Infantry of Tomorrow

[dglad]

There has been some fantastic discussion, from the likes of experienced soldiers like boondocksaint, that highlight some lessons learned and applied in Afghanistan (incidentally, boondocksaint, I presume that you and your buds who have been in the Afghan dogfights are getting these lessons captured, documented and digested for future learning....)  However, and this is a BIG however, we can't become "fixed" on Afghanistan.  For example, boodocksaint makes the point:

can the carl-g, junk junk junk heavy junk m-72 did the job fine

This may be true for your experience, boondocksaint, and I would NEVER presume to second-guess someone who has been there.  However, only a year ago, we were told to completely erase our Balkans experience from the training we were providing to our soldiers (except in a very general way), and use (at least in LFWA) a training model based on OP ATHENA Roto 2.  We did that...and guess what the direction is now.  We are to drop the focus on the Kabul experience, and focus on the current operating environment in Khandahar.  Of course, this makes good sense, in terms of delivering training tailored to the mission of the day.  BUT, our general training environment musn't become fixed in the same way.  A year or two from now, we may be fighting an entirely new opponent (for example, a conventional, medium-heavy opponent engaging in high intensity ops, in which case the 84mm may be a very important weapon system.  Or, we may be right back to Pearsonian-type peacekeeping in some s**thole somewhere.  Or something in-between).  So no matter how we may choose to adjust our doctrine, it has to be clear, but also remain broad and flexible enough to allow us to deal with any situation we may end up facing.  To put it another way, we need to concentrate on this thing called "warfighting" to give our soldiers the foundation, and then develop in them the critical thinking skills to adapt to whatever they encounter on the ground.

This really isn't  specific to any of the discussion in this thread so far, just a general comment we should keep in mind as we debate/discuss the infantry/armoured/arty/whatever of the future.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Lessons learned and war-experience should always be analysed before adopting any recommendations.  What works at one particular time in one particular place against one particular enemy may not be universal and we do need to be careful.  You need to cast a wide net to see if observations hold true across a given element as well. 

That being said, we are at war right now in southern Afghanistan.  I venture that we should organize and train for that war.  It may be short-sighted, but I think we should focus on Afghanistan and fall off the other bridges when we come to them for now.  Did the Canadian soldiers in England in early 1944 prepare for something other than war in Europe? 

 

[dglad]

Lessons learned and war-experience should always be analysed before adopting any recommendations.  What works at one particular time in one particular place against one particular enemy may not be universal and we do need to be careful.  You need to cast a wide net to see if observations hold true across a given element as well. 

That being said, we are at war right now in southern Afghanistan.  I venture that we should organize and train for that war.  It may be short-sighted, but I think we should focus on Afghanistan and fall off the other bridges when we come to them for now.  Did the Canadian soldiers in England in early 1944 prepare for something other than war in Europe? 

By no means am I suggesting that we don't absorb the lessons from Afghanistan and incorporate them into our current training.  My point, which is fairly general, is that we don't get fixated on redesigning ourselves to fight that particular war.  However, within our current training environment, I've been seeing a diffuse, but noticeable, trend to do just that.  Your WWII example, while well-taken, is somewhat spurious.  The training conducted by my Regiment, for example, was still fairly generalized and focused broadly on war-fighting for the most part, and then, as appropriate, increasingly specialized to deal with specific ops.  The point I'm cautioning against is focusing all of the training on the more specific environments.  My Regiment didn't re-engineer itself  and its training to fight in a particular part of France, against a specific opponent.

