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Infantry of Tomorrow

I could also see us employing....

a Heavy Weapons Section,
& 3 Sections of Space Marines.

SHARP WO
 
I think ArmyRick's formula could work really well in a LAV environment,  while Sharp WO's seem's optimized for dismount operations.

Rick, have you considered applying your formula to a 6 to 8 car Pl/Tp which seems to be coming more acceptable to some in the Armoured/Cavalry area?

Also the divergence of opinion between the two of you pretty much highlights the difficulty of trying to get the infantry to be all things to all people.

As I and others have noted elsewhere, in particular the Canadian Armoured Cavalry thread, I am in favour of turning all turreted beasts over to the Blackhats, each regiment with 3 identical squadrons and dismounts equivalent to an infantry company per regiment . Eg if 146 is accepted by the army as a doctrinal company size then that would produce 36 4-man patrols split up 12 per squadron.  One breakdown could be 12 LAV-IIIs plus Coyotes, MGS and/or TUA's per Squadron.  Another might be 8 LAV-IIIs (with a 4-man per) and 8 G-Wagens (or other LAPVs) with 2 dismounts per along with Coyotes, MGS and TUAs.

On general principles I think I prefer Sharp's scheme for the Infantry although I prefer the notion of a fourth section per platoon with a tool-box of weapons, tailoring equipment to suit the mission, rather than dedicated specialists.
 
On Tuesday I was watching "tactical to practical" and they had some stealth vehicles on there and I think that armoured recce could use the stealth linx they had on the show.

Sharp WO
 
On the topic of the make up of the platoon and section, how about something similar to the US Army's Stryker infantry platoons:

The platoon would have the Canadianized LAV-III Stryker.  Meaning a LAV-III with a Protected Weapons Station instead of the Delco 25mm turret.  Two vehicles would have an M2 .50 calibre HMG and two would have a 40mm GMG.  This allows each vehicle to carry 9 dismounts instead of the current 7.

Platoon Headquarters & Weapons Detachment (10+1)
- Platoon Commander (Lieut)
- Platoon Warrant (WO)
- Signaler (Cpl)
- Weapons Det Commander (MCpl)
- 2 x C6 Gunners (Cpl)
- 2 x C6 Assistant Gunners/Ammo Bearers (Pte)
- Vehicle Commander/PWS Gunner (Cpl)
- Vehicle Driver (Pte)
- Medical Assistant (attached)

3 x Infantry Sections (11)
- Section Commander (Sgt)
- 2 x Fire Team Leaders (MCpl)
- 2 x Riflemen (Cpl)
- 2 x Grenadiers (Pte)
- 2 x Light Machine Gunners (Pte)
- Vehicle Commander/Gunner (Cpl)
- Vehicle Driver (Pte)

This is a total of 43 troops + 1 attached medical assistant.  Each infantry section would be equipped with a Javelin/Spike and a Carl Gustav.  The corporal in each fire team would be the gunners for these weapons.  They would remain stored in the vehicle until needed.
 
Are the two fire teams symmetrical, or would you split them between a "support" team with the C-9's and grenadiers, and an "assault team" with the riflemen, or option 3; the section commander can reorg the section as he sees fit?

 
The Americans have them organized into two balanced fire teams.  A team leader, rifleman/anti-armour specialist, grenadier and a light machine gunner.  But the section commander could easily mix and match this for a specific need.  And the Americans obviously don't have a Carl Gustav.  One section has an anti-armour specialist with a Javelin and in the other section the rifleman is a Designated Marksman with the normal M4 Carbine (C8) with a scope.  But this is because the rest of the team doesn't have scopes on their weapons where as Canadians do.  They also have a 3-man sniper team at Company HQ.  I would also have a 7-man light mortar section with three 60mm mortars at Company HQ.
 
Also, there should be a Combat Piper thrown into each Platoon.  Keep the morale up.
 
