Infantry of Tomorrow

[a_majoor]

The two things that ran through my mind when reading Kirkhills post were ISTAR and Crusader Castle.

Having an ISTAR CC in a base or camp is almost inevitable, although I will say ISTAR is a process and NOT a unit (i.e. ISTAR should happen in the regular CP, not a separate ISTAR CC with a separate staff...). ISTAR has the potential to increase coordination and flexability of deployed units by giving them a "common" picture of the AOR.

Using the ISTAR CC to attempt to dominate the ground as a sort fo fire control centre is only marginally productive. Although the phrase "winning hearts and minds" is pretty old hat by now, it is still true. Being able to rain death and destruction from an artillery firebase will not have the same sort of impact on the local population as being out there with smiling faces; or being the scary presence which snipes Jihadis in the dead of night.

Two other objections. A Crusader castle will be a small manpower and logistics burden (at least initially), and so it will be very tempting to the powers that be to "cheap out" and build a string of small "castles" without the accompanying mobile forces to give flexability and control.(Remember your history; the "Franks" never had enough manpower to even man all the castles, much less have presence in the field to figure out just what the Saracens were up to). Cost cutting, an impatient public and an enemy willing to outlast us will result in fewer "castles" being built or manned than really needed, and a gradual retreat as castles are unmanned and dismantled. The other negative is the fact that ISTAR is a process which can be countered, just like every other TTP or doctrine ever invented. How long before castles get invested and beseiged or overrun because the enemy discovered through on means or another how to "hide" from ISTAR?

Some form of base will be needed; true, but perhaps we should look more at classics like Borneo or Kenya, where the ideal was a patrol base or "jungle fort" hidden in the woods, or perhaps Malaysia or the "Civic Action Program" the Marines ran in Viet Nam, where soldiers often worked out of police stations in town (a bit tricky in this age of IEDs and suicide bombers, but still doable). Finally, since 70% of the worlds population lives a short distance from the littoral areas of the world, why not use a real ship as your floating firebase? This is much easier to deploy, and as long as it stays over the horzon, the locals might never know just what you really can bring to the table.

 

[Kirkhill]

The notion of the wired firebase is not so much to displace infanteers and cavalrymen, both on patrol and reaction forces, but to reduce the number of engineers, and gunners and the number of base defence personnel.  The intent is to free up bodies to win hearts and minds. 

The firebase is not in place of manoeuvre forces,  it is reduce support and defence requirements allowing manoeuvre forces to be free to manoeuvre.  If you are going to garrison a place for a generation then I think you are going to need a warm, cosy, secure nest to retire to.

 

[McG]

The notion of the wired firebase is not so much to displace infanteers and cavalrymen, both on patrol and reaction forces, but to reduce the number of engineers, and gunners and the number of base defence personnel.   The intent is to free up bodies to win hearts and minds.  

Building a castle will not reduce the arty and engr support required by the manouvre elements.  It may reduce the number of pers required to maintain the all around defence at any given point in time.  With a dedicated "castle defence force" (CDF), it means that your mission critical elements are either resting or focusing on thier job outside the gates. 

 

[a_majoor]

I agree with McG and Kirkhill in principle, what I am pointing out is that (like most good ideas) the "law of unintended consequences" will come into play. Picture the following scenario:

It is 2023, and PM Justin Truedeau has been convinced that sending another "peace support force" (Formerly Cavalry Regiment under CDS 2Bravo; formerly Battlegroup) to Lower Unpronouncableastan. Sending the force could generate a lot of messy press (problems renting Chinese container ships, friction and delays in sending the 500 man ISTAR theater support unit and the CF Vetrenary service to support the pack mules, etc., not to mention what might happen if an element actually engages the "insurgents" and suffers casualties) A bright light in the PMO, not tasked to discover the potential political weakness in Conservative leader Ben Mulrouney, suddenly realizes that the support base team; the artillery unit and their "Netfires" rocket artillery packages are designed to cover the AOR, but only require a fraction of the manpower, transportation, logistics support etc. as the entire force package. Not only that, but staying in their base under the SNC-Lavlen/Bombardier "Collapsable Hardened Shelter System"; they will be far less likely to sustain any casualties.

Voila! Infanteer is stood down and leads his mules back to the coral in Suffield; most of the soldiers go to the BTE and a small handful of ISTAR and artillery troops, augmented by engineers for ROTO 0 and several hundred PSP and Atco Frontec contractors head overseas. The PM can announce a low cost/ low threat deployment and everyone in the PMO is happy. What actually happens in "FSB Martin" is really of no interest to them anymore.