To clarify further, we really do two "types" of training--the general, all-encompassing training that we have to provide to everyone, all the time, and the training that is specific to a particular mission or theatre.  My point is that some of the recent conversations I've had in the force generation world, and the flavour of a few of the discussions on this board (probably unintentionally) is that we should be refocusing the first "type" of training on our lessons learned from Afghanistan.  That would be a problem, as it would increasingly prepare us to fight in one particular environment, against one particular enemy.  We can't let that happen; we can't aford to "fall off" even one bridge in a future op.  Our general training environment has to remain on this broad thing called "warfighting", while our mission specific training must, of course, be focused on Afghanistan.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

At the risk of being more spurious (spuriouser?), did your Regiment train to fight some generic enemy or were they focused on the Germans?  I'm pretty sure that if someone came to them before entering battle with some lessons to draw from fighting in NW Europe they would have jumped at the chance to incorporate them.  Where they not engineered to fight the Germans in Europe? 

I am saying that we should engineer our army to fight in Afghanistan, because we are indeed fighting there now and will probably be tomorrow.  If we did move provinces in theatre we would still be ahead in terms of readiness (we fought in more than one province).  In Kabul we saw a little piece of whole picture as there weren't really any engagements.  We now have a resevoir of combat experience to draw from.

Terrain will always be a variable which can emphasize or de-emphasize a particular lesson, and I am in agreement with you that we shouldn't just dispose of capabilities or methods because they haven't been used in Pashmul.  That being said, when it comes to assigning priorities (money, time, PYs) we should emphasize lessons from theatre.  I realize that the army will have to do some reorganization when this war ends, but I think we should be willing to pay that price it if it helps us win the war we are in now. 

I feel that "pre-deployment" training is too late to get ready for the war you are going to be in, especially when we now have a pretty good idea what they war looks like.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

Is there a danger, with focused training, of having too narrow a range of options available if the enemy decides to "switch flanks" and move, for example, to a more traditional form of warfare?  Or conversely switch to more of a civil insurrection?  What happens if the tactic of choice becomes the "riot" with Women and Children first?

These have all been encountered and the knowledge, corporately, exists on TTPs to deal with them but with focused training which elements do you focus on?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I suppose there is a danger of over-specializing.  I agree that if we made every decision based on Pashmul then we could be in trouble in ten years if we face a more "symetrical" foe.

Still, if we had ten dollars or PYs or training days available in a year I would focus at least seven of them on Pashmul while using three of them to maintain a residual capability for other types of warfare.

The good news is, its not my call!

Red5 Standing By

 

[dglad]

I suppose there is a danger of over-specializing.  I agree that if we made every decision based on Pashmul then we could be in trouble in ten years if we face a more "symetrical" foe.

Still, if we had ten dollars or PYs or training days available in a year I would focus at least seven of them on Pashmul while using three of them to maintain a residual capability for other types of warfare.

The good news is, its not my call!

Red5 Standing By

Red5, you're right...at this point, it would be horribly irresponsible of us to focus our training on a generic, "what if?" enemy/security environment.  Our clear aim has to be training our soldiers to engage in our main effort which, I'm sure few would disagree, is Afghanistan.  My point, however, is that we can't overly-generalize the lessons we draw from current ops, any more than we can from Cyprus, Bosnia, Haiti or Kabul.  These are specific environments, and have to be addressed in that second "type" of training I mentioned earlier (incidentally, this isn't "pre-deployment" training.  The mission-specific training has to encompass training delivery throughout the managed readiness cycle).

My concern is actually those would begin redesigning our army to fight in the current environment.  That's where we're becoming too specific.  We need to retain a army that has sufficient flexibility to adapt itself immediately to whatever environment to which it's deployed.  I go back to the soldier from my Regiment who just came back from ARCHER, who wisely offered that the most important thing we can do for our soldiers is ensure that they have a firm grip on the basics--weapons handling and employment, basic fieldcraft, fire and maneuver, etc.; we also have to ensure that the organizational and operation doctrine we give them incorporates flexibility and ability to react to change (to bring this back to the infantry, then, it means designing an infantry force that can span the full-spectrum of ops effectively and not just be optimized for part of it).  Once they understand and can apply these foundations, THEN they can reconfigure themselves to fit the environment, the way boondocksaint has described for us.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed,

But if the basics for our troops in the sections are obvious what, if anything, should the command and logistics echelons focus on that we are currently neglecting?

