daftandbarmy
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Informing the Army’s Future Structure
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I was not even thinking of that at the time -- the SEAL ASP had just been blown about 2 min after we landed and things where a little hectic - plus it was steak and lobster night at the DFAC (I do think the cooks were also on the fire staff - as the food wast tainted by Diesel and cold when I managed to get a meal). I've got some of a MRAP I was in that took an IED - and a pretty terrible shot of a SAM that was shot at another Blackhawk I was in -- I didn't know what it was at the time - at first I thought it was just a flare from another helo - but realized later by the pilots reactions/and corresponding flight pattern, and the crew chief doing a mad minute on his 240 that something was up)Pictures, should they exist, would be fun
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Good enough. So do we keep a civilian fleet for everyday use when no one is shooting at us? Or a military fleet that gets eaten up doing stuff for which it is overkill? Or do we do something else? Accept that the military solution is overkill but reserve it for "break the glass" scenarios and scatter them for use by reservists and qualified civilians?
We can't afford to replace large fleets of high-tech gear on the same two year schedule we used to use when buying Dodge Chargers. Brits, the Yanks and the Aussies can't afford it either. They are making adjustments and deciding what risks they can afford to take.
The Aussies are the least risk averse. The Brits have started one of their occasional major resets, to the chagrin of retired Colonels everywhere. The Yanks - Well if our Cyclone programme looks shaky we might want to look at any US vertical lift programme of the last 40 years and ask why the fleet still looks like Ronald Reagan's? As does the fleet of Tanks and APCs/IFVs and SPHs.
There was the Kiowa. Then there was the Comanche. Then there was the Arapaho. Then they were all scrapped and replaced with the 1980s vintage, 40 year old, Apache. And grandfather has replaced the handle, and the head, on that axe a number of times.
We have to work with what is given.
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FRP everyone and give the US DoD 15B a year then...
Either you get gear or you don't. Like the US CRAF - I would think it behooves Canada to offer incentives for local airlines/companies to use equipment that can be used to help the CF.
But we have just been arguing that the MILCOT was a terrible plan for the reserves and didn't offer any gains - so the idea that it would work for A/C to me is foolish.
My point would be - you can cascade the Griffons to the Reserve - when a new program kicks off -- but if you have enough airframe you don't need to run them ragged in peacetime.
If I was King, I would be linking in with the US FVL - and imbedding someone on their CFT -
I threw the 280 on the table due to the Bell hamstring you felt was good for the National Defence Industrial segment.
But IMHO that is a little risky if Bell gets kicked to the curb and the LMS option goes forward.
I'm not sure if you're being serious at this point -- but I'd argue virtually nothing is the same as under Reagan.
The difference is the Apache is still a first rate AH, and the Echo V6 is a long long long way ahead of even a Longbow D model.
Flying with V6 Apache: Supporting Today’s Missions to Prepare for Tomorrow’s Threats
“Fly, fight and survive.” This unofficial mantra of Apache aircrews is the ultimate goal when in combat and engaged in enemy fire, not only for themselves, but also for the ground soldiers the attack helicopter crews routinely support.
FJAG
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I was thinking more temperate climate conditions but don't disagree with your winter kit numbers.
As for guns, these cockamamie days a Reg F battery is 4 x M777 while a regiment is 8
(something that I strongly disagree with - it should be 6 and 18.)I've gone several different directions depending on whether the argument is based on current equipment; relatively possible future equipment; or pie-in-the-sky if I were king equipment.
In the first scenario there is a Reg F light, mech and armoured brigade supported by a hybrid combat support brigade. In the relatively possible future equipment scenario I would leave the Reg F light and mech brigades as is, realign the Reg F armoured brigade into two hybrid armoured brigades, convert the combat support brigade into a hybrid artillery brigade and realign the rest of the reserve force into a light brigade, a mech brigade, a hybrid manoeuvre enhancement brigade and a hybrid sustainment brigade.
Yeah. I was thinking minimal new facilities and the ability to draw on having squadron facilities collocated where a pool of reservists exist. Pet really sucks for that. That shouldn't stop the Wing HQ from moving to Pet but would leave the squadrons dispersed and instead of building new hangers would spend the cash on ATGMs instead.
Of course we both know that with our procurement system for helicopters we'd get neither before 2040.For 2030 - I'd be trying to find a Griffon replacement
FJAG
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No idea.