While the scenario is pushing the envelope, the mind set and knowledge base of our political masters is very limited, and they could see this as the ideal way to lower risks and costs without understanding this is part of a system, and using it alone will actually increase the cost. In fact, I don't think they understand this lesson now; recall the investure and capture of Canadian OPs prior to the start of "Operation Storm" in Croatia. The OPs were very strong bunkers which could have held out for a while, but there were too few soldiers in them, insufficient weapons and no mobile force to relieve them. We have worked on factors one and two; the relieving force will have to be our allies; but they might be occupied at the time as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

McG: Fair comment on the arty and engr support for the manoeuvre elements.  They will still be necessary.  It is the Castle Defence Force that will be reduced.  Lots of engineers will be required in roto 0 for the CDF but then that requirement will tail off to a maintenance role.  Here's a queston for you: once all the netfires missiles, radio-controlled minefields, metal storm mortar/grenade launchers, autocannons, machine guns and ATGMs on fixed and UGV platforms like Sword-Talon, which trade mans the control lap-top - gunner or engineer.  Which trade maintains all the kit in place, Gunner, Engineer or EME?

And I will stipulate that no matter how much kit there will always be a need for Mark I Eyeballs and Boots - just that the numbers needed to be dedicated to the task can be reduced.

On the arty support side - while Manoeuver forces will need their own integral fire support (40/60/81/120/155/MRLS/Polyphem/Netfires.....) to carry with them to respond to direct needs, and while Fire Coordinators to accompany them will be required I think the proliferation of Laser Designator -Range Finders, GPS locators, and Comms will ultimately reduce the need for FOOs and specialist laser designation teams.  Couple that with the reduction in the number of rounds necessary to defeat/destroy/neutralize targets and the increase in range of all systems then the number of fire bases necessary to cover a given area reduces, the number of ammo dumps and trucks reduces and the number of gunners reduce, including the number of gunners necessary to serve a given launcher (gun, mortar or missile).

As well it means that fire bases will support much larger areas with more precision, fewer gunners and fewer moves. This can also reduce the number of fire support systems that manoeuver forces carry with them.  (Which responds faster? - missile loitering overhead, armed UAV loitering overhead, aircraft loitering overhead, emplaced and ready to fire gun/missile 70 km away, mortar/gun/missile on the move with the force?  Which can best deliver sustained effect, ie runs out of ammunition last?) The net effect is that if any trade is going to be adversely affected by the Revolution in Military Affairs it will be the Gunners.  Not that they will be any less necessary, nor that they will necessarily have fewer targets to engage, just that they will be able to "do more with less" (I know how you hate that phrase but that is what technology does - whether its making bread or destroying armoured formations).

a-majoor:

Neat scenario - methinks your political colours are peeking out from under that uniform ;D

Training politicians not to take the easy way out?
I don't think it can be done - and there have actually been few enough political leaders in any democratic country with relevant experience.  Even Churchill was considered a poseur and dangerous amateur by his CIGS.

Trying to limit politicians' options by tailoring a force in such a way that it can only take on certain operations?
I think an argument can be made that that is what the post-Vietnam military attempted, resulting in the Powell doctrine.  The politicians decided other tasks needed to be performed anyway and the Army was told to get on with it.  Those that didn't like the concept seem to have been replaced until the politicians found soldiers that either liked or could live with the concept.


As to Infanteer with mules at Suffield - shouldn't it be Infanteer with Mules at Gagetown (lovely close terrain) and 2Bravo at Suffield with the Canadian Cavalry Regiment ;D

 

[McG]

The castle should not become the mission.  Its sole function is to support the mission.  It should house the AOR's Comd & CSS function.  As a minimum, it should include enough Coy groups to provide for a QRF Coy (mechanized or airmobile as dictated by AOR size), a CDF (Castle Defence Force) Coy(s), and a reserve.  The castle itself should have many satellite platoon & company houses and even a PRT or two through the AOR.

. . . but this force is now starting to get into the range of two BGs.  Maybe if the Army planned to always employ its two high readiness BGs in the same theater . . .

 

[Joint Service Guy]

The castle should not become the mission.   Its sole function is to support the mission.   It should house the AOR's Comd & CSS function.   As a minimum, it should include enough Coy groups to provide for a QRF Coy (mechanized or airmobile as dictated by AOR size), a CDF (Castle Defence Force) Coy(s), and a reserve.   The castle itself should have many satellite platoon & company houses and even a PRT or two through the AOR.

Castle? Is this some strange Canuk terminology? Do you mean MOD or FOB?

 

[McG]

It is my slang, and reflexts more an opinion of CJ which with its great size & CSS needs became a castle that few of its occupants ventured out of after roto 1.

 

[Kirkhill]

McG: I think we are singing from the same hymn-book.

What I am saying is that the "Castle" is a necessary evil.  It should absorb as few bodies as possible.  Shelter, rations, water, showers, service centres for kit repairs, places to get a good nights sleep in relative security are all necessary. 

Likewise though a Castle Defence Force is also necessary.  It should be separate from resting troops or working support personnel.  Under traditional manning practices I suggest that Camp Julien would be a Brigade base with one unit deployed, one unit as a QRF and one unit as palace guard.  We seem to have reduced the situation where the Castle and Palace Guard are the sole contribution with the occasional 4-man foray beyond the gates (sorry for offence - hyperbole for effect). 

What I am suggesting is that the Castle Defence Force might be reduceable in numbers by applying technology thus freeing up more bodies to conduct patrols, man a QRF and also man section/platoon outposts in the community.  The model I am suggesting for the CDF is a stone frigate, a land bound version of the Halifax frigates.