An alternative concept using infantry soldiers as "Hunter/Killers" from Kirkhill. These are obviously highly trained and skilled troops, but perhaps we need to think about evolving from "line" infantry.
Rainbow Division Deploys 'Intel Snipers' to Iraq
 
 
(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Jan. 15, 2005)
 
 
FORT DRUM, N.Y. --- The 42nd Infantry Division has deployed to Iraq with what leaders term a powerful, yet subtle, combat-multiplier â ” the sniper-trained Soldiers of the division's 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment, and their newly-issued M-14 rifles.  

The rifles are â Å“part and parcelâ ? of the changing LRS(D) mission, said the unit's commander, Capt. Michael Manning.  

â Å“This is not a detachment of snipers,â ? said Manning. â Å“This is a detachment of highly trained intelligence collectors. We have sniping capability. Now we can acquire targets, identify targets, and destroy targets with organic direct fire weapons. That's the big change. That's what these weapons allow us to do.â ?  

Manning said LRS(D)'s mission used to be strictly reconnaissance and surveillance ? working in small groups 80 to 100 kilometers beyond friendly lines, reporting information on enemy movements and the battlefield to a higher command. The enemy and battlefield have changed, so the mission has changed, according to Manning.  

â Å“We're not training for the Fulda Gap anymore,â ? said Manning, referring to the area in Germany that NATO forces were assigned to defend against Russian maneuver brigades. â Å“We're fighting insurgents who operate in small groups. That drives the way we conduct operations.â ?  

Manning described the new mission as reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition ? in other words, LRS(D) will be assigned to observe areas for improvised explosive devices and indirect fire activity and, if ordered by the combatant commander, eliminate insurgents with their sniper rifles. The M-14, commented Manning, has redefined the unit's mission. â Å“It's a tremendous force multiplier. It's a tremendous asset on the battlefield.â ?  

Equipping and training LRS(D) on the M-14 rifles was a joint effort of the 42nd Infantry Division, the 1215th Garrison Support Unit at Fort Drum, the First Army Small Arms Readiness Group, or SARG, and FORSCOM, according to Lt. Col. Richard Ellwanger, chief of personnel, 1215th Garrison Support Unit.  

â Å“Our mission is to support the mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves,â ? said Ellwanger. â Å“We work with the post to provide an infrastructure for the National Guard and Reserves while they're here at Fort Drum.â ?  

The M-14 rifles will increase LRS(D) Soldiers' ability to neutralize targets without collateral damage, said Ellwanger. â Å“The rifle gives the Soldiers the ability to engage targets out to 800 meters. Once the word gets out to the insurgents that the Soldiers have that capacity, they will be less likely to get inside the 400- to 500-meter range and engage with RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) or medium machine guns.â ?  

The instruction of the SARG team was superb, according to Manning. â Å“These guys are superb marksmen. They instilled in LRS(D) the techniques, tactics and procedures that make them good marksmen. They're professional. To a man, they're first-rate marksmen.â ? Most of the training took place at Fort Drum's Range 21, where the sniper-trained LRS(D) Soldiers zeroed and engaged targets with their iron sights, and zeroed the scopes on their rifles.  

â Å“By virtue of going through this training, LRS(D) Soldiers now have the confidence in themselves that they can effectively operate this weapon system,â ? said Manning. â Å“What the 42nd Division has done, by virtue of outfitting LRS(D) with M-14 rifles, is make us the cutting edge of the LRS(D) community.â ?  

But the real edge in LRS(D)'s sniping capability are the LRS(D) Soldiers behind the newly issued M-14 rifles â ” graduates of the four-week National Guard Sniper School at Camp Robinson, Ark. With their M-14 training complete, the LRS(D) soldiers became trainers themselves, turning Soldiers from other 42nd Infantry Division units into designated marksmen.  