I wouldn't consider such a charter fleet as a viable alternative. It's far safer and easier to ferry a military flight or two out west for the odd exercise. Personally, once you remove the light battalion from 1 CMBG the need for aviation support in training becomes minimal. For an armoured brigade recce/attack helicopters are useful. I don't consider the Griffon a very viable recce helicopter (others may disagree) and we don't have attack helicopters so its a stretch at the best of times.
lenaitch
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Sorry, my earlier post was an incomplete thought - I had to go make dinner. Short of a national emergency where aircraft could be conscripted/leased/coerced, leasing private aircraft for year-to-year CAF domestic needs would probably limit itself to either leasing companies, such as Voyageur, and perhaps commercial carriers with some spare aircraft. I would think most of these would be inherently larger airframes, likely at least Twin Otter-ish size, which is probably great for capacity but the bigger the aircraft the more limited you get for suitable airfields. I suppose one advantage to using block leased fleets would be a degree of commonality for how the CAF personnel would use them, rather than trying to adapt plans and logistics to a wide variety of constantly changing airframes. At the smaller end, the Cessnas, Beavers, etc., the majority of the those are small fleets; sometimes fleets of one or two. Although more flexible in terms of where they can get into, they are typically VFR operations and often piloted by low-hour pilots getting their start in the industry.
Unless the goal would be to spurn a new private industry based on semi-permanent government contracts ('semi' in the sense that there will always be contracts, just rotating contractors), the small aircraft bush-and-gravel runway fleet is the lifeline of remote communities, outfitter tourism and resource exploration and I don't know how much spare capacity there would be without degrading these clients.
I imagine it is the same situation in the rotary world. Other than companies such as Canadian Helicopters, I don't get the sense that there is much lease capacity in other than light machines.
I have this imagine of a domestic CAF operation looking like an Oshkosh meet or a Gathering of the Classics.
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Lenaitch,
I would sooner the government bought a standardized fleet to be manned by part-time civilians and then sold off on a regular schedule. The fleet would then be renewed. Might even put a few Hercs in the mix.
Development up north is going to cost money. Something is going to have to be subsidized. Why not helicopters and aircraft?
I would sooner the government bought a standardized fleet to be manned by part-time civilians and then sold off on a regular schedule. The fleet would then be renewed. Might even put a few Hercs in the mix.
Development up north is going to cost money. Something is going to have to be subsidized. Why not helicopters and aircraft?
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Sort of a CRAF for the North? -- subsidize certain platforms for Canadian companies, with the agreement that those who partake do need to be willing to supply crews and craft if called up.
daftandbarmy
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To an enlightened CAF, I would agree, KevinB. The reality of all this (including the political reality) is that we won’t have tiltrotors anytime soon, well continue to have some type of Camada/Quebec/Mira-Bell product now and in the future, we won’t get anymore Chinooks, and there is no way in earth one could ever get a ‘civilian surge’ rotary-wing capability trained up on NVG and able to support even moderately opposed operations that would otherwise provide, to quote Battlestar Galactica, a rag tag (fugitive) fleet…
That why I stated earlier the best the Army can expect out of (rotary) aviation is a CoyGp…maybe (+) on a good day. Call it a BG (-… or even - -) if you want, but PRes and eqpt readiness and op avail levels will not realistically support more. Folks like to use max kit fleet sizes to plan ops, but that doesn’t happen…ever. I notice nobody is planning a BDE (X) armoured operation with ‘all of our’ 82 Leo2 A6M/A4M tanks.
Kirkhill, for the Yellowknife suggestion:
GR66
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If we're looking at what we'd like the Army to be capable of in the near to mid term within the constraints of what equipment we currently have (and what realistically we can hope to get in the current economic climate), here's what I'd hope to see:
1) The ability to independently deploy a credible military force (even if Light-weight) to a distant location within a reasonably quick period of time (days/weeks vs weeks/months). This could include anything from friendly, well supported environments like NATO Europe to austere environments like the Canadian Arctic.
2) The ability to contribute a heavier, high-intensity combat capable force as a contribution to a larger, allied force in case of a major conflict.
3) The ability to continue to contribute forces capable of partaking in stability/counter insurgency operations in cooperation with allied forces and host nation forces (including capacity building).
4) Our deployed forces should not have to rely on higher level allied formations for capabilities which should normally be present in the size of force we have deployed.
