Future Armour

[McG]

Europe seems to be favouring 40 mm for its future mid caliber cannon. The US Army seems more interested in 50 mm to 75 mm which is getting outside the autocannon sizes.

 

[Kirkhill]

Europe seems to be favouring 40 mm for its future mid caliber cannon. The US Army seems more interested in 50 mm to 75 mm which is getting outside the autocannon sizes.

75mm is a Sherman with an autoloader.

 

[Maxman1]

I think the 6 pdr Troop is exactly the right place for a 105/120 gun. Not so much for knocking out tanks, as you saw autocannons, ATGMs and LAM/OWUASs have probably got that covered. But a few larger guns for demolishing obstacles from a distance might come in handy. No?

Or maybe put a demolition gun on an engineer vehicle, like the L9 on the Churchill and Centurion AVRE.

 

[KevinB]

Europe seems to be favouring 40 mm for its future mid caliber cannon. The US Army seems more interested in 50 mm to 75 mm which is getting outside the autocannon sizes.

US Army wanted 50-65mm, (the MICV requirement document had that range), in which they still believe is an autocannon in a 45-50t vehicle. The entire theory in that is multiple rounds in short succession to defeat a MBT, and a large enough payload for HE/HEI on dismounted troops.


I think Europe is on the right track. As while one can get a significant payload increase in a 50-65mm, you are dealing with a vastly larger cartridge, less ammo, and more platform rock - all of which are counter to the mutiple round bursts in quick succession.

Now there is a rumor that MICV will look at 40-60mm now (I suspect the GDLS 50mm didn’t perform to expectations, and RM is offering the contrast in their 40mm they have v the 65mm on their prototype). The PM shop is being fairly tight lipped, so it will be interesting to see.

Frankly I think it’s a failure in NATO not to standardize a 40mm CTA cannon. But again we (US) don’t have a great track record for going with the flow and just pressure others to adopt what we want. I don’t think anyone is going to buy that argument anymore.

 

[Kirkhill]

US Army wanted 50-65mm, (the MICV requirement document had that range), in which they still believe is an autocannon in a 45-50t vehicle. The entire theory in that is multiple rounds in short succession to defeat a MBT, and a large enough payload for HE/HEI on dismounted troops.


I think Europe is on the right track. As while one can get a significant payload increase in a 50-65mm, you are dealing with a vastly larger cartridge, less ammo, and more platform rock - all of which are counter to the mutiple round bursts in quick succession.

Now there is a rumor that MICV will look at 40-60mm now (I suspect the GDLS 50mm didn’t perform to expectations, and RM is offering the contrast in their 40mm they have v the 65mm on their prototype). The PM shop is being fairly tight lipped, so it will be interesting to see.

Frankly I think it’s a failure in NATO not to standardize a 40mm CTA cannon. But again we (US) don’t have a great track record for going with the flow and just pressure others to adopt what we want. I don’t think anyone is going to buy that argument anymore.

And Europe has a perfectly viable 40mm family with a 90 year history of multi-domain kills if they want to go that route.

They seem happy with the Bushmaster 35 as a compromise knowing what they know now.

 

[Brad Sallows]

one common chassis, cheaper, bought in greater numbers

Yes, cost, but not necessarily in large numbers. The idea of the TD was mainly (since inception) a corps-level unit or formation for blocking large armoured forces (stiffen a defence, counter-penetration, guard, etc). There would never have been many.

Repeating what I've written before:

"TD" as a doctrine should apply to any system which will serve (tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-armour missiles, attack helicopters, etc), which means it is really just a part of each of the doctrines of forces employing each of those. "TD" as a weapon is a bit too bespoke unless a nation is on the strategic defensive against massive mechanized forces (or expects to be) and is pressed for resources. "Can't get a heavy enough gun into a turret" is no longer really a problem that requires another solution.

Tanks and helicopters are more versatile; towed guns are nigh-obsolete (survivability and impractical size); missiles have the advantages of isolation of launcher from controller and guidance (thus NLOS capability).

Similar arguments apply to "assault gun", which a fair number of TD were employed as from time to time. I figure once everyone figured out how to put a high-powered 75 mm or 3" gun into a turret the TD and assault gun were no longer needed, except as expedients to get more guns into an army somewhat desperately on the strategic defensive.