 

[a_majoor]

Going back over this thread, one thing is clear; we need to find ways to lighten the load while retaining the firepower of the Infantry section/platoon. One possibility was showcased on "Future Weapons" last night; the AA-12 automatic shotgun. (Similar weapons would include the Pancor "Jackhammer"; USAS-12; SPAS-15 or Armsel Striker)

As a magazine or drum fed weapon, it can carry a useful amount of ammunition before reloading, and firing shot it is quite effective at close range (CQB anyone?). What I found intriguing was the perfection of 12 gauge "mini grenades" for this sort of weapon. Since these are fin stabilized they have a range (in current form) of up to 200 M, and are quite accurate enough to put through a window at that range. The demo also included firing a burst of these grenades to blow the window open and take out the target in the room. As it stands, this is a great support weapon for urban and complex terrain.

Although it does not have the range or explosive effect of the XM-25 or current M-203, it is much lighter and more "soldier friendly", and being a shotgun, can accept a wide range of ammunition, anything from beanbag rounds for CCO, shot, flechettes, "deer slugs" and micro grenades. With time and some R&D, more effective ammunition can be developed as well. Certainly innovative tools like this have a place in the section to provide rapid and hard hitting fire support without bulking up the section or the soldier's load.

 

[Gasplug]

What I found intriguing was the perfection of 12 gauge "mini grenades" for this sort of weapon.

The problem with this round is that it would contravene one of the articles of the Hague Convention which stipulates that you cannot make explosive ordnance of less than 400g.  of course, there are workarounds like classifying as an anti-material round etc... but you see my point...

Gasplug

 

[Mountie]

A few different subjects here, so I'll see what I can address:

WHO's DRIVING?:

The way I see it, there are three possible approaches to solving combined arms cooperation and career structures of both the Infantry Officer and the Infantry Soldier.

Since I A Majoor gets to be king of the Armour thread, I'll usurp the throne here.   In my ideal system the Regiment would be tied to the Brigade level - all units within the Brigade would belong to the same regiment, irregardless of trade.   Formation of units and sub-units would not depend on which trade a guy was in (Infantry go into the Infantry Battalion, Arty goes into the Arty Regiment, Strats go here, etc, etc) but rather by operational requirement.  An Infantry Battalion could contain Arty (mortarmen), Engineers (Pioneer), Crewmen (LAV driver), and Infantry (Dismounts).  If the battalion is becoming the main Unit of Action (where the main level of Combined Arms exists) then it would be possible for a commander from any branch to command the battalion.

Infanteer.

This was basically what I proposed in another topic and it didn't go over so good.  In a true combined arms approach a brigade would have numbered comined arms battalions (regiments, battle groups, whatever you want to call them).  1 Combined Arms Battalion would then have all LAV crews being armoured crewman wearing the RCAC cap badge, dismounted infantry would wear the RCIC cap badge, the mortarman would be artillerymen, pioneer platoon would be engineers, etc.   This would allow each branch to concentrate on its specific skill set.  Even within the specialty platoons there could be a mix.  The mortar platoon could be primarily artillerymen with armoured crewman driving the mortar carriers. 

Each soldier would wear their branch/corps cap badge and they would all wear a unit shoulder flash/patch.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are problems with the 'melting pot' approach to personnel management, as noted and addressed through the Cardwell Reforms in the mid-19th C British Army:

Cardwell Reforms

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardwell_Reforms

Localisation scheme

Cardwell then passed the comprehensive Regularisation of the Forces Act (1871). Previously, soldiers had enlisted for General Service, and were liable to be drafted into any regiment regardless of their own preferences, another factor which had made service harsh and unpopular. It had been recognised as early as 1829 by Lord Palmerston that:

"...there is a great disinclination on the part of the lower orders to enlist for general service; they like to know that they are to be in a certain regiment, connected, perhaps, with their own county, and their own friends, and with officers who have established a connection with that district. There is a preference frequently on the part of the people for one regiment as opposed to another, and I should think there would be found a great disinclination in men to enlist for general service, and to be liable to be drafted and sent to any corps or station." [6]

Nevertheless, the Army had insisted for years that it could be administered only on the basis of General Service.

