Unlike many reservists I've had the dubious distinction of having been part of dismounted rifle companies in 'combat'. During a few COIN style tours at any rate. Even then, there's no way I would consider myself 'good to go' without a work up period of some kind, of course. I don't doubt that many Reg F companies would be in the same boat.
That experience is why I pay attention when you say things. Mine in the seventies was different in that we rarely did or had time for "work up training". We all understood the concept of rehearsals but something like the six months of predeployment training for an op was a non starter. For the Octoberfest we just got on the bus and went. For the 1976 Olympics we did do some specialized training but that was the Olympics immediately after Munich so we were on edge. Battalions going to Cyprus did some work up but those of us on flyover status for either AMF/CAST or 4 CMBG did nothing in particular other than our ordinary training.
I know we all think of SOP per the last war but my thought is that the 6 months of predeployment training with a 6 month rotation model is probably not what the next major event for Canada's Army will look like. IMHO, we should be looking more at something in the nature of REFORGER operations with predeployed equipment and short notice flyover manning as the extreme end of the capability with something in the nature of routine and sustained Op Unifer and Latvia commitments as part of the day-to-day missions to prepare for. The latter ops have predeployment training time the former not so much.
This is where my thought process departs from what Canada's Army does. We seem to be in a rut where we believe we will always have time. And maybe I'm wrong and we always will. Let's face it we've had a tremendously long period of peace where our security as a nation or alliance hasn't been threatened. During the sixties to eighties we felt that the likelihood of having to go quickly was more real so we trained like we would and could. With 20/20 hindsight I'm not so sure that we could have, but at the time it felt like we could.
At the turn of the century the Army's tasking from the government was still to have an IRU light battalion on 10 days notice to move, a mechanized battlegroup on 21 days notice to move and a full mechanized brigade group on 90 days notice to move. LGen Jeffery, the CLS then, said we could do the first, would be challenged to do the second would be a challenge but achievable in six months. He was wishy washy on the brigade issue saying it depended on what you called a "brigade". A small one was doable but a full up brigade - nope - and even a smaller one had sustainment issues.
IMHO, this inability to "mobilize" substantial elements of even our RegF rapidly is a severe capability deficiency. I actually sometimes wonder if that's a real inability or an imagined one brought on by risk aversion. I have a hard time imagining that given a week or two you couldn't assemble a full-up equipped and manned brigade from the resources we have available. I'm not sure whether we have the ability to do the staff work and logistics required to launch it, but assembling it ... I'd be surprised if we couldn't do that.
Anyway that a long roundabout way to get me to my point. Reserves should be there for the big surprise events. And those come with shorter lead times than the low key routine ones. We spend all this money on an army to provide us with an ability to respond rapidly to big events - whether a flood, forest fire or war. We should aim for and build a force that can be called up with an acceptable amount of risk and that means certain levels of individual and group capabilities. Which brings me to:
Regardless, the 'next step', if there is one, should probably be to - first - confirm that the CAF expects the militia to field competent Coys/Sqns/Btys, and - next - set up the ability to develop these sub-units as an SOP as opposed to, what I was able to achieve a handful of times over a couple of decades, a few 'happy accidents'.
Fully agree. Over and over again we have had happy accidents like what ResF members did in the Medak pocket or in small groups during Afghanistan and the odd mortar platoon to Latvia but the overarching RegF leadership attitude is not to expect too much from the ResF beyond individual augmentees and to do nothing to build on those successes. There are dozens of things that could and ought to be done and I see some opportunity in F2025 in that but nowhere near enough.
Since I joined in 1965 I've watched the Army slowly die by a thousand cuts (and I don't mean financial; there's more money going into DND than ever before). Much of the gear is better and I think individually, the soldiers are every bit as good, but as a force, we are a shadow of our former selves and the slip to complete irrelevance is shorter than ever before. Something big needs doing. I don't see F2025 as it.