Trying to look forward:

The weight of a platform must have already practically topped out, if only because of civil engineering limitations (eg. bridges permanent and temporary). Within that weight, the guns they can mount are already able to kill their peers. Some stand-off detonation protection (eg. against missiles) is awkward to arrange, but possible. Wheels and tracks both seem to have reached the limits of how far they can be exploited long ago. There is no obvious technology that can provide a non-fragile VTOL "tank" (ie. to skip past wheels/tracks) except at absurd levels of fuel consumption.

I keep thinking that if the munitions can overpower the kinetic protection and the problem has moved instead into the realm of "must not be acquired", future tanks might as well be lighter (and maybe there are some techniques for improving crew survival which have not been exhausted).

What is needed to enable armoured operations has not changed: first win air dominance and artillery dominance so that the other guy is too busy with other things to be able to mount some kind of drone swarm counter-measure to combined arms moving into his turf.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes, cost, but not necessarily in large numbers. The idea of the TD was mainly (since inception) a corps-level unit or formation for blocking large armoured forces (stiffen a defence, counter-penetration, guard, etc). There would never have been many.

Repeating what I've written before:

"TD" as a doctrine should apply to any system which will serve (tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-armour missiles, attack helicopters, etc), which means it is really just a part of each of the doctrines of forces employing each of those. "TD" as a weapon is a bit too bespoke unless a nation is on the strategic defensive against massive mechanized forces (or expects to be) and is pressed for resources. "Can't get a heavy enough gun into a turret" is no longer really a problem that requires another solution.

Tanks and helicopters are more versatile; towed guns are nigh-obsolete (survivability and impractical size); missiles have the advantages of isolation of launcher from controller and guidance (thus NLOS capability).

Similar arguments apply to "assault gun", which a fair number of TD were employed as from time to time. I figure once everyone figured out how to put a high-powered 75 mm or 3" gun into a turret the TD and assault gun were no longer needed, except as expedients to get more guns into an army somewhat desperately on the strategic defensive.

Trying to look forward:

The weight of a platform must have already practically topped out, if only because of civil engineering limitations (eg. bridges permanent and temporary). Within that weight, the guns they can mount are already able to kill their peers. Some stand-off detonation protection (eg. against missiles) is awkward to arrange, but possible. Wheels and tracks both seem to have reached the limits of how far they can be exploited long ago. There is no obvious technology that can provide a non-fragile VTOL "tank" (ie. to skip past wheels/tracks) except at absurd levels of fuel consumption.

I keep thinking that if the munitions can overpower the kinetic protection and the problem has moved instead into the realm of "must not be acquired", future tanks might as well be lighter (and maybe there are some techniques for improving crew survival which have not been exhausted).

What is needed to enable armoured operations has not changed: first win air dominance and artillery dominance so that the other guy is too busy with other things to be able to mount some kind of drone swarm counter-measure to combined arms moving into his turf.

The Tank Destroyer and the Assault Gun I always perceived as the continuation of the old Field Guns that served on line with the Sabres and the Rifles. They brought a Direct Fire heavy weight round to the fight that could be judiciously applied against discrete Line of Sight targets.

The 25 pdr of the Field Artillery served more as a Howitzer than a Gun although it was nominally a Gun-Howitzer. Field Gunnery in the pre 1914 sense, was the domain of the 6 and 17 pdrs and the 88s.

A TD was a field gun that only killed tanks, by intention, but in practice, like every other gun, was used on every target in its sights.

Now DFS has taken on a whole new meaning when the gunner can pause his round in mid-flight, reconsider his target, and redirect to a preferred target with precision.

Worse/Better the target and the gunner need not be in LOS of each other.

Worser/Betterer the gunner's round may be co-opted by the gunner's commander in mid-flight and redirected for him.

The Brimstone 3, launched from a helicopter has a range of 60 km but only delivers a 6.3 kg warhead. It was meant for launching in salvos against regiments of tanks. Now it is being used to plink tanks from 60 km away.

The new range of Low Cost Cruise Missiles, like L3 Harris's Red Wolf (350 km and an 11 kg payload), or Anduril's Barracuda series (16 kg for 222 km, 16 kg for 370 km, 55 kg for 926 km) or Kratos's Ragnarok (36 kg over 926 km) .... they suggest plinking gun positions from 500 to 1000 km away. But the time of flight is measured in hours and not the seconds needed by an infanteer in a hole.

So what might rounds like that excel at?

They could sacrifice some of that range for endurance and establish a cab rank circling above the infanteer waiting for her to pick a target.

Or

They could be used at extreme range, timed to arrive when buddy steps out of his front door for his regular morning run. And leave his house standing.

 

[KevinB]

And Europe has a perfectly viable 40mm family with a 90 year history of multi-domain kills if they want to go that route.

