are working full time to support/plan/enable the part-time reserve, what number are working full time to provide reserve representation at various HQ levels, and what number are working full time just to fill positions which the Reg Force cannot (including HQ bloat).

 

[TCBF]

- Is "Bloat" an Action Verb?  What's the Map Symbol for "Bloat"?

 

[The Bread Guy]

- Is "Bloat" an Action Verb?  What's the Map Symbol for "Bloat"?

Don't know the map symbol, but it is, indeed, a verb, bud:
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/bloat

 

[Haggis]

I am curious as to what number of those full time reservists are deployed & preparing to deploy, what number are working full time to support/plan/enable the part-time reserve, what number are working full time to provide reserve representation at various HQ levels, and what number are working full time just to fill positions which the Reg Force cannot (including HQ bloat).

Tracking the number of Res F on full time service is problematic at the best of times.  This is partly because the automated systems (HRMS, CFTPO, Monitor MASS, RPSR, CCPS) don't record and report similarly (nor do they "talk" to each other).

On average, though, about 9,000 Res F members are on some type of full time service.  Numbers vary seasonally (i.e. much higher in the summer) so this a yearly average.  This comprises 40% of the Reserve strength.

 

[Grognard73]

Just counting Army Reservists is a real problem.  The Official count of Army reservists includes all Reservists serving in the Army, Class A, B, and C.  It doesn't relate to structure just number of "pay checks" basically.  Even the authorised structure is in question.  The ARE forms the basis of the establishment recorded in the Automated Establishment report AER and it has had little oversight from a strategic Reserve point of view, meaning no one really monitored the growth of Reserve positions over the ARE.  So now for discussion purposes the Army Reserve is, say around 21,000 "effective" soldiers, (approx 25,000 in HRMS).  Of those 21,000 about 4,000 in training, 5,000 working full time and that leaves about 12,000 Class A effective and trained soldiers on our armouries floors.  The directed strength for the Army reserve is 18,850 which includes the Army Signals now.

As far as operations are concerned about 1200 per year on Class C which equates to about 10% of the class A strength.  What I find interesting is, given that dynamic I have heard some complain that our commitment cannot be sustained.  I feel the opposite, and hope that we do not lose this after the Combat mission ends.  Much resitance I hear from all sides of the argument.  The intersting stat would be the impact at the units.  12,000 divided roughly by 140 units!  How big is the average unit?  I mean the real number, how many on a tuesday night and on local exercises?

 

[Haggis]

Consider how many of the 12,000 Class A soldiers are:

a. unavailable to deploy due to civilian commitments (job, education, family etc.)
b. not interested in a tour for whatever reason (Ex Reg F with lots of BTDT, for example);
c. have already done one or a number of tours.
d. cannot be deployed (i.e. PERSTEMPO restrictions, temporary medical limitations)
e. cannot be deployed due to the valuable contributions they currently make to the system (someone posted something earlier about "not eating the seed corn").

Therefore, only a small portion of the 12,000 are deployable on international operations.  Most, however, would readily step up to the plate for domestic deployments, particularly where their community was concerned (i.e. the Ice Storm).  This is the hallmark of the "Citizen-Soldier" .

 

[Grognard73]

Thanks for the response.  So what I hear is that there is pressure and debate on what size the Army Reserve should be.  Some people say that it is already too big given the contribution to Ops especially Afghanistan where the Reserves have sent the highest contribution since the Second World War, Korea did not call up the Militia at the time but lots joined the special service force.  Domestic Ops are the most important contribution in my opinion and there has been 11 Major Dom Ops over the last, say, 12 years.  The largest Res contribution was about 3500 during the Ice Storm and the Floods in Winnipeg.  The Reserves did that with a force that was easily 6000 smaller than it is today.  I also think that a fundamental flaw with LFRR was the lack of recognition that structure and people were required to continue this most important work.  That has to have an influence on the size I think.

Bottom line is that intuitively some Reservists feel that they should be larger, I agree, but the facts in evidence are that for the current reality they are currently producing without fail.  The argument for the mobilization basis remains undefined and as this planning paradigm is not currently relevant given the planning scenarios under the CFDS.

So, with growth being announced for the Reserves to 30,000 in the CF where is the growth to be assigned?  This is complicated and needs thought at the highest levels of the CF.   

 

[dapaterson]

Go away for a few days, and see what topic pops up...

(1) Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.

(2) Identifying where full time Reservists work is a trivial exercise.  I was reporting on it on a regular basis when I worked on the land staff.  The granularity can be quite good, if people are willing to invest a bit of time to ensure things are kept clean.  However, there is no will to have the info.  The Army G1 staff is not filled with the best and brightest.  And there is no insistence from the top that they provide the commander with the information he requires.  Instead, they muddle along doing what they've always done.

(3) Further Reserve expansion.  (a) The LFRR model was an abject failure, travesty, and abject stupidity.  Never Again!
(b) Given the P Res currently parade about 19K (Army), 3.5K (Navy), 2K (AF), 1K (Other), expansion would be about 4.5K to get to 20K parading.  Remove 1200 BTL, and you're left with a minor increase.
(c) The Army Reserve remains bloated with LCols that have no use (both structurally and individually).  A structure is needed that provides increased opportunities for leadership to be employed outside unit lines earlier in people's careers to get greater breadth.