In terms of specific capabilities it might look something like this:
1 x Airborne Battle Group capable of deploying by C-130J (too few CC-177s to risk) to secure a forward air base/port/staging area - by air assault if required. This same Battle Groups should also have the ability/training to deploy from RCN ships by landing craft/helicopters to secure the objective from sea (not proposing the capability to conduct an opposed amphibious landing operation).
1 x Airborne-capable Engineer Squadron capable of improving a rough landing field for sustained operations by C-130J's/CC-177s.
1 x AD Regiment with the capability to provide layered air defence of the airport/sea port once secured (as opposed to the mobile SHORAD capabilities that would support the maneuver units). This unit should also be able to be deployed by C-130J.
1 x Light Brigade capable of deploying from the secured landing area and equipped with vehicles capable of being deployed by C-130J. This Brigade Group should have integrated light vehicle mounted AT, SHORAD and Indirect Fire elements.
1 x "Heavy" Mechanized Brigade Group equipped with Tanks and LAVs. Also with all required AT/AD/IF capabilities integrated
1 x Medium/Cavalry Brigade equipped with LAVs capable of a supporting Recce/Strike role in a high-intensity conflict as well as stability/counter insurgency/peace keeping roles.
Artillery (Gun/AD/Rocket) - both Reg Force and Reserves - other than the direct support Regiments attached to the "Heavy" and Light Brigade Groups to be grouped together in an Artillery Brigade.
Reserve Armour/Infantry would be re-organized to supply at least 1 x "Heavy" Brigade (initially set up to supply trained augmentees only to the Reg Force Heavy Brigade until such future time as equipment is acquired to be able to make the Reserve Brigade deployable) and 1 x Light Brigade with the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force Light Brigade.
Reserve Arctic Response Companies would be equipped with BV206's (or similar) and would be assigned direct affiliations with specific Arctic communities and their Ranger patrols. This would foster ongoing relationships and local knowledge for the Reserve units and create the opportunity for eventual expansion of the Reserve units to have actual satellite locations in these communities as they grow.
As for TacHel, I personally think the Griffon should eventually be upgraded to a larger, medium-lift helicopter. Maybe follow along with the US FVL program, or a common airframe as an eventual CH-149 replacement. Either option is likely quite a way out and outside a Force 2025/2030/2035 discussion. The good thing about the Griffon though is that it can be transported in our existing air transport fleet (1 in a C-130J or 3 in a CC-177 if I'm not mistaken). I wonder if maintaining this capability should be a goal. Even if we upgrade/upsize the Griffon fleet perhaps we should keep at least a squadron of light utility (ideally with an armed recce/gunship capability) that could be deployed by air in support of our Light Brigade.
1) The ability to independently deploy a credible military force (even if Light-weight) to a distant location within a reasonably quick period of time (days/weeks vs weeks/months). This could include anything from friendly, well supported environments like NATO Europe to austere environments like the Canadian Arctic.
2) The ability to contribute a heavier, high-intensity combat capable force as a contribution to a larger, allied force in case of a major conflict.
3) The ability to continue to contribute forces capable of partaking in stability/counter insurgency operations in cooperation with allied forces and host nation forces (including capacity building).
4) Our deployed forces should not have to rely on higher level allied formations for capabilities which should normally be present in the size of force we have deployed.
In terms of specific capabilities it might look something like this:
1 x Airborne Battle Group capable of deploying by C-130J (too few CC-177s to risk) to secure a forward air base/port/staging area - by air assault if required. This same Battle Groups should also have the ability/training to deploy from RCN ships by landing craft/helicopters to secure the objective from sea (not proposing the capability to conduct an opposed amphibious landing operation).
1 x Airborne-capable Engineer Squadron capable of improving a rough landing field for sustained operations by C-130J's/CC-177s.
1 x AD Regiment with the capability to provide layered air defence of the airport/sea port once secured (as opposed to the mobile SHORAD capabilities that would support the maneuver units). This unit should also be able to be deployed by C-130J.
1 x Light Brigade capable of deploying from the secured landing area and equipped with vehicles capable of being deployed by C-130J. This Brigade Group should have integrated light vehicle mounted AT, SHORAD and Indirect Fire elements.