Where it in known that the camp will be needed for an extended period of time then rather than spending money to maintain a battalion of hungry troops to defend the place but are unavailable for "offensive" action then spend money on permanent defences, on technology, on sensors and automatic weapons controlled from a central operations room.  And if Canada doesn't want to be seen planning to maintain a "permanent" force overseas, then you can be sure that other nations would be happy to take over the premises.

Edinburgh, Stirling, Caernarvon and Windsor have never outlived their usefulness and they've been in place for nigh on 1000 years.  Those refuges are not to deter foreign invaders.  They are sanctuaries for the local constabulary when the peasantry gets out of hand.  They permit sally forces to roam the countryside, when necessary, and come back home to a warm bed. Something that is necessary if you are going to be on the job not for 6 months but for 20 years, for a career.

The job of maintaining order never ends.  Forces to maintain order will always be required.  The "Castle" is not a temporary structure. It may be occupied temporarily but if you don't occupy someone else will.

Further to the discussion of defences vs artillery.  I accept that Garrison, Field and Horse artillery are different.  However there is a quantitative and qualitative difference in the decisions that can be made when the umbrella of fire support supplied by the Castle increases in size from the distance a cow can be thrown by a piece of string  , through an immobile cannon that can fire 3 miles on a good day, to weapons that from an entrenched, even covered, position can fly a variety of payloads anywhere withing 100 km and hit the cross hairs painted on a 20 foot ISO trailer or other suitable target.

The "Castle" is not the end goal of the deployment.  The "Castle" enables the deployment.  The fewer resources expended defending the "Castle" then the more time can be spent actively patrolling, engaging the enemy or winning hearts and minds.  Likewise the more support that the "Castle" can supply then the less kit the deployed forces have to carry and the more ground they can cover.

Cheers McG, Chris.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The problem with taking vacations is that it is very hard to pick up again afterwards!  I'm going to throw in a couple of observations.

First off, I think that setting up "Castles" in AOOs will continue to be the norm.  Ideally our Krac de Chevalier will have a runway etc to reduce the need for convoys but this will not always be possible.  Ideally, you bring enough troops to let you rotate soldiers through camp guard, QRF and patrolling.  By being a little more ruthless in our command and sustainment TO&E we could probably fit the troops in (or try out an Inf Company with five platoons).

Looking at the ISTAR CC, I'm a believer.  I agree that ISTAR is a process and not a unit, but I do like having someone in charge of the ISTAR process.  Having a G3 ISTAR with an all-arms cell to go with him makes sure that the many sensors in the force are harmonized.  It also ensures that someone is focused on the "recce battle" even when current ops take centre stage (the Ops staffs tend to focus on the "close battle" once it starts).  You don't necessarily need ISTAR units, but an ISTAR CC is a multiplier in my opinion.

Going back to the infantry of tommorow, I wonder about the recent focus on mounted patrolling.  This seems to me to be Armoured Recce stuff (although I could be accused of branch parochialism here).  Let Armoured Recce do the mounted patrolling and have the infantry focus on dismounted ops and raids etc.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Let Armoured Recce do the mounted patrolling and have the infantry focus on dismounted ops and raids etc.

Hi 2B.  Welcome Home.

Broadly I agree.  The only things I would add are the melding of turf due to terrain.  Is a Gator patrol dropped by Helo a Cavalry or an Infantry operation?  I am being tendentious here but just to suggest that circumstances may require adjustments depending on available manpower. 

As to Infantry operations, I continue, against the best advice of many here, to think that concentrated manpower with non-lethal weapons (clubs and shields) in crowd control operations, is also an infantry application.  (And a_majoor, Infanteer, et al.... yes they do need support and that can include armoured vehicles and marksmen ;D

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I think that I am violently agreeing with you.  If the folks doing the patrol get in a vehicle (wheels, tracks, propellors or otherwise) to get to where their patrol will take place then I suppose that they would be infantry.  If they are mounted in a vehicle as the patrol, however, I would say that they should be armoured.  This does not mean that the armoured guys on patrol do not dismount.  Far from it. They should have strong dismounted skills (to include being able to talk to locals through interpreters).  There will always be overlap.  I do find it odd that we train "light" infantry to conduct platoon and company attacks and then send them out in two vehicle patrols to gather information.

Going back a step, I have been meditating on the Infantry of Tommorow.  What has changed from the Infantry of Yesterday (1944) and what else will change? 

I see two broad areas of change: technology and the nature of the enemy.

In terms of technology, what has changed since 1944?  Automatic weapons are more prevalent, although assault rifles were in limited use in 1944.  Machineguns have not changed too much, although most armies have taken the 1944 German path.  Man portable anti-tank weapons have improved at the expense of greater bulk.  ATGMs are now out there but I would think that the AT guns of 1944 were perhaps a greater comparative threat.  Soldiers are not bullet-proof, although of course there is better body armour/helmets.  All in all I think that a 1944 infantryman could adapt pretty quickly to our infantry weapons.  A section in 1944 could certainly kill what it could see at 200m.  I don't know if our weapons will get all that more lethal.  Perhaps the revolution will come in protection.  If we can make armour that gives the infantry complete protection against bullets while retaining mobility then we will certainly have an RMA on our hands.