A few hobby horses of mine here; unfortunately, I don't have time right now to make detailed contributions to the discussion.

 

[Haggis]

(3) Further Reserve expansion. (b) Given the P Res currently parade about 19K (Army), 3.5K (Navy), 2K (AF), 1K (Other), expansion would be about 4.5K to get to 20K parading.  Remove 1200 BTL, and you're left with a minor increase.

Are you including the PRLs in this estimate?  There are many Reservists on the PRLs but no longer on the ECS's Res Establishment.

 

[Grognard73]

PRL's, now there is an interesting story.  The numbers I quote exclude the NDHQ PRL and there are many Army Reservists working outside the Army on that PRL.  There are other PRL's as well but the numbers of personnel wearing an Army uniform are not significant.  I have estimates of between 700 to 2000 Army Reserve personnel outside the Army.  This is part of a great mystery that I know the Army staff  is trying to work through.  Counting Reservists and then managing them with current system is at a pretty basic level.  HRMS has failed and hopefully there is work being done to sort this critical issue out.

 

[Haggis]

Counting Reservists and then managing them with current system is at a pretty basic level.  HRMS has failed and hopefully there is work being done to sort this critical issue out.

HRMS hasn't "failed" but the users and those who manage personnel policy certainly have.  In that data regarding Reservists is stored in separate and non-interconnected systems, this results in duplicate counts and missed personnel.  What really drives this is that the only system that really matters to the Class A 9and B) world is RPSR.  If the troops get paid, the troops are happy.  Therefore if the data on Class A/B Reservists isn't accurately entered in HRMS nobody really cares because the troops don't complain.

Yes, work is being done to address this (I saw a draft policy framework document this today, in fact) but it is going to be a slow, labourious and evolutionary process to bring the Reserves from (historically) strategic to (currently) operational.  There is, in my mind, no real need for a strategic Reserve to support mass mobilisation any longer.

 

[Grognard73]

I would just like to respond to some points made in an earlier post.

Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.

This is a really tough number.  Data systems to collect this a prone to info lag and poor updating.  Nevertheless HRMS indicates this is the number of not DP1 qualified pers.  If you assume a 15% attrition rate and recruiting to maintain that number you approach a number in the area of 3000 required for a BTL.  I think that is a pretty simplistic view but it illustrates the size of the problem.  Work to create a Rerserve AMOR seems to be stalled pending some kind of review of the establishment.Higher attrition rates mean more BTL, and if you consider the limitations of available time of candidates and throughput limitations these will all impact the number.  This must be considered in any system level analysis and you are right it is often ignored.

Please excuse my lack of skill with the site I am new here.

Reporting on Reserve strength is now part of the Army G1 monthly report.  I understand it is not perfect but at least it works.

My opinion is the basic flaw with LFRR was it was not in synch with the requirements of the Army.  The Track 1 (or 2) if I am wrong was never completed.  The Army did not input into the analysis with what tey wanted or needed.  Ithink it is being done now and forms what is the basis for Army Transformation but it is far from complete.  Any analysis of the Army reserve structure must include the requirements from the Army. 

There are too many LCols but the Army seems to lack the organizational discipline to control it.  There seems to be some effort in Ontario but I do not know the details. 

I also think the lack of other career opportunities for junior Reservists is a factor of the current manning levels and not some plot.  If we had more structure and people it could be done.  But in a zero sum game of today, creating those may mean structure reduction.  Can this be done?

 

[Larkvall]

Roughly 25% of the parading Army Reserve is not yet DP1 qualified; that's a key factor often overlooked.

I wish to bring something up about this point. I am in the process of applying to the Reserves (32 CER). On the 32 Brigade website on this page....

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/32brigade/hq/BSL/Basic_Skills.htm

..... it talks about how they usually run 6 BMQ courses (previously they mentioned each course holds approximately 50 people), but under the BMQ - Land (formerly SQ) description they say they only run 1 or 2 courses per year.

Everybody has to take these two courses so why is there such a drop off? Maybe not all the BMQ courses are full? Even so it seems people are dropping like flies during BMQ or right after. Do people really know what they are getting into?

 

[Haggis]

I wish to bring something up about this point. I am in the process of applying to the Reserves (32 CER). On the 32 Brigade website on this page it talks about how they usually run 6 BMQ courses (previously they mentioned each course holds approximately 50 people), but under the BMQ - Land (formerly SQ) description they say they only run 1 or 2 courses per year.

32 CBG BSL may "only" run 1-2 BMQ (L) per year, but the Area RST in Meaford runs several more over the summer to accomodate those who cannot/do not attend the BSL BMQ (L) courses.  BMQ is not run over the summer.  It is decentralized to the units/CBG BSLs to run over the winter thus allowing RST to concentrate on BMQ (L) and, more importantly, DP1 courses.

 

[Larkvall]

32 CBG BSL may "only" run 1-2 BMQ (L) per year, but the Area RST in Meaford runs several more over the summer to accomodate those who cannot/do not attend the BSL BMQ (L) courses.  BMQ is not run over the summer.  It is decentralized to the units/CBG BSLs to run over the winter thus allowing RST to concentrate on BMQ (L) and, more importantly, DP1 courses.

Thank you very much! I was somewhat concerned because according to the 32 CBG website they run 6 BMQs with 50 pers and only 1-2 BMQ (L)s with 36 pers. I thought the dropout rate was staggering.