1 x "Heavy" Mechanized Brigade Group equipped with Tanks and LAVs. Also with all required AT/AD/IF capabilities integrated
1 x Medium/Cavalry Brigade equipped with LAVs capable of a supporting Recce/Strike role in a high-intensity conflict as well as stability/counter insurgency/peace keeping roles.
Artillery (Gun/AD/Rocket) - both Reg Force and Reserves - other than the direct support Regiments attached to the "Heavy" and Light Brigade Groups to be grouped together in an Artillery Brigade.
Reserve Armour/Infantry would be re-organized to supply at least 1 x "Heavy" Brigade (initially set up to supply trained augmentees only to the Reg Force Heavy Brigade until such future time as equipment is acquired to be able to make the Reserve Brigade deployable) and 1 x Light Brigade with the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force Light Brigade.
Reserve Arctic Response Companies would be equipped with BV206's (or similar) and would be assigned direct affiliations with specific Arctic communities and their Ranger patrols. This would foster ongoing relationships and local knowledge for the Reserve units and create the opportunity for eventual expansion of the Reserve units to have actual satellite locations in these communities as they grow.
As for TacHel, I personally think the Griffon should eventually be upgraded to a larger, medium-lift helicopter. Maybe follow along with the US FVL program, or a common airframe as an eventual CH-149 replacement. Either option is likely quite a way out and outside a Force 2025/2030/2035 discussion. The good thing about the Griffon though is that it can be transported in our existing air transport fleet (1 in a C-130J or 3 in a CC-177 if I'm not mistaken). I wonder if maintaining this capability should be a goal. Even if we upgrade/upsize the Griffon fleet perhaps we should keep at least a squadron of light utility (ideally with an armed recce/gunship capability) that could be deployed by air in support of our Light Brigade.
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That sounds like every White Paper I've seen since the 1980s.
daftandbarmy
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That item alone would break the bank IMHO, unless we wanted to define 'light weight' as 'forlorn hope'
MilEME09
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Every white paper that we haven't fully implemented
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Got your attention.
Semi-serious.
Do I expect the CAF to establish a "proper" (personal opinion) operational presence in our north? No,
Would I like one? Yes.
And the reference to Fairbank and Thule is as a basis of comparison. Hardship postings or not people are living and working in comparable places.
Do I think Canada should be able to establish a Brigade Maintenance Area in Yellowknife (Or Churchill) and support a dispersed force of 47 platoons, even Perrin Beatty's Vital Point Guards at the North Wng Installations, half a dozen company teams at the FOLs, Alert and Churchill, a pair of Battle groups at Yellowknife (QRF and Base Defence) and the 200 or so Ranger Patrols? Yes.
Or is that a Div Maintenance Area?
And the dominant characteristic of the force is the need for navigation, communication, logistics support (fuel, shelter, water, food, transport), sensors, VVSHORAD GBAD and Small Arms to defend against small groups of lightly armed attackers equipped with UAVs, possibly operating in swarms. Attackers likely arriving by air and atv, possibly small boat.
Personally I am becoming more enamoured of Churchill as a point of focus.
It has existing infrastructure (air, sea and rail) that needs to be refurbished. It is centrally located being equidistant from both Yellowknife and Kuujuaq, meaning it can cast into both the western and eastern arctic. Hooks from Petawawa pushed forwards to there could cast to Resolute, the Barrens and the entire Boreal Forest. And with the railway, troops in rotation there could get down to Winnipeg for R&R. As could the locals.
What I am trying to get at, in all these posts, is that Canada itself needs defending. And that that should be the first focus rather than the last.
For too long we have assumed, been told, that it is a lost cause to defend Canada. Too few people. Too much land.
But in 1871, when the Brits left John A to his own devices and abandoned Kingston and Quebec, Sir John did four things, with fewer people.
He established his own artillery garrisons at Kingston and Quebec. He raised and despatched a small force of soldiers to deploy in permanent small detachments. He established an east-west line of communication across the ground held by that small group of soldiers (riflemen, policemen, constables). In parallel with the railway he established a telegraph system for "instant" communications.
Some others have looked north, Diefenbaker comes to mind, and lots of westerners. But the centre of gravity has never moved from Montreal. The Radio and the Aircraft were supposed to "modernize" the north. The Golden Era of the Bush Pilot. But that stalled. Along with the multiple attempts by Rupert's Land interests to revive the Hudson's Bay route. A route that created wealth for the HBC and for their local traders, the Cree. A route that was killed when the ships stopped coming to York Factory and then the Fur Trade was killed.