What has improved dramatically is night vision capabilities.  I think that additional light weight thermal imaging for infantry will change the way that we fight.  As a tanker I saw that with the TI on the C2.  Even in daylight TI was the choice to find the "enemy", particularily if he thought that he was hiding in a treeline.

Aviation has improved, and attack helicopters can have a dramtic impact against foes not disposed to counter them.  The same could be said for the Stukas of 1940.

Communications and precision guided munitions have improved dramatically.  Indeed, as JSG points out, anyone with the right comms and targeting gear can bring in devastating supporting fire.  Perhaps all we need is an army of FOO/FACs?  My reading of Dr Biddle tempers my enthusiasm somewhat.  The targeting part of ISTAR works great against a relatively static foe, but perhaps not so much against a mobile or more cunning enemy. 

The other area of change has been the enemy.  Our enemy has certainly changed since 1944.  We train for 1944 enemies and then face an oppoent in 2004 who is not just playing from a different playbook, he is playing a different sport entirely.  As a result we need to adapt our doctrine, training and organization to cope.  One caution that I would make is that our enemy may change again.  The British Army eventually adapted to the Boers in 1900.  They faced a somewhat different foe in 1914.  Predicting the future is tough.  Will the battle of 2020 be against terrorists?  Most would say yes based on what is happening now.  Could it be against a large state or group of states? 

I'm not saying that we are in 1944, but I do believe that the RMA since then is not quite as great as that between 1870 and 1914.

Still, I agree that 90% of today's Infantry work is patrolling, with the other 10% being raids/QRF.  I would say, however, that this is a function of the policing nature of our operations and not necessarily a predictor of the future.

I'll close this ramble by saying that while techology does not regress to previous wars (for the most part), the nature of the enemy certainly can.

Ramble ends,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

2B:

We are in violent agreement.

Somebody brought up a question that caused me to re-read "Inside the SAS" by Tony Geraghty, 1980.  It was published to exploit the Iranian Embassy interest but it has some chapters on the SAS in Aden, Yemen and Oman in the 60's and 70's.  Some fascinating geopolitical insights which I am thinking of summarizing and posting here.

Curious bit of trivia.  In mountain assaults in Oman, The Life Guards were used in dismounted roles to supply support.  Working with what's available?  Back to Infanteers doing vehicle patrols when needs must.

That whole South Arabian campaign needs to be reviewed.  Likely to be a large number of applicable lessons for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Geopolitically - its like trying to track the enemy through a kaleidoscope.  Howabout Brits and Israelis supporting Royalists against Pan-Arabists backed by Nasser, Russia and the US deploying Chinese chemical weapons.  Or Saudis and Americans vs Brits and Omanis?  Or Brits and Americans and Saudis against Russians and Yemenis and Adenis?

Anyway off topic.

Back on track.

Infanteer fights on foot with suitable kit.  Cavalry rides around the battlefield adding tone.  Artillery makes lots of noise and Engineers dig holes. Nothing much seems to have changed to result in a greater revision of roles.  Eh, What?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

You are indeed correct that all soldiers must be flexible and their leaders should not be pedantic or dogmatic in employment.  One day tankers might be hauling supplies for SF guys.  The next, SF guys might be humping ammo through a city to resupply a pair of tanks.

I do see some blurring between Armoured and Infantry, and again it would be helpful to avoid the silly extremes of branch protectionism.

I may have made a somewhat circular argument regarding current operations by saying that their heavy patrolling nature is a function of the nature of the operation.  This is rather dangerous logic (a tautology).  I guess what I'm trying to say is that we should avoid making 100% predictions on the future based on the present situation.  As we've discussed on some other threads, there are different types of conflict.  Conventional vs non-conventional is a useful start point although there are other ways to look at it.  I would argue that we are currently in a non-convetional environment with an army that was geared for conventional operations.  This is not the first time that this has happened in history. 

As an outsider looking in, I believe that we have an infantry corps that had its comfort zone in company attacks.  Section tactics were ruthlessly suppressed because nothing was envisioned outside of the combat team quick attack.  We then find ourselves in a dispersed environment against an amorphous foe.  The section becomes the manoeuvre unit, operating independently on "patrols" to gather information or conduct presence patrols.  The good news is that a high patrolling standard was maintained through the Cold War, resulting in section commanders who could indeed operate on their own.  (Don't worry, I have my own doctrinal baggage).

What do we want the Infantry of Tommorow to be able to do?  It will need to be able to defeat both conventional and irregular opponents (basically what JSG is proposing on his thread, but I do not focus on the destruction of AFVs).  Operations in complex terrain will certainly a key area.  I would say that it needs to have a large number of small, self-contained units.  "Sections" will need improved sense, communications and targeting capabilities to be able to call on the tremdendous fire support resources that will be available.