They seem happy with the Bushmaster 35 as a compromise knowing what they know now.

I see the BM2 35mm as a stop gap. It can be retrofitted into M242 setups (Bradley and LAV-25).
The 40mm Casetelescope Ammo (CTA) cannons are inherently superior for reliability and ammunition storage (it is like a large beer can). Polymer casing is much lighter and due to shape packs easily with no wasted space.

The real question beyond the gun is the fire control.

There is now a huge push for STC input from AD and CB Radars. Which is a cost driver - and will every IFV need that FCS or just some in the formation (and can others be slaved to accept input from those that have the STC FCS?). You may get a radar (or coordinating hub) at BN while each Coy have some STC setups, and they get OPCON of other turrets for C-UAS, C-RAM, and VSHORAD

 

[Kirkhill]

I see the BM2 35mm as a stop gap. It can be retrofitted into M242 setups (Bradley and LAV-25).
The 40mm Casetelescope Ammo (CTA) cannons are inherently superior for reliability and ammunition storage (it is like a large beer can). Polymer casing is much lighter and due to shape packs easily with no wasted space.

The real question beyond the gun is the fire control.

There is now a huge push for STC input from AD and CB Radars. Which is a cost driver - and will every IFV need that FCS or just some in the formation (and can others be slaved to accept input from those that have the STC FCS?). You may get a radar (or coordinating hub) at BN while each Coy have some STC setups, and they get OPCON of other turrets for C-UAS, C-RAM, and VSHORAD

The way we got to the 40mm and the 35mm was they were introduced on top of all the other calibers that were in use at the time of introduction. They proved effective and thus popular. They were more effective than some and less effective than others. When they broke down or ran out of ammunition the fight continued with all the other available and functional weapons and ammunition.

There was no singular perfect solution.

It would be a mug's game to change everybody all at once to a brand new system and remove all the existing fuctional solutions. Walking, not leaping. We can't afford to risk having everybody with both feet off the ground at the same time.

The 40m CTS is probably as good as you think it is. Let it prove itself over time. An disregard the moaning from the logisticians.

 

[FJAG]

There is now a huge push for STC input from AD and CB Radars. Which is a cost driver

First off, I'm a fan of turretless IFVs with configurable RWSs and all with improved interior space for dismounts. My perfect solution would be that within a given rifle company that there would be a few vehicles with an RWS and veh crew dedicated to AD. A few with an RWS configured for ATGMs and other direct fire support (35-40mm or whatever) while the rest have only a heavy/medium MG RWS so as to leave more room for pers, dismountable support weapons and ammo.

If we're talking converting the LAV fleet (and to stay cheap) I'd leave roughly half of the company's LAVs with their current 25mm turrets and have the other half be ACSV troop carrier versions with several configured as RWS AD and the others as RWS ATGM/direct fire support.

I'm not so sure about having vehicles that fulfil both the AD and direct fire role simultaneously, regardless of calibre compatibility, because whenever the direct fire role is active, it is also a time where there needs to be an AD overwatch. IMHO, technology has not gone so far as to make it feasible to run both roles, full time, out of a given vehicle without a massive risk of doing one of those jobs badly exactly when it matters.

 

[Kirkhill]

First off, I'm a fan of turretless IFVs with configurable RWSs and all with improved interior space for dismounts. My perfect solution would be that within a given rifle company that there would be a few vehicles with an RWS and veh crew dedicated to AD. A few with an RWS configured for ATGMs and other direct fire support (35-40mm or whatever) while the rest have only a heavy/medium MG RWS so as to leave more room for pers, dismountable support weapons and ammo.

If we're talking converting the LAV fleet (and to stay cheap) I'd leave roughly half of the company's LAVs with their current 25mm turrets and have the other half be ACSV troop carrier versions with several configured as RWS AD and the others as RWS ATGM/direct fire support.

I'm not so sure about having vehicles that fulfil both the AD and direct fire role simultaneously, regardless of calibre compatibility, because whenever the direct fire role is active, it is also a time where there needs to be an AD overwatch. IMHO, technology has not gone so far as to make it feasible to run both roles, full time, out of a given vehicle without a massive risk of doing one of those jobs badly exactly when it matters.

If the basic unit is a packet of four out of range of effective mutual support, and could find itself split into two divisions of two how would you disperse capabilities?

I would think that passive acoustic and EO would be universal, with the acoustic for cueing, and the radar tightly regulated.

Also, perhaps, the primary role would be CUAS with DFS as the secondary role. It seems that UAS are a greater threat than ground threats.