Under Cardwell's localisation scheme, the country was divided into 66 Brigade Districts (later renamed Regimental Districts), based on county boundaries and population density. All line infantry regiments would now consist of two battalions , sharing a Depot and associated recruiting area. One battalion would serve overseas, while the other was stationed at home for training. The Militia of that area then (usually) became the third battalion.

The senior twenty-five regiments of the line already consisted of two battalions, but almost all the higher-numbered regiments had only one battalion. Many regiments were amalgamated to produced two-battalion regiments, a complicated internal process involving much debate over regimental traditions and seniority which was not finally completed until the ensuing Childers Reforms. Nevertheless, Cardwell's measures quickly produced far more cohesive and homogenous units.

 

[Infanteer]

Musings:

1)  Regimental association is gradually evolving.  The PPCLI has placed a soldier of any branch or trade that died with its sub-units in combat operations into its Hall of Honour where the names of all fallen Patricias are inscribed.  Thus, by their sacrifice, they are all Patricias.  Does this take away from their identity as gunners or medics?  No.  But it does seem to indicate that the notion of "Regiment" isn't confined to the infantry soldier alone;

2)  Canadian soldiers, renowned for their "generalist" abilities, are becoming increasingly specialized.  Gone are the days when QM, signaller, and intelligence functions within a battalion were all done by Infantrymen with rudimentary training.  These are highly skilled jobs requiring some pretty intensive training.  This, combined with the downward push of combined arms functions, means soldiers of many branches/trades working together at lower and lower levels.  At the same time (and as contradictory as it sounds), these specialized soldiers are generalizing in a way.  For the trucker and the mechanic, every sortie outside of the wire is a combat logistics patrol that demands the same detail to low-level tactics as the infantry put into a fighting patrol.  Likewise, an infantryman on patrol is a beat cop, an intelligence specialist, and a rudimentary cultural/linguistic representative all in one.  Gone are the days when "the 7 Section Battle Drills" would suffice as good training (Col Wayne Eyre's "Infantry against the Snakes" article in the CAJ is a good one on this);

3)  Task Organization is starting to move away from "belonging" to a specific unit.  TF 1-06 was TF Orion, not the 1 PPCLI BG - 1 PPCLI was one (albeit major) contributor to the Task Force.  We will see this again in the near future, and I suspect it will become more and more of a norm.  The USMC has already entrenched this with their very effective MAFTF system and the numbered MEUs;

4) 

This was basically what I proposed in another topic and it didn't go over so good.  In a true combined arms approach a brigade would have numbered comined arms battalions (regiments, battle groups, whatever you want to call them).  1 Combined Arms Battalion would then have all LAV crews being armoured crewman wearing the RCAC cap badge, dismounted infantry would wear the RCIC cap badge, the mortarman would be artillerymen, pioneer platoon would be engineers, etc.   This would allow each branch to concentrate on its specific skill set.  Even within the specialty platoons there could be a mix.  The mortar platoon could be primarily artillerymen with armoured crewman driving the mortar carriers. 

Each soldier would wear their branch/corps cap badge and they would all wear a unit shoulder flash/patch.