I hate to say this, but it will need to have an enhanced "policeman" capability for non-conventional operations.  Patrolling, law enforcement and SWAT style raids will need to be in the playbook.  That being said, the infantry will also have to be conduct "standup and fight" operations against more or less conventional opponents in a variety of environments.  I guess that is what Gen Krulak was getting at, so I'm not saying anything revolutionary here.

There can also be a risk in converting an army into an "imperial police force."  An army geared for policing can have a rough time if it comes up against a conventional opponent.  Some might argue that the days of inter-state warfare are over, but I would prefer that we hedge our bets. 

To bring it back to the beginning, can we have an Infantry of Tommorow that is organized, equipped and trained for both operating environments?  Do we need two forces?

 

[Kirkhill]

2B:

I think where I am arguing from is this.  "It is with cannons that war is made."

I have argued, and continue to argue, that there are two primary types of army.  Those that control peoples and borders - an army of place dominated by infanteers and garrisons.  Those that destroy armies - an army of manoeuvre dominated by the cavalry and artillery.

Imperial, (and by extension any state) armies are primarily policing forces able to dominated large areas and large numbers of people with "minimum force".  This necessitates large numbers of bodies on the ground.  Both large numbers of troops broadly dispersed in small garrisons and patrols, establishing a presence and maintaining order, and large numbers of troops concentrated in mobile QRFs to deal with unruly, predominantly unarmed, mobs with "minimum force".  In the wilder parts of the world, like 1607 Scottish Borders, 1837 Lower Canada and 2005 Iraq or Afghanistan, where significant parts of the population are armed and adopts many of the attributes of a small military force then there also has to be "overmatching" capability that can only be supplied by a larger or better equipped or better trained military force, or some combination of all of the above.

This suggests to me that in "peace support" operations - which are the normal state for an army - peace being not a period of inactivity because of lack of need but something that has to be actively maintained - that the local government needs an Infantry force.

That Infantry force needs to be large in number.  It needs to be broadly trained - ie all soldiers need to be able to conduct both crowd control operations, patrols and the high-intensity conventional battles.  It does not serve anybody well to generate a large, usually despised, formation of low-skilled head crackers for crowd control and a "corps d'elite" of "real" soldiers.  In any event it is a waste of resources to spend the money on two separate bodies in that way. 

That is not to say that there don't have to be specialists.  Specialists are needed.  Both for their skills and independence and developing new approaches, as well as the need to keep troops involved and motivated so that their services can be retained.  However specialists should be held as far as possible at the lowest tactical and operational levels, ie a platoon within the company or a company within the battalion, to prevent the sense of "us and them" developing and also to discourage OCs and COs from shuffling off their problems.  If an independent minded soldier is causing the OC problems, the OC will handle the situation differently if they know that, no matter what, that soldier is still going to be on their pay roll than if they can be shuffled off to somebody else somewhere else.

To that end, rather than creating a LI-SOC regiment, or even brigade within the army, or a LI-SOC battalion within the Brigade, I am leaning more towards a generalist battalion with a LI-SOC company.  If a LI-SOC battalion capability is actually required then geographic collocation of the LI-SOC and the Line Battalions is critical, as is constant movement of personnel from Line to LI-SOC to Line to LI-SOC...  The learning of skills and constant evaluation of ability to operate independently and/or ability to command (not necessarily the same thing) need to be constantly evaluated during a soldiers career.

For the above reasons I believe strongly that ANY and ALL armies have to be Infantry-Centric.  But the trade off for the Infantry is that in exchange for being the largest Corps in the army it is also going to be required to be "Jacks of All Trades".  Instead of being "Masters of None" however,  within their ranks some indeed will be Masters and ideally each individual and all formations will be Masters of something.  Infanteers that can handle the CO-IN battle. Infanteers that are LI-SOC capable. Infanteers that are Mountain, Jungle, Para, Amphib, Mech, Anti-Tank....capable but always Infanteers and always capable, with the help of the specialists, of being retrained to other skills and capabilities.

The other army, the army of the Cavalry and Artillery,  that army needs to be the SMEs in destroying other armies.  Those formed, usually Governmental, forces that act to prevent the "peace-support" army doing its job of securing borders and the population.    Small incursions should be handled by the Infantry army but there needs to be a hammer that can be rapidly moved in considerable force to disrupt and overwhelm incursions.

That army is characterized by movement, communications and firepower.  Ultimately firepower - the application of energy to a geographic location to eliminate a threat.  That energy can be kinetic, or chemical, or electrical, or light, or acoustic or anything else you can imagine but ultimately it is energy.  It can be delivered by a club, by a rifle, a gun on a tank or on trails or in a garrison, by a missile, an aircraft (rotary or fixed, manned or unmanned), aerostat, satellite or "Death Star".  The broad requirement is first to move to where you can get "eyes-on" the threat.  Next appreciate the threat.  Next decide on the nature and amount of energy that needs to be applied, find a suitable supplier, communicate the need, deliver the energy, determine the results, repeat until the threat is eliminated.

The troops involved in those operations need to be specialists in their own right.  If only because of the technology that they will be required to interact with.  That has to be the focus of the their training and their organization and their equipment and they have to be held available, as formed entities, to fight their primary battle.