â Å“We're a combat multiplier because we can give the division planners nearly real-time information, and a picture of the battlefield,â ? said LRS(D) sniper-trained Staff Sgt. Tim Halloran. â Å“If we're on a mission and we acquire a high-value target, we can not only report it to higher [headquarters], we can eliminate it.â ?  

â Å“Hopefully we can interdict the people placing the IEDs,â ? said LRS(D) Assistant Team Leader Cpl. Wayne Lynch, who, along with LRS(D) Team Leader Staff Sgt. Thomas O'Hare, served a tour in Iraq last year.  

â Å“That's all I thought about when we were in Iraq last year: 'how do we stop these people who are placing the IEDs?' Now that we've got snipers in LRS(D), we're able to do surveillance and take direct action,â ? Lynch said.  

Deployed to Iraq with the 119th Military Police Company, Rhode Island National Guard, Lynch said he and O'Hare made it their job to find IEDs. Lynch said he hopes LRS(D) will be tasked with interdicting terrorists placing IEDs. He's been a member of the unit for nine years and loves it. He does not regret going back to Iraq. â Å“I'm going with a unit I've trained with,â ? he said. â Å“I'm honored to go to war with them.â ?  

Based in Rhode Island, LRS(D) ruckmarches to the north summit of New Hampshire's Mount Mooslacki every year. All members of LRS(D) are airborne qualified, and nine are ranger qualified. They have to do a jump every three months to maintain their airborne status.  

â Å“We train on a higher plain,â ? said LRS(D) sniper-trained Soldier Spc. Richard O'Connor. â Å“Most units do five-mile rucksack marches. We do 15-mile rucksack marches. Other units have 45-pound rucksacks. We have 80-pound rucksacks. We have to march farther and faster than anyone else.â ?  

O'Connor was a scout/sniper with the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division. He's been on real-world missions to Tunisia and Liberia, and took part in the rescue of Air Force Pilot Capt. Scott O'Grady, who was shot down over Bosnia in 1995.  

â Å“Anticipation of the mission is awesome,â ? said O'Connor. He described the job as a â Å“rushâ ?, and said LRS(D) team members must be physically fit, mature, and disciplined, and must know each other's jobs. Part of that job is going â Å“subsurfaceâ ?? patrolling to a location outside friendly lines, digging a hole, and living in it while observing enemy activity.  

â Å“They might live in that hole for two to four days,â ? said Manning. â Å“It takes an unbelievably disciplined individual to do this job.â ?  

â Å“We're just guys with rifles,â ? said O'Connor. â Å“You have to have absolute confidence in everyone on your team. There's nothing else in the Army I want to do.â ?  

-ends-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

Even in what we might think of as Advance to Contact scenarios, you can picture section sized formations leapfrogging through the streets, with one group covering likely enemy fire positions while the other team advances a bound. A full eight man section is probably the best size, since there are enough "shooters" in each group to cover ground level, windows and rooftops. The group leader can supply the "overview" and keep in contact with his counterpart in the moving team through PRR or whatever future system replaces it. Suppressive fire (if needed) might be better applied through the use of M-203 type grenade launchers or "shoot through" grenades carried by the riflemen.

In a platoon setting, the 2I/C still has the heavy weapons to deal with hard targets. This is ideal for light, airmobile and airborn infantry soldiers, and maybe "motor infantry" who do not use AFVs.
 
Let's not get carried away here. As far as I can tell, these guys are approximately equivalent to a Canadian Inf Bn Recce pl. I wonder how their sniper course (4 wks) stacks up against ours, and what are the comparative skill and experience levels of the soldiers being put into LRSD vice Recce? I don't see anything at all in this article that a Cdn recce pl isn't either already doing or could easily do.

Cheers.
 
The reason the article attracted my attention pbi was the fact that the Yanks, who generally seem to specialize a lot more than some armies, had decided to put a bit more "act" capability into a unit that was designed primarily to "observe". I posted it originally in the context of the discussion of the recce/cav discussion as to whether our Armoured Corps functioning as Cavalry or Recce should be focussed on observing or on acting.  This was an effort to point out that it is possible to have your cake and eat it too.  Perhaps a poor exposition...