 

[FJAG]

If the basic unit is a packet of four out of range of effective mutual support, and could find itself split into two divisions of two how would you disperse capabilities?

Why would you split a platoon into two divisions? Why would you even split a company so that its elements would be out of mutual support of each other?

My guess is that you are being influenced by the unique circumstances that the Ukraine finds itself in. That's not a mechanized units role.

I would think that passive acoustic and EO would be universal, with the acoustic for cueing, and the radar tightly regulated.

You don't need a sensor on every vehicle. Sensor sets require crews. That thins your dismounted force.

Also, perhaps, the primary role would be CUAS with DFS as the secondary role. It seems that UAS are a greater threat than ground threats.

My point though is that at the point in time that the crew is working at providing DF is the same time that you most probably need AD overwatch. They shouldn't be made to suck and blow at the same time.

I know that you're a great fan of double tasking folks whenever a weapon system exists that could be dual purpose, but a given unit or subunit is a delicate balance. It needs to be small enough to be managed easily while having enough capacity to be effective and redundancy to absorb casualties. Yes, you could take a company headquarters and A Ech and make them another rifle platoon, but of course you wouldn't because they have other necessary roles. Its the same with AD and CUAS; its a full attention 24/7 job.

 

[CBH99]

First off, I'm a fan of turretless IFVs with configurable RWSs and all with improved interior space for dismounts. My perfect solution would be that within a given rifle company that there would be a few vehicles with an RWS and veh crew dedicated to AD. A few with an RWS configured for ATGMs and other direct fire support (35-40mm or whatever) while the rest have only a heavy/medium MG RWS so as to leave more room for pers, dismountable support weapons and ammo.

If we're talking converting the LAV fleet (and to stay cheap) I'd leave roughly half of the company's LAVs with their current 25mm turrets and have the other half be ACSV troop carrier versions with several configured as RWS AD and the others as RWS ATGM/direct fire support.

I'm not so sure about having vehicles that fulfil both the AD and direct fire role simultaneously, regardless of calibre compatibility, because whenever the direct fire role is active, it is also a time where there needs to be an AD overwatch. IMHO, technology has not gone so far as to make it feasible to run both roles, full time, out of a given vehicle without a massive risk of doing one of those jobs badly exactly when it matters.

B...but...

But ADATS...???


(I also am not a fan of having the DF vehicles also being used as AD vehicles because once one gets taken out, there goes both capabilities)

 

[KevinB]

B...but...

But ADATS...???


(I also am not a fan of having the DF vehicles also being used as AD vehicles because once one gets taken out, there goes both capabilities)

I’m a fan of overlapping capabilities.

I was not a fan of the MMEV in the Canadian setting simply as you’d get less than half of what you needed for each task, and it would be called done.

However for the IFV, I disagree with @FJAG as while I see the appeal of the non penetrating ‘modular’ turret - I want a crewed turret, using optics down the bore line. I’ve used RWS systems on the move (Hummer admittedly) and was qualified as a LAV CC/Gunner, which gives me the opinion that I don’t think a sole RWS type turret is an acceptable option on an IFV. I think they are good options for many vehicles as well as for Very Short range APS setups on an AFV.

Also more and more systems are networked, and cooperative engagement for ground forces needs to become the norm like it has with Naval and Air assets.
I see the ability for AI/ML to prioritize threats and dedicate (or assist commanders and vehicle crews to apply) assets to neutralize the largest enemy threats.

There are already APS systems being networked for C-UAS, and we have dedicated networked C-RAM assets.

I see the EO/IO/Acoustic sensors on vehicles being part of a larger network to give the ADA cell the best picture and appropriate engagement options.

I see the VSHORAD/C-UAS/C-RAM role as one that will require a holistic approach. I don’t see it really as a competing role with DFS, but more as a larger APS umbrella. I

n a defensive situation, you are hopefully interdicting those air, arty, etc assets while using longer range missiles, and Blue Arty and Air against the vehicles before they come into gun range. Plus the anti-AFV DF role is why you have MBT’s.

Once those non ground threats are suppressed/minimized, then ground targets can be engaged if in range.

For offensive operations, you need to have suppressed those enemy assets in advance, so the majority of tasks will be DFS, with scattered requirements for APS roles.

 

[PrairieFella]

My two cents is RWS are not panacea. Controlling the being below the lay of the gun is a major pain the ass. Its even more of a pain in the ass when the gunner is also the CC like in Stryker/ACSV setups. You lose a lot of SA with systems like that.