That being said, given that "peace-support" should be the norm and that "war" should be the exception such troops will find themselves largely unemployed most of the time.  Training for a conflict which may never come and when it does is likely to be fought under different circumstances to those for which they trained.  To that end cavalry and arty troops need to be made available, as formed bodies, in their tactical teams, with or without their specialist systems, to act as Infanteers in peace support operations.

For example: A recce squadron will act as a recce squadron regardless of the nature of the conflict.  But how about a Tank Squadron or an Arty Battery, deployed with or without, or only a portion of, weapons?  Rather than breaking up unit cohesion and trying to shoe horn 4 crewmen into seats or 7 gunners into a 8 man section employ those troops in their tactical teams for "Castle" security, or as a QR Crowd Control Force? Maintain, at all costs, the most important attributes of an army, the internal cohesion of disciplined formations.

The strength of the army is in the quality of the individual soldier, cohesion and discipline.  Weapons are tools.  Occasionally weapons can become toys.

The army exists to impose the Governments will, both on foreigners and on its own people.  Not everybody agrees with their own government all the time and unless the government can keep those people in line then the government breaks its pact with both its own citizens and its neighbours.

In this there is no difference between the police officer, the infanteer, the cavalryman (cavalier?) and the gunner. They are all agents of the state. The difference lies in the environment they are expected to operate in and the tools they are trained and authorised to use.

The Infanteer is the bridge between the "unarmed" police officer and the full force of the government represented by the gunner. The cavalryman can be either a mounted policeman or infanteer or even a mounted gunner (a tanker). But the cavalryman is always mounted and always mobile.

 

[a_majoor]

My take on the subject:

What has changed in the Infantry? I would say that the amount of dispersion possible with modern weaponry and communications makes "mass" a thing of the past. LCol Banks article in the last issue of the CAJ speaks of American Squads operating 5 to 30 kilometers away from the Platoon HQ, which makes concepts like platoon firebase almost meaningless, unless the platoon commander has some EFOG-Ms in the back of his HMMVW.

I would also say that the focus should now be changing from attacking the physical enemy to attacking his morale. An old Infantry Journal article on the operation of the Rwandan People's Army showed a "section attack" where the section did not assault the enemy, but rather used manoeuvre and fire to flush the enemy out of the prepared position and into a killing zone. (Some of the early posts in this thread discuss this in more detail). Infantry soldiers using a combination of patrolling, intelligence gathering, "policing" operations and the occasional shock assault will have a huge effect on the enemy morale as thier options get closed by the agressive information, propaganda and combat actions of our Infantry soldiers and other arms.

Given those conditions, the distinctions between "mounted" and "dismounted" are somewhat moot, or at least can be fought over in the "Dragoons" thread. On the other hand, the sorts of operations described above would seem to negate the idea of a "castle", and in fact, I might go so far as to say a castle would work against the sort of agressive and mobile sorts of operations that the Rwandans or 173 Surveillance Detachment (or Rangers or SOF or Light Infantry) do. Historical examples also abound of seemingly normal "Line Infantry" units getting out and working the ground as well (British operations in Palestine, Aden, Kenya and Malaysia for example). Sallying forth from a castle is a different mind set, and also provides the enemy with a degree of predictability and a series of fixed targets to operate against. Patrol bases hidden in the woods or in an apartment block seem better suited for todays "4GW" operations, and also provide few concentrated targets for conventional or irregular enemies to operate against.

WRT conventional war, future Infantry will have weapons like the Javelin or Gill/Spike which allow them to deal with a wide range of hard targets. These  soldiers combined with open organizations that allow the free passage of information will also have the ability to vector heavy firepower onto targets they can identify. Mechanized Infantry (or Dragoons, if you will), combine the attributes of Infantry soldiers with extra skill sets involved with working with and using weapons platforms, and are useful in dealing with the enemy at relatively short range.

 

[Kirkhill]

a_majoor:

I love you dearly. But you are wrong ;D.

Mass never goes out of style.   If you forget how to fight the wars of the past, and that includes fighting armed mobs, then you risk being outflanked by tacics that the other side knows have worked in the past but that you are unprepared to counter.

I DO agree with your analysis concerning operations as they apply to the higher end of the conflict spectrum.   I even agree that they are suitable for dealing with a dispersed enemy.   However the ability to concentrate mass as a blunt instrument must be maintained.

An infantry force that is maintained en masse but that can be utilised in packets.   Low intensity - a battalion deployed with one company on patrol and 2 -3 companies in garrison on any given day. High intensity - a battalion deployed as sections, platoons, companies, or as a unit depending on situation.    

I was just watching a re-enactment of the battle of Isandhlwana, 1879 Brits versus Zulus.   Zulus won. Traditionally the QM has been blamed for requiring requisitions in triplicate before releasing ammunition.

Investigation suggests that the Zulus had good tactics, good generalship, useful weapons, chemically enhanced warriors, and numbers or mass on their side.   The Brits relied on their long range, hard hitting, rapid reloading Martini Henry rifles to deliver fire power.