I would like to at least change the focus. To the north. To Resolute. To Yellowknife. To Churchill. And the 2-300 communities scattered across land that could be used to generate a lot of wealth for all of us.
We need to protect ourselves from leaving openings for our enemies, real and imagined, to exploit assymetrically. And before the shooting starts. At the same time we need to be able to respond when the shooting starts.
And once we have got all that done then we can go looking for fights where we can help out our friends, or at least discomfit or enemies.
(Your fault G2G!)
In terms of detail.
Churchill, NATO, shipping, railway, icebreakers, northern focus.
The Port of Churchill: Frozen Out?
In the first of a new series on Canada's North, Paul Pryce discusses the precarious situation of Manitoba's northern port - and what can be done to save it.
natoassociation.ca
How about, at least, running regular deployment exercises to Churchill of 2 Expeditionary Wing from Bagotville, 450 squadron, 408 Squadron from Edmonton and a rotation of the Light Infantry Battalions. Have them run security exercises at VPs and QRF exercises throughout the North. Bring the AOPSs into Churchill and have them shadow land based excursions up the coasts. etc.
WRT civilians wearing NVGs. Nope. But they don't have to. We have you military guys to do that. When and if the bullets start flying.
Civilians could handle the logistic support to distributed communities, ranger patrols and VP platoons when there are no bullets.
And that logistic support could be put to use in the event of civil emergencies. Especially if a portion of the people operating that support are short field qualified, and have access to EO/IR devices, good nav support and good comms, and bladders for water and fuel and such ...
And making such a fleet of aircraft, and ATVs available to civilians from the public purse, doesn't have to be impossible.
Openly subsidized government hardware to support community economic development.
I could add in the leased fleet of oil cars.
Or the "hidden" subsidies for rail, ship-building, building aircraft, operating airlines.
We might as well get something tangible out of those hidden investments. Buy actual planes.
Yes small aircraft are preferred in the civilian market. Which to me makes the Valor an interesting civilian prospect for puddle jumping from community to community with small cargoes. And with that production base make some available to the Air Force.
But delivering fuel and a village worth of rations needs something bigger, but short field compatible. Something to replace/supplement ice-roads and seasonal barges. Which are also subsidized. Why not subsidize the operation of "uneconomical" Hercs by local operators. In Government of Canada colours.
Yep. I know I dream in techni-color TM.
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And the one closest to "reality" in terms of needs was 1987. Too bad history ended and the world changed.
Funny though. When I re-read that strategic assessment the only thing I would change would be some of the numbers and replace the word Russia with China as the champion of the anti-democratic East. The European maps have to change as well.
Edit - and GR66s solution sounds a lot like Perrin Beatty's.
A Div HQ and a Brigade in Europe (Mech)
2 Medium Brigades in Canada for reinforcement of Europe.
1 Lt Brigade (SSF) for defence of Canada.
An Air Force as big as the Regular Army (20,000 each) with a Navy of 10,000.
A Reserve Force of 90,000 equipped with Bv206s and Bisons with capabilities ranging from armed security guards for Vital Points (like the NWR radar sites), enhanced existing militia units, 10/90 battalions. Oh yeah. And the ADATs/SkyShield GBAD.
All really shot down by the inclusion of 12 nasty nuclear powered submarines.
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Kirkhill, I seriously doubt we’ll do much about NWS station security…especially if the PIN-3 mystery fire at Lady Franklin Point is any indicator.
Just an unforeseen fire, folks. Nothing to see here.
Just an unforeseen fire, folks. Nothing to see here.
MilEME09
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I think any permanent arctic presence is out of the question, that said I do believe we should develop the infrastructure to rapidly deploy to the arctic. Especially given climate change is making the far north more open, we need to be able to rapidly respond to shipping disasters, etc...
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As I said, just like Frank, in Techi-Color.
But I seem to recall the Canadian Army developing a plan to invade the US back in the 20s or 30s. Not because there was a hopinhel of it being put into play but because it might come in handy some time in the future.
It seems to me that the Forces could at least expend some energy in developing credible plans and capabilities for the North. And defence of NWR sites seems to be at least a credible basis for planning exercises. At least as credible as chasing Fantasians around Wainwright.