Cheers

Chris.
 
I agree that our snipers are probably better trained (11 weeks vs 4 weeks).
However there comments about physical fitness or correction battle fitness is valid.
Maybe we could emphasize using our snipers more often?
Using the MacMillan .50 they could really reach out and touch the enemy. Also, snipers are an ultra precision asset (Very good for 3 block war scenario)..
 
This is sort of what I am thinking, a scalpel rather than a club. A four week marksman's course is not unattainable for the normal soldier (don't forget these guys are NG and not Regular Army). The ability to move fast and fire accurately would make infantry tactics a lot more fluid, and certainly attack the morale of the enemy more effectively than the current dodging from random bursts of fire.

There are some other factors as well. Units trained in these tactics would be vital in three block war scenarios. Imagine if a section was deployed near an Iraqi polling booth when the Jihadis showed up and started to attack voters and election officials? A normal section would probably either hesitate due to ROE and collateral damage issues, or attempt to defend the voters but end up causing casualties in the firefight. This "marksmans" section could quickly and confidently engage the Jihadis in a series of rapid double tap exposures before the Jihadis would be able to respond with human shields or make an escape.
 
I remember reading an article someplace else, I think it was a USMC type commenting.  He was arguing against the "pray and spray" tactics of Vietnam era conscripts and in favour of "Aimed Fire".  A traditional Marine line.

His comment was to the effect that in 1900 19 year olds were equipped with bolt action rifles and trained to keep their heads, respond to the words of command in the midst of enemy fire and pick off targets at ranges in excess of 400 yards over iron sights.  He wanted to know if it could be done then why can't it be done now ( I think it was in the 80's or 90's I read the piece).  I would add that I believe that the Old Contemptibles of the BEF of 1914 were capable of 15 rounds per minute of aimed fire at those kind of ranges.

Shouldn't every infanteer be capable of long range, accurate shooting....especially with optical sights?
 
Please pardon my intrusion into yet another Infantry thread.   In our current and future conflicts the ability to bring precise fire against the enemy will be critical.   Volume certainly has its appeal, but we cannot go around leveling city blocks to get one insurgent.   While specialized snipers will always be a key part of the team (and ours are certainly among the best if not indeed the best) making each "rifleman" a marksman would give us a definite edge in the populated urban battlefield.   In my opinion, our soldiers need to be able to put a single round into the insurgent firing out of a crowd or shooting out of a window or rooftop.   As an aside, I think that we put too much emphasis during our training on the room to room aspect and not enough on house to house and across the street.  

I attended a briefing given by a USMC officer who served in Fallujah last April http://army.ca/forums/threads/25726.0.html.   They tried to get optical sights for all their riflemen (the ACOG sight?) and they were impressed with the effects.   Others here can certainly give more expert opinion than me on infantry weapons, but it apprears that the marksmanship of the individual rifleman is more important than ever (but lets still keep the C6s and C9s around).

Cheers,

2B
 
A bit of a shift, but since the US military is beginning to deploy armed "robot" vehicles to Iraq, the integration and use of this equipment will also concern the Infantry of Tomorrow.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/26116.0.html for the introduction.

Some thoughts on the topic. Right now, this sort of equipment is only a limited supplement for existing capabilities, such as perimeter patrols. As the technology matures, I can forsee the following: 

"Ammo caddies" that move with the platoon carrying extra stores. This will allow dismounted troops to do more and stay in the field longer then they can at present.

Remote sensor platforms, to enhance OPs and LPs, as well as move forward and provide a look at the next bound. These systems can also act as forward observers for PGM and indirect fire assets.