An idea I held before as a possible way around our entrenched notion of regimental association tied to a single arm.  I don't know if I'd push this idea anymore, or at least not in the way I did before.  I've yet to fully conceptualize to myself my new idea of the "Infantry of the Future", but I do see the new paradigm as being the Company is the smallest unit capable of conducting independent, self-sustaining operations for an indefinite period of time - or something to that effect.  This has traditionally been a descriptor of the infantry battalion - but not anymore (IMO); and

5)  Of course, an Armoured Squadron can do this due to the strength of its echelon.  For some reason, the Armour does "adaptive, dispersed operations" (to use a current buzzword) very well - nature of its systems and the way it fights.  For some reason, the infantry has been reluctant or incapable (or both?) of applying the superior system of the Armoured echelon system to sub-unit and below.  I believe we have to to make my above premise a reality.  What does this mean for the Infantry?  Looking at the difference between a SSM and a CSM seems to imply there would be some.

Just some random thoughts.  Anything concrete?  No.  A starting point for further discussion?  Maybe.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Kirkhill]

Is it possible to contemplate a Montgomery solution and pin two cap-badges on the requisite head-dress?

 

[Infanteer]

Why?  That's what we have shoulder flashes for.

 

[daftandbarmy]

5)  Of course, an Armoured Squadron can do this due to the strength of its echelon.  For some reason, the Armour does "adaptive, dispersed operations" (to use a current buzzword) very well - nature of its systems and the way it fights.  For some reason, the infantry has been reluctant or incapable (or both?) of applying the superior system of the Armoured echelon system to sub-unit and below.  I believe we have to to make my above premise a reality.  What does this mean for the Infantry?  Looking at the difference between a SSM and a CSM seems to imply there would be some.

Just some random thoughts.  Anything concrete?  No.  A starting point for further discussion?  Maybe.

Cheers,
Infanteer

The Air Forces and Navies of the world seem to make it work, with a common cap badge and traditions (more or less) with working loyalties to Ships and Squadrons. The Engineers, Artillery and Service Support arms seem to make it work as well. The Infantry and Cavalry have always argued, though, that there are distinct 'human' differences between serving a piece of machinery and attacking a dug in position that call for a different set of leadership and organizational strategies.

 

[Greymatters]

... (Col Wayne Eyre's "Infantry against the Snakes" article in the CAJ is a good one on this)...

Does anyone have a link to this article, or an electronic version of it?

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Canadian Army Journal Search

 

[Mountie]

In the US Army's Future Combat System Combined Arms Battalion the mechanized infantry platoon has been reorganized with 5 vehicles rather than the normal 4.  The 5th vehicle is for the weapons squad, which is also organized as a full squad. 

Platoon Headquarters - FCS ICV (platoon command variant)
Weapons Squad - FCS ICV (weapons squad variant) 2 crew + 9 dismounts
3 x Rifle Squad - FSC ICV (rifle squad variant) 2 crew - 9 dismounts

Any comments on this organization?

It could be done with the Canadian platoons (if manpower and vehicles were available of course).

Platoon Headquarters - LAV-III TCV (Plt Cdr, signaller, medic & any attachments)
Weapons Section - LAV-III ISC with 5+1 dismounts (Section Commander and 2 x 2-man weapons teams + Plt WO)
3 x Rifle Section - LAV-III ISC with 7 dismounts (as current)
-This lets the Plt WO ride with weapons section without removing a section member from their vehicle like when he rides with a full-strength rifle section.  It also allows extra space for specialist personnel to be carried with the Plt HQ such as a translator, CIMIC specialist, etc.  And it also allows for more C4I equipment in the Plt HQ that may be needed with the trend towards more distributed operations where platoons are operating on their own quite often.

 

[vonGarvin]

Holy crap, can we please keep it simple?  Unlike the Armoured Corps, which is organised along platforms, can we please not keep the infantry organised along people?  EG: A platoon is required to do "x", and given hundreds of years of Western Military History, it requires "y" sections.  To transport them in mechanised environment, they need "z" vehicles.

Also, forget not that sections are rarely, if ever, at full strength due to our top priorities: HLTA and medals parades.  (I'm not just being sarcastic.  It's reality)