They were defeated by obscured vision from smoke and an eclipse as well as jamming rifles resulting from overheating and damaged brass casings on the bullets.

Within days of that action Brits and Zulus faced off against each other at Rorke's Drift.   The Brits won.   Identical forces and weapons.   No eclipse this time.

The big differences were:  

Defensive Works were prepared at Rorkes Drift.   At Isandhlwana not even the wagon train was employed as a hasty defence.
                                 
At Rorkes Drift the troops were massed in ranks, shoulder to shoulder, employing disciplined, coordinate fire power to overcome the enemy at a distance but were able to   supply mutual support when the enemy breached the defenses.

At Isandhlwana the commander relied strictly on firepower and perceived weapons superiority and established his troops on a very wide perimeter with 5 to 10 yards between riflemen.   When their weapons jammed, and blinded by the smoke and low light conditions, the troopers were overwhelmed by thousands of Zulus armed with knives and clubs that didn't feel the pain of bullets or bayonets striking them.

Stop me if some of this doesn't sound familiar to those that have and are planning to engage forces in Africa today - Sierra Leone, Congo, Rwanda, Somalia.

Yes you are still going to have to prepare for tank charges, just as you are going to have to locate heavily armed and deadly individuals that will hover around the fringes of mobs, inciting them and using them for cover.   But you are also going to have to prepare for the mobs, directed and disciplined or otherwise.

Alexander's cavalry, Caesar's tortoise, Wellington's square, Napoleons guns, as well as skirmishing rifles, anti-tank gunners and LI-SOC commandos all need to be part of the repertoire of a well-prepared army.

Edit: Interestingly dispersion to form a skirmishing line of dismounted rifles may also have contributed to Custer's disaster of 1876. He might have done better to keep his force mounted and concentrated and relied on shock and cohesion.    The same need for concentration, mass, cohesion may also have contributed to Col. French's decision to march the Mounties slowly across the Prairies rather than mounting a rapid sortie.   A final historical analogy would be the use of the Brigade square in the Sudan in the 1890s.   Concentration and Mutual support defeated a larger force.

I don't think that any military force can afford to forget the advantages of concentration and mass.

Edit 2:  OK, after re-reading your post, maybe not wrong.  Just incomplete.  There needs to be the ability to handle both a concentrated and dispersed battlefield (I think elsewhere I said troops would never concentrate again - I was wrong -hyperbole again, mea culpa) just as much as high intensity and low intensity conflicts.

Cheers Arthur.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I did enjoy the Rwandan article.  I would argue, however, that they were conducing more or less "conventional" warfare as they were pushing across the geography, engaging the enemy along the way.  The same can be said for the initial phases of OEF in that the SF guys supported a basically conventional force in a push across Afghanistan.  The first phases of OIF also involved a "conventional" push across Iraq.  A "castle" method would certainly not work for these types of operations, as they are mobile in nature and invovled extended lines of communications. 

In the "stability" or security or "uncoventional" phase of an operation I'm not sure if roving mobile columns are the way to go.  If you have a local security force to conduct the "policing" then you have an easier task and can focus on raids against identified terrorists.  If you are going to police the place then you need lots of people.

If you are in a permissive environment where you are truly perceived as liberators then perhaps a wide dispersal of small platoon houses is the way to go.  In a non-permissive area, however, I think that wide dispersal can lead to a series of last stands.  The concept of a four-man SF team hiding in an apartment building is cool, but how do you sustain them?  How do you rescue them?  How long can they realistically hide, especially in the types of places that we will operate in?  Where are the helicopters based?  Do their FARPS etc roam around as well?  Who secures them in a guerrila war scenario?

I am partial to the idea of secure bases that then support our operations in non-permissive environments.  Put our vulnerable bits inside the walls.  Send out small teams that can then hide in the hills or conduct patrols but have that base nearby with the QRF and sustainment piece.

That being said, a mobile column could roam around an AOO for as long as it can be sustained, setting up laagers at night (Boer War).  Once you leave an area, however, the enemy has it again.  It is the classic problem of this type of warfare.  Once again, how do you sustain this mobile column?  Where are you evacuating the casualties too? 

What am I arguing for?  We need bases of some kind in unconventional (lets call it guerrila warfare) situations to support our non-linear operations.  This does not mean that we can't then have mobile forces that operate out of the bases.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. As an interesting aside, I believe that the Sioux at Little Big Horn had better rifles than the Custer's 7th Cav.  The Sioux had obtained modern rifles while the US Cavalry were using Civil War-vintage Spencer carbines.  The 7th Cav was also facing a huge numerical superiority and were actually trying to attack.  I would argue that in ten years (or even today) it is not inconceivable for a Western force to meet an opponent who actually has better weapons.  Hubris.  One advantage of the small size of Canada's field force is that we should be able to give them the most modern kit available.

 

[a_majoor]

The question of mass....(pulls on pipe and slowly lifts whiskey glass).

The classical ideas of massing troops to concentrate firepower or physical presence are being challenged by modern technology and organizational practice. This is not to say that mass isn't useful (I was trained during the late Cold War, after all), but it will be harder and harder to pull off.