Remote weapons platforms. Kirkhill has suggested mounting the SWORD robot on the back of a truck and allowing it to fire on the move, or dismount the truck to assist the soldiers on the ground. In current Canadian practice, a platoon of 4 "MILCOTS" type trucks carrying one or two SWORD robots each could make up the "Fire support platoon" for the infantry company. Since the stabilized platform can carry an assortment of weapons and is very accurate, this would provide a means to defeat hard or high risk targets like bunkers and AFVs, or do the wall breaching task and shoot in the assault. Dismounted SWORD robots would also be able to perform the cut-off tasks in Urban Ops.

With current technology, the robot is really a remote control platform, and will require a dedicated soldier to control the machine and fire the weapons. I really have no idea how long it would take to develop an autonomous version, although I would rather not see it come to that.

 
With current technology, the robot is really a remote control platform, and will require a dedicated soldier to control the machine and fire the weapons. I really have no idea how long it would take to develop an autonomous version, although I would rather not see it come to that.

I don't think it needs to come to that.  I much prefer the "operator in the loop", male or female.  And I don't see why one operator couldn't handle a pair of Swords, or maybe better if an operator and an assistant handled multiple units (3 or 4).
 
The DM article seems to me to indicate that we need to affirm something on this thread.

Are we all agreeing that the Infantry section, like the Platoon, would be most capably served as another level of command that exerts control over smaller units.

Right now, the section is almost indivisible.   It can be broken down into two groups, with one under the 2ic (Master Corporal) - but this is more of an adhoc measure, and there is no "group tactics" in our Infantry Doctrine (besides group and team movement).

It seems that we wish to make the Infantry section the coordinator of three or four independent "bricks", all of which are served by a junior leader (Corporal)who has trained to command his small infantry unit (3-4 soldiers).   This brick can be considered a tactical unit; able to conduct patrols, be armed with DM's in the overwatch role (like the article), able to break off in indpendent execution of a section level tactics (See   this thread ).

The specifics of the Infantry section leave much to be debated (3x3,3x4,4x3 brick layout, Section Commander (Sergeant) as brick commander or independent, even bricks or consolidation of section support wpns, etc) but am I understanding that we have a consensus on this approach as being the objective for the Infantry of Tomorrow.

If so, I can see one important shift needed, the way we train junior leaders.   We shouldn't need the Master Corporal appointment any more, as the Corporal will be a genuine leader.   Needing two or three corporals in a section, Privates should attend a Junior Leadership Course where they will be instructed on being a junior NCO and taught how to command their 3 or 4 man bricks within a section/platoon level context.   When they are ready to make the jump to Sergeant, they must attend the Infantry Section Commanders Course, which qualifies them to command 3 or 4 bricks in a platoon level context.   Or should we combine the courses and, like the old ISCC, qualify all our junior leaders to take the reigns of Section Commander if need be - this would definitely be part of the "two levels up" mentality - although breaking it down into bite-size pieces may make for easier training of Corporals as junior leaders.

Infanteer
 
Because of the nature of Army.ca and internet forums in general, I can't really say that there is a set "purpose" to Infantry of tomorrow, although I am glad the discussion has been much more than a jumble of random thoughts.

My observations:

Most posters seem to agree that future Infantry units will be composed of smaller, or at least more flexible sub sub units to deal with the "three block war" scenario. I also advocate for the idea that the section and platoon is able to attack the enemy morale through flexible action, precision use of marksmanship and various weapons and manoeuvre as a supplement to shock assaults.

There is a great deal of debate concerning the actual composition of these sub sub units (sections, groups, bricks etc.) and how they should be led.

Lurking in the background are some doctrinal questions about the roles and nature of the Infantry. Mechanized, Motor and Light Infantry have been discussed, although there does not seem to be much consensus on these issues. This may be a result of the overall lack of direction in the CF.

Future technological developments such as PRR and robotic "assistants" will also drive the change of Infantry organization and tactics.

Trust Infanteeer to make us get back to work......

 
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