In conventional war, troops need to stay dispersed to escape from the effects of area weapons, and to prevent themselves from becoming inviting targets for PGM fire. As compensation, small bodies of troops can "mass" firepower with modern comms coupled to open organizations, such as the SOF operators in Afghanistan. Either on their own, or in conjunction with Northern Alliance formations, they could seek out AQ and Taliban formations and unleash unbelievable amounts of firepower, essentially being in control of anything from B-52 "arclights" to roving F-15E Strike Eagles each carrying a similar bombload to a WWII era "Flying Fortress". Modern infantry weapons also even the score; a Javelin can destroy a tank, bunker or helicopter in rotor defilaide at ranges of at least 2000m. Even if the enemy is attacking you, you may still be saved by some friendly section or squad two kilometers to your flank.

I understand (although I have no direct reference, this is mostly inference) that much of the problem with the "anti-globalization" riots was small groups of activists using the Internet, cell phones and hand held radios were able to track the police formations and often "swarm" them, preventing the police from moving quiclkly. A large CCO force might find itself in the same sort of situation, being bottled up in the streets by sudden swarms of protesters, who rapidly melt away then reform somewhere else on the route. small packets of forces could conceivably move along parallel routes, converging suddenly at the confrontation area, and with only a fraction of the force being stopped en route.

In most of the historical examples for the use of mass, there are extenuating circumstances (poor tactics, arrogence about enemy capabilities) which render the issue moot; even British soldiers with Lee Enfields would have had a very difficult time against the Zulus, and Custer just walked right into the jaws of death. As a counter example, the Spartan garrison on Pylos was defeated during the Peloponessian wars by light skirmishers; indeed the skirmishers were so successful because the Spartans formed a close order phalanx to fight, meaning the skirmishers could hardly miss with their slings, arrows and light spears. (The extenuating circumstance in this case was the Spartans had very limited mobility due to the terrain).

As for the question of supply and sustainment, well, you got me there!  ;D My concern is the establishment of "castles" for what ever reason limits the options and mobility of the force, uses up resources to sustain and maintain the castle, and provides the enemy with a fixed target or string of targets; you are effectively massing assets for the successful rocket attack or truck bomb. Some outlandish suggestions for overcoming this might include GPS guided parafoils to deliver supplies by airdrop, or the formation of "keeni-meeni" teams to impersonate local gangs etc. in order to feed off the enemy supply chain and local economy. (This would be a really hard one to do, but BGen Kitson did this in Kenya with black troops and white officers(!), so it isn't impossible).

 

[Kirkhill]

I think ultimately we are wrestling with the notion of offense and defense.

We have grown accustomed to working on virgin battlefields where property and people are nuisances to be worked around. Perhaps this is a hangover from earlier forms of warfare where empty fields were required and armies met each other face to face.

If we ignore property and people then the only thing we have to worry about defending is ourselves and we can accomplish that by movement, either towards or away from the threat, or by striking the threat.

But suppose for a moment that property and people have value and are to be protected. Suppose that they are the targets and that they must be defended.  They are dispersed.  They are numerous and they are not agile.

Doesn't their existence require concentration, immobility and protection?  Aren't we accordingly forced onto a strategic defensive where we can create defences, a protective umbrella?  We can strike towards the enemy.  We can manoeuvre towards the enemy.  We can create small packets to observe and strike the enemy.  But ultimately don't we have one foot nailed to the floor in those circumstances?  Don't we effectively end up the same place as the Spartans, a fixed body surrounded by mobile enemy, in small packets armed with light missiles that can take a deadly toll?

By comparison how would Caesars Testudo have faired against those same skirmishers?

Short answer here for me is - "horses for courses" - some horses run better in mud than dry, some run long distances and jump fences better.  In all instances there needs to be inherent flexibility to meet the enemy and the situation as it exists. 

Perhaps we shouldn't be talking about the "Future" in amorphous terms.  Perhaps we should limit ourselves as to how available technology can be married to existing troops to create an organisation capable of defeating threats on near term missions.

In that regard we know that we are going to be defending cities, people and borders against small packets of dispersed enemies.  You are going to be fighting Krulaks three block war.

The other possible scenario is a conventional battle with lots of tanks but I really only see the Koreas as a potential in that field, and maybe Taiwan, and, pollyannaish as I am, I think that technology gives the edge to the defender there.  In fact doesn't it seem likely that N. Korea sees it the same way resulting in them taking the only other step available to them to retain power - develop the nuclear option.

China has said if the Yanks use PGMs they will have to resort to nuclear weapons.  Iran and N. Korea are in poorer situations than China.  I am inclined to accept that PGMs will make massed tank formations a target rich environment on a par with the "First Day of the Somme".

From that we are back to the Three Block War and being on the Strategic Defensive.  We are not just trying to disrupt the enemy.  Until the day comes that the enemy is eliminated we are forced to also defend our society and the rest of those that are caught in the cross-fire.

It doesn't serve much to go dancing around the battlefield rapier in hand, if your opponent's buddies are stoning and raping the people you are supposed to be defending while you are otherwise engaged.

What d